

Part-A : Commentary on Jaina Learning

LESSON-1

ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE SCHOLARLY COMMENTARY ON JAINA LEARNING

Since the dawn of human culture, knowledge has been a subject of discussion. Every civilization, every culture has undoubtedly acknowledged the significance of knowledge. In the perspective of the history of religion and philosophy, the thinking over the existence of religion goes far to the ancient times. In Jaina Philosophy, there has been a detailed discussion on knowledge. On the basis of the available literature related to religion, it can be said with ample proof that in Jaina philosophy, aphorisms like *Nandi* etc. have been composed merely on the commentary of knowledge. In other philosophies, a book discussing pure knowledge is not yet available.

1.1 Discussion on Knowledge Prior to Scriptures

Scriptures have a pride of place in Jaina religion. Of the books of Jaina literature available at present, scriptures are the oldest. There is an account of the principle of knowledge in those scriptures but there is evidence that such an account was found in the texts even prior to scriptures. In the book *Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya* a tale has been narrated in the reference of knowledge, which has been recognized as a prior tale by the commentator and mendicant.

It is believed that there was an early canon that was prior even to Lord Mahāvīra and that is now destroyed. In that early canon, there was a pre-canon entitled *Jñāna Pravāda* in which there was an account of five kinds of knowledge. Both the *Digambara* and *Śvetāmbara* sects admit this fact. In the texts related to karma that are supposed to be very old there is a division of the natures of the knowledge-obscuring *karma* on the basis of five kinds of knowledge. The concept relating to karma is certainly the remaining tradition of the canon of the flow of *karma*, that has now disappeared. There is an account of them in a subsidiary canon as old as. In the text there is a discussion only on five kinds of knowledge. In the vocables that are available and that are supposed to be very old there is a clear description of the five kinds of knowledge. The benedictory prologue of the ancient expiatory text like has been done with five kinds of knowledge. Its existence is proved by the aphorism related to the royal question even prior to Lord Mahāvīra. The author has put the following sentences in the mouth of Keśīkumāra, a disciple of Lord Pārśvanātha-

*Evam kku paesi amham samañānam niggarāhānam pañcavihe nāne paññatte,
Tam jahā ābhijñābohiyanāne, suyanāne, ohināne, mañapajjavanāne, kevalnāne ii*

From this quotation it is clear that according to the compiler of this text, the monks even prior to Lord Mahāvīra recognized. Their assumption is not baseless. From the dialogue between Keśī and Guatam in the 23rd chapter of *Uttarādhyayana*, it is clear that Lord Mahāvīra had made some slight amendments in the principles regarding conduct in the tradition of Lord Pārśvanātha but had not made major amendments in his basic ideology. From all this discussion it is clear that Lord Mahāvīra did not originate the thinking of, but continued the tradition that was going on from the olden times.

1.2 Knowledge in the period of scriptures


By observing the order of development of the discussion of knowledge in the perspective of the scriptural literature we come to know the following three things :

1. At the first stage, knowledge has been divided in only five kinds.

2. At the second stage, knowledge has been divided into two kinds-Direct and Indirect. The first two kinds-sensory knowledge (*mati jñāna*) and vocable knowledge (*śruta jñāna*) have been acknowledged as indirect knowledge and clairvoyance (*avadhi jñāna*), telepathy (*manaḥ paryaya jñāna*) and omniscience(*kavala jñāna*) have been regarded as direct knowledge. At this stage only the knowledge that is related to soul has been regarded as direct knowledge. The knowledge originated from senses has been regarded as indirect knowledge. The sensory knowledge that was regarded as direct knowledge by all the other philosophers, remained indirect knowledge in Jain tradition.

3. At the third stage, sensory knowledge has been acknowledged both as direct and indirect knowledge. This is so because of the popular belief.


We get the account of the knowledge at the first stage in the scripture *Bhagavatī Sūtra*. In this book knowledge has been divided into five parts. It can be explained with the help of the following chart --



In the text, instruction has been given to supplement the remaining parts from the text *Rājaprasnīya Sūtra* stating the two kinds of apprehension apart from the kinds mentioned above. The meaning of all this discussion is that in spite of the remaining account being in accordance with, the difference is that at this stage, there is no account of the direct and indirect kinds mentioned in the beginning of *Naridī Sūtra* and at this stage there is no account of the arrived perception based on verbal symbol and perception based on non-verbal symbol at this stage. On this basis it can be said that this is an account of the ancient stage.

Discussion on knowledge in the canon *Sīhanāṛiga Sūtra* represents the second stage.

In this canon, two distinctions of knowledge direct and indirect have been made and the five kinds of knowledge are merged into these two kinds. In this text, there is an account mainly of two kinds, not of five. This, clearly, is the development of the first stage.



On the basis of this very classification, ācārya Umāswāmī has divided the organ of knowledge into two parts direct and indirect and merged the five kinds into them. Later on Jaina thinkers divided the direct knowledge into two parts total (whole, ldy) and deficient (inadequate, fody). The basis of this qualification too is the division made in the text perfect knowledge and 3rd and 4th cognitions.

The basis of the 3rd scriptural stage of the order of development of the discussion on knowledge is the discussion on this topic in *Nandī Sūtra*

Knowledge

1. deliberate 2. vocable 3. clairvoyance 4. telepathy 5. omniscience

direct		indirect	
sensory perception	quasi-sense perception	deliberate	vocable
		perception based on verbal symbol	perception based on non-verbal symbol
1. perception by the sense of hearing	1. clairvoyance.	1. apprehension (a) apprehension	1. intellect of instantaneous comprehension
2. perception by the sense of seeing	2. telepathy.	(b) indistinct apprehension	2. born of faithful service
3. perception by the sense of smell	3. omniscience.	2. speculation.	3. developed by practical experience
4. perception by the sense of taste		3. perceptual Judgment	4. intellect of mature experience
5. perception by the sense of touch (skin)		4. retention	

In the text knowledge has first of all been divided into five parts and then these five parts have been merged into two divisions direct and indirect. These two divisions are sensory perception and quasi-sense perception. Under sensory perception there is a mention of the knowledge gained with the help of the five senses and under quasi-sense perception come clairvoyance, telepathy and omniscience. Deliberate and vocable knowledge have been acknowledged under indirect knowledge. Perception based on verbal symbol and perception based on non-verbal symbol are the two kinds of indirect deliberate. There are four kinds of perception based on verbal symbol apprehension, speculation, perceptual judgement and retention; four kinds of intellect intellect of instantaneous comprehension, intellect born of faithful service, intellect developed by practical experience and intellect of mature experience fall under perception based on non-verbal symbol. The speciality of this division is that sensory knowledge has been accepted under both direct and indirect knowledge. Such a division has not been made at the two stages mentioned above. All the philosophies other than the Jaina one have regarded knowledge gained by the five senses as direct knowledge. Keeping this co-ordination in view, Jaina ācārya Jinabhadra has made it clear that sensory direct should be termed as practical direct. The conclusion is that sensory knowledge but because of practical utility it has been said to be direct. Real directs are only clairvoyance, telepathy and omniscience. Only the knowledge that relates to only soul from the point of view of direct non-sensory perception is direct knowledge. From the discussion given above, it is clear that

1. Clairvoyance, telepathy and omniscience are direct non-sensory perceptions.
2. Vocabable knowledge is indirect knowledge.
3. Sensory knowledge gained with the five senses is indirect from the point of view of direct non-sensory perception and direct from the point of view of practical utility.
4. Psychic sensory knowledge is indirect.

1.3 Liberty of the discussion on knowledge

The peculiarity of all these three scriptural stages in the gradual development of the discussion on the five kinds of knowledge is that no co-ordination with the discussion on the organ of knowledge popular in other philosophies has been made in them. Knowledge has been regarded as right or wrong, taking into consideration the candidate. The purpose of the instrument of valid cognition and of invalid cognition in the scriptural period was served by using the adjectives right and wrong with the word knowledge. Adjectives like valid or invalid have not been used in this period but the first three kinds of knowledge sensory, vocable and clairvoyance have been acknowledged as right or wrong keeping the knower in view.

2.1.0 Development of thinking regarding knowledge

In Jaina tradition the development of thinking regarding knowledge took place in two different directions : practice in the philosophy of one's own and practice in the philosophy other than one's own. In the first direction, no attempt is made to adopt the definitions of the persons believing in philosophies other than one's own, nor their opinion is contradicted. In the second direction attempt is made to assimilate the definitions of the philosophies other than one's own, their views are sometimes contradicted and meaningless talks are also resorted to. When we study the development of Jaina ideology regarding knowledge, we come across its many historical stages in Jaina Literature.

The stages of development of knowledge from the scriptural period to Jinabhadraṇī Kṣamāśramaṇ can be divided into six parts. The seventh stage may be the one developed by the acharyas that came later.

Order of the stages-1. pertaining to the ideology of *karma* and the scriptural period, 2. pertaining to *prākṛta* commentary, 3. pertaining to exposition, 4. pertaining to ascertained reals, 5. related to siddhasena, 6. related to Jinabhadra and 7. related to the ācāryās that came later.

2.1.1 The stage pertaining to the philosophy of *karma* and the scriptural period : At this stage the names of all the five kinds are found and the kinds and the sub-kinds of the knowledge gained by the practice of the philosophy of one's own are also thought over somewhere near these names.

2.1.2 Commentary on the knowledge pertaining to *prākṛta* Commentary : *prākṛta* commentaries are regarded as the first expatiation of scriptures. There is an account of the five kinds of knowledge in the part of the *prākṛta* commentary that is supposed to be belonging to the second *vikram* century. Apart from the words like sensory and deliberate, many synonyms like instinct (*saṃjñā*), and memory etc. and the two kinds of knowledge-direct and indirect are also found in it. This classification is the indicator more or less of the practice of the other philosophies.

2.1.3 The stage pertaining to exposition : *Anuyogadwāra Sūtra* that is supposed to be belonging to the second of *vikram* century, contains four organs of knowledge of the *Nyāya Sūtra* having some steps and a collection of the kinds and the sub-kinds of the inference relating to them and which is an evidence beyond any doubt of the practice of the philosophies other than one's own. Ārya Rakṣit has made an attempt first of all of bringing the famous section of organ of knowledge and the definitions of *Nyāya* philosophy into the sphere of Jaina thinking even while presenting the five kinds of knowledge in his famous work.

2.1.4 The stage pertaining to ascertained reals : The fourth stage of the development of knowledge is found in the scripture and its self-composed commentary. This is a work of the third *vikram* century. The commentator has given an account of direct and indirect organ of knowledge expounded by *prākṛta* commentary and shown indifference to the four-fold section pertaining to the philosophy of *Nyāya* acknowledged in. The result of this idea of the commentator was that no scholar (logician) coming next gave any thought to the four-fold organ of knowledge, thought to the four-fold organ of knowledge pertaining to the philosophy of *Nyāya* got a permanent place in the scriptures like *Bhagavatī* that are regarded as the supreme evidence because of

Ārya Rakṣit Sūri, a reputed and established disquisitionist being once admitted in the Jaina vocable. The commentator has included the evidences like the famous inference and implication in the commentaries other than philosophy. Such an attempt was not made by anyone prior to this.

2.1.5 Thinking of knowledge pertaining to Siddhasena : Siddhasena Diwākar, the famous philosopher, is a bright gem in the field of logic. He has presented many issues worthy of consideration in the field of knowledge by his extra-ordinary talent. He was a scholar of the fifth *vikram* century. In the sphere of knowledge he presented many extra-ordinary things. No one would have ever thought of them in Jaina tradition before. The main points of the commentary on knowledge presented by Siddhasena Diwākar can be divided into four parts.

1. The real unity of sensory and vocable knowledge. According to Siddhasena, sensory knowledge and vocable knowledge are not two different things. There is no sense in treating them as two separate entities.
2. Basically there is no difference between clairvoyance and telepathy. According to Siddhasena, there is no need of treating them as two different things. The purpose is served when even one of them is acknowledged.
3. There is no difference between omniscience and the philosophy of omniscience. Siddhasena Diwākar didn't admit their separate entities and gave solid argument in support of his view of non-differentia between the two.
4. Siddhasena Diwākar has admitted non-difference between the philosophy of faith and knowledge too. By presenting these four novel ideas, Siddhasena Diwākar has thrown a new light on the ancient line of difference and non-difference between knowledge.

There was a great controversy in Jaina tradition over these new ideas. Ācārya Diwākar has presented his original and revolutionary ideas in books like. By writing *Nyāyāvatāra*, he has presented an entirely new idea in the field of organ of knowledge too.

2.1.6 Commentary on knowledge pertaining to Jinabhadra : Ācārya Jinabhadraṇī Kṣamāśramaṇa has made a valuable contribution in the field of the development of knowledge. Ācārya Kṣamāśramaṇa has given a detailed commentary on knowledge, in his mammoth work *Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya* with the help of the commentary from the period of scriptures upto his time. There are 840 tales in from the book alone. In his book Jinabhadraṇī has presented an all entire and logical account of the five-fold knowledge based on the scriptures. This developmental stage of Ācārya Kṣamāśramaṇa can be better called the scriptural stage dependent on logic. All his force of logic can be seen tied up in the limits of scriptures. He has very systematically presented all the matter related to knowledge in his ambitious work that serves as a basis for all the writers of books belonging to the *Śvetāmbara* sect of the Jainaas.

2.1.7 Commentary on knowledge presented by the Acharyas coming next to Jinabhadra : Some distinguished Ācāryas coming next to Śrī Jinabhadraṇī Kṣamāśramaṇa have made a significant contribution to the field of knowledge. Ācārya Akalaṅk, Vidyānaṇḍ, Hemcaṇḍra and Upādhyāya Yaśovijay are some of them. Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka has made a many sided contribution to the development of the ideas of knowledge. Three of his attempts are particularly remarkable :

The first can be said to be the reflection of *Tattvārthasūtrānusaṛī* and the second can be said to be the reflection of *Nyāyāvatāra* written by Siddhasena Diwākar. The third attempt is in the form of *Laghīyastrayī* and more specially in *Pramāṇa Saṅgraha*. It is his original work. In his books *Aṣṭasahasrī* and *Pramāṇa Mīmāṃsā* etc. too knowledge and the organ of knowledge have been discussed in detail. Upādhyāya Yaśovijay has presented the essence of the entire commentary on knowledge available upto that time in his ambitious

works etc. Solution of many debatable issues from many points of view is also found in his books. Besides, many new ideas relating to knowledge have also been included in his work *Jñāna Bindu Prakaraṇa* that are not found in his earlier works.

For example he has compared apprehension etc. to the parts of cause and business etc. that are found in philosophies like *Nyāya* etc. Many Ācāryās have contributed largely in bringing about changes and refinement in the commentary on knowledge. The thing to be noted is that the basic scriptural form and kinds of knowledge have nowhere been disturbed or distorted.

2.2 Discussion on the organ of knowledge in Jaina Scriptures

Commentary on knowledge originated and developed in Jaina tradition from the practice of the philosophy of the self. From the account found in scriptures it is clear that organ of knowledge was not mixed up with knowledge. Not that the Jaina Ācāryās were ignorant of the discussion on organ of knowledge going around them, but it is certain that they arrived a bit late in the field of the organ of knowledge. When the form of organ of knowledge got stable and clear to the philosophies other than the Jaina philosophy, Jaina philosophers too began to wonder as to what should be considered as an organ of knowledge. In the attempt of solving this problem, knowledge itself took the form of organ of knowledge. Ācārya Ārya-rakṣita discussed the organ of knowledge first of all in his book. He has interpreted the organs of knowledge as the kinds of organs of knowledge and quality. The other philosophers acknowledged four organs of knowledge: direct organ etc. Āryarakhita made it clear that these organs of knowledge are conative. This expatiation makes this thing also clear that in Jaina tradition, close proximity with senses, factors causing entirety and the attitude of senses cannot be the organs of knowledge. Siddhasena and all the philosophers have given an account of knowledge to a certainty while describing the characteristic of the organ of knowledge. Description of the organ of knowledge is found independently from the account of knowledge in Jaina scriptures. However, sometimes we find the description of four organs of knowledge approved by the philosophers of *Nyāya* and others, in reference to the discussion regarding the organs of knowledge.

At some places there is a mention of three organs of knowledge. Their mention is found in the dialogue between Lord Mahāvīra and Gautama Gaṇadhara in *Bhagavatī Sūtra* too. From all this account it seems likely that the writers of these books regarded the organ of knowledge too an independent means like the knowledge approved by self in. In the book the word (logical reason) has been used in place of (organ of knowledge). From all this discussion it is clear that the Jaina authors in the scriptural period have not done independent thinking from Jainaa point of view in the section of organ of knowledge, only the collection of the ideas of the other famous philosophers is found in their works. However, by the time Umāswātī appears, an independent form of the tradition of organ of knowledge from the point of view of Jaina philosophy is expounded. In the works of the Ācāryās coming next, discussion on the organ of knowledge has been an important topic for consideration.

Doctrine of viewpoint in Jaina philosophy occupies a unique place. In the scriptural literature, element has been expatiated many times from substantive and modal standpoints. Gautama asks Lord Mahāvīra, O Lord, please tell me whether living being is eternal or non-eternal. The Lord addresses Gautama and says, O Gautama, living being is eternal in comparison to matter and non-eternal in comparison to mode. According to Jaina philosophy matter is of infinite nature, and the very matter has been acknowledged as the subject of organ of knowledge. The quality of being of infinite nature can be realized by destructional knowledge only that is the form of omniscience. The knowledge of even non-omniscient has been regarded as right knowledge in both the traditions scripture and philosophy. In such a situation an order of the doctrine of qualified assertions and seven-fold predication has been established so that the things may be known. When organ of knowledge came to be discussed in the world of philosophy, it seems likely that Jaina philosophers too had to enter this field. In spite of accepting the organ of knowledge they did not neglect standpoints but presented them in a

novel way. But it is clear that in the field of, the system of standpoints of the Jaina scholars is very old and original and the system of organ of knowledge originated because of the circumstances. Scholars are of the view that knowledge has been admitted prominently by the Jaina ideology but the atmosphere when discussion on the organ of knowledge prevailed attracted the attention of the Jaina scholars with the result that some new installations developed. It was Ācārya Umāswāti who first of all talked of independent Jaina organ of knowledge. Knowledge itself was transformed into an organ of knowledge. After that the tradition of the organ of knowledge went on flourishing. Ācārya Umāswāti didn't forget the system of standpoints that was prevalent in the reference of the concept of the matter that can be known. He accepted both the organ of knowledge and stand point as a means of attainment of the matter.

Upto the scriptural period there was the predominance of the commentary on knowledge. The concept of organ of knowledge came later in the period of philosophy. The two main Ācāryās who introduced it are Ācārya Āryarakṣita and Ācārya Umāswāti. Ācārya Āryarakṣita introduced *anuyoga* with the aphorism of five-fold knowledge. He has discussed the organ of knowledge under the organ of knowledge and attribute. The conclusion of all this discussion is that the original basis of the commentary on the organ of knowledge is the commentary on knowledge. Ācārya Umāswāti has first discussed the five-fold knowledge and then composed the aphorism that knowledge itself is the organ of knowledge.

This is undoubtedly true that in no other philosophy has knowledge been discussed and commented on in such a detailed way as in Jaina philosophy. In books like *Nandī*, *Viśeṣāwśyaka Bhāṣya*, *Śaṭkhaṇḍāgama*, *Kaṣāyapākuḍa*, *Jñānbindu prakaraṇa* etc., knowledge has been represented in detail.

According to Jaina commentary on knowledge, there are two kinds of knowledge direct and indirect. These kinds or sections are of the later period. In the ancient times, knowledge had been divided into five parts. There were no parts as direct and indirect. The use of direct knowledge along with the organ of knowledge is found in almost all the Indian ideologies. The word *ĕindirectī* is not found in any other ideology except Jaina philosophy. The concept and the use of the word *ĕindirectī* is a significant contribution of the Jaina scriptural period. Both deliberate and vocable knowledge do not know the object that can be known directly, hence they have been regarded as indirect knowledge. In the period of philosophy or in the period when organ of knowledge was commented on, the word indirect knowledge¹ has been used in the sense of ambiguous knowledge. There has been an expansion in the meaning of the word *ĕindirectī* in the scriptural period (the period when philosophical ideas prevailed).

QUESTIONS

Essay Type Question :

1. Explain the concept of direct and indirect knowledge and discuss the origin and development of Jaina commentary on knowledge.

Short Answer Type Question :

1. How many stages are there of the development of the concept of knowledge? Represent any one of them in your own words.

or

Expatiate in brief the antiquity of the Jaina commentary of knowledge.

Objective type questions :

1. The assumption of the five-fold knowledge was prevalent among monks even prior to Lord Mahāvīra. From the quotation of which scriptural text is this statement realized-
 (A) *Acārāṅga* (B) *Rāja Praśanīya*
 (C) *Samvāyāṅga* (D) *Uttarādhyaṇa*.

2. The oldest literature to expatiate the principle of knowledge is
 (A) Scriptural Literature. (B) *Bhāṣya* Literature.
 (C) Literature of *Prākṛta* Commentary. (D) Early Canons.
3. A kind of direct non-sensory perception is
 (A) Sensory knowledge. (B) Vocable knowledge.
 (C) Omniscience. (D) Perception based on verbal symbol.
4. Scriptural literature is a kind of
 (A) Sensory knowledge. (B) Vocable knowledge.
 (C) Clairvoyance. (D) Omniscience.
5. Kinds of indirect knowledge are
 (A) Sensory knowledge and vocable knowledge.
 (B) Sensory knowledge and clairvoyance.
 (C) Vocable knowledge and telepathy.
 (D) Vocable knowledge, clairvoyance and omniscience.
6. Direct non-sensory perceptions are
 (A) Sensory knowledge, vocable knowledge, clairvoyance.
 (B) Vocable knowledge, clairvoyance, omniscience.
 (C) Clairvoyance, telepathy, omniscience.
 (D) Sensory knowledge, clairvoyance, telepathy.
7. For the purpose of study, the stages of the development of the ideology of knowledge have been divided into-
 (A) Seven parts. (B) Eight parts.
 (C) Nine parts. (D) Ten parts.
8. According to Jaina philosophy, the meaning of the word *anekānta* is
 (A) There being many objects. (B) The object being of infinite natures.
 (C) The object being inherent. (D) Existence of an object having proof.
9. The organ of knowledge was first of all discussed by-
 (A) Jinabhadraṇī Kṣanāśramaṇa (B) Ācārya Āryarakṣita *Anuyogadwār*
 (C) Umāswātī in *Tattvārth Sūtra* (D) Upādhyāya Yaśovijay in *Jñāna Bindu Prakaraṇ*'.
10. The work expounding the discussion on the organ of knowledge by Siddhasena Diwākara is-
 (A) *Jñāna Bindu Prakaraṇ* (B) *Viśeṣāwaśyaka Bhāṣya*
 (C) *Laghīyastraī* (D) *Nyāyāvatāra Sūtra*

Reference Books :

1. *Jaina Darśana; Manana aur Meemāṃsā* : Ācāryaśrī Mahāprajña.
2. *Jaina Dharma aur Darshan* : Dr. Mohan Lāl Mehtā.
3. *Jñāna Bindu Prakaraṇ* : Pt. Sukhlālji Sanghvī.
4. *Nandī Sūtra* : Intepreter Ācāryaśrī Mahāprajña..

Author : Samani Maṅgalprajña

M.A. J (P)/IV/8

LESSON-2

JÑĀNA (KNOWLEDGE) AND JÑEYA (OBJECT OF KNOWLEDGE)

Relation between Subject and the Object

We know that knowledge is a function of consciousness, that is, the soul. Now, we shall try to know what sort of function it is. In other words we shall try to find out how a subject comes in relation with the object, which is the problem of epistemology proper.

The relation between subject and object presupposes the existence of both the factors. But, the Indian as well as the Western systems hold different views regarding it. Some of them hold subject as the only reality, while others resort to the object only. There are others who hold both of them as real or unreal. The second point of controversy is, whether the subject is related with the object directly or through a *via media*. Amongst the Indian systems epistemology follows metaphysics. First, they fix up a particular notion regarding the nature of universe and then explain the subject-object relation in consonance with their metaphysical conceptions.

The Nature of Object

1. The *Advaita Vedānta* holds that external objects do not exist independent of the subject. They are illusory projections subsisting in the latter. The subject has a real existence while the object has phenomenal existence.
2. The *Yogācāra* maintains that the object does not exist at all. The subject itself appears into the two forms of subject and object.
3. The *Mādhyaṃika* holds that the subject and object both are phenomenal.
4. The realistic systems on the other hand, hold independent and a real existence of both the subject as well as object. But, they also hold divergent views regarding their actual nature. According to the Buddhist the object is absolutely particular without any mixture of generality which is purely subjective. According to *Sāṃkhya* it is general. The others hold it as a combination of both. The Jaina holds that the object exists independent of the subject and possesses the characteristics of generality as well as particularity relatively.

Objections against Idealism

The main objection against the idealist system is this, that the apparent diversity in cognition cannot be explained without diversity in the objects. If the objects do not exist at all or do not possess real existence, where from this diversity comes? The example of dream also cannot explain it; because, the dreams are not absolutely unconnected with the objective reality. The world of dream is composed of only these objects as are already experienced. The only difference is that they appear in the relations different from their real existence. The past impressions also cannot explain this diversity as the diversity in impressions also must have some cause behind it. Ultimately, we shall have to admit some external cause responsible for diverse cognitions and impressions.

Further, we observe a lot of difference between the subjective and the objective appearances. The appearances of pleasure pain etc. is subjective. It differs with the subject. No two persons feel alike. But, the appearance of jar, i.e. objective appearance is one and the same, in spite of the difference in cognisers. Objective appearance changes with the change of object. The subjective appearance, on the other hand, changes with the change of subjects. The idealist cannot explain this difference between the two appearances.

The Jaina is an empiricist. He holds that everything that is apprehended must have objective existence. He differs from the realistic Buddhism also, which holds the notion of class as merely conceptual. On the other hand he discards the *Sāṅkhya* view also, which holds the notion of particularity as merely conceptual. The *Jaina* holds that the aspect of generality and particularity, both are real and objective. Both of them exist in each and every object.

Relation between object and knowledge

Now, we come to the question of relation between the two. According to the *Advaita Vedānta* the object is related with the subject through the mode of *antaḥkāraṇa* goes out through the medium of senses and transforms itself into the form of object. This mode of *antaḥkāraṇa* destroys the obscuring *ajñāna*, lying with the consciousness conditioned by the object. This results into the appearance of jar which was projected by *avidyā*.

According to *Yogācāra* this relation means appearance of the subject in the form of object.

Amongst realists the *Sautrāntika* and *Sāṅkhya* are the advocates of representation theory. The *Sautrāntika* holds that *Jñāna* takes the form of object. This he calls *tadākārātā* (coordination). Thus, cognition of jar means the coordination of jar by *jñāna*. The latter does not reach the object directly, but gets its coordination and can infer the existence of object, through it. The *Sāṅkhya* holds that the object is reflected into the mode of *buddhi*. Cognition means the apprehension of that reflection only. In the *vr̥tti* of *Vedānta* the contact with the object is real. In the case of *Sāṅkhya* it is merely a reflection. Thus, the *buddhi* is not able to reach the object directly.

The other realistic systems do not believe in the theory of representation. They hold that the object is presented to the subject directly. But, the presentation is not one and the same in all systems.

The Nyāya View

(1) The presentation according to *Nyāya* means physical grasping. The term *upalabdhi* used by Gautama, Vātsyāyana and Vācaspati signifies the idea. Udayana has substituted it by *paricchitti* (measuring) which also denotes the same thing. The *Nyāya* is very particular about its theory of contact. Cognition means the contact of the soul with the object through mind. The soul, according to *Nyāya* is all-pervading. It is always in contact with the objects far and near. But, that kind of contact is not sufficient for cognition. The contact that results into cognition must be through the mind. The soul is united with the mind, the mind with the senses, and the senses with the object. Thus, in the case of perception it is a four-fold contact. In the case of feelings it is two-fold, i.e. the soul is united with the mind. But, the contact between senses and the object is not same in all the cases. In the perception of a substance it is unity (*saṃyoga*). In the perception of *guṇās* it is united-inherence (*saṃyukta-samavāya*). In the case of generality existing in the *guṇās* it is united-inherent-inherence (*saṃyukta-samaveta-samavāya*). In the cognition of sound it is inherence. In the case of generality existing sound it is inherent-inherence (*samaveta samavāya*). In the cognition of non-existence it is merely a qualification (*viśeṣanā*). Though the *Naiyāyika* is very particular in establishing some sort of physical contact between subject and the object; yet, his theory of six-fold contact is so generous that it can establish the contact anywhere.

The Mīmāṃsā View

The *Mīmāṃsaka* also supports the theory of contact and all-pervasiveness of the soul. But, his idea of knowledge is different from the *Nyāya*. He holds knowledge not as grasping.

Self as self-illuminating entity

The Nyāya View

The *Nyāya* holds that knowledge manifests the object only. It cannot reveal itself. The knowledge of a jar can be known by a second knowledge, which is called *Anuvyavasāya* or after-thought. The *Nyāya* theory is based on the contention that nothing is cognized unless it comes into contact with the soul through mind.

This rule is equally applicable to the external as well as the internal objects. Even the attributes of soul, such as pleasure, pain, desire etc. are not known until the mind comes into their contact. Knowledge, according to the *Nyāya*, as has been stated before, is grasping in the physical sense. This grasping implies difference between the object grasped and that, which grasps. The factor of grasping which is another name of knowledge, can not be grasped by itself. It requires another knowledge to be grasped.

The main objection against the *Nyāya*, advanced by other system, is that the contention of after-thought leads to regress ad infinitum. If the cognition of jar requires another cognition to be cognized, the second cognition would require a third one and so on. The *Nyāya* replies to the objection that the judgement of the existence of jar stands in need of the apprehension of jar only. The second judgement, regarding the knowledge of jar requires another knowledge to apprehend it. It is not necessary for the first judgement that its knowledge must be cognized. The regress and infinitum is applicable only if the first judgement is impossible without the second and second without the third. In the present case first judgement occurs with cognition of the jar without waiting for its own apprehension. The *Jaina* contends that no judgement can be confirmed unless its source is apprehended.

The *Mīmāṃsā* View

The Bhaṭṭa school of *Mīmāṃsā* goes a step further and holds that the knowledge of object i.e. pot, is not perceived even at subsequent moment. It is never directly known, either with the object or at a subsequent moment of reflection. The dictum runs, "Just as the tip of a finger cannot touch itself, so knowledge cannot know itself by itself." Knowledge is known, however, through inference. In order to explain the quality of manifestedness (*jñātatā*) abiding in the object we must suppose, for want of any other explanation, that there was such a thing as knowledge of the object. Knowledge, therefore, is never known directly; it is inferred through the quality of knownness, that exists in the object and is experienced in the appearance of the pot.

Prabhākara disagrees with Kumārila and holds every cognition as self illuminative. He maintains that each and every apprehension is constituted of the three factors of knowledge, the self and the object. He calls it as *trīpuṭṭ-pratyakṣa*.

Murāri Miśra on the other hand holds that after the cognition of pot, there is an after-appearance which has the above mentioned three factors as its objects.

The *Vedānta* View

The *Advaitins* do not accept any of the these positions. Against Bhaṭṭa they argue : The Bhaṭṭa seem to think that, as a result of the knowing activity of the self the object (the pot) comes to acquire the quality of being known which is similar to its other qualities of size, colour, etc. and that the knowledge of the pot is to be inferred from this objective of quality. But, this theory is unintelligible; because, we cannot understand how the knowing activity of the self should be able to endow the object with the quality of knownness, which is to be conceived as objective like the properties of colour, size, etc. It is contradictory to think, as the Bhaṭṭa do, that knowledge is the activity of the self, and yet, the result of this activity (viz. knownness) is an objective characteristic on a par with colour, size, etc. The result of the activity of the self must be in the self and not in the object; that is, it must be subjective and not object. The attempt to infer the knowledge of an object from any objective characteristics is, therefore, doomed to failure. Consequently, the theory of the Bhaṭṭa is untenable.

As against the *Naiyāyikās*, the *Advaitins* argue that the theory that knowledge known in a subsequent reflective knowledge involves a great difficulty. To suppose one knowledge to be the object of another knowledge is to hold that two states of knowledge exist together at the same time, which is inconceivable. It faces one more difficulty. The *Nyāya* holds that the subsequent reflective knowledge, in which the previous knowledge is known as an object, is a self-conscious judgement of the form, "I know the pot (*ghaṭam ahaṃ jñānāmī*)" or what is the same as "I possess the knowledge of pot" (*ghaṭa jñānavānaham*). In such a case, the knowledge (of the pot) comes to be perceived as a quality inhering in the self. The self is directly perceived,

and knowledge is perceived indirectly through perception of the self. In the *Nyāya* scheme of relations between the mind and the percept, already explained, the relation between the perceiving mind and this knowledge falls within the class of *samyukta samavāya* i.e. inherence in the conjoined. For, in this case first there is a direct connection of mind with the self, and then, through the self with the knowledge inhering in it. But, this account of the *Nyāya* does not satisfactorily explain the knowledge of knowledge. The self according to the *Nyāya* has many qualities inhering in it and all of them are not held to be perceived in the perception of the self. As the attribute of a self is not necessarily perceived, therefore, in the perception of the self, it is of little help to say that knowledge is perceived as being an attribute of the perceived self. For, even then, to answer the question why the attribute knowledge should be perceivable, whereas some other attributes of the self are not perceivable, the *Nyāya* must say, because knowledge is an attribute of the nature of which is to be perceived. "If so, the *Vedāntist* asks, what harm is there in supposing that it is the very nature of knowledge to be perceivable, they gain little by resorting to the round about way of explaining that knowledge is perceived as an attribute inhering in the self, which is perceived by the mind.

The *Vedāntins* themselves hold that it is the nature of knowledge to be self-manifest. When the pot is known, the knowledge of the pot also becomes manifest at that very moment. The self manifesting the nature of knowledge is regarded by the *Vedāntins* to be a natural subjective characteristic, which, therefore, cannot be classed under immediacy (*pratyakṣatva*) as pertaining to objects. As Mādhavācārya puts it "Things like pots are perceived as objects. But knowledge being self-manifest cannot be regarded as an object of perception."

The Jainās also hold knowledge as self-manifest. It is like the lamp which illumines the object as well as itself. The self-manifestation and the manifestation of the object are not two functions. It is one function, where all the three factors of knowledge, the self and the object appear simultaneously.

The Jaina Stand-point Clarified

The theory of manifestation or illumination implies that our knowledge solely depends upon experience. Whatever we know is given, and enjoys an existence independent of the mind. Not only the substances or physical qualities but the relations, class concepts and all other categories have their objective existence.

According to Jainism a thing is possessed of an infinite number of attributes and characteristics. Out of them certain qualities are natural (*svabhāva*) while others are derivative (*vibhāva*) i.e. caused by external association. Consciousness in *Jīva* does not depend upon any external factor for its possession. But the possession of divine or human body is not independent. The *Jīva* depends upon *pudgala* or other factors for their possession. They are not natural. Similarly, *pudgala* has corporeality as its natural quality. But, its transformation into a physical body is derivative. According to the *Vedānta*, the natural qualities are real, while others unreal. But, according to Jainism, there is no difference between the two as far as reality is concerned. Perishability or permanence have no value in this respect. Everything that exists, temporary or permanent, natural or derivative, is on the same level as far as reality is concerned. All of them are objective and external.

Reality is not confined to the Existence only

Further, the Jaina does not believe that reality is confined to the existences only; which is only an aspect of it. The reality consists of many other aspects also in addition to the existence. The aspects of existence and non-existence are governed by four factors. They are : Substantiality (*Dravya*), Space (*Kṣetra*), Time (*Kāla*) and State (*Bhāva*). Everything exists in relation to its own substantiality, space, time and the state. The same thing does not exist in relation to the substantiality etc. possessed by another thing. But, as far as reality is concerned, both aspects are objective and stand on equal footing. As a matter of fact they are implied by each other. Existence implies non-existence in relation to the factors other than governing the existence. Similarly, non-existence implies existence in different relations. One without the other is unconceivable. To say, that one is real and objective and the other as unreal and merely conceptual has no reason. The cognition of both the

aspects is an experience, based on external reality. The Jaina differs from the *Mīmāṃsā* also which holds that the cognition of absence (*abhāva*) as purely mental.

Generality and Particularity

What has been said about existence and non-existence, applies to the question of generality and particularity also. The Buddhists like Dīnāga and Dharmakīrti hold that sense-experience is confined to particularity only. The class-concepts are purely mental and are added to the particulars afterwards. Kant also holds that the time, space, class and all other categories of understanding are supplied by the mind. According to Jainism generality and particularity, both are objective. Nothing is supplied by the mind. They are two aspects of the same reality rolled into one. The mind only arranges them.

Knowledge : True and False

It can be argued; if nothing appears in knowledge which does not exist objectively, the difference between true and the false would disappear; as both of them would refer to the objects existing externally. The Jaina replies that objectivity or subjectivity of a cognition has nothing to do with its truth or falsehood. A cognition is false when the something appears in the context other than its own. In the case of the conch-shell appearing as silver, the silver exists in relation to its own substantiality of silverness. It does not exist in relation to shellness as it appears in the present case. Similarly, it exists in relation to its own space, i.e. the shop where it is sold, and not in relation to the space where it is appearing. The same is the case with time and state also. The Jaina does not hold that the silver is purely mental as the *Vedānta* or *Yogācāra* does. He says the silver and shell both exist in relation to their contexts. A cognition is false when the context is disordered.

False knowledge is that which represents things in relation in which they do not exist. When a rope, in a badly lighted place, gives rise to the illusion of a snake, the illusion consists in taking the rope to be a snake i.e. perceiving the snake where it does not exist. Snakes exist and ropes also exist, there is no untruth in that. The error, thus, consists in this, the snake is perceived where the rope exists. The perception of a snake under relations and environments in which it is not then existing, is, what is meant by error here. What was at first perceived as a snake was later on contradicted and thus, found false. Falsehood, therefore, consists in the misrepresentation of objective facts in experience. Illusion consists in attributing such spatial, temporal or other kinds of relations to the objects of our judgement as do not actually exist, but the objects themselves actually exist in other relations. When I mistake the rope for a snake, the snake actually exists, though its relation with 'this' as 'this is a snake' does not exist, for the snake is not the rope. This illusion is thus, called *Sadasatkhyāti* or misrelating the existents.

The truth and falsehood of the context are ascertained by the subsequent correspondence or contradiction. The criterion of falsity is not subjectivity of the appearance, but its contradiction. If a judgement is contradicted by another judgement of unquestionable truth, the former is to be rejected as untrue. Subjective experience, as illustrated by dream, is rejected as false because it is contradicted by the waking experience. There is no intrinsic characteristics of falsity. The problem of falsity is thus, ultimately a question of experience. The problem of truth also is no less a matter of experience and a priori logic is absolutely incompetent to deal with it. We have discussed it further in the chapter on *ajñāna*.

The Personal Experiences Explained

Again, it can be asked; if the whole data of knowledge are supplied by the experience, how do you explain the cognitions based on personal attitude? The same person is cognized by one subject as his enemy, while by the other as his friend. If the attributes of enmity and friendship are possessed by the object, why they are not common to both the subjects. The subject holding friendly attitude does not see the object as an enemy and the subject holding hostile attitude does not perceive him as a friend. Moreover, if they are the objective characteristics; why they are not perceived by an omniscient? If they are perceived, how do you explain his attitude of indifference?

The Jaina replies that the above notion has two aspects. It is concerned with knowledge as well as feeling. When both of them are intermixed, they result into a confusion. There is a lot of difference between the appearances when we feel an enemy is totally objective while its feeling is subjective. Like all other judgements the judgement of 'He is an enemy' also is relative. None can say that this statement is unconditional. A person is enemy in relation to a particular person, time or occasion. Enemy means a person hatred or harmful attitude towards another. If a person really possesses such an attitude he is enemy of the person towards whom he holds such an attitude; and this judgement is not particular to any subject. Even a dispassionate person (*vīṭarāga*) can behold it. It does not, in any way, affect his own attitude towards the object of the judgement. He only knows his (of the object; attitude of enmity towards a particular person. The omniscient himself is free to have his own attitude. He is not dependent in that respect. Similarly, a third person also can know the state of affairs as good as the persons involved in it. But, he is not affected with the results and, therefore, is free from the feeling of pleasure or pain.

The feeling of enmity is a sort of mental pain, which is like all other feelings, subjective. It results from the intensity of hatred lying with the subject. If the hatred is not intense the feeling will be mild. An omniscient is absolutely free from it, and therefore, does not have such feelings. Similarly, a third person who is not attached with the result, is away from such feelings.

An omniscient does not hold harmful attitude towards any-body; and therefore, he is enemy to none. Still, another person can have hostile attitude towards him. He can feel the omniscient as his enemy and the question of its being right or wrong does not arise. It pertains to ethics and not logic. But, when a third person or he, himself, makes a judgement proposing the omniscient lord as his enemy he is wrong. Because the factors that can establish the enmity do not exist in relation to the omniscient.

One can explain this point in another way also. Three ladies perceive a person in different relations. For one, it is a perception of the son, for second that of the brother and for third that of the husband. It can be asked whether these qualities are actually possessed by the person so perceived, or they are imposed by the ladies concerned. If they are objective why they are not common to all of them?

The Jainās reply to this question also is the same as that of the former. As far as knowledge is concerned the judgement is common. Every-body can see a person as brother in relation to a particular lady. Even his wife knows that A is brother of B. But the pleasure that results from the sight of a brother is particular to that lady only to whom, he is so related. The qualities of being brother, husband or son are as objective as those of being jar etc. Just as, we call a thing 'jar' in relation to a particular form etc., similarly, we call a person brother who stands in a particular relation to the other person. Both connotations depend on the popular conventions. There is no ground in viewing one as objective and the other as subjective.

QUESTION

Essay Type :

1. How do you explain the relation between subject and object of knowledge?

Short Answer Type :

2. What are the views of various schools of Indian philosophy regarding the nature of object of knowledge.

Objective Type :

3. Jainism is: (a) *Realist*, (b) *Idealist*, (c) *Māyāvādī*, (d) *Aphātavādī*
4. Jainism believes in: (a) All pervasiveness of soul (b) Passiveness of soul
(c) Atomic size of soul (d) Consciousness of soul
5. Self-illuminates itself like: (a) Lamp, (b) Pot, (c) Sky, (d) Earth.

Compiled from

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LESSON-3

NATURE OF *DARŚANA* (PERFECT) & ITS TYPES2. *upayogalakṣaṇo jīvaḥ*

(Aph.) Th. defining characteristic of a soul is consciousness (cognitive activity). (II)

However much the karmic matter may obscure the consciousness of a soul. It cannot obliterate it altogether or make it absolutely inoperative. So this consciousness is found also in the *nigoda* state and through progressive development reaches its maximum in the omniscience of the perfect soul.

3. *cetanāvyāpāro upayogaḥ.*

cetanā jñānadarśanātmikā. tasyā vyāpāraḥ pravṛttirupayogaḥ.

(Aph.) Consciousness (cognitive activity) is the activity of sentience. (III)

(Gloss) Sentience consists of knowledge and intuition. Consciousness is the activity, that is, the application of the same (viz. sentience).

4. *sākāronākāraśca.*

(Aph.) It (viz. consciousness) is determinate as well as indeterminate. (IV)

Darśana

The simultaneity of *jñāna* and *darśana* also was accepted for the same reason.

Siddhasena being a logician, made further improvement. He held that omniscience cannot be established unless *jñāna* and *darśana* are simultaneous. But, both of them are partial views of the same thing. The view of an omniscient cannot be a partial view. It is always complete. So, he held that in the stage of *kevala jñāna* and *darśana* merge into one. As we have stated before, Siddhasena always looks to the objective side. But, Jain notion of *jñāna* and *darśana* is subjective, related with two natural powers of the self.

5. *paryāyagrāhītvāj jñānam sākāraḥ.*

utpādavyayadhrauvyātmakasya dravyasya dhrauvyaṃ gauṇīkṛtya

utpādavyayayo grāhakaṃ jñānam sākāra upayoga ityucyate. ayamākāreṇa

paryāyeṇa sahitatvāt sākāraḥ. savikalpa upayoga ityasya paryāyaḥ.

(Aph.) Knowledge is determinate, because it cognizes the modes.

(Gloss) Knowledge is called determinate consciousness because of its being the cognizer of the origination and cessation by means of subordinating the permanence of the substance which embodies origination, cessation and permanence. The expression 'conceptual consciousness' is synonymous with it (viz. determinate consciousness).

6. *dhrauvyagrāhītvād darśanam anākāraḥ*

utpāda-vyaya-dhrauvyātmakasya dravyasya utpādavyavātmakaṃ paryāyaṃ

gauṇīkṛtya dhrauvyasya grāhakaṃ darśanam anākāra upayoga ityucyate,

nirvikalpa upayoga ityasya paryāyaḥ.

(Aph.) Intuition is indeterminate, because it cognizes the permanence.

(Gloss) Intuition is indeterminate consciousness, because of its being the cognizer of the permanence, subordinating the modes of origination and cessation of the substance which embodies origination, cessation

and permanence. The expression 'non-conceptual consciousness' is synonymous with it (viz. indeterminate consciousness).

Darśana

Inarticulate Cognition

Darśana as Attitude

The term *darśana* is applied in two senses. In ethical field it means attitude of the soul towards worldly objects. It is right (*saṃyak*) if the soul leans towards spiritual progress & believes in liberation as the highest aim of life. It is wrong (*mithyā*) if the soul is engrossed in worldly pleasures and goes astray from the ultimate goal. According to *Siddhasena Divākara darśana*, in the sense of attitude, is to be included into *matijñāna*. But this can be said of the attitude found upto the seventh *guṇasthāna* only; where right attitude is caused by the rise of *saṃyaktva mohanīya*. The *kṣayopaśama* of *matijñānāvaraṇa* and the rise of either of the three degrees of *darśanamohanīya* create a certain attitude of mind towards worldly objects; it is called *saṃyagdr̥ṣṭi*, *mithyādr̥ṣṭi* or *miśradr̥ṣṭi* as the case may be. Beyond the seventh *guṇasthāna* the aspirant positively gets *kṣāyika saṃyaktva* which is a natural characteristic of the soul.

It exists even in the liberated souls. This attitude is beyond the range of *matijñāna*. Though *kṣāyika saṃyaktva* is possible in the fourth *guṇasthāna* also, yet, the existence of other varieties is not ruled out. As a matter of fact, the right attitude can be created in two ways; firstly, it is a result of simple faith produced by the teachings of certain persons to whom we are devoted; or by the books which we hold in high esteem, being the sacred books of our family; or by logical confirmation based on arguments. Secondly, it comes as the result of inner purification; when a person subdues his passions, and rises above the pride and prejudices, he gets a real and distinct vision of soul and matter. The first type is a variety of *matijñāna* as it is a mental phenomenon. The second type is manifestation of the natural quality of soul.

The psychology of early Buddhism divides knowledge into three *degrees diṭṭhi* (opinion), *vitakka vicāra* (logical operations) and *bodhi* (intuitive knowledge). The latter two degrees can be compared with *parokṣa* and *pratyakṣa* of the *Tattvārtha*. The first degree is characterised as opinion not guided by reason (*paññindīya*) but, by desires (*taṇhā*). In the Jaina literature we meet both the terms; i.e. *darśana* and *diṭṭhi*. But the *diṭṭhi* of Buddhists is related with wrong attitude only. They do not hold any category as right attitude; because all conceptual knowledge, according to them, is false.

Epistemology and *Darśana*

In the theory of knowledge *darśana* is generally interpreted as inarticulate (*nirākāra*) appearance preceding articulate (*sākāra*) knowledge.

Darśana in Jaina Epistemology

The *Pañṇavaṇā Sutta* divides *upayoga* into *sākāra* (articulate) and *nirākāra* (inarticulate) cognitions. The *sākāra* is known as *jñāna* while *nirākāra* as *darśana*. *Darśana* is devoid of judgment (*vyavasāya*). In the logical period it is not included into the category of *pramāṇa*. As a matter of fact it is neither *pramāṇa* nor *apramāṇa*. The terms applied to valid and invalid judgments respectively. *Darśana* is mere awareness without any predication.

Regarding the actual nature of *darśana* the Jaina scholars hold, widely different views. Before going into the detailed account we would like to sum up them in the following :

1. The direct cognition is *darśana* while that obtained through a mark is *jñāna*.
2. *Darśana* apprehends the present only, while *jñāna* is related with all the three times.
3. *Darśana* is limited to the appearance of mere existence; while *jñāna* begins with particularization.
4. *Darśana* represents the view-point of universality and *jñāna* that of particularity.

5. *Darśana* is the cognition of particular object without knowing their particularity.
6. *Darśana* is the first two stages of *mati*; i.e. *avagraha* and *īhā*. *Jñāna* begins from the stage of *avāya*.
7. *Darśana* stands on the same stage in the case of mind and vision where *Vyañjanāvagraha* stands in the case of touch-senses.
8. *Darśana* is identical with *Vyañjanāvagraha*; *jñāna* proceeds with *Arthāvagraha*.
9. *Avagraha* is *Darśana*; while the subsequent stages of *īhā* etc. are *jñāna*.
10. *Darśana* apprehends the self only, while *jñāna* is related with external objects.
11. *Darśana* is the first inclination of soul towards knowing something, preceding the contiguity :

(1) *Darśana* as Direct Cognition : The first view has been referred to by Siddhasena Gaṇī in his commentary on the *Taevārtha*. Unfortunately, we are in the dark about the upholder of this view. Siddhasena Gaṇī mentions it only to reject it at the end. According to this view the term *ākāru*, as stated in the *Prajñāpanā* and other *Āgamās*, means the mark. *Sākāra prayoga* means the cognition obtained through a mark, as one infers a conch from its sweet and soft sound. It does not include the case of visual perception where we cognize a jar through appearance of certain form, as the mark must be different from the object that is conceived. Roughly stated, this view renders all the sense-cognitions as *darśana* while limits *jñāna* to the inferential types only. The Jaina *Āgamās* accept distinction between *darśana* and *jñāna* in the case of *avadhi* and *kevala* also. But, we cannot say, in their case, that one is obtained through mark while the other is not. All of them are direct. Siddhasena Gaṇī rejects the above view on this very ground.

(2) *Darśana* as Confined to the Present only : The second view is this; *darśana* apprehends the present only while *jñāna* is related with all the three tenses, present, past and future. We can compare this view with the modern thinkers like Russell, differentiating sensation from image. Russell holds that sensation is without any mixture of the past events or memory, while the image is not constructed until it is mixed with the past impressions or memory. This view also falls short in the case of intuitional knowledge, particularly that of omniscience, where every thing is perceptual.

It may be observed that the above two views, though logically sound, are not accepted, because they fall short in the case of supernatural knowledge.

(3) *Darśana* as the Apprehension of Generic character : According to Jainism, everything consists of both the generic as well as the specific characters. It is also admitted that knowledge as a general rule, proceeds from generality to particularity. We have elaborately discussed this factor in the division of *matijñāna*. According to the present view *darśana*, apprehends generality while *jñāna* is related with particularity. It can be said that the terms of generality and particularity are not fixed, they are relative. The same object can claim both the categories absolute generality, which is in no way particularity, such as the apprehension of mere being.

Though, this view is generally accepted by the *Āgamic* as well as the latter scholars; yet, it is not free from confusion. It is generally held that *darśana* is the first apprehension, occurring after the contiguity of subject with the object. But, it is inconsistent with the conception of *vyañjanāvagraha*. *Vyañjanāvagraha* is generally defined as the contact between senses and the object. It is the physical grasping of an object. It is included in the process of knowledge simply because it is cause of the latter. No knowledge of any sort, whether general or particular is possible before it. The limitation of *vyañjanāvagraha* to the four senses, which cognize the object after real contact, has no significance if it is not the first stage or is preceded by some other apprehension. *Vyañjanāvagraha* is preceded by some other apprehension. *Vyañjanāvagraha* is followed by *arthāvagraha*, thus, there is no place for *darśana*.

While defining *avagraha*, some scholars have specified that after contiguity there is *darśana* and then *avagraha*. But, this order also goes against the notion of *vyañjanāvagraha*. In other definitions the *avagraha* is stated as the first apprehension of generality after the contiguity. If this view is accepted, *darśana* would mean a stage before contiguity.

Yaśovijayaḥ suggests a solution for this difficulty. He states that *darśana* is nothing but *naīścayikāvagraha*. It should be recalled here that *vyañjanāvagraha* is mere contiguity of senses and the object. The subsequent stage is *arthāvagraha*. It has two considerations. When considered precisely it is the first general apprehension occurring after contiguity. It is known as *naīścayikāvagraha*. Roughly considered *avagraha* is a relative term. Generality, in this case, means a comparative generality. The *naīścayikāvagraha* is absolutely free from the notions of class, name etc. Yaśovijayaḥ holds the same as *darśana*.

This view, though rational, upsets the *Āgamic* divisions of *matī*. The province of *matī* starts with *vyañjanāvagraha* and with *dhāraṇā*. To hold *darśana* as a middle stage makes the matter a part of *matī*.

(4) *Darśana* as the Representative of *daravyārthika naya* : Siddhasena Divākara, who always looks to the side of object, explains *jñāna* and *darśana* in another way. He says that universality and particularity are two aspects of one and the same individual. The consideration of these aspects is based on two different view-points (*nayās*). The view-points related with the aspect of universality are known as *darvyārthika* while those with the aspect of particularity are termed as *paryāyārthika*. *Darśana* and *jñāna* stress upon these two fundamental aspects respectively. Though the object is same in both cases; yet, *darśana* takes into consideration the universal aspect, while *jñāna* the particular one.

(5) *Darśana* as the cognition of particular without particularity : According to Abhayadeva, the commentator of *Sanmatī*, *darśana* is the cognition of particular objects without knowing their particularity. But, in *darśana* the particulars are not recognized as such. They are apprehended without any relation between one another.

(6) *Darśana* as the first two stages of *Matī* : Jinabhadra in his *Viśeṣāvasyakabhāṣya* and Malayagiri in his commentary on the *Sthānāṅga sūtra*, refer to a view holding *avagraha* and *īhā* as *darśana*, while the latter stage of *avāya* and *dhāraṇā* as *jñāna*. The identification of *darśana* with *avagraha* and *īhā*, as the present view proposes, puts down the objection raised above. But, this would either upset the theory of the four stages of *matījñāna* or reject the separate existence of *darśana*.

(7) *Darśana* as the first stage of Distant-senses : Siddhasena Divākara holds that *darśana* is the first apprehension of things cognized by the distant senses. According to this view *darśana* is confined to two senses only, i.e. the sight and the mind. The four touch-senses do not come in this category. The terms *caḥsur-darśana* and *acacḥsur-darśana* are confined here, to the visual and mental cognitions respectively. The mental cognition here does not include inference etc. in it. It is confined to conceptual judgments only, just as the existence of atoms. This view brings *darśana* at par with *vyañjanāvagraha*. The stage ascribed to *vyañjanāvagraha* in the case of touch-senses, is allotted to *darśana* in the case of other senses.

(8) *Darśana* as identical with *Vyañjanāvagraha* : Brahmadeva states contiguity as the definition of *darśana*; but, he does not exclude the touch-senses from this category. In his case the scope of *vyañjanāvagraha* is identical with *darśana*.

(9) *Darśana* as *Arthāvagraha* : Siddhasena Divākara refers to another view, which holds that *arthāvagraha* is *darśana*, while the subsequent stages are *jñāna*. We have already discussed this view in the name of Yaśovijaya.

According to Brahmadeva the cognition of colour, taste etc. in a general way is *darśana* while that of its division, yellow, white etc., is *jñāna*. This conception also amounts to the same view as expressed above.

(10) *Darśana* as apprehension of the self : Vīrasena refers to a view that every cognition apprehends the self as well as the external object. The two parts of objectivity are confined to *darśana* and *jñāna* respectively. *Darśana* apprehends the self only while *jñāna* is related with external objects. This view fixes the provinces of *jñāna* and *darśana* definitely.

If the distinction between *jñāna* and *darśana* is based on their being cognitions of the external objects and the self, respectively, *jñāna* and *darśana* is based on their being cognitions of the external objects and the

self, respectively, *jñāna* stands no more as the cognition of both. According to Jainism *darśana* and *jñāna* are two different types complementing each other, thus, nothing remains unknown. They are two functions of the same agent cooking. The same consciousness when acts as apprehension of the self, it is *darśana*; while the same is *jñāna* when apprehending external objects. The division is based on the objects and not on the activity.

(11) *Darśana* as the first inclination of the self : *Dhavalā* improves the last view that *darśana* starts with the first inclination of the self to known an object. This stage precedes the stage of contiguity. If we consider the process of knowledge, the above views can be put in the following order :

1. Inclination or mere awareness—The view held by *Dhavalā*.
2. Contiguity—Siddhasena and Yaśovijaya.
3. The cognition of mere existence—Pūjyapāda and the logical period.
4. Cognition of general type—Nemicandra and Brahmadeva.

As a matter of fact the term *avagraha* and its general definition denotes that it is the first stage where an object comes into consideration. *Darśana*, therefore, must be the stage of mere awareness or contiguity. In the later case it would be confined to two senses only as the case of touch-senses goes to *vyākṣanāvagraha*.

Further, the terms of *vyākṣanāvagraha* and *arthāvagraha* themselves support the above view. *Vyākṣanāvagraha* is merely an activity of senses before reaching the object, as *vyākṣanā* means the senses which manifest the object. It is in the stage of *arthāvagraha* that the object enters into the process. Now, *darśana* must be a stage preceding them. It can be nothing but the desire of soul towards knowing a particular object, which sets the senses at work.

Brahmedeva explains it in the following way : The self makes an effort to know the external object. It is an intellectual phenomenon resulting into *jñāna*. This effort is *darśana* while the later cognition is *jñāna*. For instance, a person is engaged in conceiving a jar, wishes to know a cloth. He turns his mind from the jar and tries to apply the same to cloth. The middle stage when the mind has left the association with jar and has not reached the cloth is *darśana*. This state lasts for a short while only.

Darśana is recognized as '*sāmānyagrahaṇa*' in all the texts. But the term *sāmānya* is interpreted differently. Vīrasena and Brahmadeva assert the *sāmānya* means the self of *jīva*. Vīrasena says that he self is *sāmānya* (general); because, it is common in all the cases of cognition. He further states that visual *darśana* is the result of the *kṣayopasama* of *cakṣur-darśanāvarṇa*. This *kṣayopasama* as it is the perception of cloth. *Kṣayopasama* is the manifestation of a particular power. The power is not related with the cognition of particular objects, but, to the capacity of soul. It would illumine any object that is within the grasp of that capacity. The *kṣayopasama* is identical with the self and its first inclination towards application of that power is *darśana*. Brahmadeva holds that the self is *sāmānya*; because, it is common to all cognitions. The soul is a common cause in the perception of a jar as well as a cloth. The two cognitions are differentiated from each other on the basis of objects only.

34. *cakṣuracakṣuravadhikevalāni darśanam.*
cakṣuṣaḥ sāmānyābodhaścakṣurdarśanam.
śeṣendriyamanasoracakṣurdarśanam.
avadhikevalayośca avadhikevaladarśane.
manaḥparyāyasya manasaḥ paryāyaviśayatvena sāmānyabodhābhāvānna darśanam.

(Aph.) Intuition is (possible in the case of) ocular and non-ocular cognitions as well as clairvoyance and omniscience (pure and perfect knowledge). (XXXIV)

(Gloss) Of these, the indeterminate cognition by the eye is ocular intuition. Such cognition by the other sense-organs as well as the mind is non-ocular intuition. Such cognitions in the case of clairvoyance and omniscience (perfect knowledge) are respectively known as *avadhidarśana* and *kevaladarśana*. The cognition

of mental modes has no *darśana* because it never cognizes the general feature inasmuch as it has the mental modes (which are particular) as its object.

Division of *Darśana*

Darśana is divided into the following four types :

1. *Cakṣur darśana*, 2. *Acakṣur darśana*,
3. *Avadhi darśana*, 4. *Kevala darśana*.

The first two types depend upon the senses as their cause while the remaining two are supernormal. They are produced by the self independently. According to *Dhavalā* all the four *darśanās* spring from the self. None of them has sense as its cause.

1. The term *cakṣurdarśana* does not require any explanation. It is related with the sense of vision.
2. About *acakṣurdarśana* there are different views. The general conception is this, that the *darśana* related with non-visual senses and the mind is *acakṣurdarśana*. The discrimination between visual and the non-visual senses is understandable as the former apprehends from a distance while the latter through contact. But, to place the mind also in this category is hard to explain. As a matter of fact mind has no *darśana*. Its function is limited to the objects grasped by the external senses. Memory and conceptual deliberations like inference etc., which are the actual province of mind, do not pass through the stage of *darśana*. this view is supported by the *Naridī sūtra* also, which does not admit the variety of mental perception.

According to Siddhasena Divākara ordinary *darśana* is confined to mind and the visual sense only. Consequently, *acakṣurdarśana* means the mental apprehension not derived through a mark or *hetu*. According to this view the cognition springing from mind alone, and not from any other senses, falls under the head of *acakṣurdarśana*. It is the cognition of subtle or distant things, such as atom, meru etc.

We are at a loss of understand precisely the underlying idea of the above view that the mental cognition of an atom is *acakṣurdarśana* while that of fire through the mark of smoke is *jñāna*. Perhaps, it means that in the case of inference the mind does not conceive the object independently. The conception of fire is memory which depends upon the former sense-cognition. The perception of the mark helps in revival of that memory. In the case of mental cognition like that of atoms, the idea is formed by the mind itself. It is a mental vision, where the senses are helpless. Further, in inference we do not construct a mental image. It is simply the cognition of the existence of major term. In the mental visual cognition a certain image is constructed. The former is conceptual, the latter perceptual.

The above views are mainly concerned with the conception of *darśana* as the cognition of generality. *Dhavalā* also follows nearly the same view. But in its case *cakṣurdarśana* does not mean the *darśana* springing from the vision, but that effort of the soul which later on results into visual cognition. As a matter of fact the division of *cakṣurdarśana* etc., has no real significance in the conception of *Dhavalā*. It is merely assumed. Moreover, the distinction between visual and other senses exists on the physical plane only. The former grasps the object without any physical contact; while the others are touch-senses. In the plane of internal experience they do not hold any distinction. In case, *darśana* is an internal experience, this division has no ground. If, in spite of it, *darśana* is divided on the basis of future development, then, there should be six verities corresponding to the five external senses and the mind, and not two based on touch and without touch.

According to another view, referred by *Dhavalā*, *acakṣurdarśana* means recollection of the objects already perceived. *Dhavalā* rejects it on the plea that it would mean the absence of *acakṣurdarśana* in one-sensed animals. If 'perceived' is held as 'grasped' by any of the senses, *acakṣurdarśana* in one-sensed animals. If 'perceived' is held as 'grasped' by any of the senses, *acakṣurdarśana* would be confined to a mental activity, and this comes to the view of Siddhasena Divākara.

Jinabhadra holds that *manahparyāya* and *Śruta* are followed by *acakṣurdarśana*. Perhaps, *Dhavalā* has the same in view.

3. *Avadhidarśana* is the awareness preceding *avadhijñāna*. It has the same sphere of objectivity as *avadhijñāna*.

The above three types of *darśanas* occur before *jñāna*. *Cakṣur* and *acakṣur* precede *matijñāna* while *avadhi darśana* preceded *avadhi-jñāna*. *Śruta* has no preceding *darśana* as it is preceded by *matijñāna*. *Manahparyāya* also is preceded by *jñāna*, which we have already discussed.

4. The most type is *kevaladarśana*. It corresponds to *kevalajñāna*. According to the traditional view it occurs before *kevalajñāna*; but, it is not accepted by all. There are three views regarding it, each championed by a great stalwart of *Jaina* tradition; which we propose to discuss in brief.

Jñāna and Darśana

Upayoga (consciousness) is the defining characteristic of a soul. This *upayoga* can be *sākāra* 'determinate' as well as *anākāra* 'indeterminate'. The former is called *jñāna* and the latter *darśana*.

jñāna as 'determinate' and *darśana* as 'indeterminate intuition' although we are fully conscious of the inadequacy of the translation. For the sake of convenience we shall sometimes use simply 'knowledge' for *jñāna* and 'intuition' for *darśana*.

The hoary antiquity of the *Jaina* conception of *jñānāvaraṇa* and *darśanāvaraṇa* points to the antiquity of the distinction between *jñāna* and *darśana*. The *Jaina Āgamās* use the terms *jānai* and *pāsai* in order to express the two faculties of the soul. The *Prajñāpanā Sūtra* recognizes a peculiar faculty called *pāṣaṇayā* and in this connection we should notice the contents of its two chapters dealing severally with *upayoga* and *pāṣaṇayā* and in this connection we should notice the contents of its two chapters dealing severally with *upayoga* and *pāṣaṇayā* (rendered *paśyattā* in Sanskrit). It is recognized that both *upayoga* and *paśyattā* can be *sākāra* as well as *anākāra*. This means that both *jñāna* and *darśana* can belong to both the categories of *upayoga* and *paśyattā*. Distinguishing between *upayoga* and *paśyattā*, the commentator Malayagiri says : 'Sākāra upayoga consists of five classes of knowledge (viz. *matī*, *śruta*, *avadhi*, *manahparyāya* and *kevala*) and three classes of non-knowledge (viz. *matī-jñāna* are not included therein. *Paśyattā* is derived from *drś* and means *prekṣaṇa* and, by convention, connotes 'prolonged vision' with reference to determinate knowledge and 'clear vision' with reference to indeterminate intuition. *Matī-jñāna* and *matī-ajñāna* cognize only what is present and cannot be prolonged to what is past or future, and as such cannot possess *paśyattā*. Similarly, *anākāra upayoga* consists of four classes of *darśana* (intuition) viz. *cakṣurdarśana* (eye-intuition), *acakṣurdarśana* intuition by the mind as well as the sense-organs other than the eye), *avadhi-darśana* and *kevala-darśana*. *Anākāra paśyattā*, on the other hand, consists only of three classes (out of these four), inasmuch as *acakṣurdarśana* being devoid of 'clear vision' cannot possess *paśyattā*, and as such is excluded from the category of *anākāra paśyattā*. *Paśyattā* thus means 'prolonged vision' or 'clear vision'. It can also be called 'direct vision'. The *Prajñāpanā Sūtra* gives the divisions and subdivisions but does not clarify the meaning of *paśyattā* and its difference from *upayoga*. It is only the commentator Malayagiri who attempts to demarcate the line of distinction between *upayoga* and *paśyattā*. As regards the distinction between *jñāna* and *darśana*, however, the *Āgamās* are very clear and definite, and unanimous too. The great Ācārya Kuṇḍakuṇḍa, however, records a quite original conception. His leaning is towards the absolutist standpoint. He asks, with reference to the omniscient, whether his knowledge reveals the non-self, his intuition reveals self, and his soul reveals both the self and the non-self. He considers the problem from the empirical as well as the transcendental standpoint and concludes that the *ātman*, its knowledge, and its intuition (*darśana*)—all these are identical and hence each can reveal the self as well as the non-self. He does not refer to the *sākāra-anākāra* (determinate-indeterminate) relation, and so it is not possible to ascertain whether he distinguished between *jñāna* and *darśana* on that basis. Ācārya Vīrasena in his commentary called *Dhavalā* on *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama* of Puṣpadanta says 'What

comprehends an external object of the nature of the universal-cum-particular is *jñāna*. And the comprehension of the self of the same nature is *darśana*. Reality consists of universal-cum-particular and as such the valid cognition of it must consist in the comprehension of both these characteristics. *Jñāna* and *darśana* are both cases of valid cognition, and so each must be regarded as comprehending both the aspects of reality. Those who hold that *jñāna* comprehends only the particular features while *darśana* comprehends only the universal ones are criticized as upholding wrong conception of the nature of *jñāna* and *darśana*. A particular without the universal is a figment, and so the knowledge which comprehends a particular bereft of the universal is invalid, nay unreal. Similarly the intuition of a universal without the particular is also unreal. Vīrasena thus maintains that each of the two, *jñāna* and *darśana*, comprehends reality as it is, that is, a complex of universal-cum-particular, the difference between them consisting in the fact that a *jñāna* knows the external reality while a *darśana* intuits the internal self. *Darśana* is *antarmukha* (turned inside, introvert) while *jñāna* is *bahirmukha* (turned outside, extrovert). If the *jñāna* knows the external world *darśana* intuits the internal self. The internal reality is as much a complex of universal-cum-particular as an external entity. Thus the object of both a *jñāna* and a *darśana* is a complex of universal-cum-particular. Brahmadeva in his *Vṛtti* on the *Dravyasaṅgraha* of Nemicaṇḍra upholds a similar position. In his commentary on *Dravyasaṅgraha*, *gāthā* 43, he recognizes the *darśana* as intuition of a universal characteristic. But in his commentary on *gāthā* 44, he distinguishes two views—(1) according to logic (*tarkābhīprāyeṇa*), and (2) according to scripture (*śāhāntābhīprāyeṇa*). The usual view of *darśana* as intuition of the universal, for instance *sattā* (existence), is referred to as according to logic. The conception of *darśana* according to the scripture is given as follows: Awareness or vision of one's self, consisting in the striving for the genesis of knowledge in its wake, is *darśana* 'intuition' and the subsequent determinate knowledge of the external object is *jñāna*. The soul knows as well as intuits much in the same way as fire burns as well as illumines. The selfsame consciousness is called *darśana* as well as *jñāna* with reference to the difference of its object. It is called *darśana* when it is engaged in intuiting the self, and *jñāna* when engaged in knowing the non-self. Knowledge would lose its validity if it were admitted that *darśana* and *jñāna* are confined to the comprehension respectively of the universal and the particular exclusively. The ground given is the same as already mentioned by us. Now as *jñāna* and *darśana*, viewed from the transcendental point of view, are identical with the self, it can be said that the self itself, being of the nature of knowledge free from all doubt, delusion and error, is the ultimate organ of knowledge. *Darśana* and *jñāna* thus ultimately lose their identity in the self. Brahmadeva gives yet another explanation of this twofold interpretation of *darśana*. He says that the *sāmānya-viśeṣa* (universal-particular) relation of *darśana* and *jñāna* is for the non-Jaina logicians who are unable to understand the real significance. For those of subtle intelligence, however, the other explanation which is in strict accordance with the scripture is propounded. It is to be noted in this connection that all these proponents of the new conception belong to the *Digambara* school. So far as our knowledge goes, we do not find any *Śvetāmbara* exponent of this conception. Among the *Digambaras* also, only the above-mentioned thinkers propound the theory, the other great thinkers unanimously admitting the *sākāra-anākāra* (determinate-indeterminate) relation between *jñāna* and *darśana*. Of course, it has not been possible for me to examine the whole relevant literature on the subject and so my above remark may be liable to contradiction. But in view of the fact that such great exponents as Pūjyapāda, Samaṇtabhadra, Akalaṅka and Vidyānaṇḍī unanimously accepted the conception, we can, with confidence, say that there was little controversy regarding the *sākāra-anākāra* (determinate-indeterminate) relation of *jñāna* and *darśana* among the *Digambara* thinkers as well. We do not know whether there is any basic affinity between the *upayoga-paśyattā* conception of the *Prajñāpanā Sūtra* and the apparently original theory of Kuṇḍakuṇḍa and others. In spite of the explanation of Malayagiri regarding the distinction between *upayoga* and *paśyattā*, we are not sure of the original relation between the two. It is also a problem to be decided whether there is any affinity between *paśyattā* and *darśana*. It is a difficult problem and I confess my inability to solve it ad hoc.

Now we come to the problem of the temporal relation between *jñāna* and *darśana*. *Jñāna* and *darśana*

are conscious activities, and it is an *Āgamic* principle that two conscious activities cannot occur simultaneously. The *Āvaśyaka Nirvṛtti* says that (even) the *Kevalins* (the omniscient) cannot have two conscious activities simultaneously. The *Āgamās*, therefore, unanimously admit the impossibility of the simultaneous occurrence of *jñāna* and *darśana*.

QUESTION

1. Write comprehensive note on the nature of *darśana*.
2. (i) What do you understand by *upayogalakṣaṇo jīvaḥ*?
(ii) What do you know by *cetanāvyāpārayogaḥ*?
3. Explain very shortly—
 - (i) Knowledge is determinate
 - (ii) Intuition is indeterminate
 - (iii) *Darśana* as confined to present only
 - (iv) *Darśana* as apprehension of generic character.
4. Fill in the blanks.
 - (i) *Darśana* is the of a particular object without knowing its particularity.
 - (ii) The direct cognition is
 - (iii) *Darśana* represents the view-points of universality and *jñāna* that of
 - (iv) *Darśana* is the first two stages of *matī* and
 - (v) is *Darśana* while the subsequent stages of *īkā* etc. are

LESSON 4

JAINA THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

Mati-jñāna (Sensuous Cognition)

We have seen that the *upayoga* (consciousness or cognitive activity) is of two kinds:

1. *Sākāra*- determinate i.e. knowledge (*jñāna*)
2. *Anākāra*- indeterminate i.e. intuition (*darśana*)

So far as determinate knowledge is concerned it is of five kinds in Jainism. The five kinds are as follows:

Matijñāna (Empirical Knowledge) *Śrutajñāna* (articulate knowledge) (Clairvoyance) *Avadhi-jñāna*, (*Manah-paryaya*) Mind-reading and (*Kevalajñān*) Omniscient.

Now we deal with the first type of knowledge, i.e., *Mati-jñāna* general known as sensuous cognition or empirical knowledge. "The perceptual cognition 'depending on verbal symbol' is of four kinds sensation, speculation judgment and retention."

Definition

It is Umāsvāti who gives for the first time the definition of *Matijñāna* i.e. sensuous cognition. Of course, he does not state anything new. He only gathers up the scattered views of the scriptures in a logical way. He defines *Matijñāna* as 'knowledge caused by the senses and the mind.' It is rather a statement of the condition of *Mati-jñāna* than a definition proper. But it serves quite well the purpose of a definition. It further states the two varieties viz., (1) knowledge born of senses and (2) knowledge born of mind, as the author himself informs us in his auto-commentary.

Mati-jñāna is usually known as *ābhinibodhika-jñāna* i.e. perceptual cognition in the *Āgamās*. It belongs to the category of indirect cognition (*parokṣa*) inasmuch as it is born with the help of the sense-organs and the mind. Of course, the scriptures *Anuyogadvāra* and *Nandī*, recognize the knowledge born of the five senses as *indriya-pratyakṣa* i.e. sensuous direct knowledge and Jinabhadra designates the knowledge born of the senses and the mind as *Samvyaavahāra-pratyakṣa* i.e. empirical perception. But that is only by way of concession to popular usage as is clear from the use of the word '*Samvyaavahāra*' by Jinabhadra. Ācārya Umāsvāti, however, is definitely opposed to this concession. The recognition of *indriya-pratyakṣa* is only a later addition, and this extraneous character of it is proved by the fact that the knowledge born of the senses and the mind is also recognised as *Mati-jñāna* (sensory knowledge) which is always counted under the category of *parokṣa* (indirect knowledge). The Jaina thinkers are unanimous in ascribing the status of knowledge to the *Mati-jñāna* and the *Śruta-jñāna* (scriptural knowledge). When *pratyakṣa* is subdivided into the categories of *indriya-pratyakṣa* and *no-indriya-pratyakṣa* i.e. non-sensuous direct knowledge, *Avadhi* (visual intuition), *Manah-paryāya* (intuition of the mental modes) and *Kevala* (perfect knowledge) are put under the latter while the knowledge born of any of the five senses is counted under the former category.

Out of the five types of knowledge the last three are related with pure intuition. They are attained as super-natural powers and not through psychological process. It is *Matijñāna* that covers the whole range of cognition as far as modern psychology is concerned. The entire process beginning with contiguity of sense and the object, upto the sub-conscious impressions which are capable of rising again in the form of memory are included into this type of knowledge. All varieties of profane knowledge, perceptual or conceptual, termed and classified differently by different systems are included in it.

The Synonyms of *Mati-jñāna*

Mati-jñāna covers all types of knowledge related with the epistemology and logic. Its subdivisions include all varieties of sensual as well as mental cognitions. Synonyms of it indicated in different texts endorse the very fact. According to Bhadrabahu's *Niryukti* the synonyms of *ābhinibodhika* are: *īhā* (speculation), *apoha* (exclusion), *vimarśa* (enquiry), *mārgaṇā* (searching), *gaveṣaṇā* (fathoming), *saṃjñā* (recognition), *smṛti* (memory), *mati* (sensuous cognition), and *pragya* (wisdom). *Tattvārtha Sūtra* mentions only *Mati* (sensuous cognition), *smṛti* (recollection), *cintā* (thought), *ābhinibodha* (perceptual cognition) as synonymous.

Mati takes stock of a present objective datum; recollection (*smṛti*) has reference to a datum perceived in the past; recognition (*saṃjñā*) is the cognition of the identity of its past object of perception with the present; though (*cintā*) is the cognition of a future event. All these different varieties of cognition are regarded as identical in spite of the difference of determinations, because the substantive object is the same. *Ābhinibodha* is a cognition competent to take stock of an object with all its temporal determinations as past, present and future. The different varieties are only synonyms because they all agree in respect of the identical object. *Mati-jñāna* is a comprehensive class which includes a large variety. Thus, for example, there are purely sensuous cognitions, purely mental cognitions and cognitions which are generated by both the senses and the mind. The sensuous cognition of animals, beginning with the one-sensed and ending with the five-sensed, but destitute of the mind, are purely sensuous. Recollection and instinctive intuition (*agha-jñāna*) are purely mental. The normal cognitions of beings endowed with the mind are generated by the co-operation of the mind and the senses.

Umāsvāti gives these five synonyms explaining the range of *Mati-jñāna*. He states that *mati*, *smṛti*, *saṃjñā*, *cintā* and *ābhinibodha* are identical in sense. Accurately speaking they are not synonyms with the same denotation, but different regions of the field covered by *Mati*. Umāsvāti means that none of the varieties of knowledge expressed by these synonyms goes beyond the sphere of *Mati*. All of them are covered by it. But the commentator Siddhasena Gaṇī differentiates the above terms as follows.

- (i) *Mati*—The cognition generated by the senses and the mind and apprehending the present only.
- (ii) *Smṛti*—Memory, the mental revival of the past impressions.
- (iii) *Samjñā*—Recognition. The cognition of the object already known, but presented again.
- (iv) *Cintā*—Hypothetical judgement.
- (v) *Ābhinibodha*—The general terms for all types of the above mentioned and other varieties. It cognizes all the three times.

Pūjyapāda Devaṇāṇḍī, the author of *Sarvārthasiddhi*, does not supplement the synonyms of *Mati* as given by Umāsvāti. Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka interprets *ābhinibodha* as inference. In other respects he agrees with Siddhasena Gaṇī. He supplements the list by *pratibhā* (grasp), *buddhi* (intellect) and *upalabdhi* (perception), and refers to others by using the term *etcetera* (*ādī*). Vidyānāṇḍī in his *Tattvārthasloka-vārttika*, however, adds *adabuddhi* (intellect), *medhā* (retentiveness), *pragyā* (reasoning), *pratibhā* (grasp), *abhāva* (non-perception), *sambhāva* (probability) and *upamiti* (analogy) to the synonyms given by Umāsvāti.

In this connection the view of Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka deserves special attention. Akalaṅka, in his '*Laghīyastaya*', divides *pramāṇa* (valid organ of knowledge) into *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa* and recognizes *pratyakṣa* as twofold, viz; *mukhya* (transcendental) and *sāmyavahārīka* (empirical). The two are also called *atindriya-pratyakṣa* (super-sensuous intuition) and *indriyānindriya-pratyakṣa* (sensuous and quasi-sensuous perception) respectively. *Avagraha*, *īhā*, *Avāya* and *Dhāraṇā* are subsumed under *indriya-pratyakṣa* while *Smṛti*, *Samjñā*, *Cintā* and *Ābhinibodha* are put under *anindriya-pratyakṣa* (quasi-sensuous or mental perception). *Śruti-jñāna* (scriptural knowledge), *Arthāpatti* (presupposition), *Anumāna* (inference), *Upamāna* (analogy) etc. are put under *parokṣa*. *Mati-jñāna*, thus, is recognized as *pratyakṣa*. Memory, recognition, discursive

thought etc. are cases of *mati-jñāna* so long as they are not associated with language. They come under *Śrutajñāna* as soon as they are associated with word, and as such they become *parokṣa*. No other Jaina thinker has tried to subsume memory, recognition, discursive thought etc. under *pratyakṣa*. Akalaṅka stands alone in this respect.

Here Siddhasenagaṇī attempts to distinguish three categories of *Matijñāna*, viz; (1) exclusively due to the sense-organs (*indriya*), (2) exclusively due to the mind (*anindriya*), and (3) due to the joint activity of the senses and mind. Umāsvāti cites the cognition of sense-data; viz, (touch) *sparsa*, etc. as instances of *matijñāna* due to sense-organs. Knowledge independent of the activity of the sense-organs is called 'knowledge due to *anindriya* (non sensuous).' Thus knowledge which involves the activity of the mind alone falls under this category. Similarly, instinctive incipient intuitions of the plant world as well as the undeveloped animal organisms, which are independent of both the sense-organs and the mind, also fall under it. The commentator Siddhasena Gaṇī distinguishes an additional category comprising cognitions born of the joint activity of the mind and the senses. But this is also implied in the statement for the auto commentary. Thus in all there are four categories of *matijñāna*, viz; (1) cognition without the help of both mind and senses, (2) cognition due to the activity of the senses alone (2) cognition due to the activity of the mind alone, and (4) cognition due to the joint of the mind and the senses. One fact is to be noticed here. All cognitions are nothing but different states of the soul and as such are only cases of emergence and not origination proper. They depend upon the activity of the soul alone, the senses and the mind being only auxiliary conditions.

Mati covers all the stages of acquisition, conservation and elaboration, accepted by the modern psychology as the stages of thinking. These stages are only a logical assumption. They are hardly felt distinct from the another in our common experience. Sometimes, our mind works so abruptly that one sensation and mention in a particular case. But the sensation does not reach the stage of knowledge unless it is interpreted, understood or given a mental arrangement. The function of interpretation or understanding is generally known as intellectuation. The back-ground of this intellectuation is based on the material supplied by the person himself or some other person. When a child is born he is not able to understand anything. Gradually, his intellect develops either on his own experiences or instruction for mother persons. The instructions are either oral or through books. The main difference between the two bases of intellectual development is, that the former is automatic and experimental. The second is derived and indirect.

The *Nandī* divides *Mati* into two varieties of *Śruta-niśrūta* and *Aśruta-niśrūta* on the abovementioned two grounds. The intellectuation based on scriptures of other kinds of instructions is *Śruta-niśrūta* and that based on other sources is *Aśruta-niśrūta*. Malayagiri defines *Śruta-niśrūta* as the cognition of a person with the intellect developed through the study of scriptures. The latter are not recollected at the time of cognition; but function as assimilated in the mental set up. On the other hand, if they are remembered at the time of cognition as authorities, the resulting knowledge would be *śruta* and not *mati*.

The natural capability of mind to strike at the right solution or exact point without the previous knowledge of scriptures is *Aśruta-niśrūta*. It is the direct result of *kṣayaopasama* attained through birth (*utpatti*), self-discipline (*vinaya*), practice (*karma*) and rationality (*pariṇāma*).

Some Historical Remarks

The above division of *Śruta* and *Aśruta-niśrūta* is not found in the *Digambara* tradition. In the *Śvetāmbarās* also it is not found in the *Bhagavatī*, *Prajñāpanā*, *Niryuktis* and *Anuyogadvāra*. It is the *Nandī* which refers to it for the first time. In the *Bhagavatī* and *Āvaśyaka-Niryukti* four *buddhis* are described without their relation with *mati*. They are not specifically mentioned as related to any for the five types of knowledge. The *Śruta-jñāna* at that time was confined to scriptural knowledge only. Consequently, these examples of wits, generally associated with unlettered person, could not be created as *Śruta*. So, it appears that the author of *Nandī* tried to include them in *Mati* through the above mentioned device.

The Division of *Śruta Nīṣṛita*

The two-fold division of *Aśruta-nīṣṛita* and *Aśruta-nīṣṛita* was introduced by the author of *Naridī*. If this division is not taken into consideration *Matijñāna* is directly divided into the four varieties of *Avagraha*, *īhā*, *Avāya* and *Dhāraṇā*. This division is common with the *Śvetāmbara* as well as *Digambara*. It expresses the psychological process of knowing as admitted by the Jainās. If we consider the sphere of *Aśruta-nīṣṛita* along with *Aśruta-nīṣṛita* we can say that *Matijñāna* covers the whole field of sensuous cognition.

Avagraha (Sensation)

Sensation means cognition of a generic character in the wake of the intuition of the contact between the sense and the object.

There occurs sensation, that is, cognition of the pure general character without the manifestation of any particular characteristic of the contact due to the situation of the sense-organ and the object at a proper place etc. In the wake of this there occurs the indeterminate cognition of the general character (of the) object. This is called '*avagraha*' or sensation.

According to the Jaina psychology of knowing, the cognitive process begins with *Darśana* and ends with *Dhāraṇā*. There are three middle stages of *Avagraha*, *īhā* and *Avāya*. The stage of judgement is reached in *Avāya* the first two stages comprise in awareness and the inclination towards a judgement. The stage of *Avagraha* appears immediately after *Darśana*. Its conception, there, varies according to the views about *Darśana*.

According to the general view, *Darśana* is the first cognitive stage appearing after contiguity of the senses and the object. Puṇyapāda, Akalaṅka and all scholars of the logical school have accepted this view. Accordingly *Avagraha* is not a mere awareness. This stage is already covered by *Darśana*. *Avagraha* goes one step further towards apprehension of the particularity.

According to Vīrasena, *Darśana* is the first inclination of the soul, for knowing it does not refer to any external object. It puts the senses at work. According to this view *avagraha* means the stage of contiguity, which is closely followed by the first awareness of the external existence, known as *arthāvagraha*. The process of particularization begins with *īhā*.

According to the first view, *Avagraha* is defined as the cognition of object, following the general awareness of mere existence appearing at the contiguity of the sense-organ with the object. It holds that in the stage of *Avagraha* one is able to make a distinction whether the object is a sound or colour. This view is open to certain difficulties. The *avagraha*, as will be seen later on, is divided in two stages of *Vyañjanāvagraha* and *arthāvagraha*. The first stage is the contact of the senses with the object.

This stage cannot be explained in any other way; as its four-fold division, i.e. the exclusion of visual sense and mind from its sphere, points out clearly that it is nothing but the contact between the two. It would mean that the stage of *Avagraha* begins with the contact and *Darśana* comes after it; which is against the established order.

Secondly, the particularization is always preceded by a doubt, having an equal balance on two or more alternatives, then there is the stage of leaning towards one side followed by the stage of judgment. We cannot make the cognition of first particularity an exception to this rule. If *Avagraha* is admitted as cognition of first particularity it also must be preceded by *īhā* i.e. doubt and speculation.

The second view dominates the *Āgamika* literature. Umāsvāti, Siddhasena Gaṇī and Jinabhadra support it. The examples of a sleeping man and the earthen pot fresh from the oven as expressed in *Naridī*, support the same. According to this view *Avagraha* is the first awareness of external existence, without any distinction of sound, colour etc. All particulars in this stage lie unmanifest. The first stage towards the realization of particularity begins with *īhā*.

The process of cognition as admitted by the above mentioned two views can be placed as follows:

1. Contact: *Darśana*: *Avagraha*: *īhā* etc.
2. *Darśana*: contact: *Avagraha*: *īhā* etc.

According to the second view contact is a stage of *Avagraha*, known as *Vyañjanāvagraha*.

The Synonyms of *Avagraha*

The scripture *Naridī* gives synonyms of *avagraha* as *avagrahana* (receiving), *upadhāraṇa* (holding), *śravaṇa* (hearing), *Avalambana* (grasping), and *medhā* (gradual awareness). Umāsvāti, however, gives the following synonyms: *avagraha* (receiving), *graha*, *ghrahaṇa*, *ālōcanā* (intuition) and *avadhāraṇā* (holding).

Avagraha can be of two kinds, viz; *vyañjanāvagraha* (contact-awareness) and *arthāvagraha* (object-perception). *Naridī* does not clearly define *avagraha*, but only clarifies the implication by illustrations. It seems to quote *Āvaśyaka Nirṇyukti* of Bhadrabāhu which defines *avagraha* as 'cognition of sense-data' (*atthāṇam uggahāṇam*). It also states that *avagraha* is instantaneous, that is, it lasts only for one instant which is an infinitesimal and further indivisible point of time, beyond ordinary human conception.

But it is to be understood that this instantaneousness relates to *arthāvagraha* and not to *vyañjanāvagraha* which continues for an (countless) *asamkhyeya* number of instants, gradually proceeding towards the plane of consciousness. Suppose, for instance, that a man is asleep and is to be awakened by call. The sound, which the Jaina thinkers regard as composed of material atoms, of the call reaches his ears and he is awakened. But the sound-atoms reach his ears in succession and countless instants elapse before the ears are sufficiently saturated with these atoms so that the person may be awakened to consciousness. As soon as the person becomes conscious, *Vyañjanāvagraha* is over as then there occurs *arthāvagraha* which lasts, as has already been stated, only for one instant.

The *Vyañjana* means "the sensation in respect of the sense and the object." *Avagraha* means the indeterminate cognition of the objects such as sound and the like through *vyañjana* which is of the nature of the contact between the object and the sense-organ. There occurs in the trail of this sensation another sensation called *arthāvagraha*, which cognizes the object a little more distinctly, thought devoid of the concepts of class, substance and attributes. This is a judgement like 'there exists something.'

The term '*vyañjana*' bears two senses. The first is 'contact of the object with the external sense'. This has been stated in the gloss. On account of this contact with the object quā touch, smell, colour etc., fit to be perceived, there takes place an indeterminate cognition. This contact is also a sort of indistinct sensation and as such must be cognizant of an object. The object is also called *vyañjana*. So, the expression *Vyañjanāvagraha* is to be expounded as the cognition of a *vyañjana*, that is a perceptible object, such as sound, colour, etc. through *vyañjana*, that is, the contact of the sense with the object. The expression *Vyañjanāvagraha*, thus, means the cognition of *vyañjana* through *vyañjana*.

The idea is that material object first comes into contact with the sense-organ and this evokes corresponding consciousness. This is called contact. It is the condition of the object perception which, though slightly more developed than the former is indistinct and indeterminate as it does not take note of the specific characteristic of the object. This specific perception is perceptual judgement, say of eye. To sum up, first, there is sense-object contact which is also a kind of cognition.

The second stage is the perceptual intuition of the object in its generic character. The cognition is of the form-It is something. The third stage is speculation. The fourth is perceptual judgment, that is, cognition of the object with its specific character. This is called the determinate cognition by the *Naiyāyika* and the Buddhist. It is further to be noted that *vyañjana* quā sense-object contact is regarded as the condition of cognition and not a sort of cognition in the *Nyāya* school. In Jaina epistemology, this contact is also regarded as cognitive. This is the peculiar theory of Jaina epistemology.

The Division of *Avagraha*

Avagraha is divided into two kinds, viz; *arthāvagraha* and *Vyāñjanāvagraha*.

Vyāñjanāvagraha

Vyāñjanāvagraha means the contact between senses and the object leading to the manifestation of the later. By senses we mean here the internal physical senses (*antarmūrti*), which possess the power of cognition. The term '*Vyāñjana*' has three meanings: The senses, the object to be cognized and the contact between the two. The third is known as *Vyāñjanāvagraha*.

Vyāñjanāvagraha is not absolutely without knowledge as it supplies matter to *arthāvagraha* which is knowledge without any doubt. *Vyāñjanāvagraha* results into *arthāvagraha*. If it were without any knowledge it cannot transform into a knowledge. *Jñāna* i.e. knowledge does not necessarily mean a cognition but, also its cause. Jinabhadra suggests another explanation also. He says that a thin ray of knowledge exists in *Vyāñjanāvagraha* as well, but is unmanifest on account of its dimness. A single ray of light cannot appear distinctly in thick darkness. The contact, in the case of a deaf does not result into cognition, nor it contains even the thinnest ray of knowledge. Consequently, it cannot be accepted as *Vyāñjanāvagraha*. It means that *Vyāñjanāvagraha* is a contact of the object with living senses only.

Jinabhadra replies that 'unmanifest' does not mean, here, that the thin ray of knowledge is unmanifest even to its own extent. It is always manifest to the extent of its size. But that manifestation is so feeble that we cannot realize it. It is just like the cognition of a sleeping or unconscious person. He is not aware of his own sensation. When awakes he expresses total absence of knowledge during sleep or senselessness. But we cannot say that knowledge was totally absent in those conditions. During sleep also some persons utter meaningful sentences, reply to the calls in a general way and move their limbs. These functions are not possible in total absence of knowledge. After all they are reactions of certain stimuli which are a kind of knowledge. They are never seen in inanimate things like stones and bricks. But knowledge at that time is so obscured by slumber that it is realized neither at that time nor afterwards.

In the waking state we do not realize all the impressions or sensations, changing every moment. It is only the strong feelings and distinct apprehensions, that we are aware. Many others come and go without invoking any attention. Similarly, *Vyāñjanāvagraha* also is indistinct on account of its feebleness. But, it cannot be excluded from the category of knowledge.

As a matter of fact knowledge is a long process gradually advancing towards judgement and confirmation. It begins with the contact and gets completion in the stage of judgement. The first judgement is again scrutinized and results into discrimination. This process goes on as long as the cognizer does not divert his attention. It is difficult to hold any of the middle stages as knowledge and reject others. If the preceding stage is not knowledge, it cannot result into knowledge subsequently. The particles of sand, which do not possess oil in any degree, cannot produce it even when assembled in a big quantity. The oil-seeds can do so, only because they possess oil in single grain also, however scanty it may be. Nothing can be produced in later stages which is not possessed by a thing in the first stage. This principle holds good in the case of knowledge also. If the first moment, i.e. the contact, is not knowledge, it cannot develop into knowledge even in the succeeding stages. So, *Vyāñjanāvagraha* must be accepted as knowledge.

Moreover, *Vyāñjanāvagraha* lasts for a duration of innumerable moments. Changing into *arthāvagraha* at the last moment. We cannot say that knowledge appeared suddenly at the last state. It is an accumulation of the impressions taken in the innumerable moments. There is no instant without putting its mark. As the cloth is produced by all the threads constituting it, one cannot say, that the last thread is cloth and the others are not. Similarly, impressions of all the instants combined make a knowledge. They cannot be divided into two groups, one as knowledge and the other as not knowledge.

Arthāvagraha

Vyañjanāvagraha is mainly related with the function of senses, without producing any appreciable result in respect of grasping the object. The first moment, when the cognizer becomes aware of the external existence, is *arthāvagraha*. It lasts for a moment only. Jinabhadra describes it as a cognition of generality without any mixture of particularity, free from connotation and classification. The cognizer does not know even the nature of object, whether it is visible, audible or the object or some other sense. It results the subsequent stage into speculation of particularity.

The *Nandī* includes classification of sound, colour etc. into *arthāvagraha*. Jinabhadra explains away the contradiction in the following way:

In *arthāvagraha* sound or colour etc. are apprehended in a general way, i.e. not as sound or colour, but merely as an external existence. The object is the same in all stages beginning from *Avagraha* upto the judgement. None can say that *Avagraha* does not have sound or colour as its object. The difference amongst the successive stages is that they gradually advance towards particularization. *Avagraha* is the starting point of external awareness. It does not go beyond the most general form of mere existence. He contends further that the cognition of sound as sound is a judgement i.e. *Avāya* and not *Avagraha*. If it is admitted as the first stage, *Avagraha* and *īhā* will have no scope. Moreover, the cognition of this is 'sound' implies the exclusion of colour etc. which is clearly a knowledge of particularity.

It can be argued that the cognition of sound as sound is *Avagraha* and not *Avāya*, because in the stage of *Avāya* we go a step further towards particularity. In that stage we cognize the particulars also, whether the sound emanates from a horn or conch. Thus, the difference between the two lies in degree of awareness and not quality.

Now the question is whether this object-perception is determinate or indeterminate. Contact-awareness, as we have seen, is only stirring of the consciousness. It is only awakening of consciousness. Of the five sense-organs, the sense-organ of sight is incompetent for contact-awareness as much as there is no physical contact between this sense-organ and its object. On the same ground the mind (*mānas*) is also incompetent for contact-awareness. Thus there can be only four types of it, there being left only four sense-organs, viz; ear, taste, smell and touch competent to have contact-awareness. Thus, there can be only four types of it, there being left only four sense-organs viz; ear, taste, smell and touch competent to have contact-awareness. Object-perception, however, is possible by all the five sense-organs as well as the mind, and consequently can be of six types. According to Umāsvāti and Jinabhadra, both of whom are staunch supporters of *Āgamika* conceptions, *Avagraha* is indeterminate cognition. So far as our knowledge goes, among the later Jaina logicians there has been none to uphold this old position, except Siddhasena Gaṇī, the commentator of Umāsvāti's *Tattvārtha Sūtra-Bhāṣya*, and Upādhyāya Yaśovijaya of the seventeenth century, who has only summarized the arguments of Jinabhadra in his *Jaina Tarka Bhāṣya*. Thus, our enquiry will be based on the works of Umāsvāti, Jinabhadra, Siddhasena Gaṇī and Yaśovijaya. We shall refer to the works of Pūjyapāda Devanandī, Akalaṅka, Vidyānandī, Vādī Devasūri and Hemacandra only by way of contrast. Here we are mainly concerned with the *Āgamika* conception and as such should leave the details of the theories of the later logicians out of account in the present context.

Umāsvāti defines *avagraha* as 'indeterminate intuitional cognition of their respective objects by the sense-organs. The *avagraha* cognizes only the general features of an object. It is indeterminate. The distinctive characteristics of the object are not cognized by it. The object presented in it is indeterminate and free from association with names. The *Nandī Sūtra* cites the sound-consciousness of a man just awakened from sleep by hearing the sound as an example of *arthāvagraha* (object-perception) by the sense-organ of ear. The man is conscious of some sound, but he does not cognize the definite nature of the sound at this stage. According to Jinabhadra, the consciousness of such a person has not even taken the form of 'This is sound' inasmuch as the

cognition 'This is sound' is determinate and discursive and requires more than one instant for developing such form which is possible only in the third stage called *apāya* (perceptual judgement). The *arthāvagraha* (object-perception), being instantaneous, cannot be considered to have developed such a form. The object of *arthāvagraha* is some common feature, indefinite and devoid of any individual characteristic, name etc.

What then is the exact nature of *arthāvagraha*? Object-perception is the consummation of *vyāḥjanāvagraha* (contact-awareness) and as such can be properly understood only when the nature of the later is properly understood. Now what is *vyāḥjana*? What reveals an object even as lamp reveals a jar is *vyāḥjana*. It is the relation of the physical senseorgan with the substance transformed into its sense-data such as sound (atoms). The *vyāḥjanāvagraha* is not unconscious inasmuch as it is this that finally develops into *arthāvagraha* (object-perception).

Yaśovijaya, however, concedes as an alternative that *vyāḥjanāvagraha* is a cognition only by transference of epithet, being the condition of *arthāvagraha* which is a cognition. The consciousness is there from the very instant of inception, though it is not felt due to its undeveloped existence. It is not possible for any ordinary man to know all the contents of the mind even when he is wide awake, inasmuch as a countless number of conscious states emerge during the course of a single day. Let us now come to *arthāvagraha* (object perception).

The *Nandī Sūtra* states in the last instant of the *vyāḥjanāvagraha* (contact-awareness) there emerges a cognition such as 'The is sound' though the exact nature of the sound is not cognized there. This is called *avagraha*. Jinabhadra interprets this statement as recording only the occurrence of the cognition and not its specific content. The *arthāvagraha* (object-perception) but *Avāya* (perceptual judgement) inasmuch as it is determinate cognition having 'the exclusion of every thing else other than sound' as its characteristic. Jinabhadra refutes at great length the position of the opponent who regards *arthāvagraha* (object-perception) as determinate cognition. We do not know of any logic treatise, prior to the *Viśeṣāvyākabhāṣya* of Jinabhadra, which regards *avagraha* as determinate cognition, except the *Sarvāthasiddhi* of Pūjyapāda. Devanādi, which defines *avagraha* as 'first cognition after the instant of the contact of the object and the sense-organ and further says 'On the contact of the object and the sense-organ, there occurs intuition (*darśana*) and the cognition of the object thereafter is *avagraha*, for instance the cognition 'The is white colour' by the organ of sight is *avagraha*. The *Sarvāthasiddhi* regards *vyāḥjanāvagraha* (contact-awareness) as 'indeterminate' and *arthāvagraha* (object-perception) as 'determinate.' Jinabhadra, however, as an exponent of the *Āgamika* conceptions, insists on the indeterminateness of *avagraha*. He is not prepared to allow the least reference even to a relative particular in *avagraha*, because even relative particularity is enough to put it into the category of *apāya* (perceptual judgement). If relative particularity is the criterion of the status of *avagraha*, then the possibility of *apāya* (perceptual judgement) will be ruled out inasmuch as in that case only cognition of a particular characteristic will be a case of *avagraha*, there being always available a cognition of a still more particular characteristic. It is not possible to ascertain all particulars of an entity even in the course of very long time. An entity reveals more and more specific characteristic along with the advancement of our knowledge. It is therefore, more logical to concede the status of *avagraha* only to those cognitions which are to tally free from even negligible reference to some particular characteristic. The cognition that contains the least particular as its content is *apāya* (perceptual judgement), and not *avagraha*. Jinabhadra quotes the view of some thinkers who held that the *avagraha* of a new-born child cognizes only the general features while that of a person sufficiently familiar with the objects cognizes the particular characteristics even in one single instant. But he refutes the view on the ground that it will entail the postulation of an indefinite number of *avagrahās* each varying according to the richness of the knowledge of the cognizer. The richer the knowledge of a person the more will be the number of particular characteristics cognized in his *avagraha*. But this is certainly a fantastic position. Jinabhadra further quotes an opinion which regarded *avagraha* as bringing up the rear of *ālōcanā* (intutional cognition) which cognizes the general feature (*sāmānya*) and as cognizing its object as excluded from everything else.

He criticizes the theory on the grounds already given and says that this *ālocanā* (intuition cognition) cannot be identified with *vyāñjanāvagraha* (contact- awareness) inasmuch as the latter has none as its object while the former has 'general feature' as its object. It can, therefore, be nothing but our *arthāvagraha* (object-perception) under different nomenclature.

Now *Avagraha*, like *īhā* (speculation), *apāya* (perceptual judgement) and *Dhāraṇā* (retention) has been characterized as 'cognizing quickly', 'cognizing slowly', 'cognizing many', than one instant and as cognizing the particular characteristics. Jinabhadra got over this difficulty by stating that these are called cases of *avagraha* only by transference of epithet (*upacārena*). A genuine (*naiścayika*) *arthāvagraha* (object-perception) lasts only for a single instant and cognizes the general feature alone. It is only by way of metaphor that an *apāya* (perceptual judgement) is called *avagraha* with reference to the succeeding *īhā* (speculation) and *apāya* (perceptual judgement). In the case of genuine *avagraha* only the general feature is cognized. Then through the process of *īhā* (speculation) and *apāya* (perceptual judgement) the cognition becomes determinate. In this determinate cognition which is an *apāya* (perceptual judgement) a particular characteristic is cognized. "Thereafter if the cognizer strives for a further specific characteristic, he has to pass through new *īhā* (speculation) to new *apāya* (perceptual judgement). In this case the former determinate cognition which was the starting point of this second process is called *avagraha* by transference of epithet. It can also be called a case of relative *avagraha*. But by no means can it be called a genuine *avagraha*. Siddhasena Gaṇī has also raised the same problem and given the same view in his commentary on the *Tattvārtha Sūtra Bhāṣya*. Upādhyāya Yaśovijaya has summarized the position of Jinabhadra very excellently in his Jaina *tarka-bhāṣā*.

Pūjyapāda Devaṇandī regards *Avagraha* as determinate cognition. It is interesting to note that all the eminent Jaina logicians such as Akalaṅka, Vidyānaṇḍī, Vādī-Devasurī and Hemacandra regard *avagraha* as determinate. Akalaṅka defines *avagraha* as 'determinate cognition of the distinctive nature of an object, following in the wake of intuitional cognition of pure existence, consequent upon the contact of the sense-organ with the object. On the contact of the sense organ with the object there arises an intuitional cognition of pure existence (*sammatra-darśanam*). This intuitional cognition then develops into determinate cognition of the object. This is called *avagraha*. Vidyānaṇḍī defines *avagraha* as the object. This is called *avagraha*. Vidyānaṇḍī defines *avagraha* as the cognition of the individuality of a thing, following in the wake of the cognition of thing in general born of the contact of the sense-organ and the object. Vādī-Devasurī defines a *avagraha* as the first cognition of an object as determined by a secondary common characteristic, born of the intuitional cognition following in the wake of sense-object contact and having pure existence as its object which follows in the wake of indeterminate intuition due to the contact of the sense-organ with the object. We thus find that these Jaina thinkers unanimously hold *avagraha* to be determinate cognition was not upheld by the Jaina logicians in view of its indefiniteness and lack of pragmatic value.

Īhā (Speculation)

"Speculation consists in the experience "this must be that." Speculation is an experience which brings up the rear of doubt "this is that or anything else" through agreement and difference in respect of a characteristic feature, for example, "it must be a sound."

This speculation constitutes the intermediate stage between indeterminate perception and determinate perceptual judgement. On the intuition of the generic character of the object, there arises an enquiry about the specific nature of the same. It occurs in the shape of problem, e.g. "Is it the touch of a snake or of a lotus-stalk?" But it ought not to be regarded as a case of doubt. Doubt is indecisive in its result. But speculation is an attitude of the mind which leads to the determination of the specific character of the object by laying emphasis upon the real characteristic that are perceived and the elimination of the unreal attributes that are not cognized.

Īhā (Speculation) follows in the wake of *avagraha* (perception). In *avagraha*, as we have seen, there is only an indeterminate cognition, or an indistinct awareness of the object. In *īhā* the object is known distinctly.

For instance, in *avagraha* (perception) a person simply hears a sound while in *īhā* he cognizes the nature of the sound also. The indistinct awareness of the *avagraha* (perception) cognizes only a part of the object while *īhā*, being a determinate cognition, cognizes the rest and strives or enquires for a particular characteristic. The process of *īhā* continues for a certain period of time, though it never reaches one much truth.

The real *avagraha* has been described as the apprehension of mere existence. The speculation of particularity starts with *īhā*, which continues upto the stage judgement (*Avāya*). It is beginning of the process of sifting, whether the object known is a sound or colour. If the cognition of first particularity is accepted as the sphere for *avagraha*, *īhā* starts with further particularization. In that case the speculation whether the sound emanates from a horn or a cown would constitute the subject-matter for the *īhā*. As a matter of fact *īhā* is a desire for knowing a thing in particularity. This particularity is not confined to a definite stage. Even after reaching the stage of the judgement of a particular type, one can desire to know further about its particular type, one can desire to know further about its particulars. Thus, *īhā* occurs not only before *Avāya* but also after it, if the cognizer continues thinking and is desirous of knowing a thing further.

We come across hundreds of things in our daily life; but only about a few of them, reach the stage the judgement. This difference cannot be explained without accepting the existence of desire, distinct or indistinct, for knowing. Even in the case of undesirable things the desire for knowing cannot be ruled out. Desire for possession is something different from that knowing. This desire is explicit in the advanced stages of knowledge. On the same ground it can be postulated in other stages also. Moreover, *īhā* is a mental contemplation on data supplied by the senses. This contemplation is not universal. Some object disappears altogether after the first sensation without leaving any mark of impression on the mind. Only those which impress the mind, favourable or unfavourable, are contemplated further till the stage of judgement. These phenomena lead us to the conclusion that a desire preceded the judgement. This desire is not of a general type, where the agent follows his freewill. It is forced upon the cognizer by sensation. The cognizer has to limit his choice within the boundaries, constructed by sensation.

The *Naradī Sūtra* gives these five as the synonyms of *īhā ābhogaṇatā* (learning towards), *mārgantā* (searching) *gaveśanātā* (fathoming) *cintā* (discursive thought) and *vimarśa* (enquiry). Umāsvāti, however, gives quite different synonyms which are: *īhā* (speculation), *īhā* (reasoning), *tarka* (reasoning), *parikṣā* (investigation), *vicāranā* (thinking) and *jijñāṣā* (enquiry). Pūjyapāda Devaṇandī defines *īhā* as the striving for a specific characteristic of the object cognized by *avagraha* (perception). The *Āvaśyaka Niryaukti* defines *īhā* as 'speculation' (*vicārānām*). Jinabhadra, commenting upon it, says *īhā* means enquiry for the distinctive feature. *Vyañjanāvagraha* (contact-awareness) is the beginning of awareness, *arthāvagraha* (object-perception) is the dawning of awareness, and *īhā* is determinate tendency towards the ascertainment of the particular nature of the object. Though *īhā* is a kind of speculation, it is to be distinguished from *saṁśaya* (doubt).

***īhā* and Doubt (*Saṁśaya*)**

It can be argued that *īhā* cannot be differentiated from doubt. Both of them are apprehension without any decision. There is a lot of difference between the two. In doubt one wavers in two or more alternatives without reaching the stage of judgement. He puts equal balance on all the alternatives. It leaves the subject in confusion. *īhā* does not waver amongst alternatives. It naturally advances towards a judgement. It prepares the ground for the latter. It speculates the nature of a thing on logical ground and inclines towards acceptance of one alternative and rejecting the others. *īhā* does not lead to perversity or confusion.

There is very fine line of distinction between *saṁśaya* (doubt) and *īhā*. According to Jinabhadra the mental state which relates to many (mutually contradictory) objects, which is stupefied owing to its incapacity for exclusion (of the false), which seems to retire into a perfectly supine condition, is noncognition (*ajñāna*) of the nature of doubt. And the mental state which strives for the ascertainment of the truth by means of reason and logic, which is destined to be successful, and which tends called *īhā*. Siddhasena Gaṇī also draws the

same line of distinction between *īhā* and *saṃśaya* (doubt). All the Jaina logicians have unanimously given the same view of *īhā* and so we do not mention their definitions separately.

Apāya or Avāya (Perceptual Judgement)

Perceptual judgement is the specific determination of the object, viz, 'this is that.' For instance it is a sound, indeed. After *īhā* (speculation) there arises *apāya* which excludes the non-existent characteristics. *īhā* (speculation) is enquiry about right and wrong. *Apāya* is ascertainment of the right and exclusion of the wrong. It, therefore, is a determinate cognition of the object. *Apāya* can be rendered as 'perceptual judgement'. *Apāya* involves determination of the existent qualities and exclusion of the non-existent qualities. For instance, when on hearing a sound one determines that the sound must be of the conch and not of the horn, because it is accompanied by such qualities as sweetness, it is a case of *apāya* (perceptual judgement). Jinabhadra quotes an opinion which regarded *apāya* as only excluding the non-existent characteristics and attributed the function of cognizing the existent characteristics to *dhāraṇā* (retention) which brings up the rear of *apāya*. He criticizes the opinion as absurd and states that whether a cognition simply excludes the non-existent characteristics or simply determines the existent characteristics or does both the function, it is *apāya* and nothing else. *Umāsvāti* gives the following synonyms of *apāya*: *apagama*, *apanoda*, *apavyadha*, *apeta*, *apagaṇa*, *apaviddha*, *apanuta* (all these expressions having the same meaning viz determinate judgement). The *Naridī Sūtra* gives these as the synonyms: *avartanātā* (limited determination), *pratyāvartanātā* (repeated determination), *Avāya* (determination), *buddhi* (*vividdha*) determination *Vijñāna* (determinate cognition). A comparison of these two sets of synonyms leads us to the hypothesis that the above opinion, as quoted and criticized by Jinabhadra on the nature of *apāya*, was upheld by those who regarded the first set as the synonyms of *apāya* quoted by Jinabhadra. Jinabhadra, however, is undoubtedly a staunch supporter of the *Āgama* conceptions, and it is apparent from the consideration of the synonyms as given by the *Naridī Sūtra* that he agrees with the view of the *Naridī Sūtra*.

Avāya is the stage of judgement where one reaches at a decision. The decision is reached after due deliberation on the points of agreement and disagreement. Just again the case of Jaina holds that both the positive as well as negative aspects, are present in all the judgements. Even in the negative judgement something is affirmed and in the affirmative judgement some alternatives. Out of them one is accepted and the other is rejected in the stage of *Avāya*. Thus a judgement is always associated with both aspects; positive as well as negative. The *Prākṛta* term *Avāya* is rendered into *Saṃskṛta* in two forms having different meanings. If it is taken to be *Apāya* the sense of negation dominates. In that case it resembles the *buddha* term. *Apoha*, if it is held as *Avāya* it carries the positive sense meaning a decision. *Umāsvāti* and these subsequent *Śvetāmbara* literature accepts the former term while *Digambara*s patronise the latter.

This controversy leads to the discussion about the factor that plays most important part in arriving at a judgement. At more weight, but the negation of the existing factor carries more weight, but the negation of the non-existing factor is not reached as yet. This is completed in the stage of *Avāya*. According to this process the positive factor is known at the stage of *īhā*, while the negative factor awaits *Avāya*, *Umāsvāti* in his *Bhāṣya* stresses upon this point and recognizes the term *Apāya* on that basis. The *Digambara* tradition, has always interpreted it as *Avāya*, in the sense that it reaches the positive aspect. In both cases both aspects must be accepted. No judgement is possible in absence of any of the two.

Dhāraṇā (Retention)

Apāya (perceptual judgement) is followed by *dhāraṇā* (retention) which means retention of the perceptual judgement for a number of instants, *saṃkhyeya* (countable) or *asaṃkhyeya* (countless)

Dhāraṇā consists in retention of the judgement already arrived at. It does not add anything new to the knowledge but helps in retaining the already acquired for a longer duration or in putting the subconscious impression that can be revived into memory.

"The persistence of the same (viz. perceptual judgement) is called retention."

Synonyms of Dhāraṇā

The synonyms of *dhāraṇā* are predisposition, trace, etc. As sensation and the like (which are four in number) are related to each of the (five) senses and the (sixth) mind, and as there is no contact-perception in the case of the eye and the mind, there can be twenty-eight ($5 \times 6 - 2 = 28$) types of perceptual cognition.

There are four varieties of perceptual cognition viz. *avagraha*, *īhā*, *avidyā*, and *dhāraṇā*. Each of them is occasioned by each of the five organs and the mind. This gives us twenty four kinds. Contact sensation is possible only of the four senses excepting the visual organ and the mind. This gives four kinds which added to the first twenty-four give the first twenty-four give the total as twenty-eight varieties.

The *Naridī Sūtra* gives the following synonyms of *dhāraṇā*: *dhāraṇā* (retention), *dhāraṇā* (holding), *sthāpanā* (placing), *pratiṣṭhā* (fixing), determination of the object, retention of the (resultant) cognition and recognition (of the object on future occasions) and gives the following synonyms: *pratipatti* (continued cognition), *avadhāraṇā* (memory), *avasthāna* (retention), *niścaya* (continued cognition), *avagama* (retention) and *avabodha* (cognition). The *Āvaśyaka Niryukti* also defines.

Avicyuti or-Fixation of attention on the same point for a long time without diversion. It is the state of cognition lasting for a longer duration without interruption. It is the absence view resembles the present *avicyavāna*.

(2) *Vāsanā* (impression)- The concentration on a subject for a long period, makes strong memory in brain impressions which can be received into memory. These impressions are known as *Vāsanā* and constitute the second variety of *Dhāraṇā*.

(3) *Smṛti* (memory)-Mental revival of the past impressions. It is effected by *Vāsanā* as state above and arise generally through sensation of the same object or its associates.

Siddhasena Gaṇī has accepted view.

Pūjyapāda Devaṇandī defines *dhāraṇā* as the condition of nonoblivion in future of what has been cognized by *Avāya* (perceptual judgement). Akalaṅka and Vidyānaṇḍī define it as the condition of recollection, which is called *saṃskāra* (impressions). This trace is not unconscious. It is like *īhā* (speculation), of the nature of knowledge, inasmuch as it is the condition of another knowledge called recollection.

Avagraha (perception), *īhā* (speculation) *Avāya* (perceptual judgement), *Dhāraṇā* (retention) each of these four can again be of six types inasmuch as it can be due to any of the five sense-organs or the mind. Thus we get four multiplied by six or twenty-four types. Again, as already state, there is *Vyañjanāvagraha* (contact-awareness) of four types. Thus in all there can be twenty-eight types. Each of these again can have following twelve different kinds of data as its objects. Thus totally there can be twenty-eight multiplied by twelve or three hundred and thirty six types of *Ābhinibodhika* or *Matī-jñāna* (sensuous cognition).

- (1) *Bahu* (many)- The apprehension of many things simultaneously by the same sense. In a concert of many musical instruments a person, with minute observation apprehends all the instruments distinctly. His cognition is known as *bahu*, i.e. grasping of many things by the same sense. In case of different senses the Jainās do not admit simultaneity. They held that two senses cannot operate simultaneously. But, the principle that two cognitions do not occur simultaneously holds good in the case of two senses as well as two things.

Consequently, the idea of *bahu* can be explain in collective sense only.

- (2) *Eka* (One)- The opposite of *Bahu* (many) is one. It means grasping one thing at a time.
- (3) *Bahuvīdha* (Qualitative plurality)-The cognition of different qualities at a time. The former division was related with the numerical plurality, while the present one refers to qualitative plurality.
- (4) *Ekavīdha* (Qualitative unity) The apprehension of one quality at a time.

- (5) *Kṣīpra* (Swift)-Grasping the object swiftly.
- (6) *Akṣīpra or maṇḍa* (Slow) Grasping an object slowly.
- (7) *Niśrīta* (Inferential)-Grasping the object through some sign or emblem or *Niśrīta* mean partly exposed.
- (8) *Aniśrīta* (non-inferential) or *anukta* means unspoken.
- (9) *Niścīta* (decisive) Grasping an object ultimately.
- (10) *Aniścīta* (unconclusive)- Grasping the object without arriving at a decision.
- (11) *Dhruva* (unfailing)- The cognitive power of a person, which never fails, which grasps the object positively when the latter comes into contiguity.
- (12) *Adhruva* (uncertain)-The power of cognition is liable to failure on certain occasions.

Some persons are gifted with such a power of keen observation that nothing can escape from it; while the others are not so keen. These two divisions are based on this fact.

Out of the above mentioned twelve varieties the first four are related with the object, while others with the cognitive power.

The Duration of *Avagraha* etc.

Vyañjanāvagraha is a contact between senses and the object. It does not produce any knowledge as the mind does not operate in it. It can last for *antarmukūrta* (duration of time more than one *āvalikā* and less than forty-eight minutes) *Naiścayika Avagraha* lasts for a moment only. *īhā* and *Avāya* last for *antarmukūrta*. Out of the three types of *Dhāraṇā*, *Avicyavana* and *smṛti* last for *Antarmukūrta*; while the third category of *vāsanā* can last for indefinite period.

The Order of Causation in *Avagraha* etc.

Yaśovijaya proposes that *avagraha* and *īhā* are cause and *Apāya* the result of knowledge. *Avicyavana* the first category of *Dhāraṇā*, is confirmation of the judgement reached in the stage of *Apāya*. The remaining two categories of *Dhāraṇā* are separate cognitions.

The Division of *Āsruta-Niśrīta*

The perceptual cognition not depending on verbal symbol falls under four categories, viz; *Autpattihikī* (intellect of instantaneous comprehension) *Vainayikī* (intellect born of faithful service) *Kārmikī* (intellect developed by practical experience) *Pāriṇāmikī* (intellect of nature experience).

The instantaneous comprehension apprehends the unseen and the unheard object.

The terms *pratibhā* and *prātibha* are its synonyms.

The second *vainayikī* is so called because it is an intellect born of training in modesty, humility and loyalty to the teacher. *Vinaya* means training in modesty etc. and the *vainayikī* intellect is born of it.

The *Kārmikī* is so called because it is an intellect developed by practical experience.

Practical experience means repeated practice, and the intellect born of such practice is called *kārmikī*.

The *Pāriṇāmikī* is so called because it is the intellect born of maturity.

Maturity means maturity in respect of age.

Some Remarks on the Four *Buddhis*

Now these *avagraha* (perception), *īhā* (speculation) etc. can be either *Śruta-Niśrīta* (backed by scriptural learning) or *aśrutaniśrīta* (not backed by scriptural learning). The *Sthānāṅga Sūtra* classifies *Mati-jñāna* into *Śrutaniśrīta* and *Aśrutaniśrīta* and subdivides each of the latter two into *arthāvagraha* and *Vyañjanāvagraha*.

It does not include *īhā*, *Avāya* and *Dhāraṇā*. But they can be understood as implies, in as much as they naturally follow in the wake of *Avagraha*. Besides, the *Sthānāṅga* could not have mentioned more than two subdivisions, inasmuch as the chapter which deals with the subject follows, as a rule, the principle of dichotomy. The *Nandī Sūtra*, however, does not subdivide *Aśrutaniśrīta* into *arthāvagraha* and *Vyañjanāvagraha*, but gives the subdivisions of *Autpattikī-buddhi*, *Kārmikī-buddhi* and *pāriṇāmikī-buddhi*. Jinabhadra gives the same view but holds that *avagraha*, *īhā* etc. are common to *Śruta-Niśrīta* and *Aśrutaniśrīta*. Of course, we do not find anything in the *Nandī Sūtra* that goes against the statement of Jinabhadra whose view seems to be a consistent development of the view given by the *Sthānāṅga Sūtra*. The *Āvaśyaka Nirṣukti* gives the four kinds of *buddhi* (intellect) in quite a different context. But there is nothing there which can contradict the claim of these *buddhis* (intellects) to be regarded as *Aśrutaniśrīta Mati-jñāna*. These *buddhis* are special gifts of nature, and are not due to education or learning and as such their claim to be *aśrutaniśrīta* is but self-evident. Jinabhadra quotes an opinion which replaced the fourfold *Vyañjanāvagraha* included in the twenty-eight types of *Mati-jñāna* by these fourfold *buddhis* in order to keep the traditional number twenty-eight intact and at the same time to find a suitable place for the four-fold *Aśruta-Niśrīta* as well.

28 Types of *Aśrutaniśrīta Matijñāna*

Sense of touch, Sense of taste, Sense of Smell, Sense of sight, Sense of sound, Mind

<i>vyañjanāvagraha</i>	X	X	X	X	X	X
4 <i>buddhis</i>	X	X	X	X	X	↓
<i>arthāvagraha</i>	↓	↓	↓	↓	↓	↓
<i>īhā</i>	↓	↓	↓	↓	↓	↓
<i>avagraha</i>	↓	↓	↓	↓	↓	↓
<i>dhāraṇā</i>	↓	↓	↓	↓	↓	↓

The *Āvaśyaka Nirṣukti*, however, does not include the fourfold *buddhis* in the twenty-eight types of *Mati-jñāna*. Nor does it recognize them as a separate type of it. The opinion quoted by Jinabhadra seems to be an attempt to accommodate the new comer in the old scheme. Of course, we do not know exactly when this new conception of *Aśrutaniśrīta mati* crept in. But undoubtedly it came after the time of Bhadrabāhu, the author of the *Āvaśyaka Nirṣukti*. Jinabhadra criticizes the opinion as unnecessary because according to him *Aśrutaniśrīta* is not a separate category but it is only a variety of *avagraha*, *īhā* etc. and as such is included in them and consequently does not need separate counting. Abhayadevasūri says that *Vyañjanāvagraha* is not possible in the case of *buddhis* (intellects), in as much as they are cases of mental perception. We have already given the reason why mind is incompetent for *vyañjanāvagraha*. Instances of *aśrutaniśrīta vyañjanāvagraha* (contact-awareness), however, are available in the cases of cognitions due to the sense-organs other than sight and mind. For the differentiation of *śrutaniśrīta* from *aśrutaniśrīta*, Jinabhadra says "That (cognition) which at present is devoid of verbal association and belongs to one whose intellect has been previously trained by the (study of the) scriptures is *śrutaniśrīta*. The opposite of it is *aniśrīta* and comprises the four *matīs* or intellects (viz. *autpattikī* etc.). The *śrutaniśrīta* is so called because the perceptual cognitions that come under it are possessed by those whose minds have been educated by the instructions of others regarding verbal usage and other sources such as scriptures, although the verbal knowledge has no direct bearing and influence upon them. The sensuous intuitions are not generated by the knowledge of language as verbal judgment (*śruta*) is. The conditions of perceptual cognitions are the same in the case of the instructed as well as the uninstructed, but the knowledge of language and the culture embodied in it enriches the content of perception by implicit or explicit association with linguistic symbols and their suggestive reference and consequently it cannot but have its effects on the capacity of cognition. The *aśrutaniśrīta* perceptions are those which are devoid of the background of previous education of the perceiver. They fall into two categories according as they are purely

mental or cases of sensuous perceptions. The former category comprises the fourfold *buddhis* (intellects) viz. *autpattiki*, *vaināyikī*, *karmajā* and *pāriṇāmikī*, each having the stages of *avagraha* (perception), *īhā* (speculation), *Avāya* (perceptual judgment) and *dhāraṇā* (retention), but never *vyañjanāvagraha* (contact-awareness). The latter category comprises cases of perceptions due to the five sense-organs including *vyañjanāvagraha* (contact-awareness) also in the cases of the sense-organs other than the eye. This is the finally developed form of the conception of aśrutarishrita *mati* (intellect) and is found in Abhayadevasuri's commentary on the *Sthānāṅga* referred to above. Let us now state in brief the meanings, with illustrations, of these fourfold buddhis (intellects).

The *Āvaśyaka Niryukti* define *autpattiki* intellect as 'the intellection which comprehends instantaneously the true nature of a thing never seen, heard of, or even reported heretofore and is crowned with unhindered success. The *Nandī Sūtra* only quotes the same definitions as those of the *Āvaśyaka Niryukti* and so we shall not refer to the *Nandī Sūtra* in order to avoid repetitions. There are given many illustrations of each of the intellects (*buddhis*) but we shall give only one instance in each case. Among the numerous instances of *autpattiki*, given by the *Āvaśyaka Niryukti*, there is one of *kukkuṭa* (cock). Once Rohaka the son of Bharata-nāṭa was asked by the king of *Avanti* to make a cock fight alone. Rohaka was quite a boy. But his instantaneous intellect suggested the solution. He put a mirror before the cock, and it began to fight with its image. Jinabhadra refers to this instance, and shows how the mind passes through the stages of *avagraha* (perception), *īhā* (speculation) etc. in such a case. How can it fight in the absence of another cock? With the image-this is *avagraha* (perception). What sort of image is most suitable? —this is *īhā* (speculation). Image reflected in a mirror-this is *apāya* (perceptual judgment). Here Jinabhadra attempts to give the psychology of solution of problems. It is by a flash of genius that the solution of a difficult problem dawns upon the mind. This is the stage of *avagraha* (perception). The intellectual application of the solution presents a number of alternatives and consequently there is speculation or inquisitive pursuit-this stage can be called *īhā* (speculation). Again there is the final settlement of the mind- this is *apāya* (perceptual judgment). Then follows *dhāraṇā* (retention).

The *vainayikī* is defined as the intellection which is capable of completing a difficult task, can comprehend the spirit and letter of the trio of *dharma* (religion), *artha* (material prosperity) and *kāma* (sensual pleasure) and is fruitful in this world as well as the world hereafter. This *buddhi* is born of humility and faithful service. The ancient literature of India abounds in stories of acquisition of high knowledge by mere faithful service of the preceptor (*guru*). This knowledge has been called *vinayasamūha* or *vainayika* (born of humility and service). The *Āvaśyaka Niryukti* refers to a story of two students of astrology, one of whom became more efficient by faithfully serving of his preceptor while the other remained stupid in spite of his learning.

The *kārmikī* or *karmasamūha* is defined as the intellection while comprehends the truth due to its attentive consciousness and breadth of vision of both the practical and the theoretical sides of actions (*karmans*) and which has received appreciation of competent critics. The intellect developed due to practical experience is called *kārmic*. People appreciate such intellect when it is extraordinarily developed. It is not learning that is responsible for the development. But it is practical experience that lies at the back of such intellect. An experienced goldsmith can easily differentiate between pure gold and an alloy, while a layman is easily deceived.

The *pāriṇāmikī* is defined as the intellection which fulfils (its purpose) by means of inference, reasoning, and analogy, which develops with the maturity of age, and which results in well being and salvation.

The common feature of all these intellects is this that none of them is inspired by learning. They are either due to spontaneous suggestion or modesty and humility, or practical experience, or natural maturity of the power of reasoning. It is on account of this common characteristic that they are called *aśrutaniśrita*.

We have now dealt with the types of *matijñāna* (sensuous cognition). It is not possible to give all the possible types. Only the most apparent ones can be enumerated. The types vary according to the nature of the perceptual cognition which can be infinitefold. Perception of the same object varies with each individual, and so its types cannot be enumerated in full.

QUESTION

Essay Type Question:

1. Write critically on the *Mati-jñāna*.

Or

What are the types of *Mati-jñāna*? Examine them critically.

Shrot Answer Questions:

1. How is *Mati-jñāna* direct and indirect both?
2. *Mati-jñāna* is known as *Ābhinibodhika* how?
3. Show the difference of *Śruta-Niśrita* and *Aśruta-Niśrita*. *Mati-jñāna*.
4. Write on the any four following subjects:
 1. *Avagraha*
 2. *Īhā*
 3. *Avāya*
 4. *Dhāraṇā*
 5. *Autpattikī Buddhi*
 6. *Vainayikī Buddhi*
 7. *Kārmikī Buddhi*
 8. *Pāriṇāmikī Buddhi*
5. Give brief commentary on the synonyms of *Mati-jñāna* on *Avagraha*.

Objective type Questions:

1. The minimum development of knowledge is in *jīvas*.
2. Complete dissolution of *jñānāvavaṇa Karmans* produce
3. Ācārya Jinabhadraṇī has called *indriya pratyakṣa* as *pratyakṣa*.
4. *Vitarkamūlaka avadhāraṇa* are
5. has 336 kinds.
6. *buddhi* is originated from continuous practice.

Reference Books

1. *Jaina Darśana Manan Aur Mīmāṃsā*, Ācārya Mahāprajña.
2. *Bhikṣu Āgama Viśaya Koṣa*, Gaṇādhipati Tulsī, Ācārya Mahāprajña, *JVB Ladnun*.
3. *Nandī*, Gaṇādhipati Tulsī, Ācārya Mahāprajña, *JVB Ladnun*.

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LESSON 5

ŚRUTA-JĪĀNA (ARTICULATE KNOWLEDGE)

The cognition capable of communicating itself to others in the way of instruction by means of material symbols is called articulate knowledge (*Śruta-jīāna*).

'Material symbols' mean word, gesture and the like. The cognition capable of communicating itself to others by means of these symbols is called articulate knowledge.

Śruta-jīāna comes second in list of the five types of knowledge. It is defined as the knowledge having *Mati* as its cause. Really, it is *Mati* with prolonged activity. *Śruta-jīāna* originally means knowledge embodied in the scriptures. Knowledge of the scriptures was also called *Śruta-jīāna*. Umāsvāti says that *Śruta-jīāna* is preceded by *Mati* (empirical knowledge) and falls into two categories viz. *aṅgabāhya* (other than the original scripture) and *aṅgapraviṣṭa* (included in the original scripture) which again are manifold and twelvefold respectively and comprise the whole of the Jaina scripture. He further says that *mati-jīāna* (empirical knowledge) cognizes only what is present while the *Śruta-jīāna* comprehends what is present, past and future. The Jainas regarded their scriptures to contain all the truths, much in the same way as the *Brāhminās* considered their *Śruti* or the *Vedās* to possess all possible such was the conception of *Śruta-jīāna* in the beginning. Three stages—

There are fourteen varieties of *Śruta-jīāna* which are concerned with linguistic symbols, rational beings, authentic knowledge, what has a beginning, what has an end, *Āgamika*, what is included in the *aṅgās*, and the opposites of all these seven.

The Subject matter of *Śruta-jīāna*

A person with *Śruta-jīāna* can know all the objects of the world, the present, past or future with all modes and states. But his cognition is indirect. He knows, but cannot perceive them. *Śruta* is not preceded by sensation or the stage of acquisition.

According to certain systems the scriptural knowledge result into intuition or perceptual knowledge. But, the Jaina does not support it. As far as the subject-matter is concerned the Jaina also holds that *śruta* is not inferior to *kevala*. The only difference between the two is that the first is indirect while the later is direct.

We have now seen how *śruta* which originally meant 'scripture' gradually came to mean any symbol, written or spoken, and finally was even identified with inarticulate verbal knowledge. This development of meaning is not, strictly speaking, chronological. It is the gradual subtlety of speculation that is responsible for this development. The selfsame thinker could have started from the conception of *śruta* as scripture and reached the conception of *śruta* as inarticulate verbal knowledge. The speculations recorded in Jaina scriptures on this subject are so rich, subtle and varied that it is difficult to ascertain the original contributions of the later Jaina authors. Almost every idea that we have been dealing with can be traced in the *Āgamās* in some form or other. Our statement about development is to be judged with this provision.

The Types of *Śruta-jīāna*

The conception of *śruta* as distinct from *Mati* has passed through three stages. In the first stage *Śruta-jīāna* means knowledge derived from the scriptures. It is divided into *Aṅgapraviṣṭa* and *Aṅgabāhya* and further subdivisions. The peculiarity of this period is that it confined *Śruta-jīāna* to the canonical literature only. It is represented by the *Sthānāṅga* and the *Tattvārtha*.

The second stage is represented by the *Niryuktis*,³ the *Naridā*⁴ and the *Viśeṣāvyaśakabhāṣya*,⁵ where

the *śruta* is divided into fourteen types of *akṣara*, *Samjñī* etc. and the whole knowledge associated with speech is included in it. In this stage *śruta* becomes a prolonged function of *Matī*. This view gained prominence in the later Jaina literature and got a general approval.

The third stage is represented by Siddhasena Divākara who rules out totally the distinction between *Matī* and *śruta*. He announces them as identical. Yaśovijaya also shows some favour for Siddhasena. This view, though somewhat reasonable did not get much favour as it went against the established tradition of the five types of knowledge. The three stages in detail in the following pages.

The *Āvaśyaka-Niryukti* says that the types of *Śruta-jñāna* are as many as the number of letters and their various combinations and as such it is not possible to enumerate all the types. It then enumerates fourteen salient characteristics of *Śruta-jñāna* as given below. Inhaling, exhaling, spitting etc. are given as instances of *anākṣaraśruta*² so far as they are indices of the mental dispositions of the person. Eight qualities of the intellect are recognized as necessary for the acquisition of *śrutajñāna*. They are desire for hearing, repeated questioning (attentive), hearing, grasping, enquiry, conviction, retention and right action.³ The *Āvaśyaka-Niryukti* thus recognizes the words as well as other symbols the acquisition of *Śruta-jñāna*. It, however, does not state the meanings of all the fourteen characteristics. It is in the *Naṇḍī Sūtra* that we find the meanings clearly states.

The *Naṇḍī* refers to following fourteen categories

- | | |
|--|---------------------------|
| 1. <i>Akṣaraśruta</i> (alphabet) | 2. <i>Anākṣaraśruta</i> |
| 3. <i>Samjñī śruta</i> (discursive or cognitive or scriptural) | 4. <i>Asamjñī śruta</i> |
| 5. <i>Samyakśruta</i> (right) | 6. <i>Mithyāśruta</i> |
| 7. <i>Sādiśruta</i> (having beginning) | 8. <i>Anādiśruta</i> |
| 9. <i>Saparyavasita</i> (having end) | 10. <i>Aparyavasita</i> |
| 11. <i>Gamika</i> (containing repletion) | 12. <i>Āgamika</i> |
| 13. <i>Aṅgapraviṣṭa</i> (included in the original scripture) | 14. <i>Anaṅgapraviṣṭa</i> |

The *Naṇḍī* divides *Śruta-jñāna* into fourteen types. Out of them the first ten are related with second stage of development. We shall discuss them in their proper place. The last four varieties are related with scriptures. They are introduced in the following two pairs: (1) *Gamika* and (2) *Āgamika*; (3) *Aṅgapaviṣṭa* and (4) *Anaṅgapaviṣṭa*.

These fourteen categories are not found in the *Digambara* literature. In the *Śvetāmbara* literature also they are mentioned for the first time by *Āvaśyaka Niryukti*. They are not referred to even in the *Tattvārtha*. But, the first two categories of *Akṣara* and *Anākṣara* are accepted by the *Digambara* also. In the karma-literature of *Śvetāmbarās* as well as the *Digambarās śruta* is described as having twenty varieties; which include the above-mentioned two. VBh refers to a *gāthā* from the *Pūrva* literature referring to the same. It appears that the fourteen categories are a development of these two. Jinabhadra has given an elaborate description of them on the basis of *Niryukti*. Akalaṅka also has mentioned them but his explanation is quite different. The detail of each category of *Śruta-jñāna* is as follows

Akṣaraśruta* and *Anākṣaraśruta

Akṣara means the symbols that express some idea. They are called *Akṣara*, because they are not destroyed even at the destruction of object. They are imperishable. The Jainās do not admit eternity of letters in the form of sound as the school of grammarians holds. The imperishability means that they last for ever, as far as their knowledge is concerned. That knowledge also exists not in the form of attention; but in the form of faculty or power (*labdhi*).

The *akṣara* is divided into vowels and consonants. The vowel is known as *svara* meaning that which sounds. The consonant is known as *vyañjana*, that which expresses. It is generally consonant that are responsible

for the expression of different meanings; while the vowels are mere sounds. Articulate sound expressing definite meaning is *Akṣaraśruta*. Inarticulate sounds with definite expressions are *Anakṣaraśruta*. Long and deep breathing expresses the state of grief, spitting expresses hatred. Similarly, coughing, nasal and such other sounds express a definite meaning. They are included into *Anakṣara śruta*. One can say that the motions of body also express some meaning. The different kinds of hand movements denote refusal, calling, threat etc. They also should be included into *Anakṣaraśruta*. Haribhadra holds that the present consideration is concerned with sound only and therefore movements are not taken into account.

In the *Naridī Sūtra*, *akṣaraśruta* is given as threefold : *saṃjñākṣara*, *vyañjanākṣara* and *labdhyākṣara*. The shape of the letter, in other words, the script or alphabet is *saṃjñākṣara*; sound of the letter, in other words, the spoken letter is *vyañjanākṣara*; *labdhyākṣara* is possessed only by one who is competent to learn alphabet (*akṣralabdhika*) and can be possible through all the five sense-organs as well as the mind. As regards *anākṣaraśruta*, the *Naridī Sūtra* gives no new information. The first two categories of *akṣaraśruta* are only material symbols written or spoken, and as such are called *dravya-śruta*. The *labdhyākṣara* is a kind of knowledge, and is *Śruta-jñāna* proper (*bhāvaśruta*). It can be produced through any of the sense-organs and the mind. If it is a sound that conditions it, then it is produced through the sense-organ of ear. If it is a coloured shape that conditions it, then it is produced through the sense-organ of sight. If it is a smell that conditions it, then it is produced through the sense-organ of smell. And so on. Only those who possess the gift of language can have *labdhyākṣara*. When one hears a sound or sees a coloured shape, there arises in the wake of the perceptual cognition, a cognition couched in appropriate words composed of syllables (*akṣara*) following the conventional vocabulary. This cognition is called *labdhyākṣara*. (Knowledge of the conventional vocabulary and conscious application of it are the conditions of *Śruta-jñāna*. In other words, conscious exercise of the gift of language is the indispensable condition of *Śruta-jñāna*. The cognitions which, in spite of their being couched in words, do not involve conscious attempt on the part of the cognizer at application of vocabulary, fall in the category of *matī jñāna* (sensuous cognition) and not *śruta-jñāna*. Of course this distinction was stressed by later logicians.)

Samjñīśruta and Asamjñīśruta

The division of *Samjñīśruta* and *Asamjñīśruta* is based on the stages of mental development or the degree of the power of thinking. According to Jainism, as stated before the mind is divided into physical mind and psychical mind. The physical mind is not possessed by all animals. It is found in a portion of the five sensed animals only. The general classification of *saṃjñīs* and *Asamjñīs* is based on the possession of physical mind. But, this does not mean that the animals without it are totally devoid of the mental activities. Their different movements clearly express the existence of mental function in greater or lesser degree. The one-sensed animals, who cannot move from one place to another place at their free will, or who cannot move, have their limbs by themselves, also possess certain amount of mental function, like feeling and willing etc. Considered from this point of view no animal is *asamjñī*. But, the mental function as found in one-sensed animals like earth etc. is so minute that it cannot be commonly apprehended. The animals like ants are seen running in several ways in search of food. They react to the external stimuli and do such other things as clearly express the existence of mind in them. This is not so clear in the case of one-sensed animals. Their mental function is known as *Oghasanjñā*; which in the present case is not recognized as such.

The *saṃjñī-śruta* is considered in three ways, in as much as there are these three varieties of *saṃjñā* (cognitional activity)² : (1) discursive thinking that takes into account the past, the present and the future, (2) consciousness that can discriminate between what is to be avoided and what is to be accepted for the maintenance of life, but cannot think of the past or the future, and (3) consciousness due to knowledge of the right scriptures (*saṃyak śruta*). The first is called (*dīrgha-kālikī*) (lasting for a long time), the second *hetūpadeśikī* (discriminating) and the third *drṣṭivādupadeśikī* (backed by scriptural knowledge). Those who possess these *saṃjñās* are called *saṃjñīs*. The *Śruta-jñāna* possessed by these *saṃjñīs* is *saṃjñī-śruta*. The *asamjñīs* also fall

in three categories. The mind is the organ of thinking. The more developed the mind is the more one is capable of thinking. Those whose mind is weak and incapable of thinking fall in the first category of *asaṃjñīs*.³ Those who are totally devoid of mind and live on mere instincts fall in the second category of *asaṃjñīs*.⁴ Again those who believe in false scriptures and thus possess perverted knowledge fall in the third category of *asaṃjñīs*.⁵ *Śruta-jñāna* possessed by the *asaṃjñīs* is *asaṃjñī-śruta*.

Samyakśruta and Mithyāśruta

There are two considerations in recognizing a *śruta* as *Samyak* or *mithyā*. According to the first consideration the scriptures composed by the sages having a minimum knowledge of full ten *pūrvās* is *Samyak-śruta*; while the whole non-Jaina literature is *mithyāśruta*, the works composed by the Jaina sages having the knowledge of less than ten *pūrvās* may be included into *Samyak* as well as *mithyā*. This assumption is based on the conception that a *Mithyādr̥ṣṭi* cannot obtain the knowledge of full ten *pūrvās*. This consideration keeps in view the question of authoritative validity. According to the second consideration every scripture possessed by a *Samyagdr̥ṣṭi* is *Samyak-śruta* and that possessed by a *mithyādr̥ṣṭi* is *mithyā-śruta*.

The twelvefold *gaṇīpiṭaka* (scripture compiled by the *gaṇadhārās*) containing *Ācārāṅga*, *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* etc. is *Samyak-śruta* (right scripture) while the other books such as *Mahā Bhārata*, *Rāmāyaṇa*, the *Vedās* etc. are enumerated as *mithyā-śruta* (false scriptures). It is further said that the *Samyaktva* (rightness) or *mithyātva* (wrongness) depends upon the attitude of the knower. If his attitude is right, whatever he knows becomes right and if his attitude is wrong (*mithyā*), his knowledge also becomes wrong. Similarly if the result of the knowledge of *mithyāśruta* (false scripture) by a *mithyādr̥ṣṭi* (person of perverse attitude) turns out in the end to be the abandonment of the perversity (*mithyādr̥ṣṭi*) the *mithyāśruta* (false scripture) is to be considered as *Samyak śruta* (right scripture).

Śrutajñāna is without beginning and end (*anādi-aparyavasita*) in the view of the *Dravyārthika-naya*. It has beginning well as end in view of the *Paryayārthika-naya*.

If we leave aside the question of two *Nayās* and consider *śrutajñāna* on its own merit we have the following four alternatives

1. *Sādi-saparyavasita*-Having beginning as well as end. 2. *Sādi-aparyavasita*-Having beginning but no end. 3. *Anādi-saparyavasita*-Having end but no beginning. 4. *Anādi-aparyavasita*-Having neither beginning nor end.

These four alternatives are discussed in relation to the following four consideration:-(1) *Dravya* (person), (2) *Kṣetra* (place), (3) *Kāla* (time), (4) *Bhāva* (state). If the *śruta* is considered in relation to one person it has both, the beginning as well as the end. A person with *śrutajñāna* can have three prospects: Firstly, he may make further progress and attain *kevalajñāna*. Secondly, he may die with his knowledge of *śruta* and forget the majority of it in the next life. Thirdly, he may lose the knowledge in the very life on account of physical or mental disorder. All the three cases prove that the *śruta* is never without end. Jinabhadra says that a person with the knowledge of fourteen *Pūrvās*, does not remember all of them in his heavenly life. He may remember a portion of them or forget entirely. Even in the same life he may retain it or forget according to the external and internal factors. The change of faith from right to wrong, death, falling ill, absence of revision etc. are some of the factors which wipe out the already acquired *śrutajñāna*.

The characteristics of *sādika* 'having beginning' and *anādika* 'having no beginning'-*saparyavasita* 'having end' and *aparyavasita* 'having no end' are thus considered variously. But the discussion is unimportant for our purpose and so we do not enter into it. It is, however, to be noticed in this connection that the *Jaina* thinkers held that a soul could never (except when it has attained perfect knowledge) be bereft of *mati* (sensuous) and *śruta* (verbal) knowledge. Even the one-sensed organisms are held to be possessed of them. To be bereft of these is to lose the nature of soul and become non-soul. Now, the one-sensed organism has the feeling of touch and so can have *matijñāna* (sensuous cognition), but how can it possess *Śruta-jñāna* (verbal knowledge).

This is a difficult problem to answer. Jinabhadra says that although the one-sensed organisms do not possess *dravya-śruta* (symbols-written or spoken) they possess *bhāva-śruta* (potential verbal knowledge) which can be likened to the verbal knowledge of a sleeping ascetic (*yati*). But even *bhāva-śruta* is possible only with those who have the capacity to speak and to hear and with none else, and it is nothing but the mental disposition that precedes a speech or follows a hearing. And as such how can it be possible for the one-sensed organisms who have neither the capacity to speak nor the capacity to hear? Jinabhadra answers this objection as follows : 'Even as subtle internal sensuous cognitions are possible in spite of the absence of the external physical sense-organ, so 'potential verbal knowledge' is possible even for (the one-sensed) such as the earth-bodied (beings) in spite of the absence of *dravya-śruta*. It is admitted that the one-sensed organisms have neither the tongue to speak nor the ear to listen, nor have they any symbols of their own. But nevertheless, according to the Jaina thinkers, the one-sensed organisms are capable of potential verbal thinking. Though we are unable to know the exact nature of the process of their thinking, yet we can have some inkling of its nature by the consideration of the external activities of the one-sensed organisms. The *Brhadvṛtti* gives a number of instances from the plan world to prove by inference that even the one-sensed plants can hear sound, see colour, smell odour, and experience taste, and says that as in these cases the sensuous functions are carried out by the internal capacity of the organisms even in the absence of the external sense-organs so also can there be possible the existence of *bhāva-śruta* in the absence of *dravya-śruta*. *Dravya-śruta* is the exponent of thinking while *bhāva-śruta* is such thinking itself. The Jaina scriptures recognize ten instincts (*sajjñā*) in the one-sensed organisms—such as the instincts of hunger, fear, sex attraction, possession etc. The *Brhadvṛtti* says that these instincts are impossible without *bhāva-śruta* 'internal capacity for verbal thinking'. The famous commentator Malayagiri maintains that the instinct is a kind of desire and quotes a passage from the *Āvaśyakaśīkā*, which says that the instinct for food means 'desire for food', is born of the feeling of hunger, and is a particular disposition of the souls. He further maintains that a desire is a determinate willing for the acquisition of the object of desire. It is of the form 'such and such object is whole-some for me; it will be good if I can secure it'. Of course, in the case of one-sensed organisms the desires are not couched in articulate language. But nevertheless they must have some sort of instrument for their formation. This leads us to the postulation of a peculiar capacity of the soul. This capacity is called *bhāva-śruta*.

Gamika and Agamika-śruta

The *śruta* which is connected with mathematical calculations or repeats the same text again and again with a particular purpose is known as *Gamika*. This name was generally given to *Drṣṭivāda*, the twelfth *aṅga*. The *śruta* composed in various matter and prose forms in *Agamika*, it is also known as *kālīka*.

The *Nandī-Cūrṇī* defines *Gamika* as the text which is read twice, thrice or hundred times with a slight change in the beginning middle or at the end. *Gamika* is also explained as the literature with various types of classification or alternative interpretations. But, nothing can be said with precision about the meaning of this term. Generally, *Drṣṭivāda* is held as *gamika* and the rest as *agamika*.

Aṅgapraviṣṭa and Araṅgapraviṣṭa

The second division is current in these days also. They are known as *Dvādaśaṅgī* or *dvādaśaṅga Gaṇṭhīpīṭaka*. These 12 *aṅgas* are—

1. *Āyāra* (Sk. *Ācāra*). 2. *Sūyagaḍa* (Sk. *Sūtrakṛta*). 3. *Thāṇa* (Sk. *Sthāna*). 4. *Samavāya* 5. *Viāhā Paṇṇatti* (Sly. *Vyākhyā prajñapti* or *Bhagavatī*). 6. *Nāyādhamma kahāo* (*Jhātādharmā-kathā*). 7. *Uvāsagaḍasāo* (*Upāsakadasā*). 8. *Antagaḍadasāo* (*Antakṛda-dasā*). 9. *Anuttarovavaiyadasāo* (*Anuttaraupapātikadasā*). 10. *Paṇha-vāgarana* (*Praśnavyākaraṇa*). 11. *Vivāgasūya* (*Vipākasūtra*). 12. *Diṭṭhivāya* (*Drṣṭivāda*).

Out of the above list *Diṭṭhivāya* is now extinct. It had five sections:—(1) *Parikammā*, (2) *Sutta*, (3) *Purvagaya*, (4) *Anuyoga* and (5) *Cūṭiya*.

Perhaps, *Diṭṭhivāya* included all the *Pūrvā* literature and other remnants of the tradition of *Pārśvanātha*. The remaining eleven *aṅgas* are the contribution of the tradition of Mahāvīra. It is also said that *Dr̥ṣṭivāda* was originally composed in *Saṃskṛta*, while other *Aṅgās* in *Ardha-Māgadhi*, the spoken language of that time on the borders of *Magadha* and *Kośala*.

The 12 *aṅgās* are considered as 12 limbs of the personified *śruta*. They are two feet (*pādās*) two lower legs, (*Janighās*), two thighs (*urūs*), two halves (*gātrardhās*) of back and belly, two arms (*bāhus*) one neck (*grvā*) and one head (*śīrṣa*). *Āyāra* and *Sūyāgaḍā* stand for the feet, *Diṭṭhivāya* for the head and the rest. *aṅgās* stand for other limbs. On the other hand the *Anaṅga-praviṣṭa* literature does not form a part of this *śruta-puruṣa*. It comprises such scriptures as are not included into *dvāda-sāṃgī*. But this does not answer the question why a particular canon is admitted as a part of the allegorical *śruta-puruṣa*. This distinction is explained on the basis of two factors. Firstly, it is admitted that the works composed by *Gaṇadharās* are *Aṅgapaviṭṭha*, whereas composed by *Śrutasthavīras* (learned scholars) are *anaṅgapaviṭṭha*. Secondly, that *śruta* which exists in every tirtha in short which is *niyata*, is *aṅgapaviṭṭha* and the rest is *anaṅgapaviṭṭha*. The second view, it seems, is an influence of the *Vedic* Tradition. At least four of the *aṅgās* are biographical sketches of the historical personages. We cannot say that the same persons or the same number of other persons with the same names and life-events take birth again and again. It is an acceptance of the theory of incarnation which the Jainās do not hold. The question of eternal literature, therefore, does not arise.

Śruta as Knowledge

We have given above a short description of the Jaina *Āgamika* literature known as *Śruta*. But, in reality it is only a source of the *Śrutajñāna*. The literature itself is not knowledge. It is called so on account of its being a source of the latter *Śrutajñāna*, generally means a knowledge based upon authority. That authority is either a person or a book. But, in the later period, it covers a wider field. Every knowledge associated with speech as its cause or its effect, came to be recognized as *Śruta*. On the other hand it was realized that every articulate cognition is associated with speech. Thus, there arose a difficult problem of fixing the limits of *matī* and *Śruta*.

Jinabhadra¹ points out the difference in the following seven points : (1) Definition, (2) Causation, (3) Classification, (4) Senses, (5) Speech, (6) Articulation, (7) Dumb and eloquent.

Viśeṣāvaśyaka gives two definitions of *Śruta*. According to the first, whatever is the object of auditory sense is *śruta*.¹ But, the sound as the definition leads, cannot be included in the divisions of knowledge, still it is known as *śruta*; because, it plays important part in producing *Śrutajñāna*. It is called *Dravyaśruta*, meaning the material cause of *Śrutajñāna*.

Śruta in the real sense means the knowledge produced by senses and the mind; associated with sound and capable of being expressed into words. It is known as *Bhāvaśruta* in contrast with *Dravyaśruta*.

As regards the relation of *matī* and *śruta*, Umāsvāti says that *śruta* is, as a rule, accompanied by *śruta*.² But the *Nandī-Sūtra* says 'Where there is *ābhinibodhika jñāna* (that is, *matī*), there is *Śrutajñāna*, and where there is *Śrutajñāna* there is *ābhinibodhika jñāna*. Both those are mutually involved. But nevertheless the preceptors (*Ācāryas*) notice this distinction : *ābhinibodhika* is so called because it perceives directly (*abhinibodhyate*), while *śruta* is so called because it hears (*śṛnoti*). And as *śruta* is preceded by *matī*, *matī* cannot be preceded by *śruta*.³ According to *Nandī-Sūtra* thus the relation between *matī* and *śruta* is one of mutual concomitance. The one is necessarily accompanied by the other. Pūjyapāda Devaṇḍī and his follower Akalaṅka also endorse this view. But here the question is whether it is the *matīupayoga*⁴ and *śrutopayoga* that are upheld to accompany each other or it is their *labdhis*⁵ that are referred to. We do not get any clear statement on this in the above references. But it is very probable that it is the *labdhis* that are held to accompany each other. The fact that the Jaina thinker unanimously maintain the impossibility of the simultaneous occurrence of two *upayogas* also lends support to our hypothesis. Moreover, *matī* and *śruta* qua *labdhis* are unanimously

held to accompany each other.' Furthermore, on this hypothesis, the above statement of Umāsvāti that *mati* is not necessarily followed by *śruta* also finds proper explanation, because in that case there would be no objection against admitting that *matīupayoga* is not necessarily followed by *śrutopayoga*. It is beyond doubt that Umāsvāti refers to *upayoga* and not to *labdhi* in the above statement.

It will not be out of place in this connection to add a short paragraph on the conception of *upayoga* and *labdhi*. The consciousness in its state of dormancy is called *labdhi*. In other words, the dormant capacity of the soul for knowledge is *labdhi*. *Upayoga*, on the other hand, is consciousness in its state of activity. The soul is called *upayukta* or *upayogavān* when it is actually engaged in knowing something. Mere capacity for knowledge without actual knowledge is *labdhi*.

Limits of *Matī* and *Śruta*

There are three parts in the above definition of *śruta*. The first part is related with the cause, which is the same as in *Matī*. As a matter of fact *śruta* does not depend upon external senses. It has the mind only as its producing causes. Even, in the case of auditory sense, it is *matī* as far as the question of grasping the sound is concerned. The stage of *śruta* begins when one starts to formulate an idea on the basis of its meaning. The second part distinguishes *Śruta* from *Matī*. It holds that the knowledge based on speech is *Śruta*. The *matī* does not depend upon speech. Roughly, this factor distinguishes the two types of knowledge from each other. By speech, here, Jinabhadra says, we should take the words, whose meaning is already known. It means that the auditory sense is not so important as the words of other person, whether spoken or written, to produce *śrutajñāna*. But, one can say that everything that is seen, touched, smelt or tasted has a meaning behind it. Our mind brings out that meaning after due deliberation. We see a particular arrangement of colour and shape and interpret it as flower. We relish a sweet taste and interpret that it is a mango fruit. This process is common with all the sense and their objects, and not merely with words. There is no reason in including the one into *śrutajñāna* and the others into *matī*. Roughly, a cognition is *Śruta-jñāna* and the others into *matī*. Roughly, a cognition is *Śruta-jñāna* when it arises at hearing or reading something, in the form of mental association of word with its meaning.

The third part expresses the special quality of *śrutajñāna*. It is capable of being expressed to others through the medium of speech. The cognition of *matī* cannot be fully transmitted as it arises without the association of words. Moreover, when we grasp an object through external senses, the experience cannot be put into words entirely. Only a fragment of it can be conveyed through speech; and that also by the person who knows the expression of language, to a person with the same ability. The cognition of a newborn baby does not associate any words with the knowledge. Thus, the range of *matī* differs from that of *śruta*. *Śruta* considers only that object and only to that extent as can be expressed in words. It is associated with speech as its cause as well as the effect. It can be argued : if every cognition associated with speech is *śruta*. *Īhā*, *Avāya* and *Dhāraṇā* also would become *śruta* as they also do not occur without the association of speech. Thus, the *matī* will be confined to *Avagraha* only.

Jinabhadra replied to the above that every cognition associated with speech is not *śruta*, but, only that which follows the speech; which has words as its genetic cause. The stages of *Īhā* etc., though associated with speech, are not produced by it. In the case, where those stages are produced by words, there is no harm in accepting them as *śruta*. Again, it can be asked : *matī* has been divided into *śruta-niśrīta* and *aśrutaniśrīta*; and *Avagraha* etc. are admitted as *śrutaniśrīta*. If every cognition that is produced by *Śruta* or word is *Śruta-jñāna* the *Īhā* etc. cannot be explained as the division of *matī*; because all of them are based on *śruta* i.e. *Śabda* or speech.

Śruta in the Animals having less than five senses

It can be asked further, if *Śruta* is dependent on speech, it is not possible in the case of one-sensed animals. They neither possess mind to associate a word with its sense, nor the faculties of hearing and speaking;

to grasp or utter any word. Thus, the existence of *śruta* cannot be explained in their case. This will go against the *Āgamika* conception that all the animals positively possess two types of knowledge.

Jinabhadra replies that one-sensed animals, though devoid of speech i.e. *dravyaśruta*, possess *bhāvaśruta*. The faculties of hearing, speaking and thinking are the cause of *dravyaśruta* only. In their absence *dravyaśruta* is not possible. But, there is no difficulty in having *bhāvaśruta* in their absence. *Bhāvaśruta* is neither cause nor the result of speech. A learned man, while asleep, neither listens nor speaks any word. Still we cannot say that he is devoid of *śrutajñāna*. By seeing its manifestation in the waking state one can infer its existence in the sleeping state also, as one infers the existence of butter in the milk from the later production, though it was not visible before. Similarly the one-sensed animals also possess *śruta* in unmanifested form. The manifestation, in their case, is not possible as they are not equipped with the necessary instrument. *Bhāvaśruta*, in such cases, means the *Kṣayopaśama* of *Śruta-jñānāvaraṇa*. Its existence can be proved, not only on the basis of testimony, but also on basis of the existence of different desires (*samjñās*) in them. They also feel hunger or desire for food. Such desires are not possible if they are totally devoid of mind; and the existence of mind leads to the existence of *śruta* also.

Again, it can be asked; *śruta* has been defined in two ways. In the cause do *dravyaśruta* is was defined as whatever is heard. The *bhāvaśruta* is defined as soul in the *śruta* of attention (*upagoga*) towards *dravyaśruta* i.e. words. Both are impossible in the case of one-sensed animals as well as in the sleeping man, who can neither listen a word nor can apply their attention to utter a word. Jinabhadra replies that in such case we have another derivation which means the instrument of hearing (*śrotayāna*) or cause of hearing (*asmat*) or the location of hearing (*asmin*). Ultimately, these derivations express the sense of *kṣayopaśama* of the obscuring karmic matter; and it is not impossible in the case of one-sensed animals as well as in the sleeping man. But, these derivations do not explain the fundamental difficulty.

It can be argued that the example of sleeping man does not suit in the case of one-sensed animals. *Śruta*, ultimately depends upon the faculties of speaking and hearing. The person with these faculties can convey his ideas through the vehicle of-words and can understand others. A sleeping man possesses both of the faculties. Though, in sleeping state he does not apply them, yet, they are not absent. He can use them at any moment. Thus, we can admit the existence of *śruta* in his case. But, in the case of one-sensed animals those faculties are totally absent. There is not basis to prove the existence of *śruta* in them.

The above argument does not put any difficulty as the faculties of speech and hearing are accepted to be present, though in mild form, in one-sensed animals also. We observe a particular tree, sensitive of nonfactual impressions. On this basis we can say that the other senses are not totally absent in them. Similarly, they also have their feelings and desires which are the functions of mind. Even them, their classification as the one-sensed animals, means the absence of material-senses (*Dravyendriyas*) in them. In the same way they possess *bhāvaśruta* and not *dravyaśruta*.

Again it can be asked; if *śruta* is possible in one-sensed animals also without any recourse to speech, the latter can not be a condition of *śruta* and thus cannot form a part of the definition.

The Jaina clarifies, his position that the above definition; is means for the *śruta* as found in the five-sensed animals. Who are fully conscious of the words and their meanings. It does not include the *śruta* of the one-sensed animals who are admitted as having two types of knowledge merely on the basis of *Āgamika* conception. Their *śruta* does not function in any appreciable manner. It is known as *Oghaśruta*, quite indistinct, like a three in the seed.

Again, one can ask, if the existence of *śruta* is accepted in one-sensed animals without any functional appearance or other basis, the existence of all the five types of knowledge should be accepted there on the same ground. This objection is replied on two grounds; firstly, the existence of a particular types of knowledge in a particular person depends upon the corresponding *kṣayopaśama*. For knowing a particular *kṣayopaśama*

in a particular being the only source is the *Āgamika* statement. It is a matter of faith only. The *Āgamās* do not propose existence of *kṣayopāśama* of *Avadhi* etc. in one-sensed animals. Secondly, they are not totally deprived of the function of first two types of knowledge. It has been already stated that they also possess desires and feelings and the power of articulate thinking.

As a matter of fact, as will be seen later on, *Śruta* has no connection with speech or sound. It is articulate cognition or *vikalpa* as known in the Buddhist and other systems. The *Nyāya* recognizes the same as *prakāra*. Thus, every articulate thinking is *śruta*.

Difference between *Matī* and *Śruta* based on causation

We have pointed out the difference between *matī* and *śruta* on the basis of their having different definitions. They can be further differentiated on the following basis. *Matī* is the cause and *śruta* is its effect. *Śruta* is always preceded by *Matī*.

One can argue that sometimes *matī* also is preceded by *śruta* and it is wrong to say that in every case *matī* is the cause and *śruta* the effect. For example, when *matī* is generated at hearing a sound i.e. *śruta*, the order changes. *Śruta* becomes cause and *matī* the effect. This argument is based on misunderstanding the nature of real *śruta*. In the case quoted above, only *dravya-śruta* stands as the cause of *matī*, while we can be concerned with *bhāvaśruta*.

The above principle is applicable in the case of causation only. It only proposes that *matī* does not occur as the effect of *śruta*. It does not rule out the occurrence of *matī* after *śruta* as an independent knowledge. Just as the ornaments of bangles. Similarly, *śruta* is a particular form of *matī* and must have the latter as its cause. When that form disappears, there is no difficulty in occurrence of *matī* from its own causes. None can say, that *śruta*, once produced, rules out *matī* for ever.

Dravyaśruta preceded by *Matī*

According to another opinion it is not *bhāvaśruta*, that is preceded by *matī* but the *dravyaśruta* i.e. speech. No body speaks without thinking. First, we establish the idea in our mind and then convey it to others. So, the speech is preceded by *matī*.

There are three objections to this view. Firstly, it leaves no scope for *bhāvaśruta*. If the mental association of word with its meaning, which precedes utterance of a speech, is *matī*, the same should be admitted in case of the knowledge resulting from hearing the speech. Thus, the mental thoughts preceding as well as following the speech are included into *matī* and no room is left for *śruta*. Secondly, we are not concerned with the difference between *dravyaśruta* and *matī*. It is already established, because the former is a matter while the latter is knowledge. There can be no question about their difference. The question is related to the difference between two types of knowledge; i.e. *matī* and *bhāvaśruta* only. Thirdly, it was proposed that *śruta* is preceded by *matī* and *matī* is not preceded by *śruta*. If *śruta* is taken as *dravyaśruta* the above proposal is not supported. Because, *dravyaśruta* is not only the effect of *matī*, it is also a cause of the latter. It is effect of *matī* in the case of speaker; but, in the case of listener it is the cause of *matī*. The knowledge that is generated in the listener has the speech as its cause.

As a matter of fact *dravyaśruta* is preceded not by *matī* but, *bhāvaśruta*. When one thinks before speaking, his thinking is associated with words. It is, therefore, not *matī* but *bhāvaśruta*. One can infer from *dravyaśruta* the existence of preceding *bhāvaśruta*.

The Senses as the Basis of Difference

The fundamental difference between *matī* and *śruta* is based upon the senses that produce them. *Śruta* is produced by the auditory sense while *matī* results from all the five. It should be observed that all cognition produced by the auditory sense are not *śruta*. They are *śruta* as well as *matī*. The only limitation is that the cognition resulting from other senses is necessarily *matī*, while resulting from the auditory sense may

be *śruta* as well as *mati*. But, the confinement of *śruta* to the auditory sense does not mean that it is the result of hearing only. In the case of scriptures *śruta* results from visual perception. It is *śruta* in spite of its independence from the auditory sense. If a cognition is associated with or follows a speech oral or written, it is generally regarded as the case of auditory sense. It can be grasped through vision or other sense also. Like spoken words, written scripture also are accepted as *dravyaśruta*; because they are cause of *bhāvaśruta*.

The auditory perception of a boy, who does not understand the meaning of words is not *śruta*. It is only *mati* and takes its usual stages of *avagraha* etc. similarly, the perception of written scriptures, without understanding their meaning is *mati*.

The acceptance of *śruta* as result of all the sense does not render this distinction, based on senses, meaningless; because knowledge associated with speech is the main factor that constitutes *śruta*. It may result from any of the five senses. It is admitted as the cognition of audition of account of its capability of being an object of hearing. Whatever is associated with speech must possess that capability. Thus, every cognition of this sort is admitted as relates with the sense of audition, and the same becomes a distinguishing factor between *mati* and *śruta*.

According to a certain view, the *śruta* here, means *dravyaśruta* i.e. speech only, and it is *mati* as well as *śruta*. In relation to the speaker it is *śruta*, because it is heard. In relation to the listener it is *mati*, because it is deliberated upon for finding out a meaning. But, this view is not correct. The same word cannot be *mati* as well as *śruta*. Mere etymological derivation, leading to different forms in relation to different persons, cannot establish any real difference in one and the same thing. Moreover, as far as *dravyaśruta* is concerned, the difference between *mati* and *śruta* is beyond any doubt. One is knowledge and the other is matter. The present controversy is related with *bhāvaśruta* and *mati*. So, the above view cannot hold good any longer.

Difference between *mati* and *śruta* due to expressibility and inexpressibility. Another important difference between *mati* and *śruta* consists in that the objects apprehended by *śruta* can be expressed in toto. They are not beyond the reach of words. It does not mean that all such objects are actually expressed or conveyed to others. A greater part of them is left unexpressed. But, this is due to their huge number and the shortness of life. By nature they are not inexpressible. On the other hand the objects cognized by *mati* and the *Avadhi* etc. are not within the reach of the words. The objects known through scriptures or preaching can be put into words in their entirety. Every thing known in this way can be conveyed to other. But, what we know through senses or other types of perceptual cognition, cannot be expressed through words as it is. The words are generally related with class-concepts. The individual peculiarities, appearing new and new with every perception are beyond the reach of words. We can experience them but not express.

Conclusion

In order to have a clear conception of the distinction between *mati* and *śruta* we can divide the matter in the following three categories-

1. In the first category we include those objects as are expressible but not accompanied by the attention of *śruta*; i.e. the cognition of which does not depend upon instruction or scriptures. The cognition of such objects is *mati*.
2. In the second category we include those objects which are not expressible. They also come into *mati*.
3. In the third category we place those, which are expressible and at the same time accompanied by *śruta* attention. The cognition of such objects is *śruta*.

The above classification would show that there are two conditions for *śruta*. Firstly, its object should be expressible. Secondly, its cognitions should be produced by *śruta* i.e. speech or scriptures.

All expression is not *śruta*, because it may arise without the help of instruction or scriptures. In such

cases it is nothing but *mati*. The reason for excluding such cases from the category of *śruta* is this: in the case of *śruta* it is necessary that the whole knowledge should be expressible. It is possible only if the cognition depends upon some verbal testimony. Any knowledge gathered from self-experience may have some element that can be put into words, but the whole of it cannot be translated into language. It is always mixed with certain material that is inexpressible. So, the only possible limitation is that whatever is *śruta*, it must be expressible and not the vice versa, i.e. whatever is expressible is not necessarily *śruta*. *Mati* is expressible as well as in-expressible. *Śruta* is always expressible.

It can be said; in the case when *mati* and *śruta*, both are expressible, they do not differ as far as their subject-matter or the nature of cognition is concerned. The only difference, that can be held in such cases is that, one depends upon scripture or speech while the other on experience. But, the difference in cause does not make any intrinsic difference in the nature of knowledge.

The above objection does not arise if we compare the internal nature of the *śruta* with *mati*. The object of *śruta* is naturally expressible as it is cognized. It does not allow any difference between expression and the cognition. On the other hand the object of *mati* is not expressed as apprehended. The difference among the tastes of sugar, gur, sugarcane, honey and dates is beyond the reach of words. The term sweet is only a lame expression. Much of the experience is left unexpressed. So, *mati* and *śruta* differ in their internal nature also.

The Illustration of Bark and Rope

The difference between *mati* and *śruta* is also illustrated by the bark and rope. *Mati* is like the bark and *śruta* like the rope. It means that *śruta* is a particular stage of *mati*. The latter continues to exist even in that stage. As the existence of bark is not finished on its transformation into rope. The latter is merely an advanced stage of the former. Similarly, *śruta* is an advanced stage of *mati*.

The Difference of Articulation and Inarticulation

According to another opinion *śruta* is articulate (*śākṣara*) and *mati* particulate (*anākṣara*). This view goes against the conception of *īhā* etc. as the sub-class of *mati*, which are cognition. In the stages of *mati*, only *avagraha* is inarticulate. In the latter stages the cognizer must have articulate cognition. It can be argued that *avagraha* etc. are recognized as the stages of *śruta-niśrūta-mati*, so the function of articulation, in the latter stages can be performed by *śruta*. This view also is not free from defects. If the function of *īhā* is performed by *śruta* the former cannot be a stage of *mati*. If, in spite of its being the function of *śruta* *īhā* is admitted as the stage of *mati* *śruta* will have no scope. The alternative that both *mati* as well *śruta* should be accepted to exist there, also is not feasible; because, two *upayogas* do not occur simultaneously.

Moreover, *śruta-niśrūta* does not mean articulation or dependence upon *śruta* at the time of occurrence. It only means the relation with a person whose mind is well-cultivated through the knowledge of scripture or other instructions.

As a matter of fact, *bhāvaśruta* and *mati* both are articulate as well as inarticulate. *Mati* in the stage of *avagraha* is inarticulate and in the later stage articulate. *Śruta* is articulate as far as it follows the scriptures or articulate speech. It is inarticulate when it follows a sound other than books or distinct speech: just as the sound of inhaling or exhaling, spitting, coughing etc. But, in the case of *dravyaśruta* it is positively articulate. Inarticulate sound is not accepted as *dravyaśruta*. So, the difference of articulation and inarticulation is applicable to *dravyaśruta* and *mati* only.

The difference between the two based on Silence and Eloquency

Śruta is eloquent. It can express the object to others. *Mati* is silent. It cannot make the object known to others. It can be said, as far as cognition is concerned *mati* and *śruta*, both are silent. It is only speech, recognized as *dravyaśruta*, that can express the meaning to others. It is related with *bhāvaśruta*; because it is a cause of the latter. If *bhāvaśruta* is as eloquent on account of the expressiveness of its cause, the *mati*

also can be proved eloquent on the same basis. The object of *mati* is not expressed through words, but the same can be done through movements of the body or other sources. The above contention goes against the following reasons. Firstly, the physical movements are not the exclusive cause of *mati*. They are common to *mati* as well as *śruta*. They cannot be called *dravyamati* as well as speech as *dravyaśruta*. So, *dravyaśruta*, being closely related with *bhāvaśruta*, can assign eloquence to *śruta* is general. This cannot be said in the case of *mati*. Secondly, the indications also when they go beyond the limit of perception and indicated something more, come into the category of *śruta*. *Śruta* does not mean spoken or written words only. But, everything that given some idea based on authority. After all words also are indications. A person touches his mouth with folded five fingers. As far as the perception of his movements is concerned it is *mati*. But when we come to know that such indications express hunger, we pass into the sphere of *śruta*. Thus, what cannot be perceived, inferred or otherwise known, and is exclusively based on the authority of the other person, is *śruta*. In the above case, if hunger is known through other conditions it will be *mati*. It is *śruta* when the fact is made known by the person through words, speech or any other ostensible movement.

We have now drawn a line to demarcation between *mati* and *śruta*, which is more or less in accordance with the traditional way of through. But let us now study the logical implication of the traditional conception. We have seen that *īhā* (speculation) etc., though they are associated with words, fall in the category of *mati* and not *śruta*. The ground given is that the scriptures recognize them to be so and, furthermore, that language does not play the determining role of a condition of *mati* as it does regarding *śruta*. In *īhā* etc. there is only the minimum possible association with words, which is rather the outcome than the generating condition. Words come in only in order to make the cognition 'determinate and firm'. The perceptual character still remains there. The background of cognizer's learning plays only a silent part. It does not actively influence the cognition like the sense-organ. But this position is not without its weakness. The difficulty can be put thus: Can our cognitions be associated with words, and at the same time remain free from the influence of our previous training in verbal usage? If not, why should not such cognitions as are associated with words be considered as *śruta*? It is perhaps in order to avoid this difficulty that Akalaṅka held the view that our cognitions are *mati* so long as they are free from verbal association, and fall in the category of *śruta* as soon as they are associated with words. Pūjyapāda Devaṇandī says that all organs of valid knowledge excepting *śruta* are for one's own self and not for others, inasmuch as they cannot express themselves to others. This statement of Pūjyapāda does not mean to say that all cases of knowledge except *śruta* are devoid of words. It only means that they are not expressed in language to outsiders and that they fall in the category of *śruta* when they are so expressed. We can interpret the above statement of Akalaṅka in this light. It will then mean that all processes of knowledge, perceptual or otherwise, fall in the category of *mati* so long as they are not expressed in words, and they are transformed into *śruta* as soon as they are so expressed. This meaning follows from the statement of Akalaṅka himself as well. Akalaṅka thus widens the scope of *mati* and at the same times distinguishes it from *śruta* on the ground that *mati* is confined to the knower himself while *śruta* reveals its contents to others as well. In one word, *mati* is subjective and private (*svārtha*) while *śruta* is subjective as well as objective (*parārtha*), private as well as public. But this line of demarcation is too superficial. It is immaterial whether a knowledge is expressed in words or not. Mere verbal expression cannot be taken to confer a new status of knowledge. To be logical, therefore, all such knowledge should be regarded as *mati*. This is the logical consummation of Akalaṅka's position. And this was anticipated by Siddhasena Divākara when he said, as we have already stated, that there is not *śruta* over and above *mati*. Upādhyāya Yaśovijaya has elaborated this position in his *Jñānabindu-prakaraṇa*. Siddhasena Divākara had asserted that the admission of *śruta* as separate from *mati* involves the faults of redundancy (*vyarthyā*) and unwarranted extension (*atiprasaṅga*). Yaśovijaya only amplifies and illustrates these faults. He says that the conception of *śruta* as separate from *mati* is futile inasmuch as the function of the former can be adequately fulfilled by the latter. Moreover, if the non-difference of *mati* and *śruta* be admitted, the necessity of the postulation of a separate *avagraha* for the *apāya* (perceptual judgment) bringing up the bar of a generic verbal cognition (*śabda-jñāna* or *śruta-jñāna*) on account of a further

enquiry for a more specific characteristic of the same object is also avoided, because in this new conception the generic verbal cognition itself will serve as the basic *avagraha* of the whole process which is a case of *mati-jñāna*. The unity of the process will remain undisturbed even when it becomes intricate due to the entrance of verbal knowledge (*Śruta-jñāna*), because says Yaśovijaya, when it is acknowledged that there is no disturbance in the unity of the process of *śrutopayoga* (verbal knowledge) even when it is interspersed with more than one process of *mati*, what possible harm can there be if the process of *mati* is conceived to preserve its integrity even when the *śrutopayoga* follows in the wake of it.³ Besides, if a separate status were accorded to verbal knowledge on the ground that it is non-perceptual the undesirable consequence of the admission of a respective separate category for inference, recollection, recognition etc. would follow, because these also are non-perceptual. But the Jaina thinker cannot accept this consequence without throwing overboard their whole theory of knowledge. The Jainās accept inference, recollection etc. to belong to the category of *mati*. What then is the ground for treating *śruta* as a separate category from *mati*? Again, if *mati* is conceived as twofold viz. (1) perceptual and (2) non-perceptual, and *avagraha*, *īhā* etc. are held to fall in the latter group, then logic will demand that *śruta* also should be treated as a case of non-perceptual *mati* and not as a separate category. Thus does Yaśovijaya vindicate the position of the great logician Siddhasena Divākara whom he often quotes in his treatises with great veneration and sometimes refers to him by the term *navya* (neo-logician). Siddhasena was a great logical genius and Yaśovijaya, as an inspired admirer of him, gives him the status of a neo-logician of ancient times in view of his pure logical speculations that were the characteristics of the age that was to come after a millennium from his own time.

QUESTIONS

Essay Types Question

1. Write in detail about the *Śruta-jñāna*.
Or
Explain the types of *Śruta-jñāna*.

Short Question

1. What is the difference between agamic and *Aṅgapraviṣṭa śruta*. 2. Define the *Akṣara* and *Anakṣara śruta*.
2. What is *mūhya śruta*? How many are those?
3. What do you understand by Six *āvaśyakās*?
4. Write the kinds of *Śruta-jñāna*?
5. Which are three types of *akṣara śruta*?
6. Of how many type of *kālīka śruta*?
7. Write only names of *utkālīka śruta*?
8. Which are ten *prakīrṇakās*?
9. Explain *aṅga-cūlīkā* with name(s).
10. Explain *prakīrṇaka* according to *Cūrṇikāra* and *Vṛttikāra*?
11. What is *aṅga-praviṣṭa* of how many types it is?

Objective types questions

1. *Śruta-jñāna* is of kinds.
(i) 12 (ii) 13 (iii) 14 (iv) 15
2. *Akṣara śruta* is of kinds.
(i) 2 (ii) 3 (iii) 4 (iv) 5
3. *Samjñī śruta* is of kinds.
(i) 3 (ii) 4 (iii) 5 (iv) 6
4. *Samyak śruta* and *mithyāśruta* have basis of differences.
(i) 2 (ii) 3 (iii) 4 (iv) 5
5. *Kālikī samjñī* has activities.
(i) 5 (ii) 6 (iii) 7 (iv) 8

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LESSON 6

SENSE ORGANS & MIND

We have already seen that the senses and mind are the instruments of sensuous cognition (*mati-jñāna*). It is essential to know what is meant by this instrumentality and what is the position of the senses and mind in the Jaina psychology.

The *indriya* i.e. sense-organ means an organ that comprehends a specific object. The sense-organ is so called because it is possessed of the nature of comprehending specific objects, such as the sound and the like. There are five sense organs which are the instruments of touch taste smell sight and hearing.

The Jainās believe that the purity of self resulting from *Kṣaya* annihilation-cum-subdurance of the corresponding of *Karma*, is the main cause of cognition. In the case of *Mati* also this principle is equally applicable *jñāna*. The self is by nature possessed of these and can know everything without any external assistance. But, its power of knowing is obscured by the karmic matter. The main requirement of cognition is therefore, the removal of this obscuring matter. In the case of *Matijñāna*, this requirement is fulfilled by the senses and the mind along with other external such as object, light and the like, and internal causes such as the attention, purity of come and the like.

As a matter of fact the senses are instrument in the auxiliary capacity only. We can compare them with the windows in a room. The man sitting inside the room naturally possesses the power of perceiving outside. But the function of his power is obstructed by the walls. The only thing he requires is the removal of this obstruction, partially or totally. In the case of perfect knowledge, this obstruction is removed totally. In other cases, it is removed partially. Just as the windows remove the obstruction of walls to a part and man can see through such parts only; similarly the senses are the windows or the partial removal of *Karmic* matter. The windows do not help in perception in the main capacity sense but they help in auxiliary capacity i.e. by removing the obstruction. Ācārya Akalaṅka places the senses in the category of external but inseparable cause in the contrast with the object, light etc. which are not inseparable.

Jaina Account of sense-organs

Now we propose to deal with the nature and function of the senses as recognized by the Jaina Philosophy. According to it there are five sense-organs: *sparsāna* (tactual), *rasana* (gustatory), *ghrāṇa* (olfactory), *cakṣu* (visual) and *śrotra* (auditory) having for their characteristic the capacity of perceiving touch, taste, odour, colour and sound respectively. The definition given by the Jainās endorses the above said fact in the following manner:

“Touch, taste, odour, sight and sense serve as the organs of perception of objects for a soul which is polluted with *karma* and is, thus, unable to cognize things and sound are respectively the objects of the sense-organs.”

The proof of the existence of sense is as follows: Cognitions of touch and the like must be conditioned by relevant instruments, since they are acts like the act of cutting. The senses are called ‘*indriyas*’ because they have been produced by ‘*indra*’ which means *karma*, since the senses whose physical are produced by the manifestation of the physique-making (*nāma*) *karma* as their condition. An alternative explanation is: the reason for their being named ‘*indriyas*’ may also be due to the fact that they are the distinctive marks of the self that is designated by the name ‘*indra*’. The senses serve as the organs of perception of objects for a soul which is polluted with *karma* and is, thus, unable to cognize things by itself. Now, here is an objection: The cognition of an object by the self, generated as it is by a mark; viz, a sense, should be regarded as inferential. Such being

the case, the inference cannot arise if there be a lack of the knowledge of the mark. If the mark were to be known by another inference, there would arise the fallacy of regressus and infinitum. The Jaina replies that the objection advanced by the opponent is baseless, since the psychical senses are self-intuitive and so there is no possibility of regressus at infinitum. In Jainism, the senses are described as a mark (or a feture) of the mundane *Jīva* as well as the instruments of cognition. In the first sense they are related with ontology and in the second case with epistemology. The five senses in the former sense are known as five types of life force (*prāṇa*) possessed by living according to the stage of their biological evolution. The Jainās divide the living beings into five classes (*jātis*) on the basis of the number of senses possessed by them. These classes consist of one-sensed two sense beings and so on upto the five-sensed ones. In the field of epistemology, the senses are instruments of perception. They are of two kinds the material structure (*dravyendriya*) and the psychical function or senses quā physical and senses quā psychical.

Two Kinds of sense-organ

It has already been mentioned that the senses are of two kinds: physical and psychical. The physical senses are caused by the rise of the corresponding physique making *Karma*. The psychical senses are caused by the annihilation cum-subsidence (*kṣyaopaśama*) of knowledge-obscuring karma. Now, we propose to present their respective characteristics.

Physical Sense-organ (*Dravyendriya*)

The senses as material structure are affected by the corresponding *Nāma karma*. They are physical and made of the same stuff as that of the body. The Jaina does not regard a particular physical element as the cause of a particular sense-organ as the *Nyāya* philosophy holds. As a matter of fact the Jaina does not hold the earth, water etc. as the fundamental elements. They are themselves compounds or bodies made from the combination of *paramāṇus* or ultimate atoms.

Dravyendriya is further divided into *Nirvṛtti* and *Upakaraṇa*. *Nirvṛtti* means the structure or form. It is again divided into *Bāhya* (External) *Nirvṛtti* and *Ābhyantara* (Internal) *Nirvṛtti*. *Bāhya-Nirvṛtti* is the external form and *Ābhyantara-Nirvṛtti* is the internal form. The *Prajñāpāṇā Sūtra*, which is one of the canonical texts, states that *Bāhya-Nirvṛtti* has innumerable forms according to the innumerable species of animals. We see a clear difference between the outer forms of the ears of a horse and a fireman being. But the *Ābhyantara-Nirvṛtti* has the same form in all the animals. The *Prajñāpāṇā Sūtra* states that the form of the auditory sense is like the flower of the *Kadamba*. The form of the visual sense is like the grain of *Masūra* (a kind of edible pulse). The olfactory sense is like the flower of *Atimuktaka*. The form of the gustatory sense is like the edge of a sword. The form of the cutaneous sense possesses diverse forms.

According to the *Digambara* tradition the *Bāhya Nirvṛtti* is the particular material form and *Ābhyantara* is the part of the soul surrounded by the physical structure. According to the *Śvetāmbara* tradition both the *Bāhya* and *Ābhyantara* are material; but Ācārya Śīlāṅka in his commentary on *Ācārāṅga Sūtra* supports the *Digambara* tradition.

Upakaraṇa is the power of grasping an object, possessed by the *Nirvṛtti*. The *Digambara* tradition holds that *Upakaraṇa* means what assists. It is also a material power without which the *Nirvṛtti* is incompetent of function. It is divided into two parts viz. external *Upakaraṇa* and internal *Upakaraṇa*. For example, in the case of eye, the pupil- the white and black portion is internal *Upakaraṇa* and the eye-lids and eye-brows are the external *Upakaraṇa*. Ācārya Śīlāṅka also endorses the same view. It should be observed here that the *Digambara* tradition divides material structure of senses into three parts: (1) *Bāhya Nirvṛtti*, (2) *Ābhyantara Upakaraṇa* and (3) *Bāhya Upakaraṇa*. The *Śvetāmbara* tradition holds *Upakaraṇa* not as the material structure, but as the power possessed by the material structure which is known as *Nirvṛtti*. According to the *Digambara* tradition, *Ābhyantara Nirvṛtti* is psychical, the *Śvetāmbara* holds it is material. All the parts of *dravyendriyas* are caused by the corresponding *Nāma-karma*.

Psychic Non-physical Sense (*Bhāveṇḍriyās*)

The psychical senses (*Bhāveṇḍriyās*) are not physical or corporal but power or function of the self i.e. soul. They are again divided into *Labdhi* (potentiality) and *Upayoga* activity of consciousness for sentience. *Labdhi* is obtained due to the partial annihilation and the partial subsidence of the obscuring and the obstructing *karmas*. When the *labdhi* is put into action, on a particular object it is known as *upayogēṇḍriya*. It results into the cognition of an object.

It has been stated above that the living beings are divided into five classes according to the number of senses possessed by them. The animals possessing one sense only are recognized as *ekēṇḍriyas*, i.e. one-sensed beings. Those possessing two are known as *dvivēṇḍriyas*, i.e. two-sensed beings and so on. The order of their possession is respectively cutaneous, gustatory, olfactory, visual and auditory. The animal possessing the latter must possess the former also. (For example, *ekēṇḍriya jīva* possesses only one cutaneous, *dvivēṇḍriya jīva* possesses two- cutaneous and gustatory, and so on.).

Labdhi is nothing but the acquisition of the potential sense-activity which consists in the annihilation cum-subsidence of the intuition-obscuring karma which obscures intuition. *Upayoga* is a particular modification of the consciousness of the self, in the presence of which the self perceives the object, utilizing the physical sense-organ roused to activity. Of these two types of psychical senses, the former is responsible for the capacity of the self toprehend a relevant object, the postulation of which is necessary, since no cognition is generated in an entity which is constitutionally incompetent for prehending its object, e.g. space which is not capable of performing conscious activity. The latter is of the nature of an activity in respect of the cognition of an object. The postulation of a conscious activity as sense is necessary owing to the fact that the senses of touch, vision, etc., are not capable of prehending their objects unless they are appropriated by the conscious activity of the self. Not admitting this fact, the emergence of such cognition in deep sleep also would be a possibility. Hence, the *Jainās* view of postulation *labdhi* (potentiality) and *upayoga* (activity) as the two varieties of the psychical senses is not unintelligible.

An objection may be raised regarding the nature of conscious activity that the conscious activity employed upon the sense-perception of relevant object is rather the result and as such cannot be regarded as an organ which is necessarily of the nature of a condition. The Jainā replied that the objection does not apply to the present case, since certain attributes of the cause follow into the effect. A lamp and the like which are the effects of fire to possess the capacity of illuminating things just as fire has the quality of illuminating objects. Moreover, it is not admitted that conscious activity is an organ in the same capacity in which it is the result. It serves as an organ in the capacity of the most efficient instrument and becomes the result in the capacity of an act both of which characters are noticeable in it. Take the example of light. It discharges the function of the most-efficient instrument in its character as an illuminator and performs the function of effect in its character as the act of illumination, and plays the role of the agent on account of its independent status. All this is easy to explain from the standpoint of non-absolutism.

Identity and Difference

As regards the relationship of these sense-organs, the Jainās holds that the senses can be regarded as mutually identical, when looked at from the standpoint of substantial unity and can, again, be regarded as numerically different from one another, if viewed from the standpoint of differential modes. If the identity of the senses were absolute then the consequence would be that the tactual organ would perceive taste and the rest just as it does touch. Consequently, the postulation of other organs would be a superfluity. Moreover, the perfection or the defection of one would make the corresponding perfection and defection of others. On the other hand, if the mutual difference of senses were absolute, then the result would be that they could not co-operate in the generation of a synthetic judgement involving reference to the identity of the distinct sense-data, e.g., the judgement 'I see what I touch'. This type of synthetic judgment cannot be explained on the ground of

mind alonge, since the mind cannot generate such a judgment without the assistance of the corresponding senses. The same line of argument would dismiss the theories of absolute difference and absolute identity of the senses with the self. If the senses were absolutely identical with the self, the former would function as the subject or the latter would act as the organs, or both of them would function in dual capacity, for there is no difference between the two. On the other hand, if the senses were absolutely different from the self, they could not be held to belong to the self as its organs, just as the senses of other subject are not. The senses of A would not belong to the self of A, just as the senses of B do not belong to the self of A; since the sense of both A and B are equally foreign to the self of A. Or in the alternative, the reverse might be the case, i.e., the senses of A would be the senses of B and vice versa. The Jainā, therefore, concludes that the relation between the senses and the self should be accepted in terms of non-absolutistic position as neither absolutely different nor absolutely identical but both. They can be regarded as identical if viewed from the standpoint of substantial unity and as different when viewed from the standpoint of diversity. This kind of non-absolutistic position of the relationship of the senses with the self is approved by the verdict of experience. This finishes our discussion of the problem of the nature and functions of the senses in general.

Regarding the relationship of the physical sense-organs among one another and to the material atoms from which they are produced, it should be understood in terms of identity and difference from the same standpoint of non-absolutism. Since the elements of identity is intelligible from the viewpoint of substantial unity and that of difference from the standpoint of differential modes.

Essential Conditions of Sensation

The Jainās hold that the physical contact with the object is not an essential condition for sense-perception. They state that it is mere competence (*yogyatā*), that is needed for sensation. Competence or potentiality as we have stated in the case of *labdhi*, is nothing but partial removal of the obscuring karmic matter. The function depends upon many internal as well as external factors. The contiguity of physical senses with the object also is one of them. But, this contiguity does not necessarily mean a physical contact. In the case of four non-visual senses, the Jainās also admit real contact. They accept the auditory sense as a distance-receptor (*aprāpyakārī*). They believe that the sound comes into a real contact with the ear before it is apprehended. According to Jainism, the sound is a material product. The sound travels through the vehicle of air and strikes with the ear, a fleshy structure of the shape of *kadamba* which causes the sensation of sound.

In the case of eye, the Jainās agree with the Buddhists and hold it as a distance receptor. The *Nyāya* philosophy admitted the eye as a fiery substance, which goes out and establishes a contact with the object. The Jainās do not agree with it.

The Jainās distinguish between ears and the other senses. They hold that the senses of touch, taste and smell apprehend an object which is not only in contact with the sense-organ but also fastened (*baddha*) to it. The sense of sound (ear) apprehends the object which is in contact only. It does not require the condition of being fastened also. The auditory sense is so sharp (*paṇu*) that mere contact is sufficient. Thus, the Jainās make three classes regarding the contact between senses and the object. The senses of touch, taste and smell apprehend the object which is in touch as well as physical grip (*baddha-sprṣṭa*). The sense of sound apprehends on mere touch only. The sense of sight apprehends the object which is neither in touch nor in grip.

The Objects of Sense-organs

(1) Touch- The Jainās hold the five qualities as the objects sensed naturally by the corresponding five organs. The organs of touch-sense is naturally capable of apprehending the quality of touch. The Jainās maintain eight kinds of touch, viz., hot and cold, soft and hard, viscid and dry heavy and light.

According to the modern psychology, there are four classes of the cutaneous sensations, namely the sensations of (i) touch proper, pressure or contact, (ii) heat and warmth, (iii) cold and coolness, (iv) pain

(2) The Tongue- The gustatory sense reveals the five types of taste; namely astringent (*tikta*), bitter (*kaṭu*), pungent (*kaṣāya*), sour (*āmla*) and sweet (*madhura*). Modern psychology reduces the list to four as the pure taste sensation, namely, sweet, salt, acid and bitter. It holds other tastes as a mixture of taste with smell or touch.

(3) The Nose- The olfactory sense apprehends two varieties of smell, namely, fragrant and non-fragrant. The modern psychology holds that there are many degrees of the intensity of smell. They are so vague and indistinguishable from one another, that it is impossible to have an accurate classification. They also get blended with (a) tactual sensations of nostrils, as in the case of the smell sensation of ammonia or of snuff; (b) organic sensations of the respiratory system, e.g. certain smells stimulate respirations and others have a choking effect; and (c) common sensibility, e.g. some smells have an exhilarating and others a depressing effect on the organism as a whole.

(4) The Eyes - The sense of vision apprehends the five varieties of colour, namely, black (*kr̥ṣṇa*), blue (*nīla*), red (*rakta*) Yellow (*pīṭa*) and white (*śukla*). The modern psychology accepts seven varieties of colour with a complex system of sensation. The Buddhist inclusion of form (*akāra*) in visual objects is not favoured by the Jainās and the *Nyāya*. They hold that it can be perceived by the sense of touch also.

(5) The Ears- The sense of sound apprehends three varieties of the sound, namely (i) produced by living being (*saçitta*), (ii) produced by the lifeless object (*acitta*) and (iii) the mixed (*miśra*). The *Tattvārtha Sūtra* divides the sound into two varieties of (i) produced after certain deliberate process (*prāyogika*) and accidental (*vaiśraṣika*). The sound is divided in other varieties also, but, they are connected with its being an articulate, inarticulate speech and so on. They have no bearing on the objectivity of auditory sense.

According to the modern psychology, sounds are waves of vibrations produced by certain physical action.

The Concept of Mind in Jainism

Now, let us know about the sixth sense i.e. mind. Thought externally, it does not look as a sense yet internally it is connected with all the five senses. That is why mind is defined as follows:

“The mind is the organ of apprehension of all objects of all the sense-organs of the three periods of time.”¹

“That which apprehends all the objects- and not specifically determined objects as is done by a sense-organ- is the mind. As it can comprehend the objects belonging to the three periods of time, it is called *trailkālīka*.

It is also called ‘*anindriya*’ and also ‘*no-indriya*’ or ‘quasi-sense’. Moreover, the matter transformed into mind is *dravya-mana* or physical mind, while the attainment of efficiency and conscious activity is known as *bhāva-mana* or psychical mind.

“The mind is called quasi-sense because it is not restricted, like the sense-organs, to specific objects. Another explanation of this nomenclature may be that it is not a sense-organ because it has not independent jurisdiction over the external perceivable objects, and this lack of independent capacity disqualifies it from attaining the status which the sense-organ has.”²

In Jainism, the mind is known as no-sense (*anindriya*) or not-sense (*no-indriya*). The terms ‘no’ or ‘not’ in this case, do not mean negation but comparatively lesser degree of the character of a sense. Though mind also is a source of knowledge, it is regarded as *no-indriya*; because it is dependent on other senses for grasping the external objects. It is a common factor in all cognitions. The object of each of sense-organs is fixed but the mind is not confined only to any particular physical qualities. It is also capable of apprehending the past and future. The main function of the mind is thinking together with memory of past and imagination of future. It is capable of analysing the data given by the senses.

As regards the views of the Jaina thinkers, Pūjyapāda writes in his commentary ‘*Sarvārtha-siddhi*’ on the *Tattvārtha Sūtra* that mind is the internal sense-organ. It is called *anindriya* (not-sense) since it does not occupy a particular site in the body nor does it last for a long period, whereas the sense-organs have their seats in the different part of the body and last for a long time. The mind is, therefore, not a sense-organ in the ordinary sense, but it enjoys a unique status, since it cognizes internal activities. It is called not-sense in the sense of quasi-sense. Just as a girlhood is called *anudarra* without uterus, not because she does not have a uterus but because her womb is so small that it does not possess the capacity of conceiving, so also the mind is called ‘*anindriya*’, since it is not of the rank of ordinary sense-organ. The same opinion we come across in the *Tattvārtha Bhāṣya*. Vidyānanda argues that the mind is not a sense-organ, because it is different from the sense-organs. The sense-organs apprehend specific objects. One sense-organ cannot apprehend the object of another. Such is not the case with the mind. It can cognize all objects of all the senses. So it cannot be regarded as a sense-organ. It may be argued, he further remarks, that the mind is an instrument of cognition and so it must be regarded as a sense-organ. But in that case smoke also would be a sense-organ, since it is an instrument of cognition, being a mark of inference. Hence, it is wrong to include the mind in the list of the sense-organs. This argument of Vidyānanda can only refute the position of a psychologist who regards mind as an ordinary sense-organ. In the case of smoke, the situation is quite different, since it is not an instrument of the self, since the self is the agent which exercises that cognition. Smoke is an ordinary object that can be perceived by the external senses. The mind is not like that. It is an important instrument of the self and not an ordinary object of the sense. Hence, the status of mind is not like that of an ordinary external sense-organ, nor can it be regarded as an object of the senses like smoke. It is the internal instrument that helps the self in cognizing internal states like pleasure, pain, etc. Hemacandra’s account regarding the status of mind seems to be quite consistent. He gives the definition of mind as follows: Mind is the organ of cognition of all objects of all the senses. All objects of all the senses, and not specifically determined such as touch is of the tactual sense, are cognized by the mind. So it is called the organ of cognition of all objects. If the definition were worded simply as the mind is the cognizant of all objects then this definition would also apply to the self, since the self, while in all perfection, cognizes all the objects requiring no help of the senses, and so the phrase ‘the organ of cognition’ has been inserted in order to emphasise the instrumental character of the mind. And thus, the definition does not extend to the self which is but the agent.

The Classification of Mind

The mind is also of two types viz., physical mind and psychical mind just like the five external senses. The physical mind is nothing but made up of material aggregates of atoms transformed into the form of mind. The nature of the stuff of which the physical mind is made up is as under: The Jaina philosophers have classified matter into number of groups (*vargaṇās*) of material atoms. The first group contains only such atoms as remain alone and solitary and have not formed composite bodies with others. The second group contains the aggregates of two atoms; the third group contains those of three atoms and so on. By this process we arrive at a group that contains the aggregates of an infinite number of atoms, which is fit for the making up of gross (*audārīka*) body. There is another group of this type which is competent for the making up of (*vaikriya*) body. There is still another group of atoms that is fit for forming the stuff of communication (*ākāraka*) body. Similarly, other groups can be conceived which are capable of forming bio-electric (*aijās*) body and karmic (*kārmāṇa*) bodies, speech, respiration and the like. The stuff of which the physical mind is composed is one of these various types of groups which is technically known as ‘*manovargaṇā*’ meaning thereby the group of atoms which is essential for the functioning of mind.

Place of Mind

It occupies the whole body. The *Digambarās* admit the heart as its abode; and of the shape of a lotus with eight petals. The psychical mind. The psychical mind (*bhāvamāṇa*) is the power or activity of the self resulting into various states of mental activities.

The psychical mind is in the form of *labdhi* (potentiality) obtained through the destruction-cum-subsidence of the relevant obscuring karma and in the form of *upayoga* i.e., conscious activity of the self through which it cognizes the object. Thus, from these observations we arrive at the conclusion that the status of mind in the Jain system is just like that of other senses the only unlikeness being that the other senses are external and have specific objects for their cognition, whereas the mind is internal and has no special object for its cognition. It cognizes all objects of all the senses, and thus, serves as an organ of knowledge. The activities of consciousness e.g. pleasure, pain, recognition, love, aversion, etc., are performed by the mind. All these activities are rooted in sense-perception. In other words, all the various states of mind are based on the sensory cognition and hence, we are justified in establishing the fact that mind is the organ of cognition of all the senses. Whatever is the object of sensory perception can also be the object of mental cognition.

According to the *Nandī* and *Anuyogadvāra*, the ordinary (sensory) perception is confined to the five external senses. Therein mental cognition is not regarded as perception. But, in the later times, the apprehensions of pleasure, pain etc. were included into perception. In the *Āgamika* literature, feeling is considered as to have no relation with the mind. It is effected by *Vedanīya-karma* and directly connected with the soul. Even the animals which do not possess mind, do feel pleasure, pain etc. The *Arhatās*, who have transcended the mind for any psychic activity, are said to feel favourable or unfavourable experience directly through the soul. In this stage, the mind is purely connected with the function of thinking.

Regarding the cognition of the qualities of soul by the mind, the Jainās say that soul can apprehend its won qualities independently.

The Jainās assert that the experience of pleasure, pain etc. are the qualities of the self due to rise of karma.

The Function of Mind

The *Āgamika* term for the function of mind is *saṃjñā*. It is classified in many ways.

The First Classification

According to the first classification, it has three varieties:

(a) *Dīrghakālīkī*- The sense of keeping the past impressions into memory and reflection on the future. This sense is found in the living beings of living beings possessed of and hell and in the animals born out of womb or egg. The classification of living beings into *saṃjñīs* mind and *asaṃjñīs* (living beings not possessed of mind) depends mainly on this sense.

(b) *Hetuvadīkī*- The sense of acceptance or rejection of an object after proper consideration of its advantages or disadvantages. This sense is found in all the mobile (*trasa*) animals, who can move from place to place according to their interest.

(c) *Dr̥ṣṭivādīkī*- The sense of getting the knowledge of *Dr̥ṣṭivāda*, the twelfth *aṅga* (the main canonical text). This sense is found only in the ascotics with super spiritual power.

The Second Division

According to the second classifications the *saṃjñā* is divided into two varieties of (a) knowing and (b) feeling :

(a) The variety of knowing relates to the five types of knowledge, *mati*, *śruta* etc.

(b) The variety of feeling is divided into the following four types:

(i) *Ācārāṅga*- The instinct of hunger. It is effected by the rise of corresponding *Vedanīya karma*. (ii) *Bhāṣyasamjñā*- The instinct of fear; effected by the *Mohanīya karma*. (iii) *Maithunasamjñā*- The instinct of sexual desire, effected by *Mohanīya Karma*. (iv) *Parigrahasamjñā*- The desire for accumulation, effected by *Mohanīya Karma*.

The *Bhagavatī Sūtra* adds six more varieties, i.e. the four passions (*kaṣāyās*), *Oghasamjñā* and *Lokasamjñā*. *Oghasamjñā* is the habitual feeling without any explicit psychic consciousness. It is just like the activities of unconscious mind. *Lokasamjñā* is the ordinary type of articulate cognition.

The *Ācārāṅga Sūtra* mentions, six more *saṃjñās* viz., (i) *Moha* (delusion), (ii) *Dharma* (righteousness) (iii) *Sukha* (pleasure), (iv) *Dukkha* (pain) (v) *Jugupsā* (contempt) and (vi) *Śoka* (grief).

The above types of *saṃjñās* as are common to all the mundane beings. They are found in the one-sensed beings also.

The Problems of *Samjñā* and *Asamjñā*

In the Jaina biological evolution, only a particular section of the five-sensed beings is regarded as *saṃjñā* i.e. beings possessed of mind. All other animals are *asamjñā* i.e., being not possessed of mind. This division is based on the possession of mind or otherwise. But, at the same time it is held that *Matī* and *Śruta jñāna* are common to all the imperfect souls. We have divided *matī* into three types *indriyanimitta* (produced by the senses alone), *anindriyanimitta* (produced by the mind only) and *ubhayanimitta* (produced by the both). The first type of *matī* is possible in the one-sensed animals also, as they possess the sense of touch. The other two types require the assistance of mind; so they cannot exist in the *asamjñā* animals who are devoid of mind.

Jinabhadra tries to explain this inconsistency by holding the division of *saṃjñā* and *asamjñā* as based on the physical mind; which is not complete in the lower grade animals. Their activity is mere instinctive and not rational. But, as far as the psychical mind is concerned, they are not absolutely devoid of mind. They also possess the power of thinking or feeling to a certain degree. The trees, though one-sensed in physical consideration, exhibit a clear sense of feeling, the favourable or unfavourable touches. But, this contention of Jinabhadra, goes against the theory of cognitive causal system. The physical sense does not function without the help of physical mind, as we have stated in the case of a blind. According to the same principle, the psychical mind is impotent without the physical mind. Consequently, the phenomena of mental activities cannot be explained in the case of *asamjñā*.

The only possible explanation of this division is that the negation in the case of *asamjñā*, does not mean total absence, but an undeveloped condition. The mind of the lower grade animals is not so developed as amounting to rationality. This view is further confirmed by the first division of *saṃjñā* stated above. The animals by instinct also possess mind in undeveloped form; and consequently, they have *Śruta* also.

Matī is produced by sense or mind or both.³ In case of the animals without mind, it is generated by the senses only. Such animals are known as *asamjñā*. Modern psychologists explain their activity as merely habitual or instinctive. The Jainas hold that such animals cannot think locally. *Asamjñā* does not mean total absence of mind,⁴ but the absence of developed mind amounting to intellect of the modern psychology. The cognition of the type of memory etc. are purely mental. They do not depend upon the assistance of the senses. The perceptual cognition of the animals with mind is based upon the senses as well as mind.

Umāsvāti in his *Bhāṣya* refers to one more type, i.e. *Oghajñāna*. Siddhasena Gaṇī interprets it as the cognition where the function of mind or senses is not explicit. Where the only cause is partial removal of corresponding karmic veil. For example, the movement of a creeper toward the roof of a cave or tree. But this type does not possess a qualitative difference, as that of degree. It is only a lower degree of undeveloped mind.

According to almost all Non-Jaina systems, mind is an essential condition for all types of psychic function. The Jaina does not favour this view. The *Naridī* clearly holds the sense cognition as different from the mental cognition. The first is *pratyakṣa*, while the latter is *parokṣa*. All types of *parokṣa* in the logical period, except *āgama* are included into *parokṣa matī*. Akalaṅka includes them into *Śruta*; but, this difference is related with the fixation of a demarcation line between *matī* and *Śruta*. Akalaṅka includes all types of mental cognition into *Śruta*. As far as the sensory cognition is concerned, he does not differ from the *Naridī*.

Thus according to the Jaina epistemology, mind is not an essential condition for all types of knowledge. The logical period, it which held that mind functions in the case of sensory cognitions also. But, that is an external influence. We have stated the variety of *mati* exclusively related with the senses. In such cases, the soul cognizes the object through the medium of senses, without depending upon the assistance of mind, just as in the case of supersensual cognition, it does so directly. It is another thing that in the case of *saṃjñī* the mind begins to function as soon as an object is presented.

In the case of super-sensual cognition of *avadhi* and *manaḥparyāya*, the role of mind is finished with the desire to know a particular object. After knowledge, it begins to function again for the creation of favourable or unfavourable attitude. In the case of an omniscient, it is absolved from that function also. Similar is the case with sensory cognition. It (mind) functions in creating a desire to know a particular thing. It has nothing to do with the stage of sensation. It function again for creating the particular attitude. But the stage of desire and attitude are not cognitive stages. They are produced as a result of the rise of *Mohanīya Karma*. Here, the mind does not function as an instrument of knowledge, but that of feeling or willing.

The mind as an instrument of cognition is related with the four types of imperceptual knowledge. They are memory, recognition, hypothetical judgment and authority. In the *Āgamika* period, these types are expressed along with *mati* or *śruta*. No doubt, the feelings of pleasure, pain etc. are directly related with the mind. But, they are not cognition. The four types of passions (*kaṣāyās*) and nine types of quasi-passions (*nokaṣāyās*) also are related with the mind, but those also are not cognitions. In the four state of *avagraha* etc. the mind begins to function from the stage of *īhā*, which is a mental inclination towards judgement. Here, it operates upon the data supplied by the senses. According to Jainism, *mati* advances from general to particular. This process consists in doubt, inclination and judgement. All these stages are mental phenomena. In the animals not possessed of mind, these states do not occur. Such animals get sense-impression and react habitually. For, the states of doubt etc. the memory of past impression is necessary. It is not possible in the less developed animals. They cannot retain the memory of the past events. The flies sit on the same thing even if they are hundred times blown away. They cannot be rational. Memory is the quality of developed mind. Similarly, the power of retention (*dhāraṇā*) also is a mental quality.

The above discussion leads us to the conclusion that mind is an instrument of knowing as well as the other psychical activities of feeling and willing. The external senses are related with knowing only. In the case of knowing, the mind is further analysed in two varieties. It serves as an instrument of an independently recognized category of knowledge, as in the case of memory, inference etc. It also serves as an instrument of the development of sensory cognition. As a matter of fact both types are fundamentally the same. The elements of memory and inference exist in both the cases. But, in one case, they are independently recognized, while in other, they are secondary to the sensory cognition. Such division did not exist in the *Āgamika* period and not logic (i.e. in the earlier age, when the *Āgamās* were the only source of knowledge. Later on, in the age when 'logic' was accepted by the Jaina ācāryās, i.e. during it was introduced during the logical period, where the question of inference etc. came into prominence.

QUESTIONS

Essay Types Question:

1. Write an essay on the theory of Mind in Jaina Epistemology.

or

Write an essay on the theory of Sense-organ in Jaina Epistemology.

Short Question:

1. What is the difference between sense and mind?
2. What is mind and what is its object and place?
3. Make a critical discussion on the problem of *Samjñī* and *Asamjñī*.

Fill in the blanks:

1. *Nirjīva* (lifeless) *padārtha* is devoid of
2. *Indriyās* are of 2 types (i) and (iii)
3. *Rasaneṇdriyās ākāra* (space) in like
4. The maxim of *cakṣureṇdriya* is
5. There are *vikalpās* of *indriyas* development.

Reply the following questions:

1. Which are *kāmī-indriyās* i.e. cupiditive *indriyās*?
2. What is the activity of mind?
3. What is a *samanaska* sentient (*prāṇī*) called?
4. Where is mind pervasive?
5. Who believes in *manojīva-vāda*

Reference Books:

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2. *The Jaina Epistemology*- Dr. I.C. Śāstrī
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LESSON 7

THE JAINA THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE AND EPISTEMOLOGY A VADHIJÑĀNA (CLAIRVOYANCE)

In Jainism there are five types of knowledge viz. *Mati Śruta Avadhi, Manaḥparyāya* and *kevala*. The five types of knowledge have been divided into two categories of direct cognition (*pratyakṣa*) and the indirect cognition (*parokṣa*). The first two types of *Mati* and *Śruta* are indirect cognitions while the remaining three are direct-cognitions. We have also discussed the basis of this division. Accordingly the cognition which arises from the soul without any external help is direct and that depending upon external cause is indirect. The direct knowledge is independent of all factors, commonly held as the cause of knowledge. Regarding the objects also it differs from the indirect cognitions. It apprehends the objects that are remote, past, future, minute, hidden or otherwise uncognizable through the external senses, it is supernormal.

The modern science of hypnotism, decultism etc. will find sufficient material for research in the Indian account of supernormal perceptions. They will find it in the evidences of auto suggestions, Clairaudience, hyperaesthesia of vision hearing touch etc. hypermnnesia thought reading, thought-transference, telepathy and different types of trance or obtained through such practices.

Accordingly to Jainism there are three planes of supernormal consciousness as indicated above under direct cognitions. The first plane known as *Avadhijñāna* is limited to the material objects. It resembles the *Rūpa citta* of the Buddhist. It is limited to the cognition of rūpins or material objects. The second plane is known as *Manaḥparyāya jñāna*, where one can know the other's mind. It is subtler than the previous plane. Moreover, the *Avadhijñāna* is not necessarily connected with the spiritual aspiration. It is found in the beings with right faith (*Samyagdr̥ṣṭi*) as well as wrong faith (*mūḥyādr̥ṣṭi*). The second and third planes are based on the spiritual development. The second is confined to the monks only who have eliminated the third stage deluding of attachment i.e. *Mohanīya-karma* and revealed the natural virtues found in the sixth step of the spiritual ladder.

But, the Jainās do not hold that the consciousness of the lower plane is eliminated in the higher plane. On the contrary the knowledge of lower plane gets further development in the higher stages.

In the third plane is *kevalajñāna* i.e. omniscience in which one knows *arūpin* i.e. immaterial, objects also. The Jainās do not admit any order of objective appearance, in this stage. All the objects material or immaterial, conscious or unconscious are apprehended simultaneously. Clairvoyance is the knowledge dependent on the self alone and takes stock of material substance as its object.

The Owner

It is congenital immediately caused by genesis in the case of the denizens of heaven and hell.

Divine beings and also beings born in hell are born along with this clairvoyance. It does not require the good offices of the visual organ but emerges in the soul directly and immediately. As a matter of fact knowledge can emerge only if the veil which prevented its emergence is removed and the other obscuring karmas are held in check and so the genesis of this type of super-sensuous cognition also takes place by this process. It is however, affiliated to birth as its condition in the case of the denizens of heaven and hell. Their very birth brings about the relevant destruction-cum-suppression which is thus regarded as the direct cause of the knowledge in question.

In the case of other being other than denizens of heaven and hell i.e. men and lower animals, it is due to the occasional destruction-cum-suppression of the relevant obscuring *Karmās*.

The Nature of Direct Knowledge

According to Jainism transcendental perception is produced by the self alone. It is assisted by neither sense-organs nor the mind. It is a natural quality of the soul, lying inactive on account of the karmic obscuration. It gets its manifestation according to the partial or total removal of the corresponding obscuration. It is divided into the following three stages of (1) *Avadhijñāna*, (2) *Manahparyāvajñāna*, (3) *Kevalajñāna*.

Umāsvāti holds the above three types of knowledge as perception (*pratyakṣa-pramāṇa*) in contrast to *Mati* and *Śruta* which are *parokṣa* i.e. indirect account of their dependence upon the senses and the mind or scriptures. Jinabhadra, Akalaṅka and the latter logicians have named them as *pāramārthika* i.e. transcendental perception *pratyakṣa* in contrast to the sense-cognition named as *sāṃvṛtyavahārika pratyakṣa* i.e. comprised perception. The *Sthānāṅga* classifies the above three types into *Vikala* (incomplete) and *Sakala* (complete). The first two are *Vikala-pratyakṣa* while the last one is *Sakala-pratyakṣa*.

Avadhi

The Jainās believe in the capacity of the soul to know all things irrespective of temporal and spatial distance. The past as well as the future can be perceived as vividly as the present. The soul is inherently capable of perceiving all this with all their characteristics-past, present and future. But this capacity of the soul is obstructed by knowledge (*jñānāvaraṇīya*) *karma* which veils the soul and permits only an imperfect comprehension of the world. The nature and extent of the knowing capacity of a soul, therefore, depend upon the nature of the veil. But never can the veil obstruct the knowing capacity completely because in that case the soul would become covering as good as non-soul. The knowledge of the soul is never totally obstructed by the veil even as the light of the sun or the moon is never totally obstructed even by the darkest clouds. There is always some glimpse of the external world, however imperfect or sometimes even perverted it may be. For the sake of systematic investigation, the various states of knowledge, ranging from the most imperfect and perverted knowledge of the one senses organisms upto as the most perfect knowledge of the (omniscient) *Kevalin* have been classified into five categories viz. *mati*, *śruta*, *avadhi*, *manahparyāya* and *kevala*. Of these, we have dealt with *mati* and *śruta* which, as we have seen, are dependent upon the various external organs. But now we come to those categories which do not depend upon any sense-organ. Of course, even in the case of *mati* and *śruta*, the role of the sense-organs is a subordinate one because they only serve to eliminate the veil which envelops the knowledge of the object already there. But nevertheless they have some function of their own, in the absence of which knowledge would be impossible. The other three categories of knowledge, however, are completely free from the dependence upon the sense-organs, and as such, as we have already stated, are called *pratyakṣa* proper. The conception of these categories will certainly appear dogmatic, but nevertheless it should be borne in mind that the vital source of the Jain theory of knowledge lies in this conception. If the soul has the capacity to know, it must know independently of any other external condition. Knowledge is not spatial or temporal relation, but is a capacity. Distance, spatial or temporal, is not a hindrance for the soul. It can obstruct physical movement. But with regard to the capacity to know, it cannot have any such influence. If the soul cannot penetrate into the past or future, or see through distance, it is due to the elimination of its knowing capacity by the obstructive veil, and not due to any inherent prevention. Knowledge is as independent as existence. As existence does not depend upon some other existence for its existence, so knowledge does not depend upon something else for its knowledge. Knowledge is there in its own right as its objects are there in their own right. No physical contact, direct or indirect, with objects is necessary for the emergence of knowledge. The question of physical contact or limited distance or size comes in only when the inherent capacity is delimited. And this delimitation even is not ultimately due to some extraneous condition. It is due to the soul itself which has acquired the karmic veil by its own activity.

Difference of *Avadhi* from *Keval*

Avadhijñāna is the supernormal knowledge of material objects. It is known as *avadhi*, because, its sphere of apprehension is limited. It resembles to clairvoyance or clairaudience of the modern psychology. But, according to Jainism all cognitions related with *Avadhi* are produced direct by the soul. The senses do not play any part in them.

There are three characteristics which distinguish *avadhi* from *kevala* i.e. omniscience. Firstly, it is limited in the scope of apprehension. It perceives the material objects only. Secondly, it is not constant. It follows attention (*upayoga*). The *kevala* is constant, and does not require any attention. Thirdly, its (*avadhi*) area of objectivity is wider in the lower regions than in the upper ones.

The Types of *Avadhi*

Avadhi is of two types, based upon the factors of its cause. Though the real cause of all *avadhi*, as in the case of other types of knowledge, is *kṣayaopasāma*, without which no cognitions possible; yet in certain beings it is natural, just like the capacity of flying in bird, merely on account of its birth as a bird, is adept in flying. Similarly, every being born in the plane of gods or hellish beings, is equipped with *avadhijñāna*. This *avadhi* is called *bhava-pratyaya* (caused by birth). This conception is based, perhaps, on the notion that abnormal knowledge is a necessary equipment for the excess of happiness as well as misery. Further, the inhabitants of these kingdom do not possess gross bodies. Their bodies are fluid (*Vaikṛeyaka*), Supernormal bodies and super normal knowledge go together.

The second types of *avadhi* is known as *kṣayopasāma-pratyaya*, caused by the partial removal of *avadhijñānāvaraṇa*. This occurs in the kingdoms of men as well as animals. According to Jainism an animal also can rise up to the fifth step of the spiritual progress and can observe the vows of a laymen or *śrāvaka*. We have not come across any other system giving so much consideration to a being of sub-human kingdom. In the *Purāṇās* some animals, associated with the gods incarnate or sages, are described as having supernatural powers. In the Indian legends also some birds are characterized as possessing occult knowledge and describing hidden treasures or foretelling the future calamities or personal destiny. But, they are not given any philosophical importance. The capacity of *bhava-pratyaya avadhi* is fixed according to the region where a being takes its birth. For instance, the being of hell plane cannot perceive beyond six miles. Similarly, in the different stages of gods and the seven hells (*Narakās*) the potentiality of *avadhi* is fixed.

The possession of *avadhi-jñāna* is a birthright of the denizens of heaven and hell. The *avadhi-jñāna* in their case is *bhava-pratyaya* (due to birth). The *avadhi* of human beings as well as of the five-sensed sub-human beings is due to the destruction-cum-subsidence of the relevant karmic veil (*kṣayopasāma-nimitta*). It is acquired by merit and is also called *guṇa-pratyaya* (due to merit). The distinction, however, is only apparent. The denizens of heaven and hell are endowed with *avadhi* by their very birth and hence their *avadhi* is called *bhava-pratyaya*. Other beings get it only occasionally and as a result of special merit and hence in their case it is called *kṣayopasāma nimitta* or *guṇanimitta*. In fact, however, *avadhi* is as a rule, *kṣayopasāma-nimitta* in all cases. It is necessary in the case of the denizens of heaven and hell because they have secured the destruction and subsidence of the veiling *karman* by the acquisition of requisite merits and only occasional in the case of other beings for the reason already given, and as such is classified into separate categories dingily. The *kṣayopasāma-pratyaya avadhi* is divided into the following six sub-classes.

Varieties of *Avadhi*

clairvoyance is sixfold, viz.

- | | |
|----------------------------------|---|
| 1. What follows the clairvoyant, | 2. What doesn't follow the clairvoyant, |
| 3. Expanding (Clairvoyance) | 4. Contracting (clairvoyance), |
| 5. Vulnerable (to loss), | 6. Invulnerable |

Ananugāmika—the *avadhi* which sticks to the place of its birth, which does not follow the owner if he happens to leave that particular place where *avadhi* was produced. It is like the knowledge based on the local acquaintance and the study of environment. A person can resolve the queries related with his own surroundings. If he happens to leave his hometown, he cannot answer any question.

Ānugāmika—the *avadhi* which follows the owner even if he leaves the place of its birth. It is compared with the colour of a cloth which accompanies the latter every where. We can compare it with the knowledge of philosophy or other higher sciences not dependent on particular environment.

Hīyamāna—the *avadhi* which covers large area at the time of its origin, but shrinks gradually up to the stage of negligibility or disappears totally. It is like the flame of fire spreading in dry fuel, but gradually extinguishing with the consumption of fuel.

Vardhamāna—the *avadhi* which is negligible at the time of its birth but gradually increases up to the extent of whole universe. It is like the fire of match-stick thrown into a heap of dry fuel.

Anavasthita—the *avadhi* which is unsteady; increases and decreases without any system. It is like the waves of ocean undergoing various forms.

Avasthita—the *avadhi* which is steady. Having once appeared, it never disappears up to the attainment of *Kevalajñāna* or the end of life. Sometimes, it follows the next life also. It is like the sex-organ which does not change through out the life.

The varieties of *Ānugāmika*

The *anugāmika avadhi* is again divided into two varieties viz., *aritagata* (situated at the border) and *madhyagata* (situated in the middle).

Aritagata is explained in three ways: According to the first explanation it means that which is stated at the front of soul. The *avadhi* produced by a number of molecules (*spardhaka*) which appear like the particles of light spreading out of the window in the sun. In certain beings they are numerable, in others innumerable. These units consist of various powers and forms. Some of them appear on the border of the soul. Again a number of them occupies the front position, another operates on the back, and a third in the lower parts; while another number is associated with upper parts. Another number occupies the middle. *Aritagata-avadhi* means the *avadhi* having units which occupy the border and not other parts. According to another explanation it is body and not the soul that is concerned here. *Aritagata* means, situated at the border of the physical body. A person sometimes can see in a particular direction only. Though the soul has no parts as far as *kṣayopasāma* is concerned, yet a person sees a particular direction only. This is due to the body where the *spardhakās* of *avadhi* operate. The *kṣayopasāma* appears in various ways. Its nature can be judged from the result only. *Avadhi* for a particular direction postulates the particular *kṣayopasāma*. According to the third explanation *aritagata* means the cognizer situated at the end of the area illuminated by the *avadhi* directed towards a particular direction. It means that when the cognizer stands on one end of his cognitive area and not in the middle of it, then it is *aritagata*.

Madhyagata

Madhyata also is explained in the similar three ways. One can intuit from all the sides, all the directions through the purity of consciousness is *Madhyagata avadhi-jñāna*.

The *avadhi* of gods, hellish beings and *Tīrthāṅkarās* is *Madhyagata*; that of animals is *aritagata* and that of human beings is not fixed. It varies according to *kṣayopasāma*. The *avadhi* of gods and hellish beings lasts for the whole life, that of *Tīrthāṅkarās* up to the attainment of *kevalajñāna*, that of others is uncertain.

By *avadhi-jñāna* one can intuit only those things which have shape or form (*rūpin*). The intuitions

differ in scope and durability endowed with the highest type of *avadhi* can intuit all the things having form. In point of space his intuition extends over a space that could be occupied by a countless number of space-units of the size of *loka* (the inhabited universe) and as regards time it penetrates countless cannot know all. It knows only an infinitesimal part of them. Though, of course, even this tiny part consists of an infinite number of modes. The Jainās conceive infinity as having infinite gradation and as such there is no absurdity in this conception. The lowest type of *avadhi* can extend to a very small fraction of an angula and know the infinite number of things having form (*rūvi dāvvaṃ*) that lie therein. In point of time it can penetrate only a small part of an *āvalika* (a small measure of time less than a second) and as regards modes it can infinite number of them.

The Area cognized by *Avadhi*

The knowledge of common people is confined to the capacity of senses and the mind. The area of *avadhi* is ascertained from the point where the soul begins to function independently. The minimum and the maximum area cognized by it can be fixed by placing the sense-cognition on one side and omniscience on the other. *Avadhi* with the minimum capacity apprehends the area, as little as the dimension of a *panaka* is the shortest being of the vegetable kingdom which takes birth in the body of a huge fish stretching eight thousand miles. The simile indicates the very short area as the object of minimum *avadhi*.

In the third moment of its birth, the maximum area cognized by *avadhi* is the entire universe and innumerable units of the same size beyond it. According to Jaina cosmology the whole universe is measured by fourteen *Rajjus*, a hypothetical scale of innumerable *yojanās*. It is believed that the five substances *Dharma*, *Adharma*, *Jīva*, *Pudgala* and *Kāla* are found in this area of fourteen *rajjus* only. Beyond it there is only one substance, i.e. *Ākāśa* (space). Out of the six *dravyas* the *pudgala* is material while the other five are immaterial. *Avadhi* can know the material objects only. But the question under discussion is the extension of space, where the object can be apprehended by the *avadhi* with maximum capacity. Jinabhadra holds that *avadhi* can apprehend an area as much as is constituted by innumerable worlds of the dimension of fourteen.

The Four Measurements of *Avadhi*

There are four factors on which the capacity of *avadhi* is ascertained. They are time, space, substance (*dravya*) and mode (*bhāva* or *paryāya*). By time and space we mean here, the material objects existing in a particular span of time or area. The two substances space (*ākāśa*) and time (*kāla*) cannot be perceived by *avadhi*, as they are immaterial. These four factors excel one after the other in minuteness. It means that *avadhi* cognizing a certain number of space-units cannot cognize the same number of time-units. It requires a higher potency to cognize them. It requires still higher potency for cognizing the same quantity of substance units, and still higher for modes. Space is minuter than time. Substance is minuter than space and modes are minuter than substance. The shortest unit of time is *samaya* and that of space is *pradeśa*. If the number of space-units covered by a finger-tip (*angula*) is compared with the same number of *samayās* the latter would amount to innumerable *utsarpiṇīs* and *avasarpiṇīs*. So, with the one unit of time, there are innumerable units of space. With one unit of space, there are infinite (*ananta*) units of substance and with one unit of substance there are numerable (*sankhyāta*) or innumerable (*asankhyāta*) modes. With the extension of time the area must extend; but there is no certainty vice-versa. With the extension of area the span of time may or may not increase. Similarly, with the extension in space and time the substances and modes must increase, but, there is no guarantee vice versa. In the same way the modes must increase with the increase in substance; but, it is not so, if the position is reversed.

The Proportional Development of *Avadhi* in Respect of Time and Space

We have mentioned above the minimum and maximum area cognized by the *avadhi*. All other units of space fail in the middle. As the area extends, time also gets its extension. But, this extension is not without a proportion. Jinabhadra gives the following account of it.

According to Jainism *samaya* and *pradeśa* are the shortest indivisible units of time and space respectively. But they are so minute as beyond the common apprehension. They are not taken into account for general measurement. *Arigula* (finger tip) and *Āvalikā* are the shortest units commonly applied to the measurement of space and time respectively.

The *avadhi* cognizing an area measured by an innumerably small part of *arigula*, would cognize the span of time measured by the correspondingly small part of *āvalikā*. The *avadhi* with an area of one *angula* will have one *āvalikā* in respect of time. This proportion is as below.

SPACE	TIME
<i>Hasta</i> (1.5 feet)	<i>Muhūrtānta</i> (less than 48 minutes)
<i>Gavyuti</i> (4 miles)	<i>Divasānta</i> (less than 24 hours)
<i>Yojana</i> (8 miles)	<i>Divasaprthaktva</i> (2 to 9 days)
25 <i>Yojanās</i> (200 miles)	<i>Pakṣānta</i> (less than one fortnight)
<i>Bharata kṣetra</i>	<i>Māsānta</i> (less than one month)
<i>Jambudvīpa</i>	More than one month
<i>Manuṣyaloka</i>	One year
<i>Rucakavira</i>	2 to 9 years; according to another view one thousand years
<i>Sanṅhyeya dvīpa-sāgara</i>	(Numerable years more than one thousand island and ocean)

The increase in time is not certain with the increase in area; but, with the increase in time that in space is certain.

The Scope of *Avadhi* in Respect of Substance

We have known the area and the span of time cognized by *avadhi* in its three degrees of minimum, maximum and the middle. We have also known the proportional expansion of the two.

In this connection it is essential to have some idea of the Jaina conception of the relative subtlety of time, space, matter and modes. The ultimate constituent of time is an infinitesimal indivisible unit called *samaya* 'time-point' or 'instant'. This time-point is beyond human comprehension and can be intuited only by the omniscient. In the same way space is also conceived as having *pradeśās* (space-point) as its ultimate indivisible units. But these space-points are subtler than the time-points. It is conceived that the number of time-point of a countless number of cycles of time. But an atom of matter is still subtler. An infinite number of atoms can be accommodated in one space-point. Again every atom has an infinite number of modes and as such the modes are conceived as subtler than the atoms. Thus of a time-point, space-point, a material atom and a mode the succeeding one is subtler than the preceding one. It, therefore, naturally follows that with the increase of the capacity for penetration into time, there is necessarily an increase in the capacity for extending over space, and comprehending more of matter and modes; but extension in space does not necessarily involve more penetration into time, nor does comprehension of more matter and modes involve necessary spatial extension and temporal penetration. The rationale of the argument can be brought out as follows; A time-point is more extensive as compared with a space-point than to penetrate one time-point. So it is conceived that temporal penetration is necessarily accompanied with spatial extension. But the reverse is not true. Now as each space-point can contain an infinite number of atoms, and each atom has an infinite number of modes, it is conceived that with the increase of scope in space, there is necessarily an increase in the number of things and their modes that are comprehended, but the comprehension of a greater number of things and modes does not necessarily involve more penetration into time and extension in space. Comprehension of a greater number of things and modes may be due to the clarity of the intuition as well and this is another reason why it does not necessarily involve spatial or temporal extension. Similarly, although the highest type of *avadhi* can comprehend all the atoms of a space-point, it cannot comprehend all their modes because the comprehend all the atoms of a space-point, it

cannot comprehend all their modes because the comprehension of all the modes is possible only on the attainment of the maximum of clarity which materializes only on the dawn of omniscience.

Now, we come to the scope of *avadhi* in respect of substance, it has been already stated that matter (*pudgala*) is the only substance that can be cognized by *avadhi*. Its molecules are divided into the following eight classes known as *vargaṇās*:

1. *Audārīka vargaṇā* The molecules forming the parts of gross bodies (*audārīka śarīra*).
2. *Vaikṛeyaka vargaṇā* Those forming the parts of fluid body (*vaikṛīya śarīra*)
3. *Āhāraka vargaṇā* Those forming the parts of astral body (*āhāraka śarīra*)
4. *Taijasa Vargaṇā* Those forming the parts of fiery body (*taijasa śarīra*)
5. *Bhāṣā vargaṇā* Those constituting the parts of sound.
6. *Ānaprāṇa vargaṇā* The molecules of respiration
7. *Manovargaṇā* The molecules of mind
8. *Kārmanavargaṇā* Molecules of *Karmās*

All the atoms occupying single space-units constitute one *vargaṇā*. All molecules occupying two space-units constitute the second *vargaṇā* and so on and infinitum. This constitutes an infinite number of *vargaṇās*. The molecules upto a certain grade are not fit for constitution of a gross body. After that there comes a number of fit molecules. Again they are unfit. When the number of atoms is further increased, the molecules become fit for the fluid body. Further increment makes them fit for astral body. This process goes on upto the *karmavargaṇā*. The number of atoms increases in the higher and higher *vargaṇās* but the grossness decreases. *Vaikṛeyaka vargaṇā* is finer than the *audārīka-vargaṇā*. *Āhāraka vargaṇā* is still finer. *Karma vargaṇā* is the finest.

The solidity of matter is divided into four degrees of *guru* (heavy), *laghu* (light), *gurulaghu* (mixed) and *agurulaghu* (neither of the two). The matter with nature of upward movements is *laghu*; as fire. That with side movement is *guru-laghu* as air; and that which is free from all these categories is *agurulaghu*. The above division is only a rough estimate. In reality there is no matter which is absolutely *guru* or absolutely *laghu*. Everything possesses both the natures more or less degree. Even a stone can move upwards or side-wards when thrown accordingly. In the real aspect there are only two groups; that of *gurulaghu* and a *gurulaghu*. The first four of the above *vargaṇās* are *gurulaghu* and the rest are a *gurulaghu*.

The scope of *avadhi* in respect of substance begins from the cognition of either *tejovargaṇā* or *bhāṣāvargaṇā*. If it starts with *tejovargaṇā*, it is more on the side of *gurulaghu*. Then, it moves towards the apprehension of grosser object. When the *gurulaghu* group is fully apprehended it expands, if further purified, towards the apprehension of *agurulaghu* group. In case it is not further purified, it stops there for some time and then disappears. The *avadhi* beginning with the cognition of *bhāṣāvargaṇā* is more on the side of a *gurulaghu*. It progresses towards the cognition of finer *vargaṇās*. Having apprehended all the four *vargaṇās* of *agurulaghu* group, it covers the *gurulaghu* group also, if further purified. The following table will show how the *avadhi* develops in the case of substance in proportion to time and space.

Substance	Space	Time
1. <i>Taijasa śarīra</i> (Bio-electrical Body)	Innumerable islands and oceans	Innumerable parts of <i>palyopama</i>
2. <i>Kārmana śarīra</i>	-do-	-do- (karmic Body)
3. <i>Taijasa vargaṇā</i>	-do-	-do-
4. <i>Bhāṣāvargaṇā</i>	-do-	-do-
5. <i>Manovargaṇā</i>	A numerable part of the entire universe	A numerable part of <i>palyopama</i>

6. <i>Karma vargaṇā</i>	A consideration part of the universe	A considerable portion of <i>palyopama</i>
7. -do-	The entire universe	A little less than <i>palyopama</i>

Karma-vargaṇā consists of the finest molecules. It has been shown in the sixth category. The seventh category is therefore left blank. But it does not mean that the proportion of substance does not increase in it. In the seventh category *avadhi* begins to see *dhruva vargaṇās*, which are subtler than the *karmavargaṇās*. An *avadhi jñānī* in this stage, begins to apprehend the atoms as well. Moreover, it generally turns into *paramāvadhi*, which is necessarily followed by *kevalajñāna*.

We have stated that by *avadhi* one can know only those things which have form or shape. The formless things such as the souls, *dharma* (substance that help motion) and *adharma* substance that help rest, space and time, are not intuited by *avadhi*. It is only the *rūpin* contents of space and time that are known by it. Its scope and durability is determined by the capacity of the person possessed of it. The *Āvaśyaka Niryukti* gives a detailed description of *avadhi* from fourteen points of view viz. its varieties, its spatial extension, shape of space it extends over etc. The *Naridī Sūtra*, however, gives only six varieties of *avadhi* that are possible in the case of a meritorious homeless mendicants with a few sub-varieties.

The object *Avadhi*

So far we were discussing the scope of *avadhi* attained as the result of extraordinary virtues in the human and sub-human kingdoms. The capacity of this *avadhi* is not fixed, it fluctuates according to the ethical status or the past virtues. The scope of *avadhi* related to the kingdoms of hell and heaven, which is effected, there by the very birth is more or less fixed. In the kingdom of hell the minimum area is four miles and the maximum eight miles. In the kingdom of heaven minimum is two hundred miles and the maximum *lokanāḍī*, the central part of universe from top to the bottom with a length of 14 *rajus* and breadth of one *rajju*.

Three stages of *Deśāvadhi*, *Paramāvadhi* and *Sarvāvadhi*

We have mentioned above that the scope of *avadhi* is not fixed. It begins with an innumerable part of *aṅgula* and extends upto the entire universe. As far as its capacity is concerned it can cognize an area as big as innumerable universes. It extends up to the stage just preceding omniscience. Keeping in view the above consideration, Akalaṅka divides *avadhi* into three stages of *Deśāvadhi* (the *avadhi* related with a part), *Paramāvadhi* (*avadhi* developed into the highest stage) and *sarvāvadhi* (*Avadhi* related with the whole). *Deśāvadhi* has three grades, minimum (*jaghanya*) maximum (*utkrṣṭa*) and the middle (*ajaghanyotkrṣṭa*). The *paramāvadhi* also has the above three grades. *Sarvāvadhi* is without any gradation. *Deśāvadhi* in the minimum stage perceives an infinitely small part of an *aṅgula*. In the maximum stage it cognizes the entire universe. All the middle stages are related with the third category. *Paramāvadhi* in the minimum degree perceives the entire universe with an additional unit of space, that in the maximum degree perceives the space measured by innumerable universes. The middle stages are related with the third category. *Sarvāvadhi* perceives innumerable units of space in addition to those already covered by *Paramāvadhi*. *Deśāvadhi* may undergo all the eight stages of *vardhamāna*, *kīyamāna*, *avasthita*, *anavasthita*, *ānugāmin*, *apratipātīn* and *pratipātīn*. Out of the eight, we have already discussed the first six. *Pratipātīn* means that which shines like a flash of lightening disappears at once, without any duration. *Apratipātīn* is the opposite of *pratipātīn*. The *Paramāvadhi* does not meet the stage of *kīyamāna* and *pratipātīn*. *Sarvāvadhi* meets with the four stages of *avasthita*, *ānugāmin*, *ananugāmin* and *apratipātīn*. We have discussed above the gradations of *Deśāvadhi* with middle capacity. All these stages are found in the human kingdom. The maximum limit of *avadhi* in the case of sub-human kingdom is innumerable islands and oceans in respect of space, innumerable year of time and a certain degree of fire substance.

Paramāvadhi is possible in the human kingdom only. It is attained by a person with a high degree of

self-discipline. *Sarvāvadhi* cognizes all the objects that are within the scope of *avadhi*. It necessarily results into *kevala*. As a matter of fact *Paramāvadhi* is a variety of *Deśāvadhi* only. The categories of *Deśāvadhi* and *Sarvāvadhi* cover the entire range of *avadhi*. According to *Śvetāmbara*, tradition, *Paramāvadhi* results into *kevalajñāna*.

QUESTIONS

1. Essay Type Question

1. Defining *Avadhijñāna* explain its varieties.

2. Short Questions

1. What is the limitations of the object of *Avadhijñāna*?
2. Show the difference between *Avadhi* and *Manah-paryāva jñāna*.

3. Objective type Question

1. *Avadhijñāna* is
2. *Indriya pratyakṣa*.
3. *No-indriya pratyakṣa*.
4. *Parokṣa*.
5. *Caudahapūrva kā bheda*.
4. The Kinds of *atindriya pratyakṣa* are—
(i) 5
(ii) 2
(iii) 3
(iv) 1
5. *Avadhijñāna*'s short kinds are—
(i) 2
(ii) 2
(iii) 4
(iv) 1
6. Principal types of *Avadhijñāna* as per *Nandī Sūtra* are—
(i) *Ānugāmī*
(ii) *Pratipāti* and *kīyamāna*
(iii) *Bhavapratyaya* and *Kṣayopasamika*
(iv) *Madhyagata* and *antagata*
7. Whose *Avadhajñāna* goes on increasing—
(i) who has *aprasasta adhyavasāya* and *aprasasta cāritra*
(ii) who has *prasasta adhyavasāya* and *prasasta cāritra*
(iii) who has *aprasasta adhyavasāya* and *prasasta cāritra*
(iv) who has *prasasta adhyavasāya* and *aprasasta cāritra*
8. Which is called *antagata avadhijñāna*—
(i) one, who knows one side
(ii) one, who knows of two sides
(iii) one, who knows of all sides
(iv) one, who knows only the front.
9. How many types of *Avadhajñāna* according to *Ṣaṣṭhaṇḍāgama*—
(i) 13
(ii) 7
(iii) 9
(iv) 4

Books recommended:

- (i) *Nandī sabhāṣya* - Ācārya Mahāprajña, *Jaina Viśva Bhāratī, Lādnun*.
- (ii) *Jaina Darśana Aur Mīmāṃsā* - Ācārya Mahāprajña, *Ādarśa Sāhitya Saṅgha*
- (iii) *Jaina Dharma Darśana* - Dr. Mohan Lal Mehtā

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LESSON 8

THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE AND EPISTEMOLOGY

MANAḤ-PARYAVAJĪĀNA (MIND READING)

Manah-paryavajjāna means the modes of mind. Their knowledge is called *Manah-paryavajjāna*. It is also called *Manah-paryavajjāna* (*Prākṛta-Manapajjava*). The *Digambara* literature uses the last name only.* The terms *paryava* and *paryāya* express the sense of thought-reading, while *paryāya* means the modes of mind on the basis it is defined as follows: "Mind-reading cognition of mental modes is the revealer of the mental substance."

The *Āvaśyaka Nirukti* says that *Manah paryavajjāna* is the revealer of the objects thought by the minds of the people, is limited to the abode of human beings, is due to merit and is possessed by one having character, that is a homeless ascetic.

It may be recalled here that Jainism proposes two types of mind: (1) Physical mind technically known as *dravyamana* and psychical mind technically known as *bhāvamana*. Physical mind a mode of soul in the state of deliberation. It is immaterial like the soul and so beyond the reach of imperfect knowledge. There are no two opinions in this matter. The physical mind is the material composition made of molecules known as *manovargaṇā*, the physical mind change and takes various forms according to thought impression is so deep that it is visible on the outer surface also. The face of an angry person is reddened. His body trembles. When the feeling is not so intense, or the thought is merely of the nature of knowledge, it is not externally visible. But, it cannot escape from the physical mind; which catches the impression of every idea and feeling, however feeble it may be. On the other side the physical mind is affected by the gross physical body also. Heavy stomach, hunger, thirst, holding up the calls of nature produce different effects on the physical mind, which further puts its impressions on the psychical mind. So, the physical mind is passive as well as active.

The Object of *Manah-paryavajjāna*

There are two opinions regarding the real nature of the object of *Manah-paryavajjāna*. The *Niryukti* and *Tattvārtha** with its commentaries of *Sarvārthasiddhi*, *Rājavārtika* and *Śloka-vārtika* propose that the subject-matter of *Manah-paryavajjāna* is the object conceived by the mind. *Gommaṅgasāra** adds that the object which is half-conceived or is to be conceived in future also is apprehended by *Manah-paryavajjāna*. According to Jinabhadra, *Manah-paryavajjāna* apprehends the different modes of mind substance. The objects conceived are not cognized by it, but, later on inferred by Siddhasena Gaṇī in his commentary on the *Tattvārtha* favours the latter view. The *Nandī* seems to support the former but it is interpreted in both ways by commentators!

Critical View about the object of *Manah-paryavajjāna*

The main objection against the view that *Manah-paryavajjāna* perceives the objects conceived by the mind is that the objects under conception are material as well as immaterial. The immaterial objects are beyond the scope of imperfect perception. On this ground Jinabhadra holds the *Manah-paryavajjāna* does not perceive the objects conceived; but, the different modes of physical mind.

In the *Śvetāmbara* Literature none possesses the above view before Jinabhadra. The *Nandī*† states, '*manogae bhāvejāna*'. Its simple translation is, "It knows the objects existing in the mind." But the commentators like Jinadāsa Gaṇī and Malayagiri, following the footsteps of Jinabhadra, interpret, '*manogae bhāve*' as the modes of mind-substance. In the *Digambara* tradition none has adopted this view. Even the logicians like Akalaṅka and Vidyānāda do not favour it.

1. We can analyse the above problem under the following heads. The meaning of the terms.
2. The purpose of distinguishing characteristics.
3. The cognition of physical mind.
4. The cognition of the object conceived.

(1) The term '*Manah-paryavajjhāna*' means the modes of mind. But, the mind can be physical as well as psychical. So the term itself does not indicate sufficiently which aspect is meant for. The terms of *Manah-paryavajjhāna* and *manahaparyāya* also can be interpreted in both ways.

(2) The main purpose of *Manah-paryavajjhāna* is, roughly speaking thoughtreading. It can not mean merely the cognition of changes produced in the substance; but that of the ideas contained in it. Akalaṅka maintains that the function *Manah-paryavajjhāna* is not complete unless it knows the ideas also. Jinabhadra³ confines it to the cognition of mind substance only. The cognition of ideas, he says is the result of subsequent inference.

(3) As far as the cognition of physical mind is concerned, there is no difference between the two exponents. Both of them hold that physical mind is perceived by *Manah-paryavajjhāna*.

It may be mentioned here that according to Jinabhadra the physical mind is apprehended by the mind of the cognizer. Akalaṅka² interprets '*mana*' as soul while Dhavalā interprets it as *Mati-jñāna*. But the contention of Dhavalā³ is not right; as according to this view, *Manah-paryavajjhāna* loses the credit of being a direct cognition (*pratyakṣa*). If it depends upon *Mati* cognitions (*parokṣa*). Though, an attempt is made to explain away this difficulty and it is said that *Mati*, in the present case, is not a producing cause; but, only a helper pointing out the location of the object of *Manah-paryavajjhāna*, just the cognition of cloud in previewing the moon. But, when *Manah-paryavajjhāna* cannot perceive the contents of mind directly, it will have to depend upon the cognition of mind as a producing cause; as it is in the case of inference.

The types of *Manah-paryavajjhāna*

The mind-reading is twofold, viz. *Rjumati* i.e. straight or plain and *Vipulamati* i.e. expansive.

Straight and plain is that which cognizes the general feature of the mental substance and expansive one is that which cognizes not only the substance (also) the particular characteristics of it.

The plain cognition takes stock only of the generic character of the mental substance; for instance, when one cognizes the mental condition of another in such general terms as 'he knows a jar'. While the expressive knows the details of the contents, such as the jar known is made of gold, made in Mumbai made today and has a big size.

The difference between the two is not that of quality but that of degree. *Vipulmati* apprehends³ the objects. More minutely than *Rjumati*. The *Tattvārtha* mentions two points to express the difference between the two. Firstly, *Vipulamati* is purer than *Rjumati*. Secondly, it is infallible while the latter is subject to fall disappearance.

Jaina philosophy describe the theory of *Guṇasthān* in the fourteen ethical steps which a soul aspires for attaining liberation. At the end of the seventh step the aspirant adopts either of the two paths. In the path of *Upasamaśreṇī* the karmic matter is not destroyed but remains subsides, ready to rise at any disturbance. The aspirant adopting this path does not go beyond the eleventh step; where he falls down and reverts to a lower position. He may try again and reach the goal by adopting the other path; but as long as he is in *upasamaśreṇī* the fall is inevitable. The other path is known as *Kṣapakaśreṇī*. The aspirant adopting this path does not fall and rises gradually till the attainment of *Kaivala*. In this path the karmic matter does not stay in reserve. It is totally destroyed; leaving not change of rising again.

Rjumati, generally, occurs in the aspirant with *Upasamaśreṇī*, Owing to the existence of karmic matter

in reserve his knowledge is not so pure as it is in the case of *kṣapakaśreṇī*. Secondly, it is subject to disappearance when the aspirant falls down. *Vipulamati* is attained by the aspirant with *kṣapakaśreṇī*, who destroys the obscuring *karmic* matter totally. Naturally, his cognition is purer and infallible.

Jinabhadra² holds that *Rjumati* and *Vipulamati* differ from each other in respect of subject-matter also. *Rjumati* apprehends an object in its simple form. *Vipulamati* cognizes the same with more particulars. For instance, in apprehension of a mind engaged in the conception of infer the jar in a general way; while *Vipulamati* will apprehend the minute changes also; whereby the cognizer can infer also the particulars. He can make out the colour, size, stuff and other particulars of the object under conception.

Siddhasena Gaṇī also supports the above view. The same thing, he says, which is grasped by *Rjumati* in a general way, is apprehended by *Vipulamati* with more particulars.

*Mahābandha*¹ explains the difference in another way. It holds that *Rjumati* cognizes the objects which have come into mind distinctly. The objects that are hair conceived or to be conceived in future are not apprehended by it. While *Vipulamati* apprehends all of them.

According to Akalaṅka¹ *Rju* means formed by the knowledge of the object lying in others mind or simple. He incorporates the view of *Mahābandha* by the first condition and that of *Niryukti Bhāṣya* the second. *Rjumati* is formed by the cognition of the object lying in others mind. This object has three types of mind, speech or physical activity. A person conceives an object distinctly in his mind, utters a speech in clear tone or moves his body with some specific purpose; but forgets it in the course of time. He cannot recall them to his mind. *Rjumati* knows those objects or acts and can say that such and such object was conceived, spoken or expressed in some physical act. Thus *Rjumati* apprehends the desire, memory, anxiety about life or death, pleasure, pain etc. existing in others mind. But, the contents must be clearly formed in the mind, speech or body, as the case may be. *Vipulamati* does not wait for clear formation of the concepts. It is so sharp that it apprehends the concepts which are not fully formed or are yet to be formed. Moreover, it apprehends them more minutely.

Akalaṅka follows the first reading and interprets it as the persons who have formed the idea clearly. The second reading means the object which is already present in the mind. According to this interpretation *Rjumati* does not apprehend the objects which have slipped from memory or would be coming to mind in future.

In the terms of modern psychology we can say that *Rjumati* apprehends the conscious mind only. *Vipulamati* is competent to apprehend the subconscious and unconscious minds also.

The *Sthānāṅga* recognizes two varieties of it viz. *Rjumati* and *Vipulamati*.³ Umāsvāti distinguishes the former from the latter on the ground that the latter is purer and everlasting (that is, lasts up to the dawn of omniscience), while the former is less pure and sometimes flatters too.³

Difference between *Avadhi* and *Manah-paryavajñāna*

It (viz. mind-reading) is different from the clairvoyance on account of its difference in respect of purity, scope, knowing subject and content.

Viśuddhi (purity) is that quality of the soul which makes possible the knowledge of a multitude of specific characters. The mind-reading takes cognizance of a large number of details that the clairvoyance (*avadhi*). The clairvoyance raised to perfection embraces the whole world whereas the mind reading is limited to the abode of human beings. The clairvoyance is possible in all the four states of existence, that is to say, all the four kinds of beings—men, gods, animals and the denizens in hell. The mind reading, on the other hand, is possible only for self-restrained persons. The object of clairvoyance consists of all the material objects possessed of colour and shape, whereas that of mind-reading is limited to an infinite similar part of the substances known by the former.

It May be recalled here that *Avadhi* has all the material objects as its subject-matter. The physical mind also is included in its scope. Thus, as far as the subject matter is concerned, *Manah-paryavajjhāna* has nothing new. On this basis Siddhasena, proposes the identity between *Manah-paryavajjhāna* and *Avadhi*.

But it goes against the traditional division. As a matter of fact Siddhasena, being a logician gives prominence to the objective side. His two-fold division of *Pramāṇa* follows the Buddhist tradition, which is based on the two kinds of object. The other factors are not taken into consideration. In the *Āgamika* tradition, as has been stated before, objective consideration is not so important as the subjective.

If we take into consideration the subject *Avadhi* and *Manah-paryavajjhāna* differ from each other. *Avadhi* can occur in all the four kingdoms of heaven, hell, human and sub human. *Manah-paryavajjhāna* is possible in the kingdom of men only. Among men also it is confined to *saṃyagdr̥ṣṭi* can possess *avadhi*. *Manah-paryavajjhāna* occurs in ascetics with a high quality of character only.

The *Tattvārtha*² relates the following four factors that distinguish *Manah-paryavajjhāna* from *Avadhi* (1) *Viśuddhi* (purity)-*Manah-paryavajjhāna* is purer than *Avadhi*. *Avadhi* also can perceive the mind-substances; but it, is not so clear as *Manah-paryavajjhāna*. *Avadhi* perceives them only in a general way. *Manah-paryavajjhāna* is specially meant for them. Naturally the latter is more precise and deep. For instance, a person knowing many things in a general way is not so deep in a particular subject as its specialist is.

(2) *Kṣetra* (area)-*Avadhi* begins from an innumerable small part of a finger and goes up to the whole universe or more. *Manah-paryavajjhāna* is limited to the human habitation (*Manuṣyakṣetra*) only i.e. (two and a half islands).

(3) *Viśaya* (object)-*Avadhi* has all the material objects with an amount of their modes, as its object. The object of *Manah-paryavajjhāna* is only an infinitesimal part of matter (*pudgala*).

(4) *Svāmin* (owner)-*Avadhi* occurs in all the four *Manah-paryavajjhāna* is possible in ascetics with a high standard of character only. Amongst the fourteen stages of the spiritual development it is found only in seven stages i.e. from sixth to twelfth. In those stages also there are two kinds of aspirants. Some aspirants, advance in their spiritual journey by destroying the obstructing karmans. Their path is known as *kṣapakaśreṇī*, others do not destroy the obstruction karmans, but bring them to the state of subsidence. This path is known as *Upaśamaśreṇī*. The aspirant with *Upaśamaśreṇī* cannot go beyond the eleventh stage. His progress is stopped at that stage. When the subsided karmic matter is disturbed and comes up on the surface. Consequently, the aspirant falls down. *Manah-paryavajjhāna* is not possible in the condition of retrogression. It occurs in the ascending state only. Though the higher grade of *Avadhi* also requires a certain degree of character; yet, *avadhi* as general is not so dependent.

Now let us see whether there is any essential distinction between *Avadhi* and *Manah-paryavajjhāna*. *Avadhi*, as we have seen, intuits the material substance and modes, *Manah-paryavajjhāna*, as stated above, intuits the modes only of the material substance that constitutes the mind. It is further admitted that the material substance, intuited by *avadhi*, includes the *manodravya* (matter constituting mind) also. Thus we find that both *avadhi* and *Manah-paryavajjhāna* can intuit the states of the material substance that constitutes the mind. The distinction between them, therefore, is only one of scope, *Avadhi* intuits other *vargaṇās* viz. the *audārika*, *vaikriya* etc. as well while *Manah-paryavajjhāna* cannot do so. Besides, only a qualified human being can possess the *Manah-paryavajjhāna* while the *avadhi* belongs to the denizens of heaven and hell and sometimes even to the subhuman creatures. But in our opinion, these are only superficial points of distinction. They cannot be held as constituting a qualitative distinction. They can at best prove a quantitative difference. The great logician Siddhasena Divākara who, as we have seen, does not recognize any distinction between *avadhi* and *Manah-paryavajjhāna* as well. The orthodox view is that the *Manah-paryavajjhāna* is limited to the intuition of the minds or the objective contents of the mind of the human beings alone. But Siddhasena objects that the sub human organism possessed of two or more sense-organs also are found to strive by means of attraction

and repulsion, and thus are possessed of minds and as such it will be proper to extend the scope of *Manah-paryavajjhāna* to the minds or the objects or the mind of them as well, or otherwise it will be improper to postulate *Manah-paryavajjhāna* as a separate category of knowledge. Moreover, the *avadhi* can well serve the purpose of *Manah-paryavajjhāna* and as it is not necessary to admit the latter as constituting a separate category of knowledge. It can at best be considered as a specific type of *avadhi*.

Distinguishing between *avadhi* and *paryāya*, Umāsvāti says one possessed of *Manah-paryavajjhāna* knows only an infinitesimal part of the objects of *avadhi*. He knows a greater number of states of the material objects that form the contents of the invisible thinking process of the mind and are situated in the region inhabited by human beings. According to him also, thus, it is the material objects and their states, thought of by the mind of others, that are intuited by *Manah-paryavajjhāna*.

The commentator Siddhasena Gaṇī, however, interprets Umāsvāti in the light of Jinabhadra's conception of *Manah-paryavajjhāna* as intuiting the mental modes and knowing the objects thought of by the mind by means of inference.

The mind undergoes process of change while thinking, and the objective contents of this process are intuited by the *Manah-paryavajjhāna*. Jinabhadra, however, says that one possessed of such knowledge intuites the states of the mind-substance directly, but knows the external objects thought of by the mind only by way of inference. The *Bṛhadvṛtti* argues: 'A thinker may think of a material as well as a non-material object (e.g. a cognition). But it is not possible for one who is not omniscient to intuit directly a non material object. And, therefore, it follows that one possessed of *Manah-paryavajjhāna* knows the object thought of (by others) only by way inference. Pūjyapāda Devaṇādhī, however, holds a different view. Defining *manaparyāy* he says: Due to its association with the *manas* (mind), the object of the *manas* (mind) of others is called *manas* and the *paryāya* 'knowledge' of that (object) is *Manah-paryavajjhāna*. It is not a *matijhāna* because the mind is only an inactive background and does not make any contribution (in such knowledge). It is exclusively due to the potency of destruction-cum-subsidence, although it is designated by means of the *manas* of oneself or of another (on account of its association with it). The case is on a par with the usage in the proposition 'Behold the moon in the sky' in which the moon is pointed out by means of the sky.' He thus maintains, like Umāsvāti, that the external object itself is intuited by *Manah-paryavajjhāna*. Akalaṅka supports this view and seems to refute the position of Jinabhadra. He says that all the characteristics of a *pratyakṣa* are present in the *Manah-paryavajjhāna* inasmuch as it is independent of the sense-organs and the mind, and as such it should not be regarded as an inference (*anumāna*) which depends upon the instruction of others (for the knowledge of the relation between the probans and the probandum) as well as upon the sense organs such as the eye.

Here although Akalaṅka does not mention the name of Jinabhadra, it is almost certain that he refers to the view of Jinabhadra because, to our knowledge, there is none among the predecessors of Akalaṅka, who states so clearly as Jinabhadra does that one posse of *manah paryāy* knows the external object only by means of inference. Connection that this contention refers only to the object of *Manah-paryavajjhāna* and not to the nature of it as *pratyakṣa*. Both Jinabhadra and Akalaṅka regard it as *pratyakṣa* but the contention is whether the external objects are intuited by it. Jinabhadra holds that the external objects are known by inference while Akalaṅka maintains that they are directly intuited by *Manah-paryavajjhāna* as they are associated with the mind being thought of by it. Jinabhadra holds that the function of *Manah-paryavajjhāna* of inference of know the external things thought of by the mind. Akalaṅka, following Pujaypāda Devaṇādhī extends the function of *Manah-paryavajjhāna* to the intuition of the external things as well, and it is but natural that he has to meet the objection of those who hold that it is confined to the mental states which serve as the fond of inference of external objects. Akalaṅka explains away the difficulty by asserting that the states of the mind are only the medium through which the external objects are intuited, and as such they need not be given the position of a middle term of an inference. Jinabhadra denied the possibility of a middle term of an inference, the intuition of external objects by admitting that the knowledge of the external objects is a case of inference, but at the same

time asserting in clear terms that *manahprayāy* has a different function, and that function is the intuition of the states of the mind that is engaged in thinking of the external objects. It is but natural that the *Manah-paryavajjhāna* should be conceived as intuiting the *paryāyās* (states) of the *manas* (mind) alone, and not the external objects also. Jinabhadra adhered to this perhaps original, conception, and when faced with the problem of the knowledge of the external objects thought of by the mid asserted that it is only by inference that one knows the external objects. Akalaṅka, however, takes the position of Pūjyapāda Devaṇandī and rejects the solution of Jinabhadra as unnecessary and uncalled for. It is, however, not possible for want of sufficient relevant pre-Pūjyapāda literature to trace the origin of Pūjyapāda's position. May be he took the suggestion from the *Tattvārtha Bhāṣya* of Umāsvāti. It is also plausible that Pūjyapāda followed the view embodied in the *Āvaśyaka Niryaṅki*. We can assert with some measure of certainty that he was familiar with this work, in as much as we find him quoting from the work² and as such our conjecture is not totally unfounded.

According to Pūjyapāda, the objects intuited by *Manah-paryavajjhāna* include objects of the activities of the sense-organ of speech, body and mind. Distinguishing between *Rjumati* and *vipulamati* he says that the later knows less number of objects than the former, but knows them more vividly and thoroughly. The *vipulamati* is more lucid and penetrating than the *Rjumati*. The former is infallible while the later falters. The former is possessed by one who gradually ascends the spiritual ladder while the latter is owned by one who is destined to fall in the grip of passions and go down. Akalaṅka only elucidates the view of Pūjyapāda's³ Vidyānaṇḍī repeats Akalaṅka. It seems that the development of the conception of *Manah-paryavajjhāna* stopped with Pūjyapāda on the one side and Jinabhadra on the other. The later Jaina thinkers only took side with the one or the other, but did not make any further development.

Only human beings are competent to possess beings are competent to possess *Manah-paryavajjhāna*. The *Naridī Sūtra* says that only those uterine human beings who are born in the *karmabhūmis* (i.e. lands where *Tīrthāṅkarās* are born), possess longevity and have fully developed organs, who are of right faith, self-controlled and free from passions (*apramatta*) and who are possessed of *ṛddhis* (extra-ordinary powers) are entitled to possess this *Manah-paryavajjhāna*.⁴ Even gods are not competent to possess *Manah-paryavajjhāna*. It is the special privilege of the gifted among the human species. Like *avadhi*, it has also gradation of spatial extension and temporal objects.

(4) It is about the cognition of objects conceived that there are two opinions. Jinabhadra holds that it is an inference and beyond the scope of *Manah-paryavajjhāna*. Akalaṅka holds that it is *Manah-paryavajjhāna*. Now the question remains whether *Manah-paryavajjhāna*, according to Akalaṅka, cognizes the conceived objects directly or indirectly. If it perceives directly it would perceive the immaterial objects also, which is an impossibility. Akalaṅka says that the cognition of the conceived objects is direct. They are cognized through the perception of the physical mind. Thus, Akalaṅka, also has accepted in a way the inferability of the conceived objects; but he, does not recognize this as a separate cognition. It can be objected that if the cognition of conceived objects is indirect, it cannot be *Manah-paryavajjhāna*, as the latter is a direct cognition (*pratyakṣa*). Akalaṅka replies that indirectness and directness do not depend upon the direct or indirect apprehension of the object. They depend upon the external assistance. If the soul is assisted by the senses or mind the resulting cognition is indirect; otherwise, it is direct. In cognition of the conceived objects; otherwise, it is direct. In cognition of the conceived objects the soul is not assisted by any of the senses. It is, therefore, direct. Even if a thing is known through another one, the cognition is direct, provided it does not depend upon the external factor as its cause.

One may say that the physical mind also is an external factor. Its knowledge of the conceived objects is derived through it, the latter is not direct. It must be *matijjhāna*. Akalaṅka replies, where the mind is a producing cause the resulting cognition is *mati*. In the present case the mind is not a producing cause but only an auxiliary. When we see the moon in clouds, the clouds are considered as producers of the cognition of the moon. They are simply location. Similarly, the mind substance of a person in which the conceived ideas are

known, is not a producing cause, it is simply a location of the object, i.e. the conceived ideas. The interface which is variety of *matī*, depends upon the senses or mind as its producing cause. In the present case no external helps is taken by the cognizer. Thus, the cognition of the conceived ideas though indirect on the objective side, is not indirect (*parokṣa*) on the causal side, which is the main consideration in deciding the nature of *pratyakṣa* or *parokṣa*. In logical period the clarity of appearance becomes of perception. If *Manah-paryavajjhāna* is a perception it must have that clarity, which is found in the direct observations only. The cognition of the conceived objects cannot come into the category. In that cause we shall have to confine the sphere of *Manah-paryavajjhāna* to the mind-substance only. Perhaps, Jinabhadra was influenced by the logical school in this regard. But, Akalaṅka is very careful. We do not find any confusion between Akalaṅka as a logician as an exponent of the canonical theories.

Thus, we can see that the real difference between the two Acāryās is not about the subject-matter but about the inclusion of the cognition of the conceived objects into *Manah-paryavajjhāna*.

The above discussion leads to another question of fundamental importance, we have to decide whether *Manah-paryavajjhāna*, by nature, is a direct cognition or indirect one. By direct we do not mean here the subjective directness or independence from assistance of the senses, but, the objective presentation or the direct apprehension. If it is a direct cognition we must confine its sphere of objectivity to the physical mind only. Conceived ideas on no account, can be presented directly. If it is indirect we must admit the conceived ideas as its object. The question of the object being a material substance does not arise in this case. We can know the soul and other immaterial substances through inference, i.e. indirectly.

According to the Jaina theory of knowledge a direct cognition is preceded by the corresponding *darśana*. An indistinct flash or general type is essential before plunging deep into particularity. Amongst the five types of condition *śruta* and *Manah-paryavajjhāna* have no corresponding *darsaas*. The *śruta* is definitely indirect. About *Manah-paryavajjhāna* Jinabhadra states that definitely indirect. About *Manah-paryavajjhāna* Jinabhadra states that it has not corresponding *darśana*; because owing to its intensity of force produced by the particular *kṣayopasāma*, it dives direct into particularity and does not pass through the stage of generality, as other cognitions do. But, this explanation is not convincing. *Manah-paryavajjhāna* is not more forceful than *kevala*. When *kevala* also has a corresponding *darśana*, there is no reason why *Manah-paryavajjhāna* should not pass through that stage. We can admit the possibility of swiftness as in the case of well-acquainted objects. But, it is not reasonable to leave that stage altogether. The absence of corresponding *darśana* leads us to the idea that *Manah-paryavajjhāna* is an indirect cognition. There is no other reason which can be ascribed to this factor. We think that *Manah-paryavajjhāna* is not a perceptual but conceptual. Its real function is the reading of thoughts and not the perception of mind-substance. It is immaterial whether it passes through the later stage but that is not its real purpose.

This indirectness, on the part of *Manah-paryavajjhāna* does not interfere with its position as *pratyakṣa*; because the basis of the conception of *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa*, as we have already stated, is not objective directness but the subjective independence from the senses and other external help.

One more point that requires clarity in this connection is, how the physical mind is perceived. It is beyond the reach of senses, and therefore, *Matī* and *Śruta* are out of there question. *Avadhi* can know it; but it does not necessarily, precede *Manah-paryavajjhāna*. The person having *Manah-paryavajjhāna* may or may not possess it. So, *Manah-paryavajjhāna* is the only cognition that is left. If its function is confined to the conceived objects there is no cognition to perceived the mind-substance. The alternative that it can be left unperceived also is unthinkable, because without the perception of the physical mind the conceived ideas cannot be cognized. Akalaṅka explains away this difficulty by accepting the mind-substance also as the object of *Manah-paryavajjhāna* in its first stage, the subsequent stage being the cognition of conceived objects. One is direct, while the other is indirect. But both constitute one cognition.

According to *Mahābandha*² and *Dhavalā*³ *Manah-paryavajjhāna* is a cognition of another's desire (*saṃjñā*), Memory (*smṛti*), Intellect (*matī*), Deliberation (*cintā*), Life (*jivana*), Death (*maraṇa*), Gain (*Lābha*), Loss (*Alābha*), Pleasure (*Sukha*), Pain (*Duḥkha*) the destruction of city (*Nagaravināśa*) the destruction of a district (*Deśavināśa*), the destruction of a province (*Jhānapadavināśa*) etc. This account makes the distinction between *avadhi* and *Manah-paryavajjhāna* insignificant.

The cause of Manah-paryavajjhāna

It has been stated before that *Avadhi*, *Manah-paryavajjhāna* and *Kevala* are supernatural powers attained through the spiritual progress, But *Avadhi* is supernatural as well as natural. In the cause of human and sub-human beings it is super-natural but in the case of heavenly and hellish beings it is natural. *Manah-paryavajjhāna* is always supernatural. It is enumerated in the eight powers (*labdhis*) attained through *yoga*.

Pūjyapāda⁴ accounts *Manah-paryavajjhāna* to four factors : (1) *Kṣayopasama* or *Vīryāntarāya*, (2) *Kṣayopasama* of *Manah-paryava jhānāvaraṇa*, (3) *Angopāṅga Nāma Karman* and (4) The contact with other's minds.

(1) *Antarāya-karman* puts obstacles in the progress of soul towards mundance as well as spiritual attainments. The first four types of it are related with the obstruction of worldly gains. The last is *Vīryāntarāya*. It suppresses the natural as well as super-natural powers of the soul. The power of knowledge also is not free from its effect. The soul cannot attain a otherwise removed. This is why, its *kṣayopasama* is a common cause in every types of cognition. The second cause is the *kṣayopasama* of the corresponding *āvaraṇa*. It does not require any explanation. The third factor is *Angopāṅga nāma-karman*. It should be noticed that the physical mind plays an important role in producing *Manah-paryavajjhāna*. Its completion on the subjective as well as the objective side is the first condition for the cognition of thoughts. The completion of the physical mind is the function of *Nāmakarman*. The *Angopāṅga nāma karman* is its subclass particularly related with the completion of body and its parts. The fourth factor is the physical mind. According to Jinabhadra it is the very object of *Manah-paryavajjhāna*. According to Pūjyapāda it is a helping cause that object being the conceived ideas.

Nānā Sūtra and Manah-paryava Darśana

We have already stated that *Manah-paryavajjhāna* has no corresponding *darśana*. But, the *Nānā* attributes to it both the functions of knowing (*jñānā*) as well as perceiving (*pāśai*). It seems a contradiction to the above proposal. This difficulty is explained several ways According to the first explanation the two functions are related not with *Manah-paryavajjhāna*, but the person having it. The *Nānā* means, only that the cognizer apprehends first, the mind-substance and then thinks over it. The second function is related with the mind and can be placed in the second type of *darśana*, i.e. *acakṣurdarśana*. In the case of *Śrutajñāna* also, it is held that the cognizer conceives certain idea through *Śruta-jñāna* and then deliberates on them. This deliberation is *acakṣurdarśana*.

The only possible objection to this view is that *acakṣurdarśana* is classed as mediate (*parīkṣā*) cognition. It is possible in the case of distant object only; which are beyond perception and known through scriptures, as the golden mountain etc.

But, where the object is directly cognized, as in the case of *Manah-paryavajjhāna*, no such *darśana* is possible. But, this objection has no ground, as there is nothing which can prevent the possibility of *acakṣurdarśana* in case of the objects directly perceived. One can think over a jar which is directly perceived, and have a mental perception. The Jainās do not believe in the Buddhist epistemological division of objects, holding certain objects as merely perceptible while others as inferible. In the logical period they have supported the theory of *Pramāṇasaṃlāpa* (convergence of the sources of knowledge). Even the existence of perceived fire on the hill-top they say, can be further examined through inference.

One more point of minor significance, that can be raised in this respect is, whether the cognition of a

person with *Manah-paryavajjhāna* is direct or indirect. The position of the Jainās in this respect is very clear. When the object is cognized by *Manah-paryavajjhāna* it is direct of *pratyakṣa* and when it is cognized through *acakṣurdarśana* it is indirect or *parokṣa*.

According to another opinion a person with *Manah-paryavajjhāna* possesses *Avadhi* also. So, the function of knowing (*jānai*) and perceiving (*pāsai*) as related in the *Nandī*, are performed by *Manah-paryavajjhāna* and *Avadhi* respectively. This view is inconsistent with the *Bhagavatī*, which holds that a person with *Manah-paryavajjhāna* may or may not possess *Avadhi*. But, the above difficulty can be explained if the statement of the *Bhagavatī* is given a bit more consideration. The *Bhagavatī* is related with *jñāna* only. It does not say anything about *darśana*. It does not propose that the co-existence of *Avadhi darśana* and *Manah-paryavajjhāna* also is merely a probability. Moreover, it can be held that in the stage of *darśana* there is no difference between *Avadhi* and *Manah-paryavajjhāna*. In that stage they have a cognition of general type, which develops into *Avadhi* in one case and *Manah-paryavajjhāna* in the other. That stage is termed as *Avadhi* in a general way; on account of its being an all-inclusiveness. We cannot say that *avadhi-darśana* precedes *avadhi-jñāna* only, and not *Manah-paryavajjhāna*. But it has no claim to be called as *Manah-paryava darśana*; because that distinction comes in the later stage.

According to Akalaṅka *Manah-paryavajjhāna* has three stage—(1) *Darśana*, (2) Cognition of the mind-substance and (3) cognition of the conceived objects. In the case of *Śruta* also we have three stage, viz. (i) *Darśana*, (ii) *Matijñāna* and (iii) *Śrutajñāna*. Both *Śruta* and *Manah-paryavajjhāna* rely on the *darśana* occurring in the first stage. Although they are mediated by *Matī* and *Avadhi* respectively, yet, their field begins with the stage. According to Jinabhadra there are only two stages.

According to another explanation the two functions of *Jānai* and *Pāsai* are related with the person who possesses both *Avadhi* as well as *Manah-paryavajjhāna*.

Jinabhadra² says that '*Pāsai*' in the present case does not refer to *darśana*, but to a clear and distinct knowledge known as '*pasyatta*'.

QUESTIONS

Essay type question

1. Defining *Manah-paryāya* describe its two various kinds and sub-kinds.

Or

Showing the similarity and dissimilarity of *Avadhi* and *Manah-paryāya* write on the limitation of the object of the later.

Short question

1. Write on the eligibilities of *Manah-paryavajjhāna*.

Short question

1. What is *manah paryāyajjhāna*?
 - (i) Which knows through *indriyās*?
 - (ii) Which knows through both *indriya* and mind?
 - (iii) Which knows through *ātmā* the *parakīya* emotions of mind.
 - (iv) Which is *parokṣa jñāna*.
2. Difference in *vipulamati* and *Manah-paryavajjhāna* are—

(i) 3	(ii) 6
(iii) 12	(iv) 2

3. Second of three varieties of *pratyakṣa jñāna* is—
 (i) *avadhi jñāna* (ii) *kevala jñāna*
 (iii) *śruta jñāna* (iv) *manaḥparyaya jñāna*
4. Who attains *Manaḥ-paryavajñāna*
 (i) *mithyādrṣṭi* (ii) *avirati*
 (iii) *pramatta saṃyata* (iv) *apramatta saṃyata*
5. *Manaḥ-paryavajñāna* is—
 (i) *pratyakṣa* (ii) *pārmāthika pratyakṣa*
 (iii) *sāṃvyyavahārīka pratyakṣa* (iv) *parokṣa*
6. Cause of *Manaḥ-paryavajñāna* is—
 (i) *kṣayopasāma* of *darśanāvarṇīya*
 (ii) Rise of *mohanīya karma*
 (iii) *kṣayopasāma* of *Manaḥ-paryavajñāna* and *vīryāntarāya*
 (iv) Decay of *antarāyakarma*
7. Both *paryaya paryāya* means—
 (i) *sarvataḥ bhāvana jñānaḥ* (ii) *sarvataḥ prāpti*
 (iii) partial *jñāna* (iv) *cakṣurdarśana*
8. *Rjumati Manaḥ-paryavajñāna* knows—
 (i) *manogatabhāvas* in ordinary facet (ii) one's own mental *bhāvas*
 (iii) *paryāyās* possessed with special *viśeṣaṇa* (iv) other's mind in ordinary mode.
9. There is equality in *vīpulamati rjumati*
 (i) *avisuddhi* (ii) *visuddhi*
 (iii) *visuddhatara* (iv) *visuddhatama*
10. There is equality in *Kevala jñāna* and *manaḥ paryaya*—
 (i) Both ate *sāṃvyyavahārīka* (ii) Both are *pārmāthika pratyakṣa*
 (iii) Both know *arūpī padārthās* (iv) Both are attained by *chadmast*.

Compiler & Editor

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LESSON - 9

KA VALA-JÑĀNA (OMNISCIENCE)

Of the three classes of (*pratyakṣa*) i.e. direct knowledge we have described the first two, viz. *Avadhi* and *Manaḥ-paryavajñāna* in the previous lessons. Now we come to *kevala-jñāna* i.e. omniscience, the consummation of all knowledge. The definition of omniscience is as follows: "That which directly cognizes all the substances with all their modes is omniscience (pure and perfect knowledge)."

The total destruction of the deluding (*mohanīya*) *karma* is followed by a short interval lasting for less than forty-eight minutes (*muhūrta*) after which the *karmans* veiling the power of knowledge and intuition of soul along with the obstructive (*avitarāya*) *Karma* are destroyed. And then the soul shines in its full splendour and attains omniscience which intuitively knows all substances with all their modes. Nothing remains unknown in omniscience which intuitively knows all realities with all their modes. Nothing remains unknown in omniscience. Umāsvāti quotes an opinion that maintained that on the emergence of *Kevala* the other four kinds of knowledge viz. *Matī Śruta* etc. are overpowered much in the same way as the other luminaries of the sky are overpowered on the appearance of the sun in the firmament, but himself supports the view that they are absolutely impossible in the omniscient on the ground that the *Kevala* is due to the total destruction while the other four are due only to the destruction-cum-subsidence of the knowledge-covering (*jñānāvaraṇa*) *Karma*. Total destruction bars the possibility of destruction-cum-subsidence.

The fifth type of cognition is known as *Kevala-jñāna*. It is attained when the obscuring karmic veil is totally removed. It knows all the objects in their entirety with all qualities and modes. It is the stage of omniscience, the perfect knowledge.

In the Jaina literature the term '*Kevala*,' whether single or with '*jñāna*' is applied to perfect knowledge. The last type of knowledge is called *kevala*, firstly, because, it exists alone. It does not coexist with any other type of cognition. Secondly, according to Yośovijaya the first four types of cognition are produced by the corresponding partial purity of self as well as the rise of *karma* named as *kevalajñānāvaraṇa*. The soul unassisted by the *karmic* matter is not competent to produce them. But, the *kevala* is produced by the soul alone. We may assign this reason also to its designation as *kevala*. If the *kevala* is taken in the second sense, i.e. perfect, then *kevalajñāna* means perfect knowledge.

Āvaśyaka niryukti defines *Kevala-jñāna* as the means of knowing all substances with their qualities, modes and states. It is infinite, eternal, imperishable and without gradation. The commentary elaborates the above view as follows: "All substances undergo the modes of origination and destruction etc. These modes can be classified into three categories types; viz. (1) produced by the external factors, (2) natural and (3) mixed i.e. produced partially by the external cause and partially natural. The nature of all these modes is known by *kevala-jñāna*. It dawns when the obscuring *Karmic* matter is totally destroyed. It is infinite, because it has infinite modes as its object. It is eternal, because it functions incessantly. The other types of cognition do not illumine the objects constantly. They do so, only when it is desired and the attention is paid. In the case of *kevala* the attention is permanent. It is not recurrent. All the objects are always under-cognition. Further, *kevala* is imperishable. Once appeared it never vanishes. It has one degree only. There is no gradation in it because, it appears when the soul is completely purified. It is the state of perfection. Degree are possible in imperfect state only.

The Jainās hold that each and every entity is related to all entities other than itself in the universe in some relation or other. These relations are called *paryāyās* (modes) of the entity. In order to know an entity

completely, these relations or *paryayās* are to be completely known. And hence it follows that the complete knowledge of one entity involves the complete knowledge of other entities as well. If the relations are real and if it is also possible to know these relations, it logically follows that omniscience is possible. Omniscience is perfectly consistent with the Jainā conception of emergence of knowledge as the removal of veil. As realists the Jainās believe in relations as objective links that relate each and every entity with all that is other than the entity. Symbolically, the relations are links between A and the contents of not A. This means that the complete knowledge of A implies the complete knowledge of not-A and this is obviously the knowledge of the whole universe. In other words; the perfect knowledge of one entity means the perfect knowledge of all entities. This has been very characteristically expressed by the *Ācārāṅga* in the following terms: "One who knows one knows all, and one who knows all knows one."

There is no controversy regarding the nature of *kevala* among the different Jainā thinkers, and so we do not state their views separately.

The Jainās hold a very clear and systematic view about the journey of soul towards liberation. Their theory of (14 levels of pacification of self) *guṇasthāna* present a definite road with well measured mile-stones; leading to the ultimate goal. *Guṇasthāna* means the different stages of spiritual attainments. The soul regains its natural powers in higher and higher degree as the aspirant ascends to the stairs of *guṇasthānās*. The powers of soul are lying buried under the obscuring *karmans*. The degree of manifestation of those powers varies according to the thickness or thinness of the obscurance.

According to Jainism *Mohanīya* is the most powerful of all the *karmans*. This is the principal cause of bondage of the soul. The other *karmans* get their strength from *Moha*. The arrangement of fourteen *guṇasthāna* also is mainly based on its different potencies. We can compare it with the *avidyā* of other systems.

Moha operates on the soul in two ways. Firstly, it does not allow the soul to know its own reality. The soul, which is immaterial, eternal and pure, is wrongly identified with the material, perishable and impure body or senses. The cause of this perverted attitude is recognized as *Darśanamohanīya*. *Darśana* means vision; attitude or faith. *Darśana-moha* clouds that vision, makes the attitude perverted and misdirects the faith. The second operation of *Mohanīya* is to obstruct the soul in its attempt to attain the pure state of infinite bliss. The passions keep the soul involved in external pleasures and pains. This operation is effected by *cārītramohanīya*. The first four *guṇasthānās* are based on different stages of *darśana mohanīya* and five to twelve on *cārītramohanīya*. The last two are the stages of complete realization.

Kevalajñāna and Kevaladarśana

There are three views about the order of succession regarding *kevalajñāna* and *kevaladarśana*:

1. According to the first *kevala-darśana* precedes *kevalajñāna*. This view is championed by Jinabhadra and has been generally accepted in the *Śvetāmbara* tradition. It is also supported by the old *Āgamika* tradition.
2. The second view holds that both of them occur simultaneously. It is advocated by *Mallavadin* and has got a general acceptance in the *Digambara* tradition.
3. The third view maintains that in the stage of *kevalajñāna* and *darśana* become one. This view is held by Siddhasena Divākara.

Historical Survey of the Three Views

The *Āgamās* as well as the other literature earlier than Umāsvāti favour the first view only. The second and third views are not found on it. They are not mentioned even for refutation. Of course, Kuṇḍakuṇḍa has supported the second view, but, it is a controversial point whether he lived before Umāsvāti. For the present we have followed Paṇḍit Sukhlāl, who is definite that Umāsvāti was earlier than Kuṇḍakuṇḍa. *Āvaśyaka Nirṣukti* asserts that even a *Kevalin* does not possess two *upayogas* simultaneously. This statement appears to be a refutation of the second view. But, it is doubtful whether this portion of *Nirṣukti* is genuine and not

interpolated after Umāsvāti, as it is clear that the entire literature which goes with the name of *Niryukti* is not genuine.

It is *Tattvārtha-Bhāṣya*, where we find the second view for the first time. Umāsvāti states that in the case of first four types of *mati* etc. the *upayoga* occurs in order. In the case of *Kevalin* where *jñāna* and *darśana* are inseparable, all cognizant and constant, the *upayogās* are simultaneous. Siddhasena Gaṇī interprets the above statement in favour of the first view, but he does so on the plea that Umāsvāti cannot go against the *Anama* argument show if the question.

Kuṇḍakuṇḍa in his *Niyamasāra*, Pūjapāda in *Sarvārthasiddhi* and Samantabhadra in *Āptamīmāṃsā* refer to the second view only. They do not refer to the first and third views even for refutation. Thus, up to Samantabhadra we do not meet with any *Digambara* work which mentions the opposite views even for refutation. Akalaṅka is the first to refute the first and third views. In the *Aṣṭasati* he supports the second view and clearly refutes the first view. In the *Rājavārtika* he mentions the first view as an insult to the omniscient; and at other places indicates the undesirability of the third view also. He gives a verbatim reply to Siddhasena Divākara by quoting a stanza from *Sanmati-Tarka*. Thus, we can say that *Digambara* tradition favours the second view only; but the attempt to refute other views was not made before Akalaṅka.

The *Āvaśyaka Niryukti*, as we have already stated, does not admit the possibility of simultaneous occurrence of *jñāna* and *darśana* of a *kevalin*. Then we come to Umāsvāti who says: 'The conscious activities manifesting themselves as *mati*, *śruta*, *avadhi* and *Manah-paryavajjñāna* occur in succession and not simultaneously. The conscious activities of the omniscience lord, possessed of integrated *jñāna* and *darśana*, however, in respect of 'pure knowledge' and pure intuition- which comprehend all objects and are independent occur simultaneously in every point of time'. It follows from this quotation that Umāsvāti admitted simultaneous occurrence of *jñāna* and *darśana*. The commentator Siddhasena Gaṇī, however, gives a different interpretation in accordance with the *Āgamās*, although he refers for the sake of refutation to some old commentators, possessed of logical intelligence, who interpreted the relevant statements of the *Āgamās* otherwise and denied succession of conscious activities of a *Kevalin*. The great *Digambara* Ācārya Kuṇḍakuṇḍa clearly states that the *jñāna* and *darśana* of a *kevalin* occur simultaneously even as the light and heat of the sun occur simultaneously. Pūjapāda Devaṇandī follows Kuṇḍakuṇḍa. He says: *Jñāna* is *sākāra* 'determinate' while *darśana* is *anākāra* 'indeterminate'. They occur in succession in the *chadmastha* (i.e. one who is under the influence of the obstructive *karmans*) while in the *nirāvaraṇa* (i.e. one who is completely free from the obstructive *karmans*) they occur simultaneously.

Now we come to the great logician Siddhasena Divākara who refused to admit the separate identity of *jñāna* and *darśana* because of logical difficulties. 'We can distinguish between *jñāna* and *darśana* up to *Manah-paryavajjñāna*. *Kevala-jñāna*, however, quā *jñāna* and quā *darśana* is identical. According to Siddhasena Divākara, those who, on the authority of the scriptures, maintain the emancipated one (*jina*) does not know and intuit simultaneously make no scruple to fout their *Tīrthāṅkara*. In other words, he finds logical difficulties in the position and asks those who stand by the old position to reinterpret the *Āgamika* statement and thus remove the inconsistencies. If *kevalajñāna* dawns on the complete destruction of the relevant obscuring *karma* it stands to reason that *kevala-darśana* also should dawn immediately upon the destruction of the relevant obscuring *karman*. And as both the destructions are simultaneous, it logically follows that the dawns of *kevala-jñāna* and *kevala-darśana* also synchronize. As it is said that there can be not *mati-jñāna* in the omniscient *jina* who has completely destroyed the veil, so (should it be admitted that) there can be no separate *darśana* in one who has completely destroyed the veil. Moreover, says Siddhasena Divākara, in the scriptures, *kevala* has been said to have beginning but no end and those afraid of going against the scriptures should take note of this fact. Admission of succession in the occurrence of *jñāna* and *darśana* means admission of succession in the occurrence of *jñāna* and *darśana*. The *jñānāvaraṇa* and *darśanāvaraṇa* are destroyed simultaneously, and the problem arises which of the two, *kevala-jñāna* and *kevala-darśana*, should arise first? Logically we

cannot give priority to anyone of them. Nor is it possible to admit the synchronous emergence of both, because two conscious activities cannot occur simultaneously. If an omniscient soul knows all in one instant, he should continue to know all for ever, or otherwise, indeterminate has no scope in the case of one who has destroyed all karmic veils. The distinction of 'determinate and indeterminate', 'distinct and indistinct', applies to the knowledge of imperfect beings, and not to that of the perfect ones. And hence there can be no distinction between *jñāna* and *darśana* of the omniscient. There are other difficulties as well. Supposing that even in a *Kevalin* the *jñāna* and the *darśana* are quite distinct from one another, they must occur either in succession or simultaneously. In the former case, the *Kevalin* could not be held to speak out completely reality, because his statement, being in strict conformity with his awareness, would exclude the object of *darśana* when it would synchronize with knowledge, and it would even in the case of simultaneity of *jñāna* and *darśana*, the difficulty of simultaneous statement of the contents of both would still remain. Omniscience would be only an ill-conceived notion if it were admitted that the omniscience arhat intuits the unknown and knows the unintuited. The conception of separate identity of *jñāna* and *darśana* implies that the object of *darśana* remains for even untouched by *jñāna* and the object of *jñāna* remains for even untouched by *darśana* and consequently it follows that the whole reality even remains unknown even to the *kevalin*. The various scriptural statements contradicting our position, however, are to be interpreted with reference to various standpoints. The scriptures do not recognize *darśana* in the case of *Manañ-paryavajñāna*, inasmuch as the *Manañ-paryavajñāna* cognizes only particular features of the mind-substance of others, and not its universal forms. They further recognize only four classes of *darśana* viz. *cakṣurdarśana*, *acakṣurdarśana*, *avadhi-darśana* and *kevala-darśana*. Siddhasena then quotes an opinion which recognized *darśana* as *avagraha*, simple and pure, and *jñāna* as 'determinate description' of the form 'This is a jar', and distinguished *darśana* from *jñāna* on the ground that the latter can be due to the former while the former can never be due to the latter. He refutes the opinion on the ground that *avagraha* has been recognized as a sub-type of *matī-jñāna* and as such if *darśana* were held to be nothing but *avagraha*, it would follow that *darśana* is a type of *matī-jñāna*. Siddhasena then formulates his own definition of *darśana* which runs as follows: *Darśana* is *jñāna* (cognition) of external objects untouched by, or unamenable to the sense-organs provided the cognition does not cognize the past and future events by means of a *līṅga* (probans). The definition does not overextend to *Manañ-paryavajñāna*, because the external objects are not directly known by it. *Matī* and *śrūta* have no corresponding *darśana*. But *avadhi* can have *darśana* in as much as *avadhi* intuits objects that are untouched by the sense-organs, the omniscient (*Kevalin*) knows as well as intuits objects in as much as he is aware of all objects irrespective of their amenability or unamenability to sense-organs. Siddhasena Divākara, therefore, concludes that *jñāna* and *darśana* of a *Kevalin* arise simultaneously and last for ever. He further says that this interpretation does not violate the scriptures while the view the *jñāna* and *darśana* of a *Kevalin* arise in alternate succession is not faithful to the scriptures and is to be understood as the position of the non-Jainās. We have already stated how he proves the non-difference between *jñāna* and *darśana* in order to avoid logical difficulties.

Next we come to Jinabhadra, the great upholder of the *Āgamika* view. He deals with the problem in his *Vissāvatī* and *Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya*. He mentions all the three positions viz. (1) simultaneous occurrence of *jñāna* and *darśana* (2) alternate occurrence of them (3) non-difference between them. He records arguments for and against all the three positions. But he supports the alternate occurrence of *jñāna* and *darśana* as we have stated at the outset of our inquiry about their temporal relation.

Akalaṅka and Vidyānandī the great *Digambara* logicians, support simultaneous occurrence of *jñāna* and *darśana* in a *Kevalin*. Commenting upon Samantabhadra's *Āptamīmāṃsā*, verse (1), Akalaṅka says 'if the *jñāna* and *darśana* (of a *Kevalin*) were to occur alternately in succession, his omniscience would be only a contingent occurrence. There is no reason why the universal and the particular should not reveal themselves simultaneously to the omniscient who has destroyed all his karmic veil. Vidyānandī says: Awareness of the universal form is *varaṇa* and *darśanāvaraṇa* obscure these faculties. There is absence of *kevala-jñāna* and

kevala-darśana in people like us because of the presence of these two. And it goes beyond understanding why the universal and the particular should be revealed only in alternate succession when it is established that the two (*āvaraṇās*) are destroyed simultaneously due to a special kind of absolute purification of the soul? Haribhadra, commenting on Jinadāsagaṇī Mahattarā's *Cūrṇī* on *Nandī Sūtra* says that Ācārya Siddhasena and others were the upholders of simultaneous occurrence of *jñāna* and *darśana*, that Jinabhadragaṇī kṣamāśramaṇa and others were the upholders of the alternate occurrence of these, and that the old Ācāryās uphold non-difference of *jñāna* and *darśana*. It is difficult to ascertain from the available Jaina literature as to who this Siddhasena and the old Ācāryās were whom Haribhadra refers to. Siddhasena Divākara, as we have seen, supported the position of non-difference and so cannot be regarded as referred to by Haribhadra as the upholder of simultaneity of both. Besides, we do not know of any old Ācārya who were the supporters of non-difference between *jñāna* and *darśana*. Again in his commentary on the *sanmatitarkaprakaraṇa* (II.10), Abhayadevasūri mentions Jinabhadra as the supporter of alternate succession, and *Mallavādīn* as the supporter of simultaneity. This *Mallavādīn* also is not known to us the commentator Malayagiri, however, follows Haribhadra in assigning the positions to different authors. This problem of identification of Haribhadra, Siddhasena and Abhayadeva's *Mallavādīn* has been thoroughly discussed by the great savant Paṇḍit Sukhlālji in *Jñānabīṇḍu-paricaya* and we refer to that for fuller information.

In Yaśovijaya we find the last Jaina logician who supported the position of Siddhasena Divākara at great length and practically wrote a commentary on almost the whole of the second *Kāṇḍa* of his *Sanmatitarka-prakaraṇa*, which deals with the problem. Yaśovijaya refers to the statement of Haribhadra or Malayagiri that Ācārya Siddhasena was the supporter of simultaneity, and says that here only the *prima facie* position of Siddhasena is referred to. He supplements the arguments of Siddhasena Divākara and strongly supports his position. But what is most striking is the tone of comprehensive reconciliation of conflicting views with which he winds up the discussion. He says: '*Mallavādīn*' (who admitted separate identity of *jñāna* and *darśana* but did not admit succession) has resorted to *vyavahāra naya* (empirical standpoint) which comprehends distinction, the Reverend (Jinabhadra) has resorted to pure *ṛjūsūtra* (analytic standpoint) which lie at (that is, distinguishes) the borderline between cause and effect, while Siddhasena has accepted *saṅgraha* which tends to obliterate distinction. None of these three positions of the Ācāryās, therefore, are improper.

The Object of *Kevalajñāna*

The *Upaṇiṣadās* repeatedly stress upon the knowledge of one which can lead to the knowledge of all. It is their main teaching. The *Ācārāṅga* also announces that a person who knows one, he knows all; and who knows all, he knows one. Both of them identify the knowledge of one with the knowledge of all. But, the two systems explain the above fact in different ways. According to the *Vedānta Brāhmaṇa* is the only reality. The knowledge of *Brāhmaṇa* means the knowledge of entire reality. It denounces the knowledge of external things as mere verbal wrangling. It holds that the cause is the only reality and its knowledge implies the knowledge of effect. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* says that the earth is the only reality. Its effects are merely the play of words. It is earth where all the pots of different types pots. Similarly, the knowledge of *Brāhmaṇa* means the knowledge of entire universe. It does not mean that a person with the knowledge of *Brāhmaṇa* comes to possess the knowledge of all things. It only means that he has seen the fundamental reality; after which the knowledge of resultant objects becomes false.

But, the Jaina interpretation is quite different. It does not hold that the knowledge of the fundamental cause is the only knowledge. The knowledge of effects also is as true as that of the cause. Knowledge of one as leading to the knowledge of all only means that all objects are so interrelated that the complete knowledge of one implies the knowledge of all. This contention is based on the fundamental principles of relative existence.

Kuṇḍakuṇḍa's View

Kuṇḍakuṇḍa provides another explanation of the above. He says that the above issue can be explained

according to two view-points (*nayas*). If we follow that real view point (*niścayanaya*) a *Kevalin* perceives his self only. But from the discursive view-point he knows all the objects. Kuṇḍakuṇḍa generally interprets Jaina conceptions in the light of *Vedānta*. According to the *Vedānta* *Brāhmaṇa* is self-cognizant, similarly Kuṇḍakuṇḍa also holds soul as the self-cognizant. The *vyavahāranaya* of Kuṇḍakuṇḍa is just like the *vyavahārika-satta* of the *Vedānta*; which maintains that, on discursive plane, *sarvajña* means the cognizer of all external appearances, as it is in the case of God.

Kuṇḍakuṇḍa is interpreted also in the following way: According to the real view-point the soul is self-cognizant. It does not cognize anything else. But all objects stand as reflected into soul. The knowledge of soul, therefore, ultimately leads to the knowledge of entire universe.

Arguments for Omniscience

We have given some arguments generally advanced to prove omniscience. Below we give a summary of those and other briefly:

1. The soul is a knower by nature. It cannot remain ignorant of any object if there is no obstruction; just as fire cannot cease to burn the fuel if it is without obstacle.
2. The incomplete knowledge, which we experience, is a part of the complete one. The existence of the whole implies the existence of the part.
3. The passions (*doṣa*) and obscurances (*āvaraṇa*) must disappear totally at a certain stage as they have gradation; just as the removal of the foreign matter from gold.
4. The knowledge must have its stage of completeness as it is a graded phenomenon; just as in the case of size the highest stage is found in the space, similarly, in the case of knowledge it is omniscience.
5. We see the people with different degrees of intellect, sagacity etc. They must attain perfectness at a certain stage; because, they have a gradation.

According to Jainās, passion are removed with the destruction of *Mohanīya*. But, there is nothing to destroy knowledge, Yaśovijaya, perhaps under the influence of *Vedānta*, has proposed that the four types of discursive knowledge are effected by *kevalajñānāvaraṇa*. Where this *āvaraṇa* disappears they do not exist any more. Thus, in a way, we can say that according to Jainism also the discursive knowledge disappears at the dawn of *kevalajñāna*; but the Jaina does not make any distinction between the two types, as far as their appearance is concerned.

The Jaina divides the mind ethically into four *dhyānās*. In the first two *dhyānās* it is directed towards evil-thinking. They resemble the *samsāra-prāgbhāra* state of the *Yoga*. In the remaining two the mind is directed towards good thinking. They resemble the state of *kaivalyaprāgbhāra*. The different states of these two *dhyānās* bear a striking resemblance with the *yoga* theory of *samādhi*. We shall discuss them in detail along with the Jaina theory of spiritual progress.

Conception of *Tāraka* Stage in *Yoga*

According to the system of *yoga* the last three parts of *dhāraṇā*, *dhyāna* and *samādhi* are known as *saṁyama*. The concentration or *saṁyama* on different objects results into various supernatural powers. The *yogin* who concentrates on the three times comes to possess the knowledge of all the three times. Similarly, he gets the knowledge of entire universe when *prātibha-jñāna* arises. It is the knowledge just preceding *vivekakhyaṭi*. This state is known as *Tāraka*, because it brings the worldly bondage to an end. It knows the entire universe, in all the times and conditions simultaneously. This is attained in the stage of *vīśoka*. it resembles the *kevalajñāna* of the Jainās, appearing after the destruction of *Moha*. According to *yoga* it is perishable and a sort of obstacle in the path of realization; it is a disturbance in meditation. The Jaina does not support this view. Out, no other system except *yoga* has described the omniscience as *akarma*, which is maintained by the Jaina also.

The *yoga*-conception of infinite knowledge also bears a striking resemblance with the Jaina conception of *anantajñāna*. Patañjalī says that when the dirt of obscurance is removed totally the knowledge becomes infinite; as the knowable objects are finite, they fall short in comparison with knowledge. *Vyāsa* cites the example of sky and glow-worm. Similarly, the Jaina also maintains that practically a *Kevalin* perceives the entire universe, but its capacity is infinite. Had there been infinite number of universes a *Kevalin* would have perceived all of them.

***Kevalajñāna* and *Nyāya Vaiśeṣika* Philosophy**

We have already described the *Nyāya* view of the *Vaiśeṣika* super natural knowledge; which is attained through an extra or diuary contact with the universe. This contact is established through *yogika* practices for which they do not prescribe any definite course and generally follow the *yoga* system.

In the state of liberation the soul is devoid of all qualities including knowledge. The *Nyāya* does not make any difference between the discursive and transcendental types of knowledge. In the state of liberation where the other systems propose absence of discursive knowledge and the revelation of transcendental knowledge, the *Nyāya* proposes the total absence. Practically, they are on the same level.

In addition the *Nyāya* accepts eternal omniscience of God; which is a necessary equipment for his functions of creation, preservation and destruction of the universe. The *Nyāya*, chiefly being a devotee of logic does not propose any original theory regarding omniscience.

QUESTIONS

Essay type question:

1. Write on the concept of *Kevalajñāna* in Jainism comparison to other systems of thought.
2. Critically examine the function of *Kevala-jñāna* and *Kevala-darśana*.

Shrot question:

1. Clarify *sarvajñavāda*
2. Define *Kevala-jñāna* and write its kinds comprehensively.

Objective type questions:

1. *Kevala-jñāna* is *pratyakṣa*—

(i) <i>kṣāyika</i>	(ii) <i>kṣayopaśamika</i>
(iii) <i>Audayika</i>	(iv) <i>Aupaśmika</i>
2. How many views are available on *Kevala-jñāna* and *Kevala-darśana*

(i) 2	(ii) 5
(iii) 3	(iv) 8
3. In what duration does a *kevalī* reach the position of *śaileṣī*?

(i) In duration of two utterance	(ii) In two short utterances
(iii) In two long and one utterance	(iv) In utterance of five short utterances
4. What is the process of impeding *yoga* of a *kevalī*—

(i) <i>vacanayoga</i> , <i>manayoga</i> , and <i>kāyayoga</i> respectively
(ii) <i>manayoga</i> , <i>vacanayoga</i> , and <i>kāyayoga</i> respectively
(iii) <i>yoga</i> of <i>manayoga</i> and <i>vacanayoga</i>
(iv) <i>yoga</i> of respectively <i>manayoga</i> and <i>vacanayoga</i>

5. *Kevala-jñāna* occurs in—
 (i) one, who knows *mūrta dravyās*
 (ii) one, who knows only *amūrta dravyās*
 (iii) one, who knows comprehensively *mūrta* and *amūrta dravyās* and also knows *dravya* and *paryāyās*.
 (iv) one, who knows only *paryāyā*.
6. Who is called *tīrtha-siddha*
 (i) who gets liberated after being initiated into *śramaṇa saṃgha*.
 (ii) who gets liberated after establishing *tīrtha*
 (iii) who gets liberated before initiation
 (iv) he may or may not be initiated into *saṃgha*
7. *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika darśana* are—
 (i) *anīśvaravādī* (ii) *īśvaravādī*
 (iii) *karmavādī* (iv) *prakṛtivādī*
8. *Sarvajñatā* means—
 (i) *Ātmā's svabhāva* (ii) *vibhāva*
 (iii) *svabhāva* material (iv) only man's *svabhāva*
9. *Jñātā* of *sarva-kṣetra* means—
 (i) who can make complete space (*lokākāśa* and *alokākāśa*)
 (ii) one, who knows *lokākāśa*
 (iii) one, who knows *manuṣyaloka*
 (iv) one, who knows *alokākāśa*

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LESSON 10

THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF JAINA LOGIC

In this lesson we are going to know about the development of Jaina Logic. Before we start the actual discussion on the development of Jaina Logic, let us first become acquainted with the concept of logic.

1.1 Definition of Logic (*Nyāya*)

The existence of things is self-evident. The knower may know it or not, but it makes no difference in their existence. They become known when the knower knows them and if such knowledge is right or is the determinant of the object, it is called *Pramāṇa* i.e. the valid organ of knowledge. The definition of the Logic is based on this affirmation. According to Vātsyāyana, the commentator of the *Nyāya* school of philosophy, the term (*nyāya*) stands for an examination of reality through a valid organ of knowledge. According to Umāsvāti, a Jaina Ācārya of 4th century A.D., the knowledge of the reality is obtained through *pramāṇa* (an approved means of knowledge which is comprehensive) and *naya* (a partial organ of knowledge). Thus according to the Jaina school of philosophy, *nyāya* is the knowledge of the Reality by means of *pramāṇa* and *naya*. In other words, the ascertainment of examination of the nature of reality by means of *pramāṇa* and *naya* is *nyāya*. In the Jaina tradition, the term *yukti* (reasoning) is more in vogue than the term *nyāya*. In the view of Yativṛṣabha, another Jaina Ācārya of 6-7th century A.D., if a person does not examine objects by means of *pramāṇa*, *naya* and *nikṣepa*, the right would appear wrong and vice versa to him. *Pramāṇa* means 'valid knowledge'. The definition of *nikṣepa* is:

The depositing of power of expressing the specific meaning in words through the strength of qualifying adjuncts is *nikṣepa*. *Nikṣepa* is the way of knowing the object through the exposition of the intended sense. It also excludes the unwanted meaning. *Naya* stands for the philosophical standpoint through which the knower knows a particular aspect or attribute of an object. The ascertainment of the meaning of the object, arrived at by reasoning through *pramāṇa*, *naya* and *nikṣepa* is *nyāya*. This *nyāya* according to Yativṛṣabha, has been handed down from generation to generation of the learned ācāryās. According to Ācārya Samantabhadra, the Jaina Ācārya of the 4th century A.D., the system of Jaina Logic is characterized by the use of the term '*Syāta*' which literally means 'from a particular point of view'. It is used to avoid absolute affirmation and absolute negation, for according to the Jaina belief, affirmation and negation are relative concepts. In the Jaina tradition the entire epistemological and logical systems do not transgress the limits prescribed by the doctrine of *syāta* i.e., *syādvāda*. On the basis of these facts, the definition of *nyāya* in the Jaina logical system may be put as follows; *nyāya* means the relative comprehension of the real, effected through *pramāṇa*, *naya* and *nikṣepa*.

1.2 Three Eons of Jaina Logic

Jaina Logic can be broadly divided into three eons of time—

1. Jaina Logic of the period of *Āgamās* (canonical age)
2. Jaina Logic of the period of Systematic Philosophy
3. Jaina Logic of the period of critical study of organs of knowledge

The period of the advent of Lord Mahāvīra is 599-527 B.C. The *Āgamika* period extends from this period upto the first century A.D. The period of systematic philosophy starts from the second century A.D. and that of the critical study of the organs of knowledge from the 8-9th century A.D.

1.2.1 Jaina Logic of Āgamic Eon : The logic of the canonical age is characterized by a detailed discussion of the concept of cognition (knowledge) and intuition (*darśana*) and not of *pramāṇa* as such. The consciousness in the state of *karmic* veils is in two forms: potential (*labdhi*) sentence and manifest (*upayoga*) sentence. The development of the capacity of knowing the knowable object is potential sentence and the application of that capacity in knowing is manifest sentence.

The manifest sentence is again of two kinds: with details (*sākāra*) and without details (*anākāra*). Details means 'particular' or 'various aspects of a thing'. The sentence accompanied with details is called cognition. Sentence bereft of details is called intuition. In the Jaina Āgamās, the expressions '*savikalpa*' (detailed) and '*nirvikalpa*' (without details) are not found. Instead, the usage of terms '*sākāra*' (with details) and '*anākāra*' (without details) is in vogue. There is no difference of meaning between '*sākāra*' and '*savikalpa*', '*anākāra*' and '*nirvikalpa*'. The intuition (*darśana-cetanā*) is only cursory, while the cognition (*jñāna-cetanā*) is detailed. The former may be called as indeterminate or undetermined, while the latter as determinate or determined. The soul is the knower (*jñāta*). It knows the *jñeya* (the object) through *jñāna* (knowledge). Knowledge is an inseparable attribute of the soul. The relation between the soul and the knowledge is like the one between the substance (*guṇī*), and attribute (*guṇa*). The attribute is neither absolutely different from, nor absolutely identical with the substance. The soul is the substance, while knowledge is the attribute. As there is always a difference between the substance (*guṇī*) and the attribute (*guṇa*), so also knowledge is somehow different from the soul. As an attribute belongs to the substance, so also knowledge certainly belongs to the soul. It is from this standpoint that the former is relatively identical with the latter.

Cognition (knowledge) is classified into five kinds:

1. Empirical (*mati*) — Knowledge obtained through sensual and mental perception.
2. Articulate (*śruta*) — Verbal knowledge.
3. Clairvoyance (*avadhi*) — Knowledge of distant objects directly perceived by the soul without the help of senses.
4. Mind-reading (*Manah-paryavajñāna*) — Knowledge of what the others think in their mind.
5. Omniscience (*kevala*) — Knowledge of all modes of all substances.

Of the above five, the two viz. *mati* and *śruta* are sensory and the rest are supra-sensory. Of them again, the four are non-communicative, that is confined to oneself, while the articulate knowledge is communicative, that is it is both for oneself and for others. Knowledge is essentially self-cognizing. It is the language that communicates knowledge to others. The articulate knowledge is also, in itself, non-communicative, although it is couched in words. On account of this relationship with language, the articulate knowledge is metaphorically regarded as communicative. In the above classification of knowledge, the divisions of direct and indirect are not the main types. There is however another way of classification of knowledge where sensory knowledge is regarded as indirect and supra-sensory knowledge is regarded as direct. In this classification, the first two types of the above mentioned list fall under the former, and the last three under the latter category.

Digambar Ācārya, Kuṇḍakuṇḍa (127-179 A.D.) holds that the senses are not intrinsically related to the soul. They are extrinsic. What is extrinsic can not be the nature of soul. How can the knowledge attained through what is not the nature of the soul, be considered a direct (*pratyakṣa*) perception belonging to the soul? The knowledge acquired through an instrument or a medium, which is non-soul, is, therefore, to be treated as an indirect perception (*parokṣa*). Only that knowledge which originates from the soul which is not dependent on the sense-organs, the mind and the intellect is a direct perception. The knowledge through which one can cognize non-corporeal and supra-sensory material substances, as well as the substances which are kept in a place not visible or perceptible, is called direct (*pratyakṣa*). A mode of a substance, which is still not manifest, cannot be known by sensory knowledge, but it can be known by the direct perceptual knowledge. The subtle

mode, submerged underneath the gross one, cannot be known through sensory knowledge but can be cognized through the direct knowledge. The knowledge obtained through the sense-organs and the mind is, therefore, indirect, while the knowledge obtained exclusively through the soul is direct in the true sense of the term.

Another reason to regard sensory knowledge as indirect is that there is always a possibility for doubt and error in such knowledge. In support of this view, Jinabhadra Gaṇī avers that *mati jñāna* (sensory and mental knowledge) is indirect because of the possibility of the doubt and error in them. In direct knowledge, there is the absence of doubt, error and indecision.

1.2.2 The Nature of Knowledge : The consciousness in itself is a single and undivided entity. It is self-illuminating by nature like sun. On account of the association with *Karma*, it has two states – covered and uncovered. The sentence, which is fully uncovered, is the states of *Kevalajñāna*, which is unalloyed and innate knowledge. It can also be called knowledge, which is free from any condition or imposed property. No effort is needed for knowing through the knowledge in the state of uncovered consciousness, and hence such knowledge is spontaneous. Even in the covered state, the sentence is not totally covered, being necessarily uncovered to a certain minimum extent. When the clouds which cover the sun are dense, the light is dimmer, but no amount of clouding ever dim the sun to the extent that one can not distinguish the day from the night. In the same way; the denser the cover of *Karma*, the dimmer the knowledge. Nevertheless, there is always a partly uncovered consciousness enough for its demarcation from non-soul. Although such consciousness is itself not extraneous, it is conditioned by extraneous factors. 'Knowledge' is not only a subjective idea or conception (*pratyaya*) or cognition produced by mere sensory experience, but it is the very nature of the soul. It is neither generated anew at the time of taking re-birth, nor abandoned at the time of death. The relation between knowledge and soul is not like the one between the soul and the physical body, which is acquired at the time of re-birth and relinquished at the time of death. The soul is not a blank paper on which our perception scribbles with its fingers of sensations and self-feelings.

1.2.3 The Ultimate Source and Origin of Knowledge : Knowledge is the natural attribute of the soul, which even in its worldly existence remains always more or less uncovered. It can thus be said that the uncovered state of sentence is the ultimate source of knowledge. There are three more additional sources, viz. sense-organs, mind and soul. The development of our sense-organs depends on the development of sentence. The diversity (degree) of the physical sense-organs is dependent upon the diversity of the development of sentence. The development of the mind is also dependent upon the development of sentence. The knowledge which is supra-sensory, i.e., which arises independently of the sense-organs and the mind is directly dependent on the soul. Thus from the point of view of the development of sentence, the basic sources of knowledge are three, viz., senses, mind and soul. The instrumental cause of the arising of knowledge is two-fold: internal and external. Whereas knowledge arises on the proper proximity of the external objects with the sense-organs, it can arise also on account of mental contemplation which is an internal process.

1.2.4 Limits of Knowledge : The empirical perception is obtained necessarily through the five sense-organs and mind. Among the five senses, each one has the capacity to know a particular kind of object.

Sense-organs	Objects
1. Tactile sense-organ	Touch
2. Gustatory sense-organ	Taste
3. Olfactory sense-organ	Smell
4. Visual sense-organ	Colour, shape and movement
5. Auditory sense-organ	Sound.

The above objects do not produce the sensual cognition, but the cogniser himself, through his own effort, on the occurrence of proper proximity, cognizes them through the respective sense-organs. The sense-

organs do not cognize the substance directly. They can know it through the attributes or modes, and, therefore, the sense-organs cognize modes directly and the substance only indirectly. They can know only the present mode and therefore, they are not capable of knowing the past and the future modes. The sensualists (philosophers) consider the sensory experience alone as the real cognition. But if there is no cognition, which synthesizes the discrete strands of sensual cognition, we shall never be capable of an integrated determination of the object. The mind does not directly know the objects like touch, taste etc., but it does so only through the sense-organs. The mind, therefore, is not cognizant of the substance (*vastu*). But it has the capacity to synthesize the objects (i.e. modes) cognized by the sense-organs and also to contemplate them in the context of the three fold temporal divisions viz., past, present and future. From this standpoint, the mental cognition is considered more advanced than the sensual intuition.

The experience acquired through the sense-organ is called idea (*pratyaya*) or cognition (*vijñāna*). We not only know the cognition but we also discover (through deductive or inductive processes) laws and relations which has been hitherto unknown. This power of knowledge is called intellect or reason. Sensual cognition, mental knowledge and reason constitute the jurisdiction of *mati-jñāna*.

We know the objects also through symbols and words. For example, on seeing the object called fire, we look for the word, which stands for it, or conversely, on knowing the meaning of the word 'fire', we look for the object signified by the word. The domain of verbal knowledge is constituted by the following—

1. The knowledge consequent upon the meaning-word relationship arising from the judgement 'is the meaning of the word 'fire';
2. The knowledge obtained through studies or learning of language; and
3. The determination of the knowledge acquired through experiences.

The domain of clairvoyance is the direct knowledge of the corporeal or material objects (*Mūrta*)

The domain of the mind-reading is the direct knowledge of mind (*manas*).

Absolute knowledge or omniscience is completely uncovered knowledge, which has the power to know all substances in all their modes. This defines its jurisdiction.

1.2.5 Sensory Knowledge and Epistemology : Transcendental (supra-sensory) knowledge is an uncommon achievement. It is not ordinary (phenomenon), hence it does not find frequent mention in the treatises on logic. The predominant theme of the logical treatises is the empirical knowledge (*mati* and *śruta jñāna*). *Matijñāna* is a successive process, which occurs, in the following order:

1. Contact between cognitum^{b)} and the cognizer.
2. Intuition (*darśana*) — Cognition bereft of details; cognition of mere existence.
3. Inarticulate sensation (*avagraha*) — Mere sensing of the thing such as 'there is something'.
4. Specific inquiry (*īkṣā*) — It is the curiosity to know the whole from the part through a process of elimination and reach the conclusion such as, 'It is most probably this'.
5. Articulate comprehension (*avāya*) — A definitive identification of the object, such as 'this is definitely so'.
6. Imprint or retention (*dhāraṇā*) — Creating an impression in the mind as persistent determination of the object, which is retained for a longer time. Predisposition (*vāsanā*) or traces (*samskāra*) are the same as *dhāraṇā*.
7. Memory (*smṛti*) — It is a cognition such as 'that object', which is consequent upon recalling an already retained object.

8. Recognition (*saṃjñā*) — The judgement 'this is that', arising jointly from memory and present perception.
9. Reasoning (*cintā*) — It is the ascertainment of necessary concomitance like 'there occurs smoke only on the occurrence of fire'. The terms *cintā*, *tarka* (rational or logical thinking) and *ūhā* (process of inferring) are synonymous.
10. Inference (*ābhinibodha*) — The knowledge of the probandum⁹ (*sādhya*) attained on the basis of probans¹⁰ (*hetu* or *sādhnā*) through the process of logical deduction.

The probans is of four kinds:

1. Positive probans leading to *affirmation*.
2. Negative probans leading to *affirmation*.
3. Positive probans leading to *negation*.
4. Negative probans leading to *negation*.

Now, it would be easier to understand the successive steps involved in the ultimate cognition through sensory perception. Sensory perception is not possible firstly without the contact between the cognitum and the cognizer and secondly without the intuition. Further, there cannot occur specific inquiry in the absence of sensation, nor judgement in the absence of specific inquiry, nor retention in the absence of perceptual judgement, nor retention without memory, nor memory without recognition, nor recognition without reasoning, nor reasoning without inference.

Verbal knowledge or articulate knowledge (*śruta-jñāna*) manifested in two forms—*Syādvāda* or a doctrine of conditional judgement, and *Nayavāda* or the doctrine of standpoints. The Jaina logicians have propounded the nature of ontological reality on the basis of verbal knowledge through the doctrine of *Syādvāda* was *Nayavāda*. In the world of logicians, the verbal knowledge was resorted to and the whole system of Jaina Logic got developed on that basis. In other words, there are as many alternatives of conceptual thinking as there are ways of linguistic expressions; that is, the logical conceptions are commensurate with the varieties of propositions. They are innumerable, and accordingly, the authoritative judgements can also be innumerable. If looked at from a deeper consideration, it will follow that there are as many logically valid propositions as there are determinative ways of thinking and speaking. This also holds well in the domain of the doctrine of standpoints, as it has been said, "There are as many varieties of *nayas* as there are ways of verbal expressions." In other words, the number of *nayas* is determined by our ways, intentions and opinions. The upshot is that the enumeration of the sources of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*) according to the Jaina Logic, is a matter of determination in a relative perspective.

The second period can be said more revolutionary than the first. It brings effective change in the field of Jaina Logic due to the influence of other Indian systems of logic.

2.1 Jaina Logic of the Philosophical Period

Philosophical speculations had started as early as the eighth century before the beginning of the *Christian* era, and till the first century A.D., the supra-sensory perception held a prominent place and logic which definitely occupied a secondary position. It was only in the centuries that followed that critical studies in epistemology and logic made their appearance. As epistemology occupies an important place in philosophy, the philosophical period, fortified by epistemology, started from the second century A.D. onward. During this period there was a close alliance between philosophy on one hand and epistemology and logic on the other.

The propounder of the *Naiyāyika* school of Indian Philosophy was the sage Akṣapāda Gautama who composed his *Nyāyasūtra* in 200-450 A.D, according to Professor Jacobi, and in the first century B.C, according to Professor Dhruva. The sage Kaṇāda composed his *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* in the first century B.C, and Bādarāyaṇa

wrote his *Brahmasūtra* in the fourth century A.D. Muni Kapila composed the *Sāṃkhyasūtra* in 6-7th century B.C., and Īśvarakṛṣṇa composed his *Sāṃkhya Kārikā* between the second and the fourth centuries A.D.

The Buddhists and the *Naiyāyikās* were pioneers in the field of logic. Buddhist philosopher Nāgārjuna (300A.D.) criticized *Nyāyasūtra* and Vātsyāyana (400A.D.) gave the reply in his *Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya*. Buddhist Ācārya Dignāga (500A.D.) criticized the views of Vātsyāyana. Uddyotakara, the commentator of *Nyāya* philosophy (600A.D.) gave the reply to the former in his *Nyāyavārtika*. Buddhist Ācārya Dharmakīrti, in his *Nyāyabindu*, refuted the views of Uddyotakara. Buddhist Ācārya Dharmottara, in his commentary on *Nyāyabindu*, strongly supported the views of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. Vācaspati Miśra (800A.D.) in his *Nyāyavārtikatātparyakā*, re-established the position of Uddyotakara by refuting the Buddhist criticism of the *Nyāya* doctrines.

The refutation and counter-refutation of the Buddhists and the *Naiyāyikās* went on unabated zeal from the third unto the eighth century A.D. This battle of arguments ushered in a new era of logic.

When there arise conflicts between philosophies, the philosophers are prone to strengthen their respective position through refutation of others' by means of logic, relegating the scripture to a secondary place of importance. A philosopher does not depend upon the scriptures for the support of his views, but he requisitions logic in defense of his position.

2.2 Scripture and Logic Reconciled

The Jaina Logic of philosophical period has some distinctive achievements to its credit. The first is the reconciliation between scripture and logic. In the scriptural eon, the ultimate source of valid knowledge was the scripture itself or the person possessed of supra-sensory knowledge. In the *Mīmāṃsā* System, the ultimate authority rested with the *Vedās*. It considers the *Vedās* as impersonal revelation and not as written by human being. According to the *Nyāya* School, such authority is derived by the *Vedās* from God as their revealer. The Jaina philosophers regard the man who has achieved perfect detachment as the ultimate authority. The *Āgama*, in Jaina terminology, stands for the person who has eradicated all the blemishes, who is completely free from all kinds attachment and aversion, and who is omniscient. The *Sthānāṅga Sūtra*, a Jaina scripture, mentions a hierarchy of five sources of monastic legislation of (*vyavahāra*).

1. *Āgama* — Under the first source or authority, called *Āgama*, are included the personages conversant with the eleven *Āṅgās* and the fourteen *Pūrvās*¹ or at least ten or nine of them (*Pūrvās*) and also those who are possessed of the powers of clairvoyance, mind-reading and omniscience. The first and foremost authority of monastic legislation is thus the *Āgama* 'scripture' or those who are conversant with it in full or in part, at least the ninth *Pūva*.

2. *Sūya* — The *sūtra* containing the fivefold *vyavahāra* that was extracted from the twelve *Āṅgās* by Bhadrabāhū, who possessed the knowledge of the fourteen *Pūrvās*, even as butter is churned from milk, is called *Sūya* (Skt. *śrūta*). The *Sūya* consist of the *Kappa* (*Bṛhat-Kalpasūtra*) and the *Vyavahāra* (*Vyavahārasūtra*). The dispensing of justice according to the *Sūya* is *Sūya-vyavahāra*.

This is the second authority, in order of importance, of monastic legislation.

3. *Ānā* — The third authority of monastic legislation is *Ānā* that is, the concurrence or sanction of a competent *ācārya* who must be possessed of the *gaṇisampadā* and *vinaya-paḍivatti*.

4. *Dhāraṇā* — Under the authority of *Dhāraṇā* fall those rules of expiation, which are formulated after a thorough consideration of the relevant texts. These rules derive their validity from the ancient texts as interpreted by able exponents of the principles of monastic conduct. Such rules are conveyed to the disciples by the elders according to their capacities for application in different cases. These principles are called *Dhāraṇā* because they are meant to be retained in mind for application as and when occasions arise.

5. *Jīya* (Skt. *Jīra*) — The fifth authority of monastic legislation is *Jīya*, which stands for the customs and conventions that are firmly established on account of their repeated practice by the eminent *ācāryās* of the order through the ages. The expiations prescribed by a particular *ācārya* on specific occasions and duly imitated by others in similar cases are carefully recorded for the future guidance. Such records constitute the corpus of the *Jīya* law. The *Jīya* (custom or convention) which is vicious (*sāvajja*) in any way is not commendable; it is only the immaculate (*asāvajja*) *Jīya* which conforms to the basic moral and religious principles that is accepted as an authority in monastic jurisprudence.

6. Meaning and Literary Sources — The expression *vyavahāra* is used in two senses. Firstly, it means the sources or the authorities of legislation, and secondly, it stands for the subject matter of legislation, viz. the common sense monastic propriety and the rules of expiation (*prāyaścitta*). Here we are concerned with the former, viz. the sources or the authorities, which are five in number, and discussed in the *Bhagavatī Sūtra*, the *Thāṇaṃ* and the *Vyavahāra Sūtra*. The *Vyavahāra Sūtra*, in this connection, says: “Where the *āgama* is available, the justice is to be meted out according to the *āgama*; and where the *āgama* is not available but the *suṃya* is available, the justice is to be meted according to the *suṃya*; and where the *suṃya* also is not available, but the *ānā* is available, the justice is to be meted out according to the *ānā*; and where the *ānā* too is not available but the *dhāraṇā* is available, the justice is to be meted out according to the *dhāraṇā*, and where the *dhāraṇā* also is not available, but the *jīya* is available, the justice is to be meted out according to the *jīya*.....;

Samana-niggamṭhās are devoted to the *āgama*, and so the *samana-niggamṭha*, meting out justice according to the fivefold sources of legislation, completely detached and dispassionate, is the true executor of the Lord’s command.”

Even in the *Āgamika* period, the Jain thinkers did not underestimate the value of logic. The Jainās never questioned the solid authority of logic. The reason for this is not far to seek if one clearly understands the subject matter of the five kinds of knowledge, already discussed. Through *mati* and *śruta*, one can know all the substances, but it is not possible to know all their modes through them. Substances are of two kinds—corporeal (*mūrta*), and non-corporeal (*amūrta*). The non-corporeal substances are not cognized by the senses. They can only be known by the mind as well as through instructions of others. In the Jaina *Āgamās*, six substances have been enumerated—*dharmāstikāya*, *adharmaastikāya*, *ākāśastikāya*, *kāla*, *pudgalāstikāya* and *jīvāstikāya*. Among these, *pudgalāstikāya* is corporeal and the rest are non-corporeal. The non-corporeal substances are not amenable to sense perception, which implies that the knowledge of the necessary concomitance (*vyāpti*)⁹ is not possible in such cases, and consequently, the possibility of inference is out of question. It is, therefore, said that the non-corporeal substances can be known only through the scriptural knowledge, that is the knowledge acquired from the instructions of *āgama-puruṣa* who have direct cognition of such substances. The sages possessed of supra-sensory perception can acquire direct knowledge of the non-corporeal substances and through their verbal expression, can make statement about them. On the authority of them, we understand that there do exist non-corporeal substances. The corporeal substances however can be perceived through the sense-organs. But only a few modes that belong to them and not the entire range of their modes can be perceived through the sensory knowledge. For example, the colour or shape of a thing may be known by the eye, which cannot, however, know the other modes. The verbal knowledge, conveyed by others, is acquired through the medium of words. But the words that we use are limited in number, and, as such, are incompetent to cover the entire range of modes individually, which may be numerable, innumerable or infinite. It is, therefore, not possible to know the modes in their entirety through instructions from others.

Clairvoyance and mind-reading can comprehend only the things, which are made of pudgal or physical particles. In omniscience, however, both the corporeal and non-corporeal things are directly cognized.

The object is known directly in omniscience, which, on this account, does not need any service of

logical reasoning. An object is not known directly through the scriptural knowledge and that is the reason why there is scope for logical reasoning in it. *Digambar Ācārya Nemicaṇḍra Siddhānta-cakravartī* has recognized two forms of scriptural knowledge æ one derived from words, and the other derived from probans. The scriptural knowledge, in fact, is the comprehension of an object through another object. Thus, for instance, when we know fire from smoke, it is a case of the cognition of one object through another. Similarly the service of a probans is also not denied in scriptural knowledge. This implies that reasoning was a recognized instrument of knowledge in the scriptural period too, although it occupied a secondary place in the presence of the dominant *Āgamika* personalities (*āgama puruṣa*). The logico-epistemological devices could not find scope of development during the age of omniscient teachers and specially learned *ācāryās* who possessed knowledge of the *Pūrvās*, in full or in part. In the first century of the *Christian* era, *Āryarākṣita*, in his *Anuyogadvāra Sūtra*, one of the Jaina canonical texts, accorded a special treatment to *pramāṇās*. Such treatment is not available in the literature prior to that period. The Jaina thinkers were attracted to the logico-epistemological topics in the philosophical period, when the logical science got the supremacy in the absence of *ācāryās* possessed of special learning in the scriptures. A glimpse of such development can be obtained in the exegetical literature known as '*Niryukti*', whose authors unambiguously assert the necessity of using 'examples' for the dullards, and probans for the audience having sharp intelligence.

Another *Digambar Ācārya*, *Yatīśabha*, has attached great importance to the faculty of reasoning. The theories propounded by the non-omniscient humans about the supra-sensible objects are not necessarily free from doubt and perverseness, though in some cases they may be beyond suspicion. It was, therefore, necessary to attach adequate importance to logical reasoning in expounding the views of the traditional *ācāryās*. There were two happy results of such orientation, viz. satisfaction of the intellect of the advanced disciples, and rousing of curiosity of the tyros towards the scriptural knowledge. There was a two-fold necessity of this logical development:

1. Logical defense of one's own position against the logical incursions of the opposite camps.
2. Satisfaction of the demands of the intelligent Jaina monks, for a clear comprehension of the subjects of interest in the logical age.

It was for these reasons, internal and external, that it was necessary to develop a logical apparatus adequate enough for self-defense as well as the refutation of the opposite theories.

There was a strong scriptural tradition behind the Jaina thinkers, who propounded many a doctrine, concerned with supra-sensible objects, which were amenable to rational understanding. Under the circumstances, definition of the scope of logic for the interpretation of scriptural knowledge was a desideratum,^{b)} which was eminently fulfilled by *Ācārya Samantabhadra* and *Ācārya Siddhasena*. In his *Sanmati*, *Ācārya Siddhasena* drew a sharp line of demarcation between the scope of scripture of logic, assigning complete freedom to both in their respective spheres. A person who adduces *āgama* for the understanding of the topics of *āgama* and logic for the topic amenable to logic, makes a right approach to the subject. But absolutely wrong is the attitude of the person who attempts at supporting the scripture by logic and logic by scripture. In the canonical texts, the words of the omniscient are compiled, and they are mainly concerned with supra-sensory objects. They are beyond the sphere of logic and reasoning, and as such, the application of probans are not in demand in them. The sensory object can be understood through reasoning and, therefore, such objects are to be proved through logic. The employment of scriptural knowledge for the proof of such objects is not necessary.

2.3 Objects Unamenable To Logic

The disembodied or the emancipated soul is a supra-sensory object. Logic is of no avail for its proof. Intellect cannot comprehend it. There is an allusion found in the Jaina canonical text, *Uttarādhyaṇa Sūtra*, wherein the sons of *Bhṛgu* told their father that the soul, being non-corporeal, cannot be known through the

senses. Similarly, the living being in the form of plants respire and they are possessed of all the instincts æ hunger, fear, sex, possessiveness, anger, deceit, pride, greed, etc. They are subject to pleasure and pain. The earth-bodied beings are described to suffer from infatuation. All these are supra-sensible objects. Their existence is not amenable to reasoning. The non-physical realities, the subtle physical objects and the minute modifications taking place in every substance every moment are all in need of the testimony of scripture for their proof. The authority of the scripture establishes the supra-sensible objects.

2.4 Objects Amenable to Logic

The soul in the embodied form in the living beings can be established through logic. Life in such souls can be proved on the basis of certain obvious facts such as, say, the capacity to reproduce identical offspring or progeny is a clear evidence of existence of animation (life) in any embodied soul. In the same way, the process of respiration is another criterion to test the life in it. On the other hand when such processes are absent, one may easily conclude that the thing is lifeless. Thus the animation of the embodied self can be proved by logic. Logic, therefore, is needed for the proof of such objects as are subject to reasoning.

When the propounder of the thesis is a person who is not an 'āpta' (āpta is one who enjoys unimpeachable authority on account of the fact that he directly cognizes the truth), there is scope for establishing his thesis on the basis of logic (observation, inference, etc.), but in the case of an āpta, the thesis needs no logic, it is established by his words. Such thesis, therefore, is proved only through the āgama (i.e. the scripture).

2.5 Imparting Validity to Knowledge

The second important achievement of Jaina logic of the philosophical period is the exposition of knowledge (*jñāna*) as an instrument of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*). The doctrine of valid knowledge as propounded by Āryarākṣita in his *Anuyogadvāra Sūtra* could not find a respectable position in Jaina Logic on account of its being based on the *Nyāya* school of thought. Whereas the *non*-Jaina philosophers were engaged in discussions on epistemological problems, the Jaina philosophers kept themselves engaged in their old theory of knowledge. At the time, when all other philosophers were engaged in the development of their respective epistemological theories in an age of philosophical speculations, reinforced by logical thinking, the question of developing an epistemological doctrine of their own, based on their synthetic attitude, presented itself before the Jaina thinkers too. This problem was tackled for the first time by Ācārya Umāsvāti (44-85 A.D.), which took a synthetic view of an old Jaina doctrine of knowledge and the new science of epistemology. This served as a bridge between the *Āgamika* theory of knowledge and the logical epistemology. Siddhasena Divākara (4th-5th c.A.D.) and Akalaṅka (8th c.A.D.) established an independent science of epistemology. The synthesis proposed by Umāsvāti has found vent in the *Tattvārtha Sūtra*

(1.9 *mati-śruta-avadhi-Manaḥ-paryaya-kevalānī jñānaṃ*, 1.10 *tat pramāṇe*, 1.11 *ādye parokṣam*, and 1.12 *pratyakṣam anyat*.) which may be rendered as follows:

1. Knowledge is fivefold — empirical, articulate, clairvoyance, mind-reading and omniscience.
2. They fall under two categories of valid knowledge: mediate (acquired) and immediate (innate).
3. (Of the above five) the first two are acquired knowledge (*parokṣa*).
4. The rest are innate (*pratyakṣa*).

In the above epistemological doctrine of Umāsvāti, the *Āgamika* tradition of regarding the first two kinds of knowledge as '*parokṣa*' and the remaining three as '*pratyakṣa*' have been well preserved. The only difference that has been introduced in this classification consists in substituting the terms *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa* *pramāṇa* for *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa jñāna*.

The meaning of the word *jñāna* in the old tradition was the same as that of the word *pramāṇa* in the philosophical age. Umāsvāti has defined *pramāṇa* as right knowledge. The knowledge, which is unambiguous, non-discrepant and self-consistent, is right. He included under *mati* and *śruta jñāna* all the instruments of

inference (*anumāna*), analogy (*upamāna*), verbal testimony (*āgama*), implication (*arthāpatti*), probability (*sambhava*), and negation (*abhāva*). All these categories of epistemological tools involved the contact between the sense and the object as an essential condition, and as such they are included under *mati* and *śruta*.

Siddhasena Divākara's *Nyāyāvatāra* is the first treatise on Jaina Logic, composed in 32 *Kārikās* (verses). It contains the definition of *pramāṇa*, its varieties and also the constituents of inferential syllogism. Though we do not find a developed discussion of the epistemological problem in the treatise, it occupies a respectable position in Jaina Logic on account of its being a pioneer work on the subject.

Ācārya Sāmaṇtabhadra did not write any independent work on Logic, yet his deep interest in Logic is unambiguously revealed in his epoch-making works like the *Āpta-Mīmāṃsā* and *Svayambhūstotra*. He has described *pramāṇa* as the revealer of itself as well as the object.

2.6 The Third Achievement: Definition of *Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa* in Relevant Basic Text

The Buddhist philosophers considered the sensory cognition as *Pratyakṣa* i.e. immediate. The senses directly know the object and so the resultant knowledge is called *Pratyakṣa*. Such knowledge is free from being conceptual and erroneous, which are the two specific characteristics of it.

The *Naiyāyikās* define *Pratyakṣa* as that which arises when there is contact between the sense and the object. The neo-logicians have recognized two varieties of *Pratyakṣa*, viz. ordinary (*laukika*) and extraordinary (*a-laukika*). In the former there is contact (*sannikarṣa*) between the sense and the object in the ordinary sense of the term, while in the latter there is an uncommon or extraordinary type of contact.

The sensory knowledge was considered as indirect (*parokṣa*) knowledge in the orthodox Jaina tradition. Ācārya Kuṇḍakuṇḍa has logically defended the indirect character of sensory cognition. Umāsvāti also has assigned the status of indirect cognition to sensory perception through his classification of *mati* and *śruta* as indirect cognition.

Thus there were two different traditions among the logicians regarding the nature of sensory perception as direct and indirect. Some Jaina philosophers, in the mean time, made an attempt at reconciling these two attitudes towards sensory perception.

It is in the *Anuyogadvāra Sūtra*, an early Jaina text, that sensory perception finds a mention for the first time. In the epistemological discussion of the *Sthānāṅga Sūtra*, *Pratyakṣa* is mentioned as two-fold viz. *Kevala* (omniscience) and no-*Kevala* (clairvoyance and mind-reading). In the *Anuyogadvāra Sūtra*, *Pratyakṣa* is divided as sensory and supra sensory *Pratyakṣa*, the former being fivefold, viz. auditory perception, visual perception, olfactory perception, gustatory perception and tactile perception; and the later threefold, viz. clairvoyance, mind-reading and omniscience.

The *Naridī Sūtra* follows, in this respect, the tradition recorded in the *Anuyogadvāra Sūtra*. It is only in these two *Āgamās* that the sensory cognition is included under the category of *Pratyakṣa* cognition. The *Anuyogadvāra Sūtra* can be assigned to the first century A.D., the *Naridī Sūtra* belongs to the fifth century A.D. Jinabhadra GaṇīKṣamāśramaṣa, who is the principal representative of the *Āgamika* tradition and belongs to the 6th-7th century A.D., has defended the *parokṣa* status of *mati* and *śruta*, but at the same time he makes a novel addition. Inference alone, according to him, is absolutely *parokṣa*, while the sensory and the mental perceptions are instances of empirical *Pratyakṣa* (*Sāmvyaṅvāhārika Pratyakṣa*).

Inference stands for the knowledge of the probandum through the probans. The cognition of fire on the cognition of smoke is not a case of direct perception through the senses. This is the reason why the inference is absolutely a case of *parokṣa* cognition. The cognition of the object through clairvoyance, mind-reading and omniscience is direct and absolutely *Pratyakṣa*, because no other mediatory knowledge is required for their occurrence.

The perception of touch, taste, etc. through the sense is direct sensory perception. They are *Pratyakṣa* with reference to the senses, while with reference to the soul, they are indeed *Parokṣa*. The senses in themselves are insentient (*acetana*). They are not capable of cognizing the objects. They act as the media of cognition. It is out of these considerations that it is more appropriate to describe the sensory cognitions as *Pratyakṣa* only in the popular sense of the term, while from the ultimate viewpoint, the sensory cognition is a case of *Parokṣa* experience.

The above discussion may be symbolically expressed as follows:

Knower , knowable = transcendental *Pratyakṣa* (*pāramārthika Pratyakṣa*)

Knower , sense , knowable = empirical *Pratyakṣa* (*sāṃvāyāhārika Pratyakṣa*).

[In the former cognition, the knowable is direct, while in the latter, indirect to the knower and direct to the sense-organ.]

Knower , Mind , Smoke , Fire = merely *Parokṣa*.

Here there are two intervening factors between the knower and the knowable. These two factors are: the activity of the mind and the knowledge of smoke together with its universal concomitance (*vyāpti*) with fire.

The recognition of the sensory cognition as a kind of empirical *Pratyakṣa* worked a connecting link between the indigenous and alien traditions about the *Pratyakṣa* cognitions. This was a happy solution to the problem. In the later period of logical development, distinction between empirical and transcendental *Pratyakṣa* continued without any reorientation. It was made a permanent feature of Jaina epistemological thinking by Ācārya Akalaṅka.

2.7 The Fourth Achievement:

Non-absolutism as the Synthesizer of Diverse Philosophical Systems

The fourth important achievement of the philosophical period consisted in the development of a synthetic view of the divergent schools of philosophy, and the development and extensive employment of the non-absolutistic dialectic for such synthesis.

The two important questions of the philosophical debate since the times of the *Upaniṣads* were:

1. Is it possible to know the absolute truth, the truth in its completeness?
2. Is it possible to give it a verbal expression and exposition?

The different philosophies have made out different solutions to these perennial issues of philosophy. The Jaina thinkers also have presented their own solution. They answered the first of these questions through their epistemological critique, while the answer to the second they sought to give through their doctrine of Non-absolutism (*anekānta*).

It is the omniscient (*jina*) who can know the truth in its completeness. His knowledge is absolutely perfect, for his soul is without any kind of veil over it. This explains why his knowledge has no obstruction or hindrance. The non-omniscient cannot know the truth in its fullness, because the knowledge of such person is imperfect, he being a person possessed of knowledge as well as ignorance. With the acknowledgement of the (imperfect) knowledge of the non-omniscient, we simultaneously acknowledge his nescience also. In the covered state of consciousness, both presence and absence of knowledge are entwined in one. It is only the omniscient whom we can designate as having perfect knowledge. The expression '*Kevalin*' (omniscient) can also be explained as one who is possessed of only (*Kevala*) knowledge and nothing else. He is pure knowledge, absolutely free from nescience. In the point of knowledge, all persons other than the omniscient are possessed

of knowledge as well as nescience. This acceptance of the co-existence of knowledge and nescience implies that the truth in its completeness can be known only by the omniscient and not by anybody else.

Reality has two facets—the substance and the mode. The possessor of higher kind of scriptural knowledge can know all the substances, physical as well as non-physical, but he cannot know all their modes. The omniscient knows all the substances with all their modes, and therefore it is said that he knows the complete truth. The possessor of scriptural knowledge knows the substances through the scriptures. The omniscient knows them directly and so he knows the whole truth. In the words of Ācārya Sāmañtabhadra (2nd-3rd c.A.D.), both *syādvāda* and omniscience are revealers of all objects. The difference between them, if any, consists in the later's being a direct cognition and the former's an indirect cognition. All other objects, which are not cognized by either of them, are unreal.

In Jaina ontology, two kinds of substances are accepted—sentient and non-sentient. Each substance is possessed of many units, and each unit into endlessly infinite modes. All these substances with all their integral units, together with their modes, in their totality, constitute the complete truth. The monist may postulate the Absolute Truth (independent of anything else), but the pluralists do not agree with him. This is the reason why the Jaina philosopher, explains truth on the basis of his doctrine of non-absolutism. Truth has infinite modes and the capacity of language is limited. A single mode at a single moment can be expressed verbally and hence any speaker can, in his whole life, give expression to only a limited number of modes. It, therefore, follows that the complete truth can never be explained verbally, it is only a part of truth that can be the subject matter of linguistic expression.

Among the western philosophers, *Spinoza* has made a distinct contribution to the exposition of nature of substance. Substance, according to him, is that which is in itself and is conceived through it; it is *causa sui* (*svayambhū*), i.e. self-originated and inexpressible through words (*anirvacanīya*); in other words, it is the conception, which does not need the conception of another thing from which it must be formed.

The Indian philosophers of monistic persuasion have also propounded the highest truth as *causa sui*, i.e. self-originated and inexpressible through words or concepts and as each unthinkable. The Jaina logicians have not accepted a substance as inexpressible. Their argument is that, if a substance is inexpressible in language and thinkable in mind, then its inexpressibility will not be amenable to proof through any verbal symbols of concept, which are the only means through which the inexpressibility could be established. The substance, therefore, is neither absolutely inexpressible nor absolutely otherwise. The infinite number of modes cannot be expressed simultaneously by any linguistic or conceptual device. It is from this standpoint that a substance is inexpressible. But there are modes in a substance, which are expressible through language and as such the substance is expressible through those modes. This exposition of inexpressibility or otherwise of a substance has been made by Jaina logicians on the basis of *syādvāda* (doctrine of conditional predication).

In the proposition 'the jar is red', the jar is explained through a colour. But a jar is not only a coloured object. It has also a taste, a smell, a touch and many such qualities. When we characterize an object by a particular attribute, we are not able to distinguish other device to express all the attributes simultaneously. The Jaina logicians, to get out of this predicament, invented the particle '*syāt*'. Accordingly, it should be more appropriate to say 'in some respect the jar is red' (*syād asti rakto ghataḥ*), than to assert simply, 'the jar is red' (*asti rakto ghataḥ*). In other words, the jar is red relatively in a particular framework of reference. The use of the particle '*syāt*' is indicative of the fact that you are here describing the jar with reference to a particular colour, viz., red, which is given prominence intentionally by subordinating the other attributes which are, however, not denied. Here the red colour of the jar does not segregate the other attributes from the latter, but while describing the jar as red, the particle '*syāt*' is indicative of the other attributes which constitutes the complete jar. The function of the particle '*syāt*' is to bring home the existence of all other attributes left out in the proposition under reference, which ascribes a particular attribute of the subject. Similarly, in the proposition

'in some respect the jar exists', the attribute of existence is not isolated from the other attributes of the jar, because in that case the jar will lose its jarhood. What is predicated of the jar in the above proposition is not absolute existence, which is a particular kind. The jar is not an eternal thing and as such eternal existence cannot be predicated of it. It is in order to specify the nature of the predicate to obviate misunderstanding of any kind that the particle 'syāt' is prefixed to the proposition. The only way of describing object in its wholeness is prominently to predicate a particular attribute, tacitly implying the others, and consequently an object can be regarded as inexpressible and expressible at the same time. The object qua its tacitly implied attributes is inexpressible, while with reference to the attribute expressly ascribed, it is expressible. In popular parlance, which is frequently based on relative references, we describe a thing with reference to a particular attribute without any reference to the other attributes. In such modes of description there is nothing which is inexpressible. Such descriptions are called 'nayās', while the description of a thing in its totality through a single attribute is called 'syādvāda'. The development of these two methods of describing a thing fully or partially is an important upshot of the philosophy of Non-absolutism.

2.8 Dimensions of Synthesis

The Buddhists, the *Naiyayikās* and the *Mīmāṃsākās* devoted their energies to the act of self-defense and the refutation of others. These polemics were full of stringent sarcasm and bitter taunts. Such methods of debate were not liked by the Jaina philosophers as devotees of non-violence. Their attitude was dominated by the *Āgamika* dictum that those who praise their own doctrines and disparage the doctrines of others do not solve any problem. The Jaina thinkers did not enter the arena of such debates for a long time. They restricted their intellectual activities in their own limits as silent spectators of the arguments and counter-arguments between the followers of the different schools. But in course of time, for the sake of self-existence and self-preservation, and due to the pressure of the religious, social and political circumstances, there arose a vital necessity for the Jainās to defend their own doctrines through argument and logic by participating in assemblies of logicians and philosophers. The Jaina philosophers, at such times, started taking interest in self-defence against the doctrines of the opposite camps. But their method of refutation was free from untoward vituperation. Their refutations were synthesis-oriented in the interest of the cause of non-violence and for strengthening the search for truth. Such thought-activity of the Jainās is reflected in the following statement of Haribhadra Sūri—"How can the spiritual propounders of the scriptural discourses, who are great souls, be the promulgators of incompatible doctrines and detached from the worldly things, and fully engaged in the welfare of all living beings? "The question inevitably arises "why then are there such differences among the philosophers?" Haribhadra's answer to this is - "The apparent contradictions are often only due to the fact that we do not try to understand the purport of their statements; this is not the right attempt to know the truth. Actually, we should try to comprehend their basic implications and thus get rid of the wrong approach."

While Siddhasena Divākara made laudable efforts for synthesizing the different philosophies of his times, Samantabhadra commanded an uncommon power of formulating Jaina position in a language, which evinces his deep understanding of all systems of Indian Philosophy and their refutation from the Jaina standpoint. Samantabhadra was, in fact, a first-rate Jaina philosopher, who gave a firm footing to Jaina ontology, which remained unsurpassed in centuries that followed. Siddhasena Divākara can be considered as a pioneer philosopher who took a synthetic view of philosophies while formulating the doctrine of *anekānta* as a philosophy of philosophies. His method of treatment of *Sāṃkhya*, Buddhists and *Vaiśeṣika* systems exhibits his wonderful ingenuity and critical acumen for their synthesis. According to him, the *Sāṃkhya* system is an approach to reality from the standpoint of substance, which has resulted in the postulation of 'Puruṣa' as an unchanging eternal real. The Buddhists on the other hand, look at the Reality from the modal standpoint, and as such they (particularly the *Hīnayānists*) propounded the philosophy of universal flux (*Kṣaṇikavāda*). Of these two, viz. the *Sāṃkhya* and the Buddhist, one must obviously be wrong. Either the doctrine of universal flux is false or the philosophy of unchanging eternity must be so. Both of these cannot be a true estimate of reality. The

Vaiśeṣika philosophers accept the independent existence of the universal (*sāmānya*) and particular (*viśeṣa*) and as such they recognize the validity of the standpoint of substance as well as that of modes. But their postulation of the universal and the particular as absolutely two independent facts makes their philosophy a false doctrine, being only a partial and truncated estimate of reality. The Buddhists and the *Vaiśeṣikās* consider the *Sāṃkhya* doctrine of pre-existence of the effect in the cause as a false doctrine and the *Sāṃkhya*s consider the former pre-non-existence of the effect in the cause (*asatkāryavāda*) as an absurd hypothesis. All these theories are true in their own perspectives. None of these is an absolutely false doctrine. They are false only in so far as they are exclusively postulated. Relatively interpreted, none of these is false. A jar is not absolutely different from the earth, and as such, it may be viewed as identical with the latter. The jar, of course, does not pre-exist in the earth before it actually takes the form of a jar. The jar, in fact, has come into existence on the assumption of the shape of jar by the earth, and as such, it is different from the earth. Thus, from the point of view of the identity and difference or the universal and the particular, none of the statements (*valtaṇyātā*) is untrue.

There are as many standpoints or ways of approach as there are ways of speech, and there are as many heterodox doctrines, i.e. divergent views, as there are standpoints. Every philosophy is a standpoint at best, being a view of the real from a particular angle of vision. No particular thought is complete, but it acquires completion when consistently connected with other thoughts. Thus viewed, no exclusive kind of thinking is true nor any relative mode of thought is untrue. The question arises: if the individual exclusive proposition is false, wherefrom would the sum total of such propositions derive their validity? A congregation of false beliefs is necessarily an archangel of untruth. How could that totality be a philosophy, perfect and full? Ācārya Samantabhadra has very astutely formulated the reply by asserting that “all the possible alternatives, consistently construed, are bound to give glimpse into the whole truth, capable of discharging all the functions of a Reality in its completeness. No rational proposition can be absolutely untrue. Shorn of its exclusiveness, it becomes an exponent of truth, which is tolerant of other co-ordinate rational propositions.”

Jinabhadraṇī Kṣamāśramaṇa, the author of the encyclopedic *Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya*, extended the scope of this synthetic attitude to its utmost to find in every wrong philosophy a window, which necessarily opened towards the truth. His plea is that the integration of all the perverted views is essentially the right view. A heterodox philosophy is a true doctrine in so far as it opens up a vista of true philosophy (*sva-siddhānta*). The doctrines propounding universals, particulars, permanence, flux, etc. are parts of a grand philosophy. A rational synthesis of these is a right view as propounded in Jaina philosophy, which does not believe in refutation or support of any particular standpoint, but exhibits the fullness of truth as composed of manifold views in their proper perspectives.

3.0 The Third Period of Jaina Logic

In this lesson, the third period (i.e. the period of critical study of organ of knowledge) has not been shown. The subsequent lessons mainly discuss the development of Jaina Logic on the basis of the third period. That is why it is felt that there is no need to deal with this period here. The students could learn about the development in the third period through the reading of the subsequent lessons.

NOTES:

1. *Tattvārtha Sūtra*; 1/6.
2. Siddhasena Divākara, *Sanmati-tarka*; 3/47.

GLOSSARY:

- a) *tabula rasa*—the mind etc, before impressions are recorded upon it by experience.
- b) Cognitum: the knowable object.
- c) Probandum—is the fact which is capable of being (and sought to be Proved)S.

- d) Probans—is the fact, which is definitively known to stand in necessary concomitance with the Probandum.
- e) *Pūrvās*: are the 14 scriptures of the earlier lore of Jaina canonical texts that comprise the 5th part of the twelfth *aṅga āgama dṛṣṭivāda*.
- f) *Vyāpti*—invariable concomitance or universal accomplishment of the middle term by the major.
- g) Exegetical—the works of the ācāryās, which throw light on canonical texts; *niryukti* is one of the oldest exegetical expositions.
- h) Desideratum (Latin; noun)—something lacked or wanted.

QUESTIONS

Essay type questions:

1. Discuss in detail the development of Jaina Logic.

Short questions:

1. Explain in short what is logic.
2. Write a brief note on the development of Jaina Logic in the age of *Āgamās*.

Objective questions : Give answer in one sentence:

1. Enumerate the objects, which are unamenable to logic?
2. Which objects are amenable to logic?
3. What is the second important achievement of Jaina Logic of the philosophical period?
4. Show the difference between the epistemological doctrine of Umāsvāti from that of *Āgamika* tradition?
5. Do you agree with the view that there is no difference in the meaning of *jñāna* in *Āgamika* period and *pramāṇa* in the philosophical period?
6. Which is the first treatise on Jaina Logic?
7. What is direct knowledge according to the view of the Buddhists?
8. Define direct knowledge according to *Nyāya* system?
9. In which *Āgamās* the sensory perception is included in the category of direct cognition?
10. Which were the two questions of the philosophical debate since the time of the *Upaniṣadās*?

Reference Books:

Ācārya Mahāprajña, *New Dimensions in Jaina Logic, Today and Tomorrow's Printers and Publishers, New Delhi, 1984.*

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LESSON 11

CONTRIBUTION OF JAINISM TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDIAN LOGIC

Freedom of thought generated variety of thought, which is the sine qua non of the development of thought. Indian thought has two main streams, viz. *Śrāmaṇik* and *Vedic*. Both are dedicated to the search of truth and the advancement of knowledge. The corpus of Indian logic is nourished by the intellectual exchange and inter-influence between the two and contains specific contributions of individual schools as well as a general advancement achieved in common. An outline of the basic contributions of Jainism or Jaina ācāryās to the field of Indian logic is being attempted here. It has resulted in two achievements; relativity and reconciliation. While non-absolutism has characterised the thought of the Jaina logician. The *syādvāda*, the doctrine of conditional dialectic has dominated their linguistic vehicle, and relativism and synthesis were the outcome. It is through relativism alone that one can understand the universe in its vastness and attempt an explanation of its working. The universe is made up of substances, each possessed of infinite modes. The substances are interrelated and they influence each other. Every event has its own set-up and context. Therefore, a satisfactory explanation of the apparent contradictions and discrepancies in it would be impossible without the relativistic approach.

***Anekāntvāda* and *Syādvāda* with special Reference to Relativism**

Relativism is an all comprehensive principle which is applicable in the context of an effect or an event in its manifold, rather infinite-fold, character. Usually an entity, though infinitely complex in character, is explained with reference to a particular attribute which necessitates the use of the linguistic tool, 'syāt', to imply the remaining attributes. The perfection of our language is made up of the device of 'syāt' which indicates that the specific attribute is not the whole entity. Nor is our cognition competent enough to know the truth in parts but the principle of relativism does not allow us to remain ignorant of the other parts making up the whole. The absolutists forget the fact that though the 'Reals' are independent so far as their own existence is concerned, they are not absolutely independent in their relationship with one another, which explains their existence in the context of the universe as a whole.

The determination of the laws of pervasion or concomitance is possible only on the basis of the principle of relativism. The laws of the gross world are not applicable to the working of the subtle world. The analysis of the nature of the universe in its cosmic and supracosmic aspects has been explained from two different *nayas* or standpoints. The Truth in its subtle or ultimate nature is to be studied through *nīścayanaya* (ultimate or scientific standpoint), whereas the gross or the external world is explained through *vyavahāra naya* (the pragmatic or the practical standpoint). The dictum 'the self is the doer of its own *karma* (action) is acceptable to all the spiritualist philosophers, but this is only a common place statement and the formula represents pragmatic or practical view point. It can not be the formula of the ultimate or the scientific standpoint, because the 'Real' in its ultimate nature is the doer of its own nature. The self is a conscious substance and, therefore, it can be the doer of a mode that is conscious. The *karma*, on the other hand is material and as such is heterogeneous and quite different from the self in nature. And as there cannot be any relationship between two principles of diverse nature, the self cannot be the doer of *karma* which is quite unlike the latter. Had the self been the real doer of the *karma*, it would never achieve freedom from it. The proposition 'the self is the doer of *karma* is therefore, only a pragmatic and commonplace statement, couched in a language expressive of the pragmatic standpoint.

Some bodies are felt heavy and some others light, but heaviness and lightness are dependent on the location of those bodies in space at different distance from another body on account of the law of Gravitation. A body loses its weight as soon as it crosses the field of gravitation.

Sometimes we determine the nature of an entity with reference to its length and breadth. This is understandable with reference to a material body but such determination is impossible of the immaterial or the formless entity, there being no length and breadth. It occupies space but does not obstruct it. Length and breadth are therefore, relative to a material object. When the energy in the form of heat is transformed into motion, its quantity remains constant. This is the first principle of thermodynamics. The second principle is that energy passed through an instrument loses its quality which gradually decreases. It has not been possible to invent an instrument, therefore, which is capable of changing energy into motion that is perceptual and does not consume the quantity of the initial energy. It has been presumed by some thinkers that, although it is not possible to preserve the quantity of energy intact in this space and time, yet it may be possible to do so in a different space and time so that an instrument supplied with a quantum of energy would ever remain in motion without involving any decrease in the initial energy. From such instances or scientific discoveries and inventions it is evident that the concomitances valid in a particular space and time are not applicable universally in a different space-time context. The concomitances are, therefore, to be determined on the basis of the principle of relativism.

Many a theory of statistics and physics has found an adequate exposition in the light of relativism.

Non - absolutism or *Syādvāda* with reference to Synthesis

The second important outcome of *syādvāda*, the doctrine of conditional dialectic, is Synthesis. The Jaina sages and saints have not accepted the exclusive validity of impermanence etc. given in experience, but attempted to discover their coherence with their opposites, such as permanence and the like. The philosophical doctrines have a cyclic fate due to reasoning (*tarka*). By one set of reasoning it is confirmed that a 'Real' is impermanent because it is a product and whatever is a product is impermanent, for instance, a jar. In another set of reasoning, on the other hand, it is established that the sound is permanent because it is not a product. What is not a product is permanent, for instance, the space. One can search for a synthesis between these two mutually opposed sets of reasoning. Opposition leads to synthesis. The proposition, 'sound is impermanent' is true because it becomes an entity of the past immediately after becoming the object of the ear. It is not illogical to accept a sound as impermanent on account of this change. The *Mīmāṃsaka* philosopher's characterisation of '*sphoṭa*', which is the material cause (*upādāna kāraṇa*) of the sound as external, is also not unreasonable. The material bodies that transform into sound never change their material character, and in this sense their permanence should also be acceptable. No attribute of a 'Real', according to relativism, is independently true. The attributes can be true only as interrelated. Ācārya Sāyaṇa Mādhava (14th century A.D), in his *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*, has refuted one system of philosophy by another in order to finally establish the ultimate validity of *Vedānta*. Much earlier, the great Jaina logician *Mallavādin* (fifth century A.D.) in his *Dvādaśāra nayacakra*, demonstrated the inadequacy of one philosophy by another in a graduated scheme of *nayās*. He ultimately established the validity of none independently, emphasizing the soundness of a philosophy that encompasses all individual schools into a comprehensive whole, synthesising all of them, pointing out their relevance and proper place in the world-view.

The philosophy propounded by an individual *naya*, being only a partial estimate of reality, is untrue. Only the coordinated view of all those philosophies is true. This synthetic approach has saved Logic from the whirlpool of wrangling and given the search for Truth a sound and dependable basis.

The classification of the organs of knowledge

An important contribution of Jaina logic to Indian thought is the classification of the valid organs of knowledge (*pramāṇa*). The fault of intermixture (*sāṅkara doṣa*) or overlapping is avoided by the classification

of the organs as *pratyakṣa* (direct) and *parokṣa* (indirect). All possible valid organs of knowledge are comprehended by it. The object is either known directly or through other means or medium. These are the only two ways of knowing which are the basis of the above-mentioned two divisions. The Buddhist and the *Vaiśeṣika* logicians accepted *pratyakṣa* (perception) and *anumāna* (inference) as the two valid organs of knowledge, but they had to prove the *āgama* (verbal testimony) as included under the inference (*anumāna*). It is not beyond controversy to include *āgama* under the inference. Under *parokṣa* it is easy to include inference, verbal testimony, memory (*smṛti*), reasoning (*tarka*) etc. and thus their definitions also can be made free from the faults of intermixture or overlapping. Thus considered, the Jaina classification of the valid organs of knowledge is universally acceptable, being based on a realistic estimate of the problem.

The stage of sensuous preception

The consecutive stage of sensuous perception (*avagraha*, *īhā*, *avāya* and *dhāraṇā*) of the Jaina is also an important contribution to Indian epistemology. This has been discussed in the first chapter entitled: 'The Jainas logic of the *āgama* period'. This analysis of perceptual cognition is very important from the psychological viewpoint.

The self-validity of human experience

The problem of self-validity (*svataḥ prāmāṇyam*) of the knowledge is a widely discussed topic of Logic. In the tradition of the Jaina Logic the ultimate source and validity of experience is man himself. It is the human being that is self-valid and not any particular scripture or text. The denial of the self-validity of any particular text and the acceptance of the self-validity of a human being is a very unique principle. The *Mīmāṃsakās* accept the self-validity of text (like the *Vedās*) and deny the self-validity of a man. According to them a human being cannot be absolutely free from greed and attachment, and in the absence of such freedom nobody can claim omniscience, and a person who is not omniscient is not ipso facto a possessor of self-validity. According to the Jaina thinker, it is possible for a human being to become absolutely free from greed and attachment and consequently attain pure and perfect knowledge and omniscience. This is why only a human being can claim the self-validity of his knowledge. The verbal assertions of such man or the books written by him derive their validity from the writer and are not valid in themselves. The self-validity of human experience is a fundamental contribution of Jaina Logic. In the entire range of Indian Logic it is indeed the Jaina tradition that is the chief and the earliest upholder of omniscience. And it is but natural that a huge literature devoted to the proof of omniscience is available in Jainism. The Buddhists have asserted the self-validity of Buddha's knowledge and the secondary authenticity of their texts, but they considered Buddha as the knower of *dharma* (merits and demerits) and not the knower of all things like the Jainas. According to the *Mīmāṃsā* philosophy, a human being cannot be the knower of *dharma*. The Buddhist, however, went a step further and asserted that the nature of *dharma* is accessible to the human mind. The Jainas went still further and affirmed that a human being can be an omniscient being as well. Kumārila has vehemently criticized the concept of omniscience upheld by the heterodox schools. The Buddhist philosopher Dharmakīrti has dismissed the concept of omniscience as irrelevant to the knowledge of a religious prophet. He asserts that one may see at a distance or not, but let him see the truth that is profitable and beneficent. If a person who can see at a distance is a valid authority, come, let us worship the vultures who can identify the prey at a great distance.

The refutation of omniscience and the oblique accusation against it have been adequately answered by the Jaina logicians for over a millennium and a half and they have put up a strong defence against them.

Some Valuable Concepts Borrowed From Non-Jaina System

Along with this influence of Jaina thought on other schools, it would not be irrelevant to discuss the counter-influence of the non-Jaina systems on Jainism itself. The Jaina logicians have definitely borrowed some valuable concepts from logical systems contemporaneous with it. In their determination of the nature of inference they have followed the tradition of the Buddhist and *Naiyāyika* logicians. They have attempted

clarification and amendment in conformity with their own thought and tradition about the subject of inference. The Buddhist logicians proposed the triple characteristic of a probans. But the Jaina thinkers made a remarkable advancement on it by proposing a unitary characteristic, viz. the logical impossibility in the absence of the other (*anyathānūpapatti*). The following four categories of probans are also unique contributions of Jaina logicians:

- (1) A positive probans leading to an affirmative conclusion.
- (2) A positive probans leading to a negative conclusion.
- (3) A negative probans leading to a negative conclusion.
- (4) A negative probans leading to a positive conclusion.

The above-mentioned examples unambiguously demonstrate the fact that Indian thought unceasingly went on enriching itself by inter-disciplinary influences and was never stagnant on account of dogmatism and stalemate consequent upon individual aloofness. It was to an appreciable extent free from the obsession that refutation of alien systems and confirmation of one's own was the only aim and object of a particular system of thought. The process of give and take was always in vogue — a phenomenon which characterises the entire range of Indian literature in all its ramifications.

Philosophy and Logic: New Possibilities

In concluding the discussion of the science of Logic it would not be out of place to turn our attention to new possibilities in the field. There is no doubt that Epistemology and Logic in their developed form have been recognized as essential parts of philosophical speculations. It is also undeniable that Logic brought about a stagnation in the stream of philosophical thinking by keeping it bogged down to exposition of the tenets and the doctrines of bygone days. The entire energy of the majority of philosophers remained engaged in splitting hair in place of discovering new truths. And as a result dry Logic drove scientific observation to a place of unimportance. The doors of new discovery and investigation of new facts were completely closed in the absence of the power of deep observation and scientific experiment.

The search for Truth has three avenues, viz. observation, reasoning or logic, and experiment. These are the only tools by which discovery of new truths and facts in the field of the various branches of science, viz. Metaphysics, Physics, Psychology, Botany, Biology, etc. have become possible. It is with these instruments that humanity has been in search of Truth since the times when such search was initiated.

In those days whatever new facts were discovered by philosophers it was possible only on account of scientific observation. So long as our philosophers were not averse to the method of observation, there was a genuine search of facts and truths. When Logic raised pure intellect to a predominant position and reasoning (*tarka*) came to occupy an extraordinary place in thought, the method of scientific observation lost its importance in the speculations of philosophy and completely fell into oblivion. The result was that the subsequent thinkers were rather philosophical commentators than philosophers in the true sense of the term. Only those who searched out and established new facts and truths through subtle observation were genuine philosophers. Over the past millennium and a half no new discovery has been made or even attempted, as our thinkers rested on their oars, engaged in vain discussions of the discoveries of ancient philosophers, and endless mutual criticism and refutations, fighting with phantoms created by themselves. Nothing else could be expected from them for want of the development of new methods of observation of minute facts. There was, of course, one effective way of deep observation which is epitomised by what is called suprasensuous perception (*atindriya-jñāna*) of the yogins. But this was also neglected and not properly used and developed in a scientific way.

The successful search of new knowledge and new principles by the different sciences is also, no doubt, due to the faculty of suprasensuous experience illustrated by the epoch-making discoveries spontaneously made by the great scientists like Newton and Einstein. These discoveries were certainly the outcome of incessant

search for Truth based on the analysis of the properties of matter and mind and casual and acasual relations existing between them. It is absurd to think that a modern scientist has not played his part in developing the way of suprasensuous perception. Their approach may be different, but there is no doubt that science has provided methods and instruments to discover suprasensuous truths. The subjects that fall under suprasensuous perception are three, viz. subtle, concealed and remote, which cannot be known by the ordinary normal sense-organs. The scientist today has invented instruments like microscope, telescope and X-rays, through which we can study the subtle matter or objects hidden from the senses or situated at a distance and unknown in the past. The modern scientist, however, is not conversant with the power of the soul capable of knowing such objects by its faculty of suprasensuous perception. But he has invented physical instruments capable of performing the task of knowing the subtle, concealed and remote. A philosopher has to go a step further and utilize the experience of the yogins of ancient times and the discoveries of modern science to arrive at a comprehensive truth, integrating all the valuable contributions of yoga and science. But philosophy at present is not performing this function. It should be appreciated that whereas on the one hand Logic produced some good results, it is also responsible for stalemate and stagnation of knowledge and thought in some ways. Today suprasensory experience is a suspect. We have let the lucid intervals of suprasensuous perceptions go in vain. There are two such occasions:

(1) We sometimes pass on a problem to the sub-conscious mind which continues acting on it for some time and then suddenly the solution flashes across the mind in a dream. This possibility of discovering new truths and solutions through dreams by sowing seed of the problem in the sub-conscious mind in a semi-conscious state, has been abandoned by the modern philosophers.

(2) Another occasion such flash presents itself at a moment of pure intuition. A moment may come in our life when we are in a state of absolute equilibrium of mind free from the influence of reason and discursive thought. At such lucid interval there dawns an enlightenment that is spontaneous and revealer of facts unknown and hitherto considered impossible of being known.

These two possibilities were living issues before the ancient philosopher and he applied them in the discovery of Truth. Modern science also has attempted to throw light on these two possibilities. In non-conceptual consciousness or pure intuition the subtler states of the mind become active and present solutions of penetrating problems. Even in the state of dream the gross consciousness becomes inactive. At that state the subtle consciousness comes in touch with the minute truth. I cannot believe that such power is absent in a modern philosopher. This power lies hidden under the faculty of discursive thought and the philosopher has become more a logician than an intuitionist. His power of observation lies dormant and inactive. While discussing the new possible courses of philosophy one should not lose sight of facts contained therein. The importance and the efficacy of reasoning (*tarka*) cannot be denied. It cannot be divorced from philosophy. But reason is, on no account, superior to experience. It is rather subordinate to it. Observation and experiment occupy the first position. In the expression *anumāna* (inference) the particle '*anu*' indicates that inference is preceded by perception and observation which is subsequently subjected to reasoning. The science of logic or reasoning is also called *ānvīkṣikī*, which is derived from *ānu* + *ikṣa*, thus meaning a science which is preceded by observation. General principles are derived from observation and experiment. And then the successful working of these rules is carefully observed. These methods of experiment and verification make it possible for us to formulate a plausible theory. Such theories obviously are not based on pure intuition. Reasoning is the only instrument which enables us to derive conclusions from observed facts and finally to arrive at universal laws. This is the method of philosophy and also of modern science. By experiment the scientist discovered the rule that metals expand when they are heated and contract when they are cooled. But this general rule has a solitary exception in that water gradually expands in volume when its temperature is reduced from four to zero degree, and it does not contract even when cooling. This is a special law. It thus follows that nothing can be affirmed about actual facts exclusively on the basis of the general rules. This maxim applies to theoretical science, medicine as well

as law. Definite predictions can be made on the basis of special laws. For instance, one can predict the bursting of water pipe from the temperature of its water going below four degrees. This is the function of Logic which has thus a paramount importance. But it cannot be considered as valuable as observation. In the absence of observational evidences it is neither possible to discover the general laws nor to apply Logic when there are no data supplied by experience. The most urgent need and solid basis of Philosophy can be summed up in the following three maxims:

1. Investigation of new truths and facts and deriving necessary conclusions from them.
2. Development of the method of the minute observation.
3. Development of the purity of mind for acquiring the power of subtle observation.

For the successful implementation of all these conditions of development of knowledge, it is necessary to undertake coordinated study and research of the science of *Yoga*, *Karma* and Psychology along with Logic. Without this coordinated study and research the approach of minute observation cannot flourish or be successful. The *yogic* experience is an important part of philosophy.

It is not cultivated exclusively for physical health and elimination of mental tension, but it has a great part to play in illuminating the minute strata of our consciousness. It is a successful medium of communication with subtle truths. Maharshi Caraka, it is said, could know the properties of medicinal herbs, simply by a sympathetic association with them without the help of microscope or other such subtle instruments to observe them. He used to sit down in deep meditation and the properties of medicinal herbs reflected themselves in the mirror of his pure consciousness. In ancient Jaina literature also there are recorded many such properties of vegetation as were intuited in special state of trance.

For the right growth of the method of minute observation the study of the science of *Karma* is also very valuable. Behind our physical body there is a *karmic* body which is finer than the former and its subtle functions manifest themselves in the reactions of the physical body. By developing the power of observing the function of the *karmic* body we can succeed in exposing the reactions manifested in the physical body and also determine the nature of the casual relationship between the two (viz. the *karmic* body and its reactions manifested in the physical body).

By a careful study of the different faculties of the mind and different phases of the consciousness behind them as well as the external data conditioning the consciousness, it is possible to add new dimensions to the power of observation.

It is not sufficient for a philosopher to be a mere logician to be successful in such coordinated study and aptitude for discovering new truths and facts. A philosopher has to cultivate the faculty of intuition by means of yoga. He has to achieve purification of mind by freeing it from perversions, angularities and idols. Many among the scientists are also saints and live an astute life as pure as that of an ascetic. In the minds engaged in the search after Truth, pollution and blemishes cannot subsist, and in case they subsist, obstructions are bound to present themselves to obstruct the quest of Truth.

While the scientific observation is the pre-requisite for the search after Truth, the purity and one-pointedness of mind is the pre-condition of that search. In the scientific atmosphere of the modern times the examination and verification of the observed facts are to be pursued with requisite zeal. Science has inherited the legacy of philosophy and as such why should there be an impassable hiatus between the two? Philosophy can be a live pursuit and can reoccupy its primal place if right observation followed by examination, experiment and the application of Logic are brought to bear upon it in a harmonised way. The merits of the sciences of Epistemology and Logic would thus also receive their due appreciation and estimation.

QUESTIONS

Easy type question:

1. Write a critical essay on the contribution of Logicians to the Indian Logic.

Short questions:

1. Can you suggest some new possibilities in the field of Philosophy and Logic?
2. In which field have the Jainās contributed through non-absolutism?

Answer in one sentence:

1. Show the influence of Jaina Logic on other schools of thought (in points only).
2. What has been borrowed by the *Jaina* logicians from the *non-Jaina* systems?
3. How does the Theory of Relativity deal with the problems of heaviness and lightness?
4. What are the four categories of probans, which are the unique contribution of the Jainās?
5. Which philosophy rejects the self-validity of human experience and why?
6. Why do the Jainās accept the self-validity of human experience?
7. Which subjects fall under the suprasensuous perception?
8. Sum up in maxims the most urgent need and solid basis of philosophy.
9. How can we succeed in exposing the reactions manifested in the physical body?
10. Can you suggest the way to add new dimensions to the power of observation?

Reference Book:

Ācārya Mahāprajña - *New Dimension in Jaina Logic*; translated by Dr. Nathmal Tāṭiā

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LESSON 12

CHARACTERISTIC OF *PRAMĀṆA***The Definition of *Pramāṇa***

The following is the first aphorism of the work, which proposes to set forth the subject matter to be dealt with, the knowledge of which is a necessary condition of inspiring the volitional impulse of a man of intelligence towards the study of the work.

Now a critique of organs of knowledge

The word *atha* (now) means commencement and in the present context signifies that the treatment of organs of knowledge which are to be set forth in this work is being undertaken and thus by expounding the objective of the whole work serves to enlighten and induce intelligent readers to the study of it. Or, let the word *atha* stand for the idea of sequence. The meaning would thus become: organ of knowledge is being discussed subsequent to the treatment of Grammar (*śabda*), Poetics (*kāvya*) and Prosody (*chandas*). Understood in this sense the word (*atha*) serves to signify that this work is the product of the same author as that of Grammar, etc. Again, the word *atha*, though used in the sense of commencement, by the very fact of its phonetic value being apprehended, serves to promote well-being just as the sight of a garland of flowers, or a pitcher filled with water, though carried for some other purpose, does. The promotion of well-being eliminates obstructive demerits and thus leads to the completion of the work without a hitch and hearers are blessed with long life as a consequence. The author of the aphorisms has performed the auspicious ceremony of salutation of the five exalted beings called paramesthins, but he does not propose to incorporate it in the work for consideration of economy of labour.

That *pramāṇa* organ of knowledge is the most effective instrument of the determination *pramā* of the nature of reality follows from the analysis of the etymological meaning of its components. The prefix *pra* means 'in excellent form', i.e., to the exclusion of doubt and the like and *ma* means 'to determine' and the suffix *ṇa* means 'an instrument'. The meaning of the whole word *Pramāṇa* thus comes to be what is the most effective instrument of the determination of reality in its true character through the preliminary exclusion of doubt, error and indecision. *Mīmāṃsā* critique of its organ of knowledge consists in complete consideration of the subject matter by the method of enumeration and so on. The procedure of a scientific work is threefold, viz., enumeration, definition and examination. Among these, enumeration consists in the specification of bare names, and this very aphorism is an example of the same. Definition is the statement of the peculiar characteristic of the thing enumerated. It is again of two kinds, viz., general and specific. The immediately following aphorism is an instance of general definition. Specific definition has its illustration in the aphorism "That which is immediate and lucid is perceptual cognition." Classification is only a preliminary condition of specific definition and as such is not separately considered. Examination consists in the application of the logical tests to the thing defined in order to make out that the thing defined is of the nature affirmed and not otherwise. The third aphorism serves as its example.

The term *mīmāṃsā* critique means respectful discussion. It follows from this that dissertation on organ of knowledge alone is not undertaken in this work, but it also embraces the consideration of *nayas* partial glimpses which are parts of *pramāṇa* with their scope determined by means of exclusion of false *nayas*. As has been observed by the foremost Vācaka Umāsvāti: Acquisition of knowledge of ultimate truth is by means of *pramāṇās* and *nayās*. TS I 6. The work treats also of final emancipation *mokṣa* together with the means thereto and its opposites, it being the foremost among the ultimate values to be desired by mankind. The dissertation thus becomes entitled to respectful consideration owing to its comprehensive scope as specified

above. A dissertation on knowledge alone would on the other hand degenerate into a mere polemic since it is bound to resolve itself ultimately into the refutation of rival theories. If that dissertation on knowledge were the intention of the *Sūtrakāra* the introductory aphorism should have been worded as: Now an examination instead of critique of organ of knowledge. To sum up the result: The Master has chosen the word critique *mīmāṃsā* in order to make it understood that his objective is to deal with the problem of emancipation together with its means of realisation and its opposites, after a thorough evaluation of the objects of valid knowledge by means of *pramāṇās* and *nayās*.

Now he propounds the general definition of organ of knowledge *pramāṇa*—
An organ of knowledge is the authentic definitive cognition of an object. (II)

The expression 'organ of knowledge' specifies the thing to be defined. The rest is the definition. Definition consists in the predication of an unknown characteristic in respect of a known fact given as the subject. In the present context the subject is the substantive which is known as 'organ of knowledge' without dispute and of it the characteristic of being authentic definitive cognition of an object is predicated. Definition being a case of purely negative inference presupposes a subject, a probandum and a probans. The probans thereof is the character of being organ of knowledge'. There is nothing repugnant in the subject functioning as a probans, it stands to reason that where the individual is a subject, its relevant universal may serve as probans as in the following example: The smoke is coexistent with fire, since it has the character of being smoke just like the cases of smoke cognised before. The absence of a different kind of example does not detract from its probative force as the knowledge of the probandum is secured by internal concomitance alone. It will be shown in I.2.18 that the case is quite on a par with the syllogism: The living body is possessed of a soul because it is possessed of vital functions. The term 'definitive cognition' in the definition stands for a species of cognition which is devoid of the characteristic of doubt, indecision and indeterminate cognition. Thus the use of the term 'definitive cognition' serves to negate the character of organ of knowledge of sense-object contact as it is not a cognition and of doubt, etc., though they are included in the category of cognition.

The *artha* (object) is what is attained or aimed at by a cognition and it is placed under three heads viz. what is to be avoided, what is to be accepted and what is to be ignored, in as much as the avoidable is sought to be avoided, the acceptable is sought to be accepted and the ignorable is sought to be ignored. It cannot be contended that the ignorable should be subsumed under the avoidable on the ground of its being unfit for acceptance, since by similar logic its inclusion under the acceptable may also be a possibility being the opposite of the avoidable. On the contrary, the category of the ignorable constitutes a field of overwhelming importance so far as the ascetics are concerned the number of things ignored by them being far greater than that of what they seek to attain or to avoid. And even as regards men constituted like us, the magnitude of what is to be ignored far outweighs that of what is to be accepted and what is to be avoided. So it does not deserve to be left out of consideration. In the expression the definitive cognition of object' (*arthasya nirṇayaḥ*), the genitive case-ending in the original has the force of an objective case, as the object is directly accessible to cognition, the object being what is definitively cognised. The insertion of the term object in the definition is made for the sake of the exclusion of self-cognition, as we will show that though it is a fact it is not an exclusive characteristic.

The term *Samyak* authentic means what is not contrary to fact and is an indeclinable. Or, it may be a derivative of *ānc* with *sam* as its prefix. This is an adjective to definitive cognition; because it is this alone which is competent to be determined as authentic or unauthentic. As regards the object, it is neither authentic nor unauthentic by itself and so does not deserve this adjective to qualify it, since it lacks the conditions of possibility and contingency. The result of the qualification of definitive cognition of an object' by the adjective authentic is the exclusion of error. So this general definition of organ of knowledge is destitute of the faults of undesirable extension, non-inclusion and absurdity.

Now a problem is raised, 'cognition of its own self has also been propounded by the old masters as an element of the definition of organ of knowledge just like the cognition of an object. Compare the definitions:

organ of knowledge is the cognition which is of the nature of determination of self and an object' (TSV I 10 77). Nor is this sc. cognition of self unjustified, since in the introspection I know the jar and the like, the fact of cognition is as much revealed as a content as the elements of subject and object. It is not possible that the cognition of an object can happen to a subject who does not intuit the act of cognition. It cannot be supposed that the cognition of such an act is effected by a second cognition, since the later, too, being equally uncognised cannot amount to an intuition of the first cognition in question. If a third cognition is requisitioned for the purpose, it will lead to a regressus and infinitum the third being in the same situation with the second quâ uncognised will require a fourth and the fourth a fifth and so on if no cognition is supposed to be self-intuited. If the cognition of object, it will give rise to the fallacy of logical see-saw. This exposure of absurdity is sufficient to dismiss the attempt to account for such cognition by resort to negative implication, viz., the realisation of the object would not be possible unless there were a cognition of the same. The idea is that a thing can be known only by means of a cognition and not otherwise. The fact of knownness therefore implies the presence of cognition. The reason for rejection of the aforementioned hypothesis lies in the fact that implication being itself uncognised as the cause of cognition cannot possibly be a *causa cognoscendi* which it is admitted to be and as such should be believed to be self-intuitive. If again the first implication of the act of cognition be supposed to be cognised by another implication, the result will be either an infinite regress or a logical see-saw according as a series of implications is postulated or the first implication is made known by the second and vice versa and this makes the discomfiture of the opponent inevitable as before. Thus the conclusion is inescapable that as cognition is invariably felt as self regarding, it must be admitted that it is cognisant of its own self as well.

If cognition be an object of cognition, like a jar, it would become not-cognition i.e. would cease to be a cognition.

You cannot argue like that, since a cognition is felt as cognition just as the self is felt as self. Nor is there any logical absurdity in the fact that cognition is also cognisable, since it is a 'cognition' with reference to the object and cognisable with reference to its own self that is to say a cognition cognises its own self just as it does an object. There is no incompatibility in the situation just as there is none in the same person being a son and father with reference to his father and son. Nor can an incompatibility be alleged in the action of the self upon itself, since incompatibility cannot occur in a thing attested to be true by direct experience.

The fact of self-cognisance of a cognition can also be proved by inference. Cognition reveals an object only while it reveals itself, since it is revelatory just as a light. It ought not to be urged that a cognition being an object of revelation cannot logically function as an agent of revelation. For it is quite legitimate that it should be an agent of revelation by reason of effecting expulsion of ignorance and the like. It should not however, be contended that the rule propounded breaks down in the case of sense-organs, eye and the like which though revelatory are not self-revealed and so the probans revelatory is not necessarily concomitant with self-revelation. There is no break of the rule since it is not physical organs but their spiritual counterparts which are revelatory and they are self-revealed as a matter of necessity. And the truth of our contention is proved by the following syllogistic arguments: Consciousness is self-revealing, since it is cognition of an object; whatever is not self-revealing is not cognition of an object, for example a jar which is not cognition of an object as it is not self-revealing. Whatever is a cognition is independent of the service of another cognition for its own cognition, just as the last member of a series of cognitions of an object immediately preceding the cognition of another object is. The cognition of colour, etc., which is the subject matter of dispute is certainly a cognition and therefore must be independent for its own cognition. An entity for instance a jar, does not require another entity of the same genus or of a subordinate species for its revelation; a cognition is such an entity; therefore it does not require another cognition of the same genus or of a subordinate species for its own revelation.

A cognition, being an entity, must be liable to be revealed by another just like the jar.

No. The probans viz. being an entity is devoid of a logical sanction. The fact of being an entity has no

bearing upon its revelation by itself or by another. It is a question of ultimate fact which can be decided by the verdict of experience. The fact that a jar is revealed by another sc. cognition is not due to the fact that it is an entity but because it is other than cognition.

The opponent now drives home the conclusion that self-cognition, too, should be included in the definition of knowledge. Anticipating all this, he *sūtrakāra* observes as follows:

Self cognition, though unavoidably present, is not a necessary element of the defining characteristic, as it overlaps cases of erroneous cognition. (III)

By the expression 'though unavoidably present' the author approves of the opponent's contention. The meaning is this: It ought not to be urged that whatever attribute is present in a thing should be included in the definition of it, simply because it is present therein, but only that attribute which is absent from its opposite. Self-cognition, however, is common to such erroneous cognition as doubt and the like. There is not a single instance of cognition which is not ipso facto self cognised. Therefore, we have not propounded self-cognition as a defining characteristic. The old masters, however, introduced it with a view to its examination by first learners. Hence no fault in the definition. (III)

A fresh difficulty is being raised: if knowledge is to take note of what is already known, it would be as redundant as the act of grinding what has already been ground to dust. If this contingency is excepted to then a series for repeating cognition cognisant of the precognised object should also be accorded the status of valid knowledge. So let the definition be as follows: Cognition of an object previously uncognised is knowledge. And so also has it been propounded in the following definitions: A cognition which is of the nature of ascertainment of itself and an organ of a previously uncognised object is knowledge PMS, I. or simply as 'A cognition of an object unknown before.'

To meet the difficulty, the author remarks:

The cognition taking note of an object previously cognised does not lack the status of organ of knowledge exactly as the cognition which takes note of what is to be cognised in future. (IV)

This is the meaning which can be brought out as follows: Does the repudiation of the cognition of the cognised object have reference to the substance or a mode? If it is the mode which is referred to, then even the series of repeating cognitions cannot be alleged to take stock of the same precognised object, since the modes are momentary in duration. In that case what would be the necessity of incorporating this qualifying proviso for the exclusion of the contingency i.e. repeated cognition of the same object? If, on the other hand the repeating cognition in question be supposed to relate to the substance, that will also be an illegitimate position. Substance being the self same unity, being eternal irrespective of the modes occurring in it, does not admit of any variation in either state qua cognised before or to be cognised hereafter. So we do not see any reason for this distinctive treatment since the opponent cannot point to a distinguishing circumstance in the cognition of an object to be known hereafter on the basis of which it should be accorded the rank of organ of knowledge which is denied to the cognition of a recognised object. The Jaina cannot at any rate insist on the absence of previous cognition as a condition of valid knowledge. The commentator accordingly contends: Further, determinate perception, speculation and the rest are acknowledged to be valid instances of knowledge in spite of the fact that the succeeding cognition takes stock of what has been cognised by the preceding ones. It cannot be contended that these cognitions are conversant with different objects. If that were the case, the object of determinate perception would not be the object of speculation and the object of speculation would not be the object of judgment a contingency which would throw out of gear the whole apparatus of epistemology. It would not again be a sound contention to maintain that the cognitions under consideration are each conversant with an uncognised element furnished by the ever occurring change of modes. This would be tantamount to admission that no cognition is possessed of a content which is cognised before.

As regards recollection which is acknowledged to be an organ of knowledge, its essential character

consists in the cognition of a pre-cognised object. And even those, who assert recollection to be destitute of the status of an organ of knowledge, base their conclusion on the fact that it is not directly derived from an object and not on the fact that it is cognisant of the pre-cognised object. As has been observed by Jayānta Bhaṭṭa: That recollection has not the status of an organ of knowledge is not due to the fact that it is cognisant of a pre-cognised object. The reason for its invalidity, on the contrary, is found in its origination independent of an object."

Now he proposes to set forth the definitions of doubt, indecision and error which have been rebutted by the definition of an organ of knowledge:

Doubt is the cognition which refers to both the extremes with reference to an object which is not possessed of such dual character. (V)

The cognition, which fully touches both the opposite extremes with reference to an object which does not actually possess such a dual character, is designated as *samśaya* doubt in as much as the self, on its emergence, seems to retire into a perfectly supine state owing to the loss of vigil. For example, we may cite the case of the cognition "Whether it is a post or a human being", which arise on the apprehension, from a distance, of a tall object in darkness, when proofs either by way of confirmation or refutation are equally found to be wanting. The insertion of the qualifying adjunct with reference to an object which is not possessed of such a dual character is needed for the preclusion of the definition of doubt from overlapping such cases of cognition as take note of both the extremes in objects which are really possessed of such a dual nature. As instances of the later category we may cite such judgement as "The jar exists and does not exist" or "The self is both permanent and impermanent." (V)

A cognition which fails to take note of specific characteristic is (called) indecision. (VI)

A cognition which fails to grasp the specific characteristic of its object owing to distance, darkness and the like is called indecision, because it falls short of certitude delivering itself in the form "What may it be." And as regards indeterminate intuition arising at the first moment of sense object contact which is regarded by others so. Buddhists as perceptual knowledge, it is nothing but a case of indecision in as much as it also lacks consideration of specific characteristics. (VI) Error is cognition which definitely takes a thing to be what it is not (VII)

When a cognition has for its content a characteristic, which is actually wanting in the object concerned and still the object is definitely believed to be possessed of that very characteristic in pursuance of the cognition it the cognition is a case of error literally a contrary cognition, being the reverse of the objective fact. The following cases are examples of it. (1) The cognition of a substance which is sweet as bitter and such like cases owing to the disorder of bodily humours; (2) the cognition of one self-identical moon as two owing to the affection of the eye; (3) the cognition of trees, though actually fixed and stationary, as moving owing to the swift movement of a boat, (4) the cognition of firebrand and the like as circular, though they are non circular, on account of swift rotation by a person.

The consideration of the definition of organ of knowledge comes to an end here. (VII)

Let an organ of knowledge be as it is defined. but how is its validity determined-is it determined by itself or another? It cannot certainly be determined by itself. A cognition being self intuited should intuit itself as being cognition; pure and simple. It cannot be expected to take note of the element of authenticity which constitutes its validity. And so far as the intuited character of being cognition is concerned, it is shared in common with false knowledge. Moreover, if validity were self-intuited, there would occur no occasion of dispute among philosophers. Nor can its validity be supposed to be apprehended by some other cognition. The other cognition in question may be considered to be either (i) one which has for its object the self same object of the cognition the validity of which is under dispute or (2) a cognition which verifies it by taking note of its utility or (3) the cognition of an object which is invariably concomitant with the object of the former cognition.

All these possibilities, having, as they do a validity not self certified, are themselves undetermined in logical status and as such how can they be expected to determine the initial cognition, which leads to activity, as valid? And if these later cognitions have their validity self certified, what is the offence of the initial cognition, that should deprive it of the right of self validation? It has already been definitely asserted that validity of a cognition is not known by itself and if, on the other hand, it is supposed to be determined by an outsider sc. cognition, the result would be a regressus ad infinitum.

Determination of validity is either by itself or by some other (VIII)

Determination of validity is in some cases achieved by a cognition by itself. Such for instance is the habitual cognition of one's own palm induced by a repeated course of experience: or the direct intuition of results by verification afforded by such tests as the acts of bathing, drinking, immersion and alleviation of thirst and like processes. To be sure, in these cases there is no demand for further verification felt by a rational mind. By way of corroboration one may point the following analysis of a typical knowledge situation. in the first place, there is cognition of water; in the second place, there occurs, on the part of a person affected with heat and thirst, a volitional impulse towards it; in the third place, there is eventual attainment of the object; in the fourth place, the processes of bathing, drinking and so on take place; in the fifth place, there occurs cessation of heat and thirst. And this alone gives final satisfaction to the knowing subject. And he does not feel an urge for further scrutiny of his cognition of the cessation of heat and thirst. This establishes the conclusion that the validity of the cognition is self determined. As regards inference, however, the intuition of self validity in all its cases is quite obvious when all the possibility of doubt of the universal concomitance on which the inference is based being contingent has been entirely eliminated. For doubt is impossible when the inference is known to follow from a probans necessarily concomitant with the probandum. There cannot be cognition of a probans in the absence of the probans and a real probans cannot exist unrelated to its probandum.

On some occasions the intuition of validity is secured by means of an external datum. We may point for instance to the primal perceptual cognition unconfirmed by repeated experience. Since such cognition has not as yet been ascertained to stand in unfailing correspondence with the relevant object, its validity is determined by a subsequent confirmatory cognition of the same object, or by a cognition of its pragmatic consequences, or again by the cognition of an object invariably concomitant with it. As regards the latter, their validity is self-evident and so there is no loophole for the charge of infinite regress and the like.

As regards verbal knowledge its unfailing correspondence with the relevant object is not realisable by itself and so its validity is only determined by the external evidence furnished by verification and the like in those cases where the object of the verbal cognition is capable of being directly perceived. As regards the cases of verbal propositions that refer to an object which is not amenable to perception, their validity is determined, irrespective of verification on the ground of their having been delivered by a trustworthy person, on the analogy of his other statements regarding such perceivable facts as the eclipse of the planets, loss of an article, secret contents of a closed fist, whose authenticity has been attested by verification. Thus all the issues connected with the problem find a rational explanation in our view.

The *Naiyāyikās* assert that "The organ of knowledge is that which is the condition of the cognition of an object'. Now if the condition of the cognition of an object referred to in the definition be only an efficient condition other than what is propounded as material and non-material cause by the *Naiyāyika*, then the subject, the object and so on should also be regarded as having the characteristic of being an organ of valid knowledge', since this (i.e. the character of being an efficient condition) is the common attribute of all the conditions which are meant by the grammatical cases. If on the other hand, the term condition is taken to stand for the instrumental case as distinct from the subject, the object and so forth, then it should logically be considered to be an act of cognition and not a sense-organ or its contact with the object, etc.. Now that alone is the instrumental case of a cognition on the operation of which the object is immediately known. It is a fact that a cognition of an object does not occur even in the presence of such conditions as sense organ and its contact, if the conditioning

cognition is absent. The instrumental case is that which is the most efficient condition which is found to be immediately followed by the effect. If, on the contrary a condition which is remotely conducive to an effect is regarded as its instrument, then even such remote condition of the alertness of sense organs as partaking of a dish of curd would also lay claim to their recognition as such. The conclusion is thus irresistible that none but a cognition can be regarded as the organ of knowledge except by way of metaphor.

In another definition propounded as "That which is the instrument of authentic cognition is the organ of knowledge (NSa, p. 1) the insertion of the word instrument is intended for the exclusion of the subject and the object, and thus ends in proving that the organ of knowledge is none other than the instrumental case. Such being the case, the most effective condition is certainly none else than cognition, inasmuch as it is immediately followed by the effect and so that sc. cognition alone should be accepted as the organ of knowledge.

The Buddhists assert It is non discrepant cognition that is the organ of knowledge (PV.II 1). If the cognition referred to in the definition be regarded as indeterminate, it would not be capable of generating a pragmatic consequence. If you maintain that the definition is concerned with a conventional organ of knowledge, how can you establish its validity? The validity of indeterminate cognition has been supposed to be effected by a determinate cognition bringing up the rear which is capable of generating a pragmatic consequence. But this is exposed to the consequences of the maxim of decoration with borrowed ornaments. It stands to reason that the determinate cognition capable of pragmatic consequences should rather have its claim to validity recognised. The acceptance of this course would serve to eliminate the labour of resort to a roundabout procedure. Again, if determinate cognition were invalid, how could the activity inspired by it be as a matter of universal rule never incongruent with fact? If the congruence be accounted for on the ground of identification of the concept with the perceptum as is the case with the perceptual cognition of a person suffering from disorder of the eye then the congruence in question would be a factitious one resorted to by way of metaphor. So if the Buddhist is to intend natural, as opposed to factitious, validity as the defining characteristic of perceptual cognition, he must accept that it is determinate cognition that is the organ of knowledge. (VIII)

QUESTIONS

Essay type question:

1. Define an organ of knowledge. How its validity is determined? Answer comprehensively.
2. Define *pramāṇa* and different views on this subject.
3. What do you mean by *artha*?
4. Explain *mīmāṃsā* critique in detail.

5. Fill in the blanks

- i. The *artha* in what is attained or aimed at by a
- ii. The acceptable is sought to be and ignorable is sought to be
- iii. An organ of knowledge is the definitive of an object.
- iv. *Samyak* authentic means what is not to fact and is
- v. The exposure of is sufficient to dismiss the attempt to account for such by resorting to negative implication.
- vi. A cognition is felt as a just as the self is felt and
- vii. Cognition of an object not previously uncognized is
- viii. A cognition which fails to take note of specific character is called
- ix. That, which is the instrument of authentic cognition is the organ of

LESSON 13 - A

PRATYAKṢA PRAMĀṆA

In the previous lesson we learned about *Pramāṇa* i.e. the valid organ of knowledge. In this lesson we will discuss the type of *pramāṇa* not needed. Like the definition of *Pramāṇa* all the philosophies are also not unanimous regarding the number of *Pramāṇa*. So far as Jaina philosophy is concerned *pramāṇa* is divided in two categories, viz. *pratyakṣa* i.e. perception and *parokṣa* i.e. non-perception. As Ācārya Hemacandra says:

“The organ of knowledge is of two kinds”.¹
“(Namely,) Perceptual and Non-perceptual.”²

So far as the other philosophies are concerned they have different opinion regarding the number and name of *Pramāṇa*. For example the *Cārvāka* Philosophy maintains that perception is the only organ of valid knowledge and none else. The *Vaiśeṣika* philosophers contend that there are three such organs, viz., perception, inference and verbal testimony. The same applies to the *Sāṅkhya* Philosophy. The *Naiyāyika* Philosophy regards, the forth organ as comparison, in addition to the three above. The *Prabhākara*, one of the tradition of *Mīmāṃsaka*s, again accept the above four organs and add ‘presupposition’ as the fifth. The followers of Bhaṭṭa Kumārila, another tradition of *Mīmāṃsaka*s, accept ‘negation’ as an additional organ and thus assert six such organs in all.

Having made such division, the Jainās have contributed something new to the Indian logic. This is in the sense that except the Jaina philosophy, no other Indian philosophy accepts the aforesaid categories. Though the Buddhist philosophy also regards two types of valid organs of knowledge but they are not like the classification propounded by the Jainās. Whereas the Buddhist Philosophy regards the Jaina Philosophy regards two as perception and non-perception, perception and inference. The division made by Jaina logicians is not only unique but comprehensive also. It comprises all other categories of *Pramāṇa* accepted by other systems in one way or the other. The purpose of this lesson is only to discuss the first category of *Pramāṇa* i.e. perception with special reference to the Jaina philosophy.

The thing worth noticing here is that the division made by Jaina logicians not only comprises all the immediate and mediate organs of knowledge but thereby it also paves the path of non-absolutism in the field of logic. Like *Cārvāka*, Jaina logicians have not supported that Perception alone is the valid organ of knowledge. According to the adherents of *Cārvāka*, there is no other organ of knowledge than perception. In order to refute this position Ācārya Hemacandra comments in his book ‘*Pramāṇa-Mīmāṃsā*’ in the following manner:

“That there are organs of knowledge other than perception is proved by the realisation of determination, knowledge of other men’s thoughts, and negation.”³

Past experience based on its discrepancy and non-discrepancy with fact respectively helps in proving validity of reality.

The realisation of the distinction between valid and invalid cognitions, of another man’s thought, and negation of what transcends sense-intuition is not possible without the services of other organs of knowledge such as inference. The *Cārvāka* positivist is also found to determine at a subsequent time that some cognitions are valid and some invalid on the basis of their analogy to past based on experiences. Past experience which were found to be non-discrepant and discrepant with fact respectively according as they did correspond or failed to correspond with reality. It is not possible that a perceptual cognition, which derives its genesis from a datum available to the senses and which is incapable of taking cognisance of what has preceded and what will

follow, should have the capacity of discerning a characteristic that which is capable of determining the validity and invalidity of the individual cognitions occurring before and after. And even with regard to those specific cases of cognitions of which he has direct cognisance, the *Cārvāka* will not be in a position to determine the validity or invalidity of them to the satisfaction of an outsider. Hence it follows that he must have recourse to a different organ of knowledge which must be of the nature of inference and as such included under the head of non-perceptual cognition, which will enable him to determine the validity and invalidity of present cases of knowledge on the basis of their analogy to cases of knowledge found to be veridical and also to convince the outsider of the truth.

Moreover, a person who seeks to prove a fact which is not wanted to be known by anybody, certainly runs the risk of being ignored with contempt like a man who has gone out of his senses, since thereby he would act neither as a man of common sense nor as a philosopher. Neither again is it possible to have acquaintance with what is going on in other people's mind by means of perception. If, on the other hand, it is asserted that such acquaintance with another man's knowledge is achieved by the study of his outward activity, the validity of non-perceptual cognition is established against his own will.

The negation of the other world like hell and heaven etc. and the like can not capable of being asserted merely on the basis of perceptual intuition which has its jurisdiction only over what is present to the senses. The refuting *Cārvāka*, who finds no peace without the denial of life in the other world and so on, but still refuses to admit the validity of other organs of knowledge, reminds one of the conduct of a perverse child.

Furthermore, the validity of even perceptual cognition can be established only on the evidence of its unfailing correspondence with fact. It passes one's understanding why should the *Cārvāka* not acknowledge the validity of non-perceptual cognitions, arising either from verbal testimony or inference. The *Cārvāka* may contend that the invalidity of non-perceptual cognition is proved by the fact that there are also cases of such cognitions which are found to lack correspondence with fact. But this would lead to the denial of validity of every cognition inevitable, since even perceptual cognitions, arising from diseased vision and such like defects, are also found to be invalid and thus should throw doubt over perceptual cognition whole which is the only case of valid knowledge according to the *Cārvāka*. The result will be unrelieved skepticism, since neither perceptual cognition nor non-perceptual cognition, will have in dubious claim to validity. The *Cārvāka* might retort: Well, it is a case of simulated perception and not real perception. The invalidity of simulated perception does not prove the invalidity of the whole perceptual cognition itself. To this view of the *Cārvāka* the same could be applied to the non-perceptual cognition too quotes the Jaina Philosophers. Dharmakīrti also make similar observation.

"The validity of a perceptual cognition also is due to its necessary concomitance with an objective fact, i.e., its impossibility without the existence of a corresponding object and the two cases perceptual and non-perceptual cognitions are exactly similar, if necessary concomitance be the ground of this validity, which is also present in the case of non-perceptual cognition to assure its validity."

Though the number of organs of knowledge as set forth is endorsed by them, yet the Buddhists insist on regarding all non-perceptual cognitions as necessarily partaking of the nature of inference. But this is an untenable position. Verbal testimony and others are also organs of knowledge and it is impossible to include them under the head of inference. Of course, there is no logical aberration in the fact that one all-comprehensive organ of knowledge should include other such organs as particular instances. For instance, the sense-intuition, mental intuition introspection, self-intuition and the transcendent intuition of the yogins are all subsumed as species under the genus perceptual intuition; and recollection, recognition, inductive reasoning, inference and verbal testimony are included under non-perceptual cognition, since the definitions apply to all of them without exception. As for the specific definitions of recollection and so on, they will be seated in their proper places. As regards comparison which is regarded as a case of non-perceptual cognition by the *Nyāya* and the *Mīmāṃsā*

schools, it will be shown to be included under recognition, and as for presupposition believed to be an independent organ by the *Mīmāṃsā* school, that also will be shown to be subsumed under inference.

As regards the disputed cases, for example, negation, which is not regarded as an organ of knowledge at all, it will serve no purpose to show that it is included in or excluded from one of the accredited organs. Why should it be denied the status of an organ of knowledge? The answer is that it has no corresponding object. Why should it not have one? To this query Hemcaṇdra gives the reply:

“Since reality partakes of the nature of being and non-being (both), negation cannot have an object of its own.”⁴

It is absolutely unthinkable that the nature of reality should be exhausted exclusively by the element of being, as in that case all things would have all the possible characteristics and thus there would be no real diversity. Nor is it possible that reality should consist in the element of non-being alone, since that will result in denuding it of all character. In point of fact, a reality is made up of both being and non-being as its constitutive elements, since it has ‘being’ in respect of its own nature or existence and ‘non-being’ in respect of the nature of another and this is the invariable finding of all organs. Thus, for instance, it manifest, that a perceptual cognition determines its object by way of affirmation and negation in the following terms: It is certainly a surface of the ground and not a jar and the like, and this contradicts an additional object of the nature of pure non-being. What does then remain of the objective real with reference to which negation as an organ could function? Likewise, non-perceptual organs also invariably tend to take note of such a dual reality partaking of the nature of both being and non-being. The denial of this, on the contrary, would make the apprehension of mutually exclusive facts as their relevant objects impossible. Our position is endorsed by the following observation:

“That a positive real is determined as ‘this is exclusively of such and such a character’ is not capable of being understood without the concomitant cognisance of the negation of what is different from it.”

The *Mīmāṃsist* might contend: Well, let reality be accepted as partaking of the nature of both being and non-being, but that does not affect our position in the least, as we, too, have proved this very truth. Our contention is that only the positive element of being with which a sense-organ comes in contact is the province of perceptual cognitions and as regards the element of non-being, it cannot be so i.e., the object of sense-contact and sense-intuition. The latter i.e., non-being is consequently held to be cognised by a separate organ, viz, negation. How can then it be maintained that negation as an organ would have no object? Thus has it been observed by Kumārila:

“The judgment ‘a thing does not exist’ cannot be supposed to be generated by a sense-organ, since a sense-organ can have connection with the element of being alone for which it is competent. The negative judgment is due to a purely mental activity which comes into being after the presence of a real (sc. the locus of negation) is cognised and the relevant negation is recalled independently of all the aid of sense-organ.”

The contention of the *Mīmāṃsist* is not free from objections. If the element of non-being be not different from the element of being, why should it not be liable to apprehension by perceptual cognition like the latter. If, again, it is different, still it has to be admitted that the negata, viz., jar and the like are perceived when a locus, e.g., a plot of land is perceived as bereft of the non-being of jar and the like. It is a universal rule that the non-apprehension of the non-being of anything is necessarily concomitant with the apprehension of its being. Such being the case, the organ of negation if possible at all would necessarily follow in its wake and thus would not be able to dislodge (the cognition of) the negation. If the situation were otherwise, a perceptual cognition would invariably be erroneous, if it cognised a non-exclusive object as exclusive.

Furthermore, this so-called organ is nothing but a fiction being of the nature of the negation of five positive organs. And thus it is the reverse of cognition and as such how can it function as organ which is invariably of the nature of cognition? So it must be admitted that such organs as perceptual cognition and the

rest invariable take note of non-being while they are employed in apprehending the element of being which is somehow identical with the element of non-being. It follows, therefore, that negation as an organ has no object, since there is no such thing as pure non-being separate and distinct from the double nature of the real. The conclusion, therefore, stands that it cannot be an additional organ.

Meaning of the Word '*Pratyakṣa*' (Perception)

Perception is technically known as '*pratyakṣa*'. According to the Jainās the word *pratyakṣa* is derived from the word *akṣa*. *Akṣa* here means the consciousness, self or *jīva* that which knows all objects. But in all the other systems of Indian philosophy the word '*akṣa*' means *indriya* i.e. sense organ, and thus by *pratyakṣa* they understand the knowledge which is derived from the sense-organs.

Thus, in the view of the Jainā philosophers, the knowledge which is derived from the self is *pratyakṣa* (perception) while the knowledge derived from other sources along with the self is called *Parokṣa*. In this sense, the sensuous knowledge (*indriya jñāna*) is not *pratyakṣa*. But later on, to comprise the Jainā philosophers have accepted the knowledge produced by the sense-organs also as *pratyakṣa*. The former view is designated as *Mukhya Pratyakṣa*, i.e. transcendental perception, while the later is known as *Sāṃvryavahārīka Pratyakṣa*, i.e. empirical perception. This classification has been recognised first by Jinabhadra Gaṇī and later on accepted by all the Jainā Ācāryās. This is the reason why Hemacandra in his '*Pramāṇa-Mīmāṃsā*' says that '*akṣa*' means either the self or the sense organ. *Pratyakṣa*, therefore, means either the knowledge which arises from the self alone or that which arises from the sense organs. In this part of the lesson we are going to discuss in detail about the *Mukhya Pratyakṣa* i.e. transcendental perception.

The Definition of Perception

The Jainā logicians define perception as clear knowledge. Clarity is its specific quality. This is why Ācārya Akalaṅka (8th C. A.D.) says: '*pratyakṣam viśādam*', i.e., 'clarity is perception'. According to Ācārya Vidyānandī (777-840 A.D.), perception is the knowledge which is clear. Ācārya Mārikyaṇandī (993-1053 A.D.) and Ācārya Vāḍideva (1087-1170 A.D.) also hold perception as clear knowledge. In the view of Ācārya Hemacandra (1088-1172 A.D.) the definition of perception is not much different. He defines perception in the following manner: "Perceptual cognition is that which is 'immediate-cum-lucid'".⁵

Here, the question is natural to ask that what does the attribute 'immediate-cum-lucidity' mean? If it is supposed to mean the apprehension of its relevant object, that would make it applicable without distinguishing the perceptual from the non-perceptual cognition. Again, if it is considered to be transparent or self-enlightened, that would also not be a differentia, since to be enlightened is a common characteristic of all cognitions. Having kept this objection in view, Hemacandra defines it as follows: "'Immediacy-cum-lucidity' consists in either its independence of the services of another organ or in the apprehension of its content as 'this'".⁶

An organ such as 'the cognition of a linguistic symbol', or 'of the concomitant probans' other than the organ under consideration, is here referred to as 'another organ'. 'Immediacy-cum-lucidity' consists in its independence of such an organ. In other words, contrary to non-perceptual cognition such as verbal or inferential, perceptual cognition does not need another organ such as the cognition of the linguistic symbol or of a probans in order to be brought into being. This is one definition of 'immediacy-cum-lucidity'. The other definition is the apprehension of the object's content as 'this'. The apprehension of its content as 'this' by an authentic cognition as referring to a particular existent thing, also gives a clue to 'immediacy-cum-lucidity'. In this way it is quite clear that the 'immediacy-cum-lucidity' means the power of cognition which does not depend on any other organ and knows its object as it has been in its range.

Transcendental Perception

Keeping in view the twofold division of perceptual cognition as transcendental and empirical now the definition of transcendental perception is being proposed. The transcendental cognitions are three, viz.;

omniscience (*kevalajñāna*), clairvoyance (*avadhi*) and mind-reading (*Manah-paryavajñāna*). The first one is defined as follows:

Omniscience or Pure Cognition

“The full manifestation of the innate nature of a conscious self, emerging from the total cessation of all obstructive *karmas* (veils) is called transcendental or pure cognition.” The self has consciousness as its essence and is consequently luminous by its very nature. The manifestation of the self’s luminous nature, which is nothing but the self manifested, is called ‘*mukhya*’, that is transcendental perception. This is the supreme cognition just as the face is the supreme part of the body. It is characterized as ‘pure’ (*kevala*) in scriptures, since it is independent of the services of an external instrument such as sense-organs. It knows all objects and thus stands apart in a category of its own. The manifestation of the luminous being or the self, occurs when the obscuring karmic veils which cover the innate knowledge is totally removed. This removal is only possible by practising to saturation the three means: right vision, right knowledge and right conduct otherwise called ‘triple jewel’ (*ratnatraya*). For that, one needs to undergo a course of prolonged, unceasing and reverent practice of the ‘triple jewel’ along with unflagging meditation on an aspect of an entity conscious or unconscious, as laid down in the scripture, without change of object.

The question raised in this context is that how is it established that the nature of the self is luminous. The reply given is: firstly, the self is of luminous nature because its being is not subject to doubt. Nobody doubts ‘Do I exist or not’ and therefore the self is not non-existent. Secondly, the self is of luminous nature because it is the knower. Whatever is not of luminous nature, such as a jar for example, is not a knower. It is a fact that the self is a knower. Thirdly, the author of an act cannot be the object of that act. For example, there is a person named Mohan. He is the author of the act of going but he is never the object of it (going). Likewise the self is the author of the act of knowing and hence he cannot be its object. It means it is self-luminous. There is no need for it to be known by any other organ of knowledge.

One more question arises here is: If the self is luminous by nature, why should it be subject to obscuration? And if obscuration is possible, it must be subject to obscuration for all time. The reply is: It is observed that though luminous in nature, the moon, the sun and such other bodies are liable to be obscured by a veil of dust, by fog, by a patch of cloud and so on. The case of the self is exactly parallel to these, when it is found to be obscured by knowledge-obscuring *karmas* and the like. And the removal of the obscuration of the self is effected by the practice of prescribed courses of meditation and contemplation exactly as the obscuration of the sun, the moon and such other bodies is removed by a blast of wind. Here, it can be asked: Is there anything strange about the fact that an obscuration, having a definite origin, is liable to be removed by some means? But the obscuration of the self is not a historical event, being contemporary to it. The answer is: the fact of its origin is entirely irrelevant. The dross found in the ore of gold is as old as the gold, but still it is found to be removed by the action of an alkaline substance, or by calcination in a sealed vessel. Likewise, the removal of knowledge-obscuring *karmas*, though without beginning, can become a possibility by the repeated practice of the ‘triple jewel’ antidote.

Nor is it a sound objection to say ‘How can there be obscuration of a shapeless being like the self?’ The power of consciousness, although immaterial and shapeless, is seldom found to be affected by the consumption of alcohol, intoxicating drugs and fermented wild grains. So, the objection has no basis. Another doubt is: does the self undergo change by the action of the obscuring *karmas* and their opposites? For example, “both rainfall and sunshine leave the sky (pure space) unaffected but they produce their effects on a piece of leather.” If the self were like the leather, it would be impermanent and perishable; if, on the other hand, if it resembled space, it would be devoid of any change.” This absurdity would be inevitable if the eternity of the self were held to be only static (deprived of any change). In the Jaina view, the self is a variable constant and is of the nature of a continuum running through the succession of modes in which the cessation of the former

mode is related to the origination of the latter mode. On the contrary, the exercise of causal efficiency would be impossible in every way, if things were absolutely permanent or absolutely momentary, which are the respective positions of the *Vedāntist* and the Fluxist Buddhist. So Akalaṅka rightly remarks:

“Because until there is change in the cause, the effect can not come into being; on the other hand, to generate effect the cause has to remain in existence for sometime. The exercise of causal efficiency would be impossible in the theory of changeless eternity and of discontinuous flux, since it is a characteristic of entities which admit of sequence (krama) and non-sequence (akrama).”⁸

The determination of the reality of objects depends on the organs of knowledge. There is no proof in favour of transcendental cognition, or of a person possessed of it. The function of perceptual cognition is entirely restricted to such sensible objects as colour, taste, smell, etc., and hence, perception cannot have the capacity of extending to a suprasensible fact. Inference, too, cannot be of any help, since it unfailingly derives its origin from the concomitance of the probans and the probandum as observed by perceptual cognition. As regards the proof provided by authoritative texts, if they are believed to be the outcome of transcendental cognition, the argument would be a case of logical see saw, since, “transcendental perception cannot be established without scriptural authority and scriptural authority would not be valid without the former.”⁹ As for impersonal scriptures such as the *Vedās*, there is not a single sentence in it which would prove the position. There are of course such statements as the following:

“Though without hands and feet He moves fast and gets hold of things; He sees, though without eyes and hears, though without ears. He knows the whole universe and there is none to know Him. Him the Seers declare to be the supreme God—the Great One.”¹⁰ But the statement is of a parasitical nature or only praising and hence has no validity of its own. The other organs of knowledge again have absolutely no authority over the present issue. With this objection in view, Hemacandra says:

“The proof of transcendental perception follows from the proof of the necessity of the final state or consummation of the progressive development of knowledge and other grounds.”¹¹

The progressive development, that is to say, the realisation of degrees of excellence of knowledge must reach its consummation somewhere, since this is the way of all progress, as seen in the progress of magnitude. This argument proves that knowledge is hierarchical and that furnishes the proof of pure transcendent knowledge, since the proof of it is the same as that of magnitude. The mention of ‘other grounds’ in the aphorism stands for the following proofs. The objects, which are subtle (infra and suprasensible), interrupt and distant, are perceived by a person, since they are knowable, as in the case of a jar. This is one further proof. And there is another proof of this, found in the actual verification of astronomical knowledge which is unaccountable on any other hypothesis. Therefore it has been said: “If the knowledge of absolutely imperceptible things is not possible for a person, how can the verification of astronomical knowledge be accounted for? If you account for it on the basis of scripture, that furnishes another proof.”¹²

Furthermore, the opponent too must admit that the knowledge of past and other inconceivable objects is possible to some person when he asserts the following truth:

“The *Vedic* injunction makes known past, present, future, subtle, interrupt, distant and such like objects of which none of the sense organs is capable.”¹³ Were it not so, for whose sake would the *Vedās* assert things that are spread all over the three divisions of time? In the very act of such assertion, it presupposes a duly qualified person who is certainly capable of cognising the truths which hold good for the three divisions of time. Thus, it has truly been said:

“For whose sake does the *Vedās* declare truths which hold good for all the three divisions of time, if no person could comprehend them to be so, the obscuring veils being absolutely fixed and ineradicable?”¹⁴

Thus is proved the possibility of pure suprasensuous transcendental perception from the assertion of

facts spread over three divisions of time, which is otherwise inexplicable. Moreover, the very contents of scriptures, which are confirmed by verification afforded by perceptual and inferential knowledge, furnish the proof of the existence of a person cognisant of suprasensible reality. The doctrine of non-absolutism, which is the very subject-matter of scriptures, is found to be as well the same subject-matter of perceptual cognition and the like, and this constitutes its verification. To be explicit, the doctrine of non-absolutism is established by such indubitable proof as the argument, "Every thing exists in its own individuality, and does not exist in the individuality of another. Were it not so, every thing would be existent alike, and thus there would possibly be no individuality at all."¹⁵

The scripture also sets forth this truth, and thus indirectly sets forth the omniscience of the omniscient or *Arhat* who is also the author of the scripture. Hemacandra, too, has affirmed this in a hymn :

"I offer my homage to your instruction, so that the noose of evil predispositions may meet its destruction. It is by acknowledging the authenticity of this instruction we find ourselves in the position to realise the glory of your status as the Supreme Self."¹⁵

Though empirical perception cannot apprehend the existence of suprasensual intuition, the ascetics' intuition born of the force of meditation, is undoubtedly as cognisant of its own self as it is cognisant of an external object. And thus the transcendental perception is also proved by the evidence of perceptual intuition. Here, it has been considered by Kumārila, one of the Ācāryās of *Mīmāṃsā* philosophy, that, "The Lord of the world has these four perfections which are essential in his being, viz., knowledge, dispassion, power and righteousness." On the strength of this assertion, one may allow for omniscience in God and other divinities. But it is inconceivable in a human being, though endowed with learning and appropriate conduct. It has been verily contended by Kumārila: "The gods *Brāhmaṇa*, *Viṣṇu* and *Maheśvara*, of whom the *Vedās* are the external embodiment, may, for aught we know, be allowed to be omniscient. But how can omniscience of human being be asserted?" Yet, we can not deny omniscience in someone just on grounds of him being human. Omniscient is one who has experienced an unparalleled happiness; who is equally impartial in his dealings with friend and foe, gem and a blade of grass; who has burnt to cinders the destructive *karmas* by the fire of pure meditation (*śukla dhyāna*); who is capable of destroying the progress of ignorance of the entire living creatures by the attainment of transcendental knowledge which illuminates the whole order of both existent and non-existent facts falling within its ken; and finally, he who promulgates the path of righteousness. If, on the other hand, *Brāhmaṇa* and the rest are held to be free from the pollution of attachment and the like and are the perennial embodiment of knowledge and bliss, in that case, they can also be called omniscient. As Hemacandra himself has accepted elsewhere:

"Whatever be thy creed, whatever be thy role, whatever be thy personality and whatever be thy name, if alone, thou, O Lord, are free from the taint of all imperfections, I offer my obeisance to thee."¹⁶

Thus the possibility of transcendental perception has been established by means of positive proofs. It can also be established on account of the lack of contradictory proofs. Pleasure is self-evident and therefore no proof can challenge its being. Likewise, omniscience is established on account of the lack of well attested contradictory grounds. It means, there is no such valid organ of knowledge which is contrary to omniscience. If there is, what can it be? Perceptual cognition or some other organ? Perceptual cognition cannot furnish a contradiction, as it is limited. Moreover, it is confined only to sensuous objects, while transcendental perception alone is a suprasensuous record of positive truth. As it has been observed by Kumārila himself: "Our senses such as the visual organ apprehend what is present and is in relation with them."¹⁷

It may be argued that the contradiction is furnished by the perceptual cognition when it returns without finding such objects like omniscience. This argument may be true if it refers to a determinate sphere of space and time. If, on the contrary, it refers to the entire extent of space and time, it can not be effective without its direct cognition of the whole race of mankind spread over all the divisions of space and time. The admission

of such possibility alone would establish the position of the omniscient which we seek to prove. For once, it is not deemed possible that Jaiminī or any other person should have the capacity to have intuition of all places and times on the grounds of him being an ordinary human being, just like the man in the street. If on the other hand, the superiority of those persons is inferred on the grounds of their excellence of knowledge, why should not then a person having direct knowledge of all objects be inferred on those very grounds. Thus, neither perception nor lack of perception can be a proof contradictory of an omniscient.

Nor again can inference be deemed to afford a contradictory proof in respect of an omniscient person. There can possibly be no inference without knowledge of the subject. If this is allowed, the organ of such knowledge would contradict the finding of inference and thus would make the rise of such inference impossible. The contradictory inference might be put in the following syllogistic form: 'The person is not omniscient since he is a speaker, or a human being, just like the man in the street.' But this is an unsound argument. If the logical ground, viz., 'speaker' be interpreted as 'the speaker of a fact known by valid organ; it would be a case of contradictory reason since it will prove the very opposite conclusion inasmuch as the quality of being a speaker of such truth is possible only in an omniscient person. If again, 'the speaker' is meant to be the speaker of a fact which does not exist in reality, the argument would be a case of proving an admitted truth and not a new fact. It is admitted that a person who speaks what is contrary to the judgement of all organs of knowledge is not omniscient. It is common knowledge that the defects of the speaker's delivery diminishes in proportion to the growth of his knowledge. On the contrary, the excellence of the speaker is seen to grow with the progress of knowledge. This refutation of the logical ground, viz., 'being a speaker' would also serve to dismiss the validity of the other ground, viz., 'manhood'. If manhood is undefiled by attachment and the like, then it would prove the opposite of the intended conclusion. Without omniscience it is not possible that a person can come into possession of knowledge, dispassion and such like virtues. If the denial of omniscience is based upon manhood vitiated by such defects as attachment and the rest, it would be an instance of wasted labour as there is none to dispute its obvious truth. If the quality of manhood as such is put forward as a contradictory ground it is bound to fail, since the incompatibility of manhood with omniscience the opposite of what the opponent seeks to establish is a matter of doubt as has been shown above. It is the speaking of untruth which is incompatible with omniscience and the speaking of truth, on the contrary, a necessary result of such perfection. This also holds good of manhood when it is free from the moral and intellectual limitations.

Nor again can a scriptural text be said to be an invalid proof. If reliance is placed on uncreated impersonal scripture as regarded in *Vedic* tradition, it would be to no purpose as uncreated scripture does not exist. Were the *Vedās* to be regarded as uncreated revelation, still there would be no difficulty since there is no text which is found to contradict the existence of an omniscient. As regards the scripture, which owes its origin to an omniscient person, how can it be supposed to contradict the possibility of omniscience which is its very presupposition? The position is proved beyond the shadow of doubt by enough argument and there is no necessity of further elaboration. Pure intuition is not the only instance of transcendent intuition, but there are other varieties also.

Clairvoyance and Mind-reading

There are two more perceptual knowledges, viz; *Avadhi* and *Manah-paryavajñāna*.

"Owing to the variation of degrees of the cessation of obstructive veils, the transcendental cognition admits of two varieties: clairvoyance of limited extension and intuition of the modes of other minds."¹⁸

Omniscience occurs on the complete cessation of all possible veils. But when there is variation in degrees of this cessation of veil, that is to say when there are differences, qualitative and quantitative, in the subsidence and annihilation of these veils, there occur two varieties of supersensuous cognition: *avadhi* i.e. clairvoyance of varying range, and *Manah-paryavajñāna* i.e. intuition of the modes of other peoples' minds. Etymologically *avadhi* means 'limit' or 'that which is confined' and so it is said

“*Avadhi* is limited to objects having shape and colour.”¹⁵

Though *avadhi* means ‘limit’, the intuition that is determined by it is also called *avadhi*.

Kinds of *Avadhi*

This intuition is of two kinds: congenital and acquired by merit. Of these the first belongs to the inhabitants of heaven and hell, just as movement in the sky belongs to birds. The second variety is possible for men and lower animals.

The mind is a particular substance and its modes are the different changes of state emerging into acts of thought. The cognition of these states is called *Manah-paryavajñāna*, i.e. ‘knowledge of mental state. The cognition of external objects of thought is necessarily inferential in character derived as it is by necessary implication from the cognition of thoughts which are impossible without objects. As it has been said :

“The external object is known by inference.”¹⁹

Both *avadhi* and *Manah-paryavajñāna* are equally conditioned by the cessation and subsidence of karmic veils and have reference to material object having shape and colour. Then why should a difference be made between them ? In reply to this question is stated in the next aphorism.

“The difference of the two is due to variation in purity, scope, subject and object.”²⁰

Purity—the person possessing *avadhi* intuition cognises the mind-substances, but the person possessing the *Manah-paryavajñāna* intuition knows the selfsame objects in a more lucid form.

Scope—the scope of *avadhi* intuition varies from an extremely minute part of a finger (*angula*), i.e., about 3/4 of an inch, upto all the inhabited worlds. But the *Manah-paryavajñāna* intuition is confined to the sphere inhabited by human beings.

Subject—*avadhi* intuition is possible for living beings in all their four states, (viz., infernal, sub-human, human and godly) in the three different stages of spiritual progress, viz., restrained, unrestrained and partially-restrained-cum-partially-unrestrained. But *Manah-paryavajñāna* intuition is possible only for a human being possessed of self-restraint and of exalted conduct occupying any of the stages of spiritual perfection ranging from the 6th to the 12th *guṇasthāna*). Regarding these stages, it is possible only for those whose spiritual development is continually on the wax ; and with regard to the latter only those who are possessed of supernatural powers are entitled to this intuition and not any one else, and again it is possible only for a few and not all of them.

Object—the jurisdiction of *avadhi* intuition is limited to material objects with shape and colour and that again not covering all their modes; but that of *Manah-paryavajñāna* extends only to the mental states which are comparatively the infinitesimal part to the object of *avadhi* intuition.

This, in this lesson the first category of organs of knowledge i.e. perception has been dealt with partially. The half of the matter concerned would be dealt with in the II part of the lesson.

Notes

1. (Aph.)-“*Pramāṇam dvidhā*”-*Pramāṇa-Mīmāṃsā*; 1/9 (P.M.)
2. (Aph.)- “*Pratyakṣam Parokṣaṇica*”-Ibid; 1/10
3. (Aph.)- “*vyavasthānyadhīniṣedhānām siddheḥ pratyakṣetarapramāṇasiddhiḥ*” -Ibid; 1/11
4. (Aph.)- “*Bhāvābhāvātmakatvād vastuno nivīśayo’ bhāvaḥ*” - Ibid; 1/12
5. (Aph.)- “*viśādaḥ pratyakṣam*” Ibid; -1/13
6. (Aph.)- “*pramāṇāntarānapekṣedaritayā pratibhāṣo vā vaiśadyam*” Ibid; 1/10.
7. (Aph.)- “*tat sarvathāvaraṇavīlaye cetanasya svarūpāvīrbhāvo mukhyam kevalam*”- Ibid; 1/11.
8. Akalaṅka, *Laghīyastrāṭi*; II.1 -XV.

9. Vidyānāṇḍi, *Śloka-vārttika*; V.142 ad *sūtra*11.
10. *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣada (su)* U,III,19.
11. (Aph.) - “*prajñātiśayaviśrāntyādisiddhestatsiddhiḥ*”; P. - M. 1/16.
12. Anantavīrya, *Siddhiviniścaya* (Siv), p. 413 A.
13. Śābara *Śābarabhāṣya*, I. 1.2.
14. Anantavīrya, *Siddhiviniścaya* (Siv), p. 413 A.
15. Hemacandra, *Ayogavyavacchedikā*; 21.
16. Hemacandra, *Ayogavyavacchedikā*; 31.
17. *Śloka Vārtika* (S.V); *Sūtra* IV, V.84
18. (Aph.) - “*tattāratamyē ‘avadhiManah-paryāyau ca*” in; P. -M. - 1/18.
19. Jinabhadraṇī, *Viśeṣavyaśakabhāṣya Gāthā*; g.814.
20. (Aph.) - “*viśuddhikṣetrasvāmīviśayabhedāt tadbhedah*”, in P. - M.; 1/19.

Glossary

- a) *Guṇasthāna*: there are fourteen states of the soul with reference to the consideration of the purification of *karma*.

QUESTION

Essay type question:

1. Explain the theory of transcendental perception with special reference to the Jaina view.
or
Give arguments to prove omniscience

Short questions:

1. Write a commentary on the definition of *pratyakṣa* given by Hemacandra.
2. Give some arguments in favour of transcendental cognition.

Answer in one sentence:

1. Do the Jaina logicians already accept the sensuous perception as perceptual cognition ?
2. Who is the first Jaina logician who has given the name *sāṃvyaavahārika pratyakṣa* to ‘sense perception’?
3. How many knowledges come into the category of the transcendental perception ?
4. What is difference between the *avadhi* and *Manah-paryavajjhāna* intuition ?
5. Give one example of the *avadhi* intuition achieved by birth.
6. What do you understand by the word ‘immediacy’?
7. What do you understand by the word ‘lucidity’?
8. Give one argument to prove the self as luminous ?
9. Define *avadhi* according to Hemacandra ?
10. How does Hemacandra define the *Manah-paryavajjhāna* cognition ?

Reference Book:

Ācārya Hemacandra - *Pramāṇa-Mīmāṃsā* (A Critique of the Organs of Knowledge); translated by Prof. Satkarṇi Mukharji and Prof. Nathmal Tāṭiā.

Editor:

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LESSION 13 - B

THE THEORY OF PERCEPTION - II

There are two categories of perception in Jain philosophy, viz. transcendental and empirical as indicated previously. In this part we will discuss the later.

Empirical Perception

Ācārya Hemacandra defines it as follows:

“Empirical perception is conditioned by a sense and the mind and is of the nature of determinate perception (*avagraha*), speculation (*dhā*), perceptual judgement (*Avāya*) and retention (*dhāraṇā*).”¹

The ordinary cognition, which is obtained by normal means of the five senses and mind is called empirical perception or *sāṃvṃyavahārika pratyakṣa*. It involves several stages such as determinate perception, speculation etc. Determinate perception and the rest will be defined respectively later on. The cognition which consists of these varieties is said to be of the nature of the same. The phrase ‘of the nature of the same’ is employed to demonstrate the fact that determinate perception and the rest do not absolutely differ from one another, but the preceding variety only develops into the subsequent variety and thus all of them partake of the same essential nature. The term *sāṃvṃyavahārika* (rendered empirical) is derived from *sāṃvṃyavahāra* which means ‘authentic activity by way of positive and negative endeavour’, and thus the word *sāṃvṃyavahārika* comes to mean ‘cognition’, which leads to such activity as its result. The meaning of the phrase ‘conditioned by a sense and the mind’ is to be understood in both separate and collective reference. It is said to be, ‘conditioned by a sense’ when sense plays a major part and the mind exerts influence in its generation; and it is said to be ‘conditioned by the mind’ when it is generated by the mind alone endowed with a particular kind of purity.

Now, there is a query: self-cognition (*svasamvedana*) is a recognized variety of perceptual cognition. Why does the author omit its enumeration? The answer is: the objection cannot be advanced with justification in as much as the self-cognition relating to sense perception is included in sense-perception; the self-cognition of the perception of pleasure, pain etc, is conditioned by the mind and such is included in mental perception; the self-cognition of the transcendental perception of the ascetic is included in his transcendental perception; as regards the self-cognition of the acts of recollection and the like, it is nothing but mental perception; and since there is no additional variety of perception called self-cognition, it has not been stated as a separate kind of perception.

Sense have been referred to and the author now defines them.

(Aph.) The senses are touch, taste, smell, sight, ear having respectively for their characteristic the capacity of apprehending touch, taste, odour, coloured shape and sound. Each of these again is of two kinds, called substance and function. (XXI)

The senses of touch, etc., are respectively those having the characteristic of the capacity of apprehending touch and the rest. The proof is as follows: Cognitions of touch and the like must be conditioned by relevant instruments, since they are acts like the act of cutting. *Indriyās* (senses) are so called because they have been produced by *indra* which means *karman*, since the senses are brought into being by manifestation of *nāma-karma* as their condition. The reason for their being named *indriyās* may also be due to the fact that they are the distinguishing marks of the self which is designated by the name *Indra*. The senses serve as the organs of perception of objects for a self which is contaminated with *karman* and is thus unable to perceive things by itself.

(O) The cognition of an object by the self, generated as it is by a mark, viz., a sense, should be

regarded as inferential. Such being the case, the inference cannot arise if there be a lack of the knowledge of the mark. If the mark were to be known by another inference, the result would be a regressus ad infinitum. (A) The objection is baseless, since the senses qua (spiritual) functions are intuited by themselves and so the consequence of infinite regress has no *raison d'être*. Or (an alternative explanation may be given): The senses are the marks of the self and as such they afford proof of the self's existence. It is universally seen that an instrument (and the sense is an instrument), like the carpenter's axe, is operated by an agent.

The senses again are divided into two categories, viz., substance and function. Of these, the sense qua substance is caused by the manifestation of the corresponding *nāma-karma*. The senses qua functions are brought into being by the subsidence and destruction of the obscuring *karman* and obstructive *karman* frustrating the relevant capacity. The present aphorism is a conglomeration of five aphorisms, viz, the sense of touch has the capacity of apprehending touch as its characteristic', the sense of taste has the capacity of apprehending taste as its characteristic' etc. The place of honour (in the order of enumeration) has been assigned to the sense of touch since it is universally present in all living beings subject to transmigration and as it pervades the whole body. And the respective positions in the order of enumeration of the sense of taste, sight and hearing are due to their incidence in progressively decreasing number of embodied beings.

Of these the sense of touch is born from the subsidence and destruction of the corresponding veiling *karman* and is present in such immobile creatures as earth-bodied, water-bodied, fire-bodied and air-bodied beings, and plants, which have the remaining senses veiled by obscuring *karman*. The existence of these creatures is established by the statement of authoritative scripture as follows. The search-bodied being is stated to be animated with consciousness (DV, 4.1). It is established by inference also. Consciousness must reach its lowest limit of diminution in some soul, since it is a determination admitting of progressive diminution, like magnitude. Now, (the living beings) in which the lowest limit of diminution is reached are immobile one-sensed creatures. It cannot be legitimately urged that knowledge reaches its maximum diminution in burnt cinders since they lack even the sense of touch. There is absolute non-existence of consciousness in the latter and not a diminution of the same. And as magnitude which is seen to undergo diminution from the magnitude of space as its highest limit and reaches its maximum diminution in the atom, so also consciousness which is known to suffer diminution from its highest limit in perfect knowledge reaches its utmost culmination in one-sensed creatures. And it will be proved below that earth-bodied and the rest are living conscious beings. The two senses, viz, touch and taste, are present in such mobile creatures as Worms, Solecids (Vermes without lateral appendages), Annelids (ring-like vermes with unsegmented lateral appendages), Knotty-legged (*Anthropāda*), Conchifera, Pearl-mussel, helix, leeches and the like. The senses of touch, taste, and smell are present in ants (Formicidae) red-ants (*rohanikas*), bugs and flees (*upacikās*, *kunthūs*, *tubarakās*, *Hemiptera*, *Hemimetabola*), cucumber, cotton-weevils and lice (*Aptera*), centipeds, *ayenakās*, Plant-lice (*trīṇapatrās*), *kashaharakās* (Termites, white-ants), and the like. The sense of touch, taste, smell and sight are present in black-bees, *vataras* (Wasps), *sāraṅgas* (Hornets), flies, gnats, gadflies, mosquitoes, scorpions, spiders (*nandiyāvartas*), butterflies and moths (*kitakās*), grasshoppers and locusts (*patarigās*), etc. These (four) combined with the sense of hearing are present in fish, apodal reptiles, limbed reptiles and Batrachians, birds, quadruped brutes belonging to the groups of subhuman species and in men, gods and denizens of hell without exception.

(O) According to the philosophers of the *Sāṃkhya* school, there are five other organs, viz., the tongue, hands, feet, rectum and generative organ which are respectively the organs of speech, prehension, walking, evacuation and gratification. That being the case, why should the number of sense-organs be fixed at five only? (A) The question does not arise; only those which are the conditions of specific cognitions are treated of under the head of sense-organs in the present context. If the rank of sense-organs were accorded to them on the ground of their being instruments of particular varieties of physical action, the number of sense-organs would have to be extended indefinitely since no limit can be set to different kinds of action. It follows therefore from the specification of the individual senses that the number of sense-organs is only five (neither more nor less).

(As regards the relationship of these sense-organs) they can be regarded as mutually identical when viewed from the standpoint of substantial unity and can again be regarded as numerically different from one another if viewed from the standpoint of differential modes. If the identity (of the sense-organs) were absolute the consequence would be that the tactile organ could take cognisance of taste and the rest just as it does of touch. That again would make the postulation of other organs a superfluity. And further the perfection or partial defection of one would make the corresponding perfection and defection of others an inevitable consequence. And if, on the other hand, the mutual difference of these (organs) were absolute, they could not possibly co-operate in the generation of a synthetic judgement involving reference to the identity of the different sense-data (e.g. the judgement I see what I touch') as is seen to be the case with reference to the organs of different persons. This (synthetic judgement in question) cannot be set down to the causality of the mind since it cannot produce such (a cognition) without the aid of sense-organs. Nor should it be contended that the mind aided by the sense-organ is the cause of this synthetic reference, since the question would arise, why should not (the mind) produce (the result) aided by the sense-organs of other subjects. (The opponent may retort that the question does not arise) since there is no relation (between the mind of one person and the sense-organ of another). But what is the kind of relation in question, if it be anything else than identity with one substance? (The postulation of) any other kind of relation is (out of the question) since it is found to lack necessary concomitance (with synthetic judgement). The same (line of argument) would suffice to dismiss the theories of absolute difference and absolute identity of the senses with the self. If the senses were absolutely identical with the self, the former would function as the subject or the latter would function as the organs, or both would function in dual capacity, since there is no difference (in the relation of identity). If, on the other hand, the sense were absolutely different from the self, they could not be held to belong to the self as its organs, just as the senses of other subjects are not. Or, in the alternative, the reverse might be the case (i.e. the senses of A would be the senses of B and vice versa). It follows, therefore, that (the relation in question) should be accepted in terms of non-absolutist position (as neither absolutely different nor absolutely identical but both), which is endorsed by the verdict of experience which again is not liable to (be set aside by) an invalidating proof.

As regards (the relation of) the senses qua substance among one another and to the material atoms from which they are produced, it should also be understood in terms both of identity and difference from the same standpoint of non-absolutism, since the element of identity (of the senses) is intelligible in respect of the matter qua substance and the element of difference is intelligible (in respect of the same) qua modes.

The same (line of argument) would enable us to understand the dual relation of identity-cum-difference of the data of senses, e.g. touch and the rest qua substance and modes, as attested by experience uncontradicted by any other proof. It follows, therefore, that the datum of sense is neither a pure substance nor a pure mode, and this is corroborated by (the grammatical interpretation of the terms) *sparsā* and the like in the sense of object and act; (thus *sparsā* may mean an object of touch which is a substance and act qua touch which is a mode). (XXI)

It has been said (*sūtra* 21) that the senses are of two kinds, viz., as substance and function, and the author now propounds their respective definitions.

(Aph.) The sense qua substance is material atoms as possessed of definite shape. (XXII)

The singular number in the 'sense qua substance' has reference to the class character, the word 'definite' means 'specific' and relates to both internal and external (shape), and 'shape' means 'particular structural arrangement', and so the whole expression 'as possessed of definite shape' comes to mean (that) 'the atoms having a specific structural arrangement' (are the sense qua substance). The (atoms) are called *pudgala* because they are subject to accretion (*purāṇa*) and decomposition (*galana*). And they are possessed of the qualities of touch, taste, odour and colour. Thus, e.g., in the case of the auditory organ the external combination of the atoms in the shape of an ellipse and the internal combination of the same in the globular shape of a kadambaka

flower are both to be taken in their entirety as the sense qua substance and this is typical of the rest of the organs. The reason (of their being called substance) is that they are the same as the material substance. The term *dravya* in *Dravyendriya* (rendered sense qua substance) may in the alternative be taken to connote inferiority as it is found in the proposition 'Āṅgāramardaka is a *dravyācārya* (inferior teacher)'. So the expression *Dravyendriya* would mean 'an inferior sense-organ'. Its inferiority is due to the fact that even when it is in operation and the whole group of auxiliary conditions such as light, etc., are present intact, the cognition of touch and the like does not materialise without the arousal of the function-sense. (XXII)

(Aph.) The function-sense is (of two kinds, viz.) attainment and conscious activity. (XXIII)

'Attainment' means acquisition (of the manifestation of the sense-activity) which consists in the subsidence-cum-destruction of a particular kind of *karman* which obscures knowledge. Conscious activity is a particular modification of the self due to the former (i.e. attainment) owing to the presence of which the self is directed to the substance-sense-organ roused to activity. Here also the singular number in the expression 'function-sense-organ' has reference to the class. The word 'function' (*bhāva*) has the sense of (actual) pre-eminence. Just as the individual who is actually and not by way of metaphor in possession of the attribute of sovereignty (over gods and thus the predication of the attribute is not a case of false attribution by a rhetorical device) is called real functioning sovereign, so also (the changed state of the self) is called the real functioning sense when it is actually and not by way of metaphor in possession of the attributes of 'being a sign of this self' and the like.

Of these (two function-senses), the sense qua attainment generates the capacity of the self to apprehend a relevant object and thus comes to exercise the role of a function-sense. The competence of the self for the apprehension of its object is (called) attainment, (the acquisition of which is necessary in view of the fact that) the said apprehension is not produced in a substance which is constitutionally incompetent for the same, e.g. space which is incapable of developing conscious activity). The sense qua conscious activity again is of the nature of an activity in respect of the cognition of an object. (The postulation of this conscious activity as sense is necessitated by the consideration that) the sensing of touch and the like by the tactile sense, etc., is not capable of revealing its object touch and the like unless it is appropriated by the conscious activity of the self; (otherwise) the emergence of such cognition in deep sleep also would be an undeniable possibility.

(O) The conscious activity (of the self) employed upon the sense-apprehension of a relevant object is rather the result, and as such cannot be regarded as an organ (which is necessarily of the nature of a condition). (A) The objection does not apply to the case since (it is a general rule that certain) attributes of the cause follow into the effect. There is nothing repugnant in the fact that because fire has the quality of illuminating things, the light of the lamp and the like which are its effects should also have the capacity. Nor is it admitted that conscious activity is an organ in the same capacity in which it is the result which might involve a contradiction. It becomes an organ in the capacity of the efficientmost instrument and becomes the result in the capacity of an act (both of which characters are discernible in it.) (The matter becomes clear from the example of) a light which discharges the function of the efficientmost instrument in its character as an illuminator, and is the reflect in its character as the act of illumination, and plays the role of an agent on account of its independent status. And all this is not at all difficult to vindicate from the position of non absolutism and there is no necessity for further elaboration. (XXIII).

It has been said (in aphorism 20 that empirical intuition is) 'conditioned by the mind'. (And for its clarification the author now) proposes to give the definition of the mind.

(Aph.) The mind is the organ of apprehension of all objects (of all the senses). (XXIV)

All the objects (of all the senses) and not specifically determined such as touch is of the tactile sense-are apprehended by the mind and so it is called 'the organ of apprehension of all the objects'. It is also designated as 'non-sense' (an *indriya*) or 'not-sense' (no-*indriya*). If the aphorism were worded simply as 'the

mind is (cognisant of) all the objects', then this (definition of the mind) would also apply to the self, and so the phrase 'the organ of apprehension' (*grahanam*) has been inserted in order to emphasise the instrumental character (of the mind). And thus the definition does not extend to the self which is but the agent. That the mind is cognisant of all sense-objects is a matter of common knowledge. As has been observed by Umāsvāti, the foremost of the Vācakās—(The object of) scriptural (cognition) is (the object) of the mind (TS II 22). The term 'scriptural' though it stands for a cognition having objective reference, here stands for object. The term 'scriptural' is typical of sensuous cognition also. Thus it comes to mean that whatever is the object of sensuous and non-sensuous cognition is also the object of the mind. It has been observed by the Vācaka: "The sensuous and non-sensuous cognitions have for their scope (all) substances though not with all their modes." (TS I 27). And it follows from this statement of the Vācaka that sensuous and non-sensuous cognitions jointly are cognisant of all objects, and thus a fortiori the mind is also proved to be cognisant of all things.

The mind is also of two kinds, just like the five senses, according as it differs as substance and function. The mind qua substance is nothing but substantive matter transformed into it (viz. the mind substance). The mind qua function is the attainment (*labdhi*) consisting in the subsidence-cum-destruction of the relevant obscuring *karman* and the specific activation of the self apt to apprehend its object (*upayoga*). (XXIV)

(O) Well, the statement (of the etiology of sensuous cognition) 'it is conditioned by a sense and the mind' is extremely inadequate. Thus, for instance, visual cognition has for its additional conditions (the presence of) the object and light. As has been remarked "The (visual) cognition is produced by the coloured object, light, attention and visual organ (all combined), just as fire is produced by (the combination of) the lens, the solar ray and dried cow-dung." In answer to this, (the author) says:

(Aph.) The object and light are not the conditions of cognition, because of the lack of concomitance in difference between the two. (XXV)

The external object and light are not the direct cause of visual cognition, though it is not denied that they are remote conditions just as time, space and the like are. It is admitted that they are of direct service to the cause of subsidence-cum-destruction of the knowledge-obscuring *karman*, and also (of indirect service) by benefiting the visual organ like a collyrium-paint. (Q) But why should not they be held to be the direct cause (of the visual cognition)? The answer is: because there is no concomitance in difference between them. 'Certainly the method of agreement which consists in (the observation) that 'A' is followed by 'B' is not alone competent to determine the relation of cause and effect, but it must be supplemented by the method of difference which consists in (observing) that the absence of A is followed by the absence of B. But this (concomitance in difference) is not observed so as to ensure the causality of the object and light. For example, it is observed that the cognition of water takes place in mirage in the desert in spite of the absence of water in it and cats and the like have, notwithstanding the absence of light, perceptual cognition of objects in a place steeped in thick pall of darkness. And regarding the intuition of past and future events by ascetics, how can objects have any casual efficiency? (The admission of past and future events) exercising casual efficiency (which is a criterion of existence) as condition (of intuition) would on the contrary (invest them with existence and) make them cease to be past and future.

Nor can it be maintained that the capacity for illumination possessed by the illuminator is nothing but its individual being that is derived from the object to be illuminated since it is definitely observed that light, though not engendered from the jar and the like, does actually illuminate them. And how can the opponent (sic. *Naiyāyika* who believes sense-intuition to be generated by an objective datum) allege that the intuition of God, which is (believed to be) eternal, is generated by an object? And as regards ordinary human beings like us the theory that it is only the generator (of cognition) which can be the object of cognition would necessarily lead to the rejection of the validity of such organs of knowledge as memory and recognition. (the object of these cognitions is a past datum which cannot be supposed to exert its influence upon them as their generating

condition). Regarding the view (of the Buddhists) who maintain that an existent is absolutely momentary and that the cognitum is (necessarily) the generator (of the cognition in question, it would suffice to point out that) in this theory the cognition and its object which are supposed to be related as effect and cause respectively cannot possibly stand in the relation of cogniser and cognitum on account of their being separated by an interval of time. It may be maintained that the relation of cognitum and cogniser subsisting between cognition and its object is not anything distinct and different from the relation of causality unlike the relation between a pair of pincers and an iron ball, and this (position has been endorsed) by the argument of (Dharmakīrti), viz. "How can a thing occurring at a point of time different (from that of the cognition) be the object (of such a cognition)? The answer is that the philosophers who are conversant with the rationale (of the origin of knowledge) affirm that the character of being a cognitum consists in nothing but the causal efficiency of the object to imprint its likeness on the cognition concerned" (PV, III. 247). If that (be the true position), then the intuition of an omniscient would under no circumstance be supposed to be conversant with an object present at the time, in as much as a present datum (synchronizing with it) cannot be its cause and what is not a cause cannot be thought (ex hypothesis) to be the object of the cognition. The problem again deserves the serious consideration (of the opponent) as to how can a cognition exercise its self-intuitive function, that is to say, how can a cognition become its own cogniser ungenerated as it is by itself and how again can the self of a cognition be its object (though it is not its generator)? The conclusions that cognition and its object derive their existence from their own causes and stand in the relation of illuminator and illuminated just like the light of the lamp and the jar. And this knocks down the plea that the objective datum and light are the causal conditions of (perceptual) cognition.

(O) If a cognition be not causally conditioned by its object what will be the means of determining the relation of cognition and cognitum? The determination of this relation finds an easy explanation in the theory which holds that cognition is an effect and a copy of the object. (The opposite theory fails to explain) how can a cognition which is neither produced by nor is a copy of its object (have reference to that particular object) when (as a pure act of awareness without any intrinsic specific determination) it can unreservedly relate to all possible things. (A) The position is not so (desperate). That a cognition reveals a particular determinate object is due to the destruction-cum-subsidence of the relevant obscuring *karman*, which constitutes its specific competency and the relation of causality has no bearing upon it. The postulation of competency is, on the contrary, inevitable even in the theory of causality; otherwise there would be no explanation possible of the determination that a particular cognition is generated by a particular object though an infinite number of objects is present there (to any one of which it could be affiliated). As regards the sameness of structural form (of the cognition) it cannot be accounted for by the hypothesis that it is transferred by the object to the cognition concerned, as this would deprive the physical object of its own structure. And what again can be the kind of similarity between a physical object which possesses spatial dimension and a psychical act of cognition which lacks spatial dimension? And so (the similarity of structural form) must be understood to be nothing other than the transition (of consciousness as such) into the cognition of a particular object. And so the plea (of Dharmakīrti) "Consciousness is brought into relation with a physical object by means of structural similarity and never without it" (PV, III. 305) is bereft of all substance.

Further, let us consider whether the two factors (causality and structural similarity) are jointly or severally the conditions of (objective) cognition. If the later alternative (i.e., causality or structural similarity were determinant of the cognitive relation), then the parts of the jar in the first moment (of their origin) should be cognisant of the whole jar in the last moment, or, the moon's reflection in water should be cognition of the moon in the firmament, as (in the former case) the two phenomena stand in the relation of causality and (in the later case) structural similarity subsists (between the two). If both of them collectively (determined the same), then the jar in the subsequent moment should be held to be cognisant of the jar in the previous moment (the former being both an effect as well as a structural facsimile of the later). If it is held that the two factors operate

as the conditions of cognition only when they relate to states of cognition (and thus the alleged consequences are ruled out), then a subsequent cognition which is homogeneous with the immediately precedent cognition which generates it should be cognisant of the later. Thus (on the scrutiny of the opponent) we do not find anything else than competency to be the condition of cognition. (XXV)

It has been observed before that empirical perception consists of determinate perception *avagraha*, speculation (*īhā*), perceptual judgement (*avāya*), and retention *dhāraṇā*. In reference to this the author defines determinate perception and the rest through the succeeding aphorisms.

“Determinate perception is the cognition of the object, which follows indeterminate perception upon the contact of the sense-organ with an object”.²

The sense-organs, in brief, are of two kinds - the physical organ and the psychical function. (The detailed about the sense-organ has been given in the lesson No. of this paper.) The object is a composite of substance and modes. The ‘contact’ between them is a relation, which in the ultimate analysis passes through a sort of competency constituted by the situation of the object in a spatio-temporal context neither too far, nor too near, nor interrupted by an obstructive barrier. And this competency of the sense and object is specifically determined. For example, “one hears a word when it is in contact with the auditory organ but sees a colored shape even without contact and so on.” Indeterminate perception is the cognition of an object which leaves the specific determinations out of account and it takes place immediately on that very sense-object contact. The phrase, ‘which follows indeterminate perception’, serves to show the chronological order. This further elucidates the fact that indeterminate perceptions are the stuff which is transformed into determinate perception. It is a fact that nothing is produced which was absolutely non-existent and nothing absolutely existent suffers destruction. Thus, indeterminate perception itself undergoes transformation into the subsequent state (i.e. determinate perception). In the expression ‘the cognition of the object’, object stands for an entity which consists of substance and modes, capable of exercising causal efficiency, and ‘the cognition’ is to be understood as definitive cognition in pursuance of the wording of the general definition i.e. ‘authentic cognition’ which runs down to the present aphorism. So, determinate perception is not to be confused with mere indeterminate cognition or perception.

This determinate perception must not be held to be mental construction. Since it depends for its existence on the active exercise of the sense-organ such as sight and also because it is not liable to be corrected by discursive thought. A mental construction, on the other hand, is cancelled by discursive thought. But this determinate perception is not so, and consequently it cannot be a mental construction. The very determinate perception further converts into speculation. The author indicates this as follows:

“Speculation is the inquisitive pursuit of specific details in the perceived object”.³

On the determinate perception of an objective datum, for example a sound, there arises a doubt whether the sound emanates from a conch or a horn, and the mind is driven to consider the specific points of agreement and difference in the form of judgement - it is perceived as sweet and agreeable qualities which belong to the sound of a conch and not as harsh and shrill which are the qualities of the sound of horn. The mental urge as embodied in the aforementioned consideration is called speculation. It is absolutely certain that doubt arises in the interval between determinate perception and speculation even when the object is a matter of habitual perception. Its existence is not detected owing to the rapidity of the succession and it is not valid knowledge, since it is not fundamentally authentic and definitive cognition.

It will be stated later on that there is a species of non-perceptual organ of knowledge called *īhā* i.e. reasoning. What, then, is the difference between that reasoning and this speculation? Is it not repetition? In fact, reasoning is the organ competent for the realisation of universal concomitance (necessary relationship) between the probans and the probandum and has reference to all the three divisions of time i.e. past, present and future. The logicians affirm that the knower (subject) while apprehending the universal concomitance,

exercises this organ and appears to attain the level of supernatural intuition of an ascetic. But speculation confines itself only to the things existing in the present time and is a species of perceptual cognition. Thus, there is no room for the charge of repetition.

Though speculation is an effort, yet it is the effort of the conscious self and thus must be of the nature of cognition. Hence it has been considered as a species of perceptual cognition. One should not, however, think it invalid on the grounds that it regards its own subject-matter. If the lack of analogy with other instances of determinate cognition were the grounds of this allegation, the accepted instances of determinate cognition would be liable to be condemned as indeterminate in character on the grounds of difference from speculation.

“Perceptual judgement is the determination of the specific characteristic which was the object of speculation”.⁴

It means, perceptual judgement is the final determination of the specific characteristic regarding the object of speculation as illustrated by the proposition, ‘the sound must be of the conch and not of the horn’. Thus, here the knower takes the decision about the thing which came into speculation.

“Retention is the condition of memory”.⁵

The ‘condition’ is the causal stuff capable of change into the effect as ‘memory’ which consists in the recollection of a past event. It is nothing but the latent mental trace left over as legacy by previous experience. ‘Retention’ is thus, the continued existence of a cognition for an indefinite length of time which has been designated as numerable or innumerable (*samkhyeya* or *asamkhyeya*). The trinity consisting of determinate perception, speculation and perceptual judgement can exist for a period of time varying from a mathematical instant to a *muhūrta* (forty-eight minutes minus one instant).

The latent mental trace should be regarded as a species of cognition from the fact that it is a species of perceptual cognition. It must not, on the contrary, be supposed something else as has been done by *Vaiśeṣika* philosophy that it is different from cognition as such and so called by a different name i.e. *bhāvanā* (a sort of psychic leaven). If it were not cognition in character, it could not produce recollection which is a species of cognition. Certainly one kind of existence cannot be transformed into another opposite kind of existence. If, on the contrary, it were non-cognitive in nature, it could not possibly be an attribute of the self, since it is a fact that the characteristic of a conscious entity cannot be an unconscious one. Now, a problem that arises in this connection is that the older Jaina masters assert that absence of lapse is also retention. The following statement of the commentator Jinbhadra Gaṇī

“Absence of lapse is retention”⁶ is quoted in support. How then has it been stated in the aphorism that the condition of memory alone is retention? The answer is: It is quite true that there is such a thing as absence of lapse which is called retention. But this is included within the fold of perceptual judgement and for this reason it has not been separately mentioned. Perceptual judgement when protracted for a length of time is entitled ‘retention’ qua freedom from lapse. Moreover, freedom from lapse is also a condition of memory and in this sense it has been included under ‘retention’. It is positive that mere perceptual judgement bereft of absence of lapse does not give rise to recollection. Perceptual judgement, which is not subjected to attentive reflection is almost on the level of unheeded cases of perception as the touch of grass by a man in hurried motion and such case of cognition are not found to give rise to any recollection. Thus there is no room for complaint as this aphorism includes both ‘absence of lapse’ and ‘mental trace’ as the conditions of recollection. Although recollection itself has been affirmed to be a species of retention in authoritative texts, it has not been mentioned in the aphorism. Since it is an instance of non-perceptual knowledge and as such is not relevant to the present context. Here, in the present context, one should keep a clear idea of the fact that, there is somehow a thread of unity which runs through the different stages of perceptual cognitions, i.e. determinate perception and the rest in spite of their occurrence in succession. It is certain that the presence of contradictorily opposed attributes is an obstacle to the knowledge of identity; but such occurrence does not operate as an obstacle in

the case of an object which is apprehended by a valid organ of knowledge. It is a commonplace of experience that the self-same consciousness is felt to be vested with such apparently incompatible states as pleasure and pain and so on. How is it that the Buddhists who are famous for their horror of contradiction in the juxtaposition of opposite attributes, admit the validity of the unitary cognition of variegated carpet, with its obvious reference to unity and multiplicity of the same? And how do again the *Naiyāyikās* and their allies admit the possibility of a diversified colour? Upto now we have seen the concept of empirical perception in *Jaina* philosophy. Further we shall see it context of other Indian systems.

Naiyāyika View

The *Naiyāyikās* propound the definition of perceptual cognition in the following terms:

“The unerring cognition that is produced by sense-object contact (*sannikarṣa*) is perceptual and is both indeterminate (*nirvikalpa*) and determinate (*savikalpa*).”⁷ By this definition it becomes clear that in the view of *Naiyāyikās*, like the Jainās, cognition alone is perceptual and nothing else. But scholars like Trilocana and Vācaspati, the two commentators of *Nyāya* philosophy, have interpreted it differently from that of previous exponents. They contend that the definition of perceptual cognition is summed up in the clause, “That unerring cognition which is produced by sense-object contact is perceptual”, and the rest is only elaboration. According to them it does not matter if the instrument of knowledge is of the nature of cognition or different from it. Thus, in the view of the latter *Naiyāyikās*, instrument is perception rather than cognition. Now the cognition resulting from it is possibly of two kinds, indeterminate and determinate. The statement of the classification in the aphorism as indeterminate and determinate is intended to bring home the fact that instruments of both cognitions are to be regarded as organs of knowledge.

But to recognise sense-object contact, which is not cognitive, as organ of knowledge is extremely unjustifiable. Because sense-object contact and the like do not play their role as the efficientmost instruments of the determination of object, lacking as they are in necessary concomitance, since the cognition of object fails to materialise in spite of the sense-object contact being present and seen to emerge into being only when there is cognition at the back of it. An instrument is what is actually that which is the efficientmost condition and immediately produces the effect.

Again, the sense-object contact is something different from the aptitude of the sense-organ and is deemed to be of the nature of relation like close contact (*saṃyoga*). Then certainly no such contact with the object is possible for the organ of sight which acts from distance, aloof and out of contact. It is a matter of observation that things are perceived by sight even when they are interrupted by such transparent media as glass, mica and lens. If the *Naiyāyikās* contend that the organ of sight is an instrument and as such it can work only in close contact like other instruments such as the carpenter’s axe, it can be easily refuted by presenting the case of the magnetic stone which attracts iron, though out of touch with it. This shows that the concomitance in question is not universal. It is not possible to suppose that there is an actual contact between them in the shape of contact-cum-contact (*saṃveta saṃyoga*) through a medium, e.g., A is in contact with B and B with C and so A is in mediate contact with C. In the present case, the magnet may be supposed to be indirectly in contact with iron through the space which connects both at the two ends. Such indirect relation is available everywhere even as between facts which do not stand in causal connection.

Buddhist View

The Buddhist again have propounded the definition of ‘perceptual’ in the proposition:

“Perceptual cognition is that which is free from conceptual construction (imagination) and is not erroneous.”⁸

The imagination is a cognition, the contents of which are liable to be associated with verbal expressions. And the cognition which is deprived of such conceptual construction is to be understood as the meaning of the clause 'which is free from conceptual construction'. According to the Jainās, this definition of an organ of knowledge is irrational, since it has no bearing upon practical activity. In fact, philosophers make definitions of knowledge as an organ, with the sole object in view that the person, desirous of practical advantages, may be directed to the object which serves his purpose and be saved from disappointment. The labour involved in the philosophical examination of the definition, which is devoid of all practical consequences, is as meaningless as the speculation regarding the existence or not of the teeth of a crow. If, on the other hand, the practical activity is supposed to be conditioned by determinate knowledge which occurs subsequently to the indeterminate cognition, the consideration of equity would rather make it inevitable that all validity should be set down to the credit of determinate cognition. Thus, postulation of indeterminate cognition has no meaning.

Mīmāṃsaka view

The followers of *Mīmāṃsā* philosophy, do not directly give the definition of perception. Indirectly they define it in the following terms:

"The cognition which is engendered in the mind of a person upon the actual contact of sense-organs (*satsamprayoge*) is perceptual."⁹

This definition is too wide inasmuch as it overlaps such cognitions as 'doubt' and 'illusion' which also occur as the result of sense-contact and thus should, in terms of the definition, be accepted as instances of perceptual cognition. If the terms 'actual contact' are interpreted as 'contact with the actually existent thing', it will lead to the exclusion of the cases of hallucination, which have no relation with reality. It will fail to exclude doubt and illusion which are based upon real data. Again, if the phrase 'upon actual contact' (*satsamprayoge*), is interpreted as 'upon the happening of the contact as an antecedent event' (*sati samprayoge*) the prefix '*sam*' (actual) in the term *samprayoga* (contact) may be deemed competent for the exclusion of doubt and illusion. And exactly this has been proposed by Ācārya Kumārila (7 c. A.D.) in the following:

"The prefix '*sam*' (actual) has the sense 'authentic' and thus serves to avoid the cases of defective contact. Thus for instance, the contact with a shell, which gives rise to the visual perception of silver, is prohibited since it is vitiated by a defect."¹⁰

Here the objection is: the authenticity of contact is a suprasensuous fact and so cannot be known by perceptual cognition. It must be known only by inference based on the effect. The effect here is perceptual cognition and certainly it is not competent to produce the assurance of the authenticity of the contact unless it is qualified by a restricting adjective. But as the definition stands, there is no such word present in it as can be understood as its qualifying adjective. The term *satsamprayoge*, i.e., 'on the actual contact', should be analysed as *sat samprayoge* i.e., 'on the contact with actually present objects' and this would serve to exclude subjective objectless cognition.

Ācārya Sabara (1 c. B.C.) seeks to make out the definition free from all faults and interprets the changed definition thus:

"The cognition generated in a person upon the actual contact of the sense-organ with the fact which is the object of resulting cognition is authentic perception; on the contrary, the cognition of an object different from that with which the sense is in contact is not authentic perception."¹¹

But this also does not serve the purpose, since it fails to remove the possibility of its extension to doubt. In doubt, the sense is certainly in contact with the objective datum which is the object of the resulting cognition. Though doubt is a cognition of two objects, it is a fact that the sense is in contact with one of the

objects concerned. Doubt being cognizant of two alternative objects, it is absolutely positive that it has for its object that very fact with which the sense, say sight, is in actual contact. Thus the definition fails to avoid its unwarranted extension. The definition again lies exposed to the charge of being too narrow, since it fails to include visual perception which is not the result of sense-contact. That the organ of sight function independently of actual contact with the object has been established before in the first part of this lesson.

***Sāṃkhya* view**

The older exponents of *Sāṃkhya* philosophy define perceptual cognition to be a modification of the sense-organ, such as the organ of hearing, and to be indeterminate. The sense-organs, whether it is the organ of hearing or any other, are devoid of consciousness and therefore a modification of such organs must be devoid of consciousness. How then can such modification serve as an organ of knowledge? If, on the other hand, it is assumed to derive its conscient character from its association with a conscious principle (i.e. self), it stands to reason that the status of an organ of knowledge should rather be accorded to the conscious self. Moreover, there is no evidence to prove that indeterminate cognition is an organ of knowledge. This definition under review is thus found to be meaningless.

Ācārya Īśvarakṛṣṇa, the author of *Sāṃkhyakārikā*, propounds the definition of perception in this way: **“Perception is the determinate cognition of its specific object.”¹²**

This also is not a proper definition on account of its undue extension to inference. It may, however, be contended that the word “*prati*” (rendered specific) here stands for ‘position in the front’ and thus perception is the determinate cognition of an object standing in front. But this also is on the same level with inference. Just as the perception ‘this is a table’, refers to the object present in the front, so also the inference ‘this hill is possessed of fire’ has reference to an object standing in front and thus there would be no difference between perception and inference. It may be held that determinate cognition of an object in the front of the subject, as distinguished from inference is to be understood as perceptual cognition. But in that case there would be no necessity of setting forth the definition of perception as the proposed definition would be automatically known by virtue of its mere difference from the definitions of verbal and inferential cognition.

Thus, it is quite clear on logical grounds that all the above definitions propounded by other than the Jainās are vitiated by some defect or other while the definition of perception proposed by Jainās, i.e., “That which is immediate and lucid is perceptual cognition” is the only possible definition which seems flawless.

Notes:

1. (Aph.) - “*indriya manonimitto'vagrahehāvāyadhāraṇātmā Sāṃvyaavahārikam*”; Ibid 1/20
2. (Aph.) - “*akṣārthayoge darśanānantaramarthagrahaṇamavagrah*”; Ibid; 1/26.
3. (Aph.) - “*Avagrhitaviśeṣākāṅkṣaṇamīhā*” Ibid; 1/27
4. (Aph.) - “*īhitaviśeṣanirṇayo'vāyah*”; Ibid; 1/28.
5. (Aph.) - “*smṛtiheturdhāraṇā*”; Ibid; 1/29.
6. Jinabhadra Gaṇī, *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya*; 180
7. Akṣapāda, *Nyāyasūtra*; I.4
8. *Nyāyabindu*; 1.4
9. Jaiminīn *Jaiminisūtra*; I - 1.4
10. *Śloka Vārtika Sv*, (Sū 4, 38-9)
11. *Sabara*, *Sabarabhāṣya*; I.1.5
12. “*pratiṣayādhyavasāyah*.” *Sāṃkhya Kārikā*

QUESTIONS

Essay type question :

1. Describe comparatively the theory of empirical perception.

Short questions:

1. How does the Jaina view on the empirical perception differ from that of the other Indian systems?
2. What is the difference between the view of the Jainās and that of the *Naiyāyikās* as far as the definition of empirical perception is concerned?

Answer in one sentence:

1. Define 'empirical perception' in the view of Hemacandra.
2. Define 'determinate perception'.
3. How does speculation differ from doubt?
4. 'Perceptual judgement causes retention'. Do you agree with this statement?
5. How long can retention last?
6. What is 'perception' in the view of Buddhist philosophers?
7. Can you define 'perceptual cognition' according to the older *Sāṃkhya*s?
8. How do the followers of Jaimini define 'perceptual cognition'?
9. Why don't the Jainās agree with the *Vaiśeṣika* view of perception?
10. What does the word '*sannikarṣa*' mean to you?

Reference Books:

Pramāṇa-Mīmāṃsā (Critique of organ of knowledge) - By Hemacandra
Translated by Prof. Satkarṇi Mukharjī and Prof. Nathamal Tāṭiā

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LESSON 14

INDIRECT PRAMĀṆA

(Recollection, Recognition, Inductive Reasoning and Verbal Testimony)

Of the two-fold organ of knowledge, which consists of 'perceptual' (*pratyakṣa*) and 'non-perceptual' (*parokṣa*) varieties, the 'perceptual' has been defined. Now Ācārya Hemacandra proposes the definition of the non-perceptual variety as follows:

"The non-perceptual is that which lacks immediacy-cum lucidity."¹

A more complete definition would be: "The non-perceptual organ of knowledge is the authentic definitive cognition lacking immediacy-cum-lucidity."

Sub-divisions of the Non-perceptual Organ

"The varieties of the same (non-perceptual cognition) are recollection (*smṛti*), recognition (*pratyabhijñāna*), inductive reasoning (*ukhā*), inference (*anumāna*) and verbal testimony (*āgama*)."²

These are varieties of non-perceptual cognition and not independent organs, since the latter alternative would involve contradiction of the number of valid organs of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) as stated in the aphorism 1/1/10. In the Jaina view, there are only two valid organs of knowledge, viz. perception and non-perception. Here it is quite natural to ask: Why should not recollection and the rest be affirmed as independent organs? The answer is: The types of cognition, which are comprehended by the definition of non-perceptual cognition, cannot be regarded as different and distinct from non-perceptual cognition as an organ. Just as the types of perception viz., sense perception, mental perception and transcendental perception, which are comprehended within the definition of 'perception' according to the Buddhists, are not regarded as separate from perception. Likewise, recollection and the rests which fall within the purview of the definition of non-perceptual cognition, ought not to be regarded as standing in conflict with the number of fundamental organs of knowledge.

In this lesson we shall discuss all the varieties of non-perceptual cognition except 'inference' which will be dealt with in the subsequent lesson.

1. Recollection (*Smṛti*)

Memory or recollection also comes under organ of knowledge because with the help of which many more monks or done.

"Recollection is the cognition which has for its condition the stimulation of memory-impression and which refers to its content through the pronoun 'that'.³

A memory-impression is the disposition deposited by past experience. Its 'stimulation' means its emergency to the surface of consciousness. The clause 'which has for its condition'... etc., means that the emergence of recollection is necessarily conditioned by stimulation. It is apparent from the remark "A disposition can persist for a length of time which may be numerable (*saṃkhyeya*) or innumerable (*asaṃkhyeya*)."⁴ It means that a disposition, though it may have continued for a great length of time, does not operate as the cause of memory unless it is roused by a stimulus. When, however, the requisite conditions such as the destruction-cum-subsidence (*kṣayopasāma*) of the obstructive *karmic* veils, observation of similar objects and the like are at work to bring it to maturation, they produce recollection. This is what is meant by "which has for its condition the stimulation of a memory impression." The clause "which refers to its content through the pronoun 'that'" is inserted for setting forth its mode of deliverance. The word '*that*' indicates that recollection is always related to the object experienced in the past." It means that whenever we memorise something, that would never be present in front of us.

Recollection is an organ of knowledge since it is never found to be discrepant with a fact. This is further attested by successful activities such as search for things deposited by one own self. But how can recollection be an organ of knowledge when it is not cognizant of the object perceived at the present, thus lacking an objective basis? This charge is obviously not true because recollection is certainly possessed of an object that has been experienced in the past. The reality of the object, and not its actually felt presence, is the condition of validity of cognition. If it is contended, on the analogy of perception, that the object must be felt at present so that the cognition may be valid otherwise, the charge will equally apply to the perceptual cognition of a mystic since it is found to lack the criterion of referring to the fact that has been experienced in the past. On the other hand, if revelation of the relevant object is the criterion of validity, it is found to be equally present in the case of memory. But how can an absent object be the generating condition of recollection? Hence, it can not lay claim to validity as it is not generated by an object. The doubt raised has no substance so far as the theory of causation is concerned. Thus, for instance, light which comes into being by the operation of its own conditions reveals the objects, jar and the like, if it is brought into existence by its requisite conditions, viz., sense organ or the obscuring karmic veil. The statement, "Nothing is caused which is not followed in agreement and in difference by an event and nothing is the object which is not the cause of its cognition" is only nonsensical utterance, since there is no dispute regarding the validity of the mystic's intuition of past and unborn objects, though it is not generated by the latter. Moreover, if recollection is convicted of invalidity, one must be prepared to repudiate the validity of inference, since there is no possibility of inference being realized unless recollection has already taken note of the necessary concomitance. It is universally accepted by all logicians that inference is conditioned by apprehension of the probans and recollection of its necessary concomitance with the probandum. It is established, therefore, that recollection is to be accepted as an organ of knowledge, as otherwise the validity of inference would become unaccountable.

2. Recognition (*Pratyabhijñāna*)

Recognition is also a new category of knowledge. It has been defined as follows:

"Recognition is the synthetic judgement born of observation and recollection as typified by such forms as 'that necessarily is it' (judgement of identity), 'it is like that' (judgement of similarity), 'that is dissimilar to that' (judgement of dissimilarity), 'this is different from that' (judgement of difference), and the like."⁵

Observation is perceptual cognition. Recollection is an act of memory. These two, separately and jointly, are the condition of recognition which is a kind of synthetic judgement. *Hemacandra* exhibits the form in which it delivers judgement. For example, all judgements as 'this is necessarily that jar' 'this is necessarily that cloth', 'this is necessarily that water pot', are the cases of judgement of identity; 'this is like that', e.g., 'the cow is like the *gavaya*' is a judgement of similarity. The judgement of dissimilarity, viz., 'This is dissimilar to that' is illustrated by the proposition 'the buffalo is different from the cow. As for the judgement of difference, it is exemplified in the following: 'this is lesser than, greater than, further than, nearer than that', etc. The employment of the words 'and the like' in the aphorism is for the inclusion of such cases as the following:

"Know that *Mohan* is shaggy all over the body, has protruding teeth, is swarthy, dwarfish, possessed of broad eyes and snub nose. The swan is an aquatic fowl which is capable of separating milk from water in a solution. The bee is an insect possessed of six feet. The seven-leaved tree is to be known by the learned as one that possesses an odd number of leaves in each stem. A jewel with five colours is called multicoloured" etc.

When, on hearing such descriptions, one finds out *Mohan*, swan and the rest, and vouches them for the objects as described, all these instances of synthetic judgment are to be classed under 'recognition', since they satisfy the terms of the definition, being generated by observation and recollection. The following is also an instance in point. Suppose a northerner happens to censure a camel in the following terms:

"Cursed be the camel, the worst of the brutes, with its long crooked neck with its elongated upper lip with ugly disposition of limbs, addicted as it is to feeding on hard and sharp bramble."

Suppose a southerner who has heard all this, and happens to see, on a visit to North India a thing of the above description, he would naturally judge, "the object ahead is certainly what is meant by the word 'camel'." Now this synthetic judgement is to be accepted as a case of recognition, since it is derived from observation and recollection as its conditions.

Now, the things noticeable here is that those philosophers who acknowledge a judgement of similarity to be an independent organ called 'comparison', they have to accept judgements of dissimilarity and the rest as separate cognitive organs. As *Akalanika* remarks:

"Comparison is regarded as the organ of knowledge of the relation of similarity to a known object. If so, why is cognition of the name-relation based on diversity not regarded as a separate organ of knowledge?"

"Moreover, the following judgements, on the basis of the relation between perceived data, should be regarded as independent organs also: this is lesser, greater, further, nearer, taller or otherwise than the other."⁶

If however, the term 'similarity' is regarded as a typical illustration and not an exhaustive enumeration, or if the *Naiyāyikās* and *Vaiśeṣikās* resort to the stratagem of splitting the aphorism in order to add the predicate 'dissimilarity' in a resultant one, this procedure will show that the author of the aphorism is an unskilled craftsman, since his aphorism is found to lack the essential characteristics of an aphorism. As it has been observed.

"Those who are acquainted with the nature of an aphorism lay it down that this is one which consists of the minimum of syllables, is indubious in significance, states only the essential elements, is comprehensive of all issues, is devoid of excess, and is not liable to censure."

The scholiast records the objections of the *Buddhists* who deny that recognition is a unitary cognition, far less an organ. The *Buddhists* observe: "We do not find any phenomenon called recognition, which is given out as a separate organ, as anything different from the low cognitive acts, viz., recollection, indicated by the word 'that' and perception indicated by 'this'," is certainly not a sound contention. A little reflection will show that the object, which is envisaged by recognition, cannot be comprehended by recollection and perception combined together. The province of recognition is the substance which stands out as the identity in and through its antecedent and subsequent mode. Certainly, this identity cannot be the content of recollection, which is cognisant only of what has been experienced before. As it has been said, "Recollection comes to cognise only what has been known before and refers to its content as 'that' (a past event)." As for recognition, which envisages the identity of a past datum with a present one in the form 'that is this', it is certainly different from it."⁷ Neither can this identity possibly be the content of perception which is constrained to take stock of a present mode alone, nor is it a sound contention that there is no cognition different from perception and recollection inasmuch as recognition is a different cognition which is distinctly felt to emerge subsequently from perception. It is certainly not a justifiable attitude to deny what is felt, since this habit of disregarding the plain testimony of experience may lead to unwholesome consequences - the denial of what the opponent rightly believes to be true.

The scholiast now proposes to take up the issue with the *Naiyāyikās* who maintain that recognition is nothing but a species of perception. But this view cannot be accepted to be true. For the province of perceptual cognition is limited to what is actually present and given to the senses. The *Naiyāyikās* ought not to forget the dictum, "That which is in direct contact with the senses and actually present is directly apprehended by the sense of sight and the like."⁸ Hence the identity of a past and present datum cannot lie within the jurisdiction of perception. It has been urged that a sense organ as aided and reinforced by memory does give rise to the perception of such an identity, and so recognition is asserted to be a species of perceptual cognition. But this is an impossibility. A sense organ, which is entirely delimited to its own relevant sphere, cannot be supposed to proceed to another object, which is beyond its jurisdiction, in spite of the aid rendered by a hundred of auxiliary factors. It is a truism that the sense of sight cannot take stock of odour and the like which transcend

its province, though it may be aided by a memory of its fragrance. A substance qua identity, which embraces the past and the present states, does certainly fall outside the scope of senses. Nor will it be a sound argument, for the reasons set forth above, to maintain that a sense organ aided by an unseen potency can apprehend this identity. On the other hand, it will be more appropriate to assert that this cognition of identity directly eventuates from the self as reinforced by such unseen potency. It is seen that a self reinforced and strengthened by the knowledge of a secret science acquired in dream, comes to have a distinct kind of knowledge even in regard to objects which are beyond its ken. It has been contended that just as the organ of vision acquires additional efficiency when it is anointed with the paint of collyrium, likewise, recognition may acquire efficiency regarding identity when it is in alliance with recollection. But this analogical argument overreaches itself. The additional efficiency that might be acquired by a sense organ is never found to overstep its proper jurisdiction. It is never found to operate in the way of apprehending an object which lies within the jurisdiction of another sense, too. We may quote *Kumārila Bhaṭṭa* in support: "Where an additional efficiency is seen to materialise in a sense-organ, it is found to manifest itself in the apprehension of such objects as are distant and infra-sensible and is never found to transgress the limits of its proper jurisdiction which would be the case if the auditory organ were to operate on colour."⁹ "The conclusion must be established that recognition, which has an object of different kind from that of perception, is different from the latter and falls within the category of indirect non-perceptual cognitions as organs.

Recognition cannot be regarded as lacking in validity, since the lack of discrepancy, which is the criterion of validity, is present in it. If an occasional occurrence of discrepancy (e.g., in the case of growing hair, nail, flame, etc.) were to condemn it as a whole kind to invalidity, the same issue would also be unavoidable in the case of perception. Moreover, if the identity of the self and the like, as determined by the evidence of recognition, were to lack objective reality as a rule, the logical justification of bondage and emancipation as states of the same ethico-religious aspirant would become absolutely impossible. If it is the selfsame person who suffers bondage and achieves liberation, it is possible that the person in bondage, feeling himself to be subject to the misery of bondage, can be expected to put forth the requisite labour to achieve the joy of freedom. If, on the other hand, there was no personal identity and one is unhappy and another achieves happiness, who will labour and for what end? It follows, therefore, that recognition is a valid organ since the sense of identity can have a lease of life only if there is recognition to validate its claim, and it is this sense of identity, again, that is at the root of all secular and spiritual activity.

3. Inductive Reasoning (Tarka)

Inductive Reasoning is also an organ of knowledge. With the help of which we can find out universal laws. The definition is as follows:

"Inductive Reasoning is the knowledge of universal concomitance conditioned by observation and non-observation."¹⁰

'Observation' in this context stands for valid cognition as such, and not for perceptual cognition alone, since the middle term probans may be an object of inference too, and there is no incompatibility in the fact of universal concomitance obtained between terms known by inference as between terms known by perception. 'Universal concomitance' will be explained subsequently and the knowledge of it is a specific kind of determinate cognition taking stock of the same. Such determinate cognition is inductive reasoning. It cannot be maintained that such knowledge of universal concomitance is derived exclusively from perceptual evidence. It is not conceivable that perception is competent to discharge the entire series of operation that are involved in the knowledge that, "whatever the case of smoke, it is invariably the exclusive product of fire in all places and times." The reason is that perception is not discursive and owes its genesis to the influence exerted by a datum that is present.

Nor, can it be maintained that such knowledge is obtained by inference inasmuch as this too is quite

unequal to the stupendous burden imposed by the knowledge of universal concomitance when on the occasion, the subject become as omniscient as a yogin (mystic). Even if its competency for such a task were conceded, it remains to be settled—which of the inferences, the present one or another, is cognizant of this universal concomitance? If the knowledge of concomitance were supposed to be secured by the present inference, the result would be the logical seesaw: Inference comes into being only after universal concomitance has been ascertained, and the knowledge of universal concomitance will again be secured just on the emergence of this very inference. If it were supposed that the knowledge of universal concomitance were to be secured by another act of inference, the result would be an infinite vicious series. The latter inference, supposed as it is to yield the knowledge of universal concomitance, which is the condition of the contemplated inference, is possible only if the universal concomitance, (which makes it possible) has already been apprehended as an antecedent condition. If the apprehension of this universal concomitance were thought to be secured by its own self, i.e., if it were self-evident, then why should the previous cognition of universal concomitance be condemned of incompetence and why again a second inference be held in request for the purpose? If, however, the universal concomitance underlying the validating inference were sought to be secured by means of another inference, the apprehension of universal concomitance would not be possible of realization even in thousands of epochs.

Even conceding that indeterminate perception is undiscursive and hence incompetent for universal concomitance, there is no reason to doubt that determinate reflection, which follows in its wake, should seize hold of universal concomitance. But this is not possible. If indeterminate perception were not competent to apprehend universal concomitance, the determinate reflection would not succeed in comprehending the same for the reason that reflection has for its contents the same data as are apprehended by indeterminate perception. If, however, reflective thought were supposed to be conversant with different datum and were not in any way dependent upon the contents of indeterminate perception, the initial objection of equal incompetence would be avoided, no doubt, but this would give rise to another difficulty, whether this reflective thought were an organ of knowledge or otherwise. If it is considered to be an organ, the *Buddhists* have to accept the reflective thought as an additional organ in excess of perception and inference. And if it is regarded as invalid, expectation of the knowledge of universal concomitance therefrom would only be as absurd as the expectation of a child from an impotent husband.

The *Vaiśeṣika* philosophers, on the other hand, hold that reflective thought, which works by way of elimination and assimilation, is the effect of perceptual cognition and the knowledge of universal concomitance is secured by this reflective thought. If this reflection, which is the result of perception, falls under the head either of perception or inference, the old difficulty of their incompetency for the realization of universal concomitance would remain unresolved. And if, again, reflection is different from both of them, it would be tantamount to the admission of an additional organ of knowledge. It will not be a valid contention to say that the knowledge of universal concomitance is only the result, and as such the question of its being an organ simply does not arise. The fact is that though it is a result of perceptual cognition, it is a condition of a subsequent result in the shape of inference, and as such there is no inherent incompatibility of its serving as an organ regarding inference. The case is exactly on a par with knowledge of the adjectival determination which, though itself the result of sense-object contact, serves as an organ of knowledge of the substantive in the judgement.

As regards the *Naiyāyikās*, they hold that the apprehension of universal concomitance results from perceptual cognition when aided and reinforced by inductive reasoning. When it is admitted even by them that apprehension of universal concomitance is effected by perception not in isolation but only when it is aided by reasoning, it is quite proper to acknowledge that the apprehension of such concomitance should be set down to the credit of reasoning alone. It may be urged that reasoning can not be an organ of knowledge and so it is not regarded as the instrument of the knowledge of universal concomitance. But there are no valid grounds as

to why reasoning should not be regarded as an organ of knowledge, particularly when it fulfils all the criteria that an organ of knowledge possess. As for the criterion of lack of discrepancy between knowledge and its object reasoning share it with all the acknowledged organs of knowledge, and it is not true that it does not possess a distinctive object of its own since its object is nothing but universal concomitance itself. It follows, therefore, that reasoning is a separate organ of knowledge of universal concomitance which is not apprehended by any other accepted organ.

4. Verbal Testimony (*Āgama*)

“Verbal testimony is the knowledge of the meaning of a statement by a person of unimpeachable authority.”¹¹

A person of unimpeachable authority is one who has knowledge of an object as it is and who states it in strict conformity with his knowledge. *Ācārya Siddhasena* has recognized two kinds of indirect knowledge, viz, inference and verbal testimony, i.e. *āgama*. He does not mention ‘memory’, ‘recognition’ and ‘reasoning’ as species of indirect knowledge. The set of five kinds of indirect knowledge is the contribution of *Ācārya Akalanika*. The basis of such classification is found in the concept of sensuous cognition (*matijñāna*), as explained in the *Naṇḍī Sūtra* and *Tattvārtha Sūtra*. Memory, recognition, reasoning and inference are the varieties of *matijñāna*, whereas *āgama* is identified with *śrutajñāna* (verbal testimony). *Akalanika* has included ‘inference’ under *śrutajñāna*. *Siddhānta-Cakravartī Nemicanidra* has recognised two kinds of verbal testimony, viz. *āgama* produced by a word as the probans and inference produced by an object as the probans.

The *Jaina* logicians have explained verbal testimony (*āgama*) as both ordinary (popular) and extraordinary (trans-popular). Scriptural knowledge stands for the cognition of an object on the basis of the words of a trustworthy person (*āpta*). Metaphorically, the words of a trustworthy person are also *āgama* (verbal testimony). At the trans-popular level a person possessed of extra sensuous perception is a trustworthy person, and at the popular level the criterion of a trustworthy person is non-discrepancy or non-contradiction in his statement. Thus according to this connotation of *āpta*, any person who is untrustworthy with reference to a subject is *āpta*.

In the tradition of *Jaina* Logic, Divine Revelation and impersonal scripture have no place or validity but knowledge acquired by human beings and the scriptures composed by them enjoy authenticity. A sound is composed of matter, being a transformation of the latter. As the transformation of matter it is evidently impermanent. When sound itself is impermanent, how can scripture that is composed of sounds (words) be considered as eternal?

According to the grammarian, the sound of syllable being momentary cannot produce the knowledge of the object. He therefore postulates an eternal entity called *śabda* (verbum) which is manifested through a syllable (*varṇa*) and is what is called *sphoṭa*. This is manifested by the sound of a syllable, and as a result the meaning is known.

According to the *Mīmāṃsaka*s, the verbum is not subject to origination and cessation. It is eternal. It is not always heard because of the cover or obstruction. As soon as the cover is removed, we hear it. According to this doctrine, therefore, the verbum becomes manifest and is not newly produced. The above view of verbum is not acceptable to the *Jain*s. According to them, the origination of a word is a new occurrence due to collision of material bodies or their disintegration. When two objects are united, separated or broken, though the property of expressing a particular meaning is imposed on it by convention, any word is competent to express any meaning. But convention confers on it the power of connoting a particular meaning in a particular context. The inherent power and the convention, jointly make the word convey its particular meaning. Only the person who knows the convention is capable of knowing the meaning of particular word. For example, the ‘fire as fact’ is imposed by convention on the ‘fire as word’. If this convention is known to me, I shall be able to know the object ‘fire’ signified by the word ‘fire’. A person ignorant of the word in the Indian language, will

not be able to know the object signified by the word. The waving of the index finger symbolizes an act of admonishing and the person conversant with the act is capable of understanding the warning. The verbal conventions function exactly in the same manner.

According to the *Mīmāṃsākās* the 'word' stands for the universal alone. The word 'cow' does not stand for a particular cow but refers to the universal called 'cowhood'. A convention is possible only with reference to the universal and not in respect of particular cows that are countless in number. The standpoint of the *Jaina* logician is quite different. According to him, the referent of a word is the thing which is a composite of the universal and the particular. Pure universal has no causal efficiency (*arthakriyākāritva*). A particular object like a jar or a piece of cloth has such efficiency, but 'jarhood' or 'clothhood' are devoid of any such function. It is not difficult to comprehend the verbal convention in spite of the countless number of individuals signified by a particular word. The fire qua probandum and the smoke qua probans are countless, but there is no difficulty for the organ of reasoning to comprehend all those particular 'fires' and 'smokes' for ascertaining their universal concomitance. If so, why should it not be possible to understand a particular word or symbol as standing for the countless individuals. The reality is ipso facto a universal and particular rolled into one, and as such, pure universal or pure particular cannot be the meaning of the word. It is only the entity as universal-cum-particular, that is the referent of a word.

The relation between the word and the meaning is not like the relation of universal concomitance (*vyāpti*) between smoke and fire. Their relation is one of identity-cum-difference. If the relation between the word and its meaning is one of absolute identity, then the word 'fire' and its meaning would be identical and that would mean the act of combustion on the utterance of the word 'fire'. But this does not happen, implying thereby that there is no relation of universal concomitance between a word and its meaning. On the other hand, if a word is absolutely different from its meaning, the relation of denotative and denotatum (*vācyavācaka-sambandha*) between them would be impossible. The object 'jar' is understood as a verbal symbol, because there is some sort of relationship between the objective aspect called 'denotatum' and the verbal aspect called 'denotative'. The object 'jar' alone, and not any thing else, is known to be the meaning of the word 'jar' as the verbal symbol. The popular convention is the determinant of this word-meaning relationship which is not natural, for it is imposed by the human will. The word-meaning relationship is thus arbitrary, and this is the reason why in different parts of the world, the same word denotes different objects. Had this word meaning-relationship been natural, the entire world would have one language and invariably one word for one object.

The concept of *Sphoṭa* can be explained on the basis of the principle of relativity. Language is ontologically a mode of matter. The speech material (material aggregates capable of being transformed into linguistic symbols) ever remains spread over the entire cosmic space (*lokākāśa*), and a person cannot utter a word without taking in the speech material. The process of speech consists in taking in of the speech material by physical effort, transforming it into linguistic symbols and finally exploding it. This moment of explosion is the word which is audible, and before and after this moment of explosion, it is non-existent qua word. The sound of the syllable at the time of explosion is momentary and impermanent. The speech material qua the continuum of material aggregates, may be considered as eternal and compared with the *Sphoṭa*.

Memory is a case of indirect cognition because the object remembered is not present at the moment. Similarly, recognition of identity and similarity is a kind of indirect cognition, because the objects compared are not present. In the same way the universal concomitance in the case of reasoning (*tarka*) and the denotatum in the case of verbal testimony (*āgama*) are conceptual in nature and, therefore, reasoning and verbal testimony are also instances of indirect cognition.

Notes:

1. (Aph.) *Aviśadaḥ Parokṣaṃ*. - *Pramāṇa-Mīmāṃsā*, 1/2.1
2. (Aph.) *Smṛtipratyabhijñānohānumānāgamāstadvidhayaḥ*. - *Ibid*; 1/2.2

3. (Aph.) *Vāsanodbodhakhetukā tadyakārā Smṛtiḥ*. - Ibid; 1/2.3
4. *Viśeṣāśyabhaṣya* - (VB), 33
5. (Aph.) *darśanasamāśambhavaṃ tadevedaṃ tatsadṛśaṃ tadvilakṣaṇaṃ tatpratiyogīyādisaṅkalanam pratyabhijñānam*. - P.M., 1/2.4
6. *Akalanika*, *Laghīyastrayī* - (LT), III.10,12
7. *Śāntarakṣita*, *Tattvasaṃgraha* - (TS), 453
8. *Ślokaṇṛtta* - (sv), IV.84
9. Ibid; (sv) II,114
10. (Aph.) *Upalambhānupalambhanimittam Vyāptijñānam ūhaḥ*. P.M., 1/2.5
11. (Aph.) *Āptavacanādarthajñānamāgamaḥ*, in *Illuminator of Jaina Tenets* by Ācārya Tulsī; 10/16.

Glossary:

- a) *Gavaya* : is a wild cow
- b) *Collyrium* : The black eye-paint specially put into the eye of a child.
- c) *Denotative* : That which comes within the province of speech and is expressible or speakable.
- d) *Denotatum* : Sign, speech or word which expresses something.

QUESTION

Essay type question :

1. Give arguments in favour of inductive reasoning as a separate, approved organ of knowledge?

Short questions:

1. How do you explain that 'recollection' determines the object?
2. Describe in brief the authenticity of the second non-perceptual cognition, i.e. recognition.

Answer in one word:

1. How many non-perceptual knowledges are there?
2. Define 'recollection' in your own words.
3. How does Hemcandra define recognition?
4. Through which knowledge the necessary concomitance is determined?
5. What is verbal testimony?
6. Who can be recognized as an impeachable person?
7. What type of literature can be included in verbal testimony?

Reference Books:

1. Hemcandra; *Pramāṇa-Mīmāṃsā* (A Critique of organ of knowledge)
2. Ācārya Tulsī; *Illuminator of Jaina Tenets*
3. Ācārya Umāsvatī; *That which is*, Translated by Dr. Nathmal Tāṭiā
4. Ācārya Mahāprajña; *New Dimensions in Jaina logic*

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LESSON 15

THE OBJECT, THE RESULTANT AND THE SUBJECT

The knowledge of reality is summed up under the four topics, viz., knowledge, the object of knowledge, the result of knowledge and the subject. And so the definition of organ of knowledge is bound to remain incomplete unless the definition of the object and the rest are known. Accordingly Ācārya Hemcaṇdra proposes to define the object as follows:

1.0 The object (*Prameya*)

“The *Prameya* i.e. ‘object of an organ of knowledge’ is the Reality which is of the nature of substance-cum-mode.”¹

The expression *Pramāṇa* i.e. ‘organ of knowledge’ in the aphorism stands for the whole class and so includes all the varieties of knowledge, perceptual and the rest, and the object of all these is a Reality which is of the nature of substance-cum-mode. The term *dravya* (rendered substance) is derived from the root *dru* (to go), and etymologically means that which runs through the different modes - which sets forth the characteristics of persistence. It thus ultimately transpires to be the vertical universal which is revealed by the cognition of its identity running in succession through the antecedent and subsequent states. The term *pariyāya* (rendered mode) etymologically denotes the state which the characteristics of coming into existence and ceasing to be in succession. The Reality which is of the nature of substance and mode (*dravyapariyāyatmakam*) thus comes to mean that which has the former (identity) and the latter two (coming into existence and ceasing to be) as constitutive of its nature. The term Reality thus means what is truly existent as an objective fact in its own right. This has been endorsed by Ācārya Umāsvāti in the aphorism **“Reality is that which is endowed with origin, cessation and persistence”²** and also by the following statement of Lord Mahāvīra **“Reality originates, ceases and is continuous.”**

The incorporation of ‘substance-cum-mode’ in the definition serves to counteract the conception of the object of knowledge as exclusively substance and as pure mode respectively advocated by the philosophers of the *Sāṃkhya* and Buddhist schools. The insertion of the term ‘nature’ is extended for the refutation of the conception of the object sponsored by the adherents of Kaṇāda, the propounder of *Vaiśeṣika* philosophy and Akṣapāda, the propounder of *Nyāya* system who maintain that substance and mode are absolutely different from one another. The following statement of Siddhasena lends support to our position. **“Kaṇāda has built his system in pursuance of both *nayas* (points of view), yet it is vitiated with untruth, because he has advocated that substance and mode are mutually independent and that each is supreme in its own sphere.”³**

But what is the reason that the Reality, which is the object of the organs of knowledge, should be only a complex of substance-cum-mode and neither pure substance nor pure mode nor both independent of each other? In reply, the Hemcaṇdra states:

“Because of the capacity for the generation of practical consequences.”⁴

Practical consequences are of the nature of acceptance and avoidance and the like. ‘Generation’ means production. The capacity for such is possible only in a Reality which is a complex of substance-cum-mode and not substance or mode alone. This is the reason that Jainās have accepted this complex as characteristic of an object. In the words of Hemcaṇdra:

“Because reality has ‘that’ for its characteristic.”⁵

‘That’ in the aphorism means ‘capacity for generating a practical consequence; ‘characteristics’ means the peculiar nature. The meaning of the whole aphorism is this: it is invariably the case that every person engages in the pursuit of an organ of knowledge only when he is impelled by the desire for the acquisition of a practical consequence, in the hope that he will be able to satisfy his requirement by finding the object capable of yielding the desired consequence with the aid of such knowledge and not without regard for practical consequence. It is a truism that if the subject is persuaded that the object of an organ is not capable of satisfying a requirement, he will not set any store by the pursuit of such an organ. As has been observed by Dharmakīrti, the buddhist logician, **“What will a person have to do with the examination of an object which is incapable of yielding the consequence of which he is in questing. What can a woman in love gain from the examination of the beauty or ugliness of an impotent man?”**”⁶

The Vedānta View on the Object of Organ of Knowledge:

Regarding the character of reality it must be held that a Reality which is exclusively of the nature of substance cannot be possessed of casual efficiency. How can a substance, having a static identity which does not admit of lapse or growth in being, exercise any casual efficiency which is possible either in succession or in non-succession, since there is no third alternative in between two mutually exclusive opposites? Of these two, the alternative of succession is out of question. A substance will perforce discharge in the very time of executing its primal causal operation all the operations which are, as a matter of fact, due in other times, since there is no reason for an entity which is fully endowed with the relevant capacity to wait idly and let the opportunity slip. On the contrary, a thing which waits for a lapse of time is to be condemned of incapacity. It might be contended that though possessed of capacity, it actually produces its relevant consequences only when it comes to be associated with the relevant set of auxiliary conditions. But the contention is suicidal, since in that case the entity in question would have been denied the capacity which is admitted to be vested in an entity needing the association of other factors. As it has been said in the dictum **‘that which stands in need of others is incapable’**⁷.

It might be further argued that the entity qua cause does not stand in need of the auxiliaries but it is only the effect, which does not come into being in the absence of auxiliaries, that requires the presence of these ancillary conditions. But the question arises: is the entity concerned incapable of the effects in question. If it is conceded to be possessed of the capacity why should it wait in indifference for the effects which are condemned to look forward in utter helplessness to the emergence of the auxiliary conditions, and not, on the contrary, produce the effects on the spur of the moment? It has been argued that the seed which is quite endowed with the causal capacity is seen to produce sprout only when it is associated with the auxiliary conditions such as soil, water and so on and not otherwise. In that case, the question pertinently arises whether the auxiliaries are of any service to the basal cause or not. If they render no service, why should it not persist in the state of neutrality as before? If they are supposed to render some service, the question is: how does the service in question relate to the basal entity? Does the service rendered by them become identical or remain numerically different? If the relation is one of absolute identity, it transpires that is the basal cause that is produced and this puts the opponent in the position of a merchant who invested his money for profit but eventually lost even the capital. If the service under consideration maintains its numerical difference, how can it be supposed to relate to that main cause?

If that is not a bar, what would prevent such a relationship between the *Vindhyās* and *Sāhyās* (the mountain ranges of the Eastern and Western *Ghāṭs*)? It may be urged that one belongs to the other by virtue of a definite relation in which it stands to the other. It may be true but what is the relation between service and receiver of service? It cannot be contractual conjunction, since it is possible only between two substances. Nor can it be inherence, since it is present everywhere in like manner and there is no gulf of separation to cut off its incidence and thus it does not seem logically justifiable that it should function as a relation between determinate terms. And even if this were allowed to be possible, it must be admitted that the terms render some

service to inherence. Such being the case, the dilemma regarding the relation of the service in question in terms of identity or difference would emerge in the same way as before. If the service produced were regarded as identical with inherence, it would be tantamount to the admission that it is inherence that has been brought into being. And if the service in question were to remain different and aloof, inherence could not be supposed to behave as a relation between determinate terms. It would be a poor defence to argue that relation of substantive and adjective determines its specific incidence, for the former relation also can not function as a determinate condition unless there be a relation of benefactor and beneficiary between them at its back. And the admission of an actual benefit occurring will open the gate to the old dilemma based on difference and identity for making a fresh appearance. The conclusion, therefore, irresistibly follows that an entity absolutely eternal is not capable of exercising a causal activity in succession.

Nor again does it fare better in non-succession. It is not endorsed by experience that a self-identical entity simultaneously discharge all the functions which are due to occur in all the division of time. Let it be supposed that it does not do so. What will it do in the second moment? If it does anything, the difficulties incident to the alternative, viz., successive discharge of causal efficiency will reappear. And if it does not do anything at the second moment, it would forfeit its claim to Reality being destitute of causal efficiency which is the criterion of Reality. The exercise of causal activity is determined by succession and non-succession as its determinant concomitants. The absence of these determinant concomitants ascertained on the evidence of the non-observation of them entails as its consequence the absence of causal activity in the absolutely eternal entity, and this absence of causal activity in its turn proves the absence of the agent of causal activity. This lack of causal agency necessary involves the lack of existence which is its determinate concomitant. Thus an absolutely unchanging substance transpires to be a non-entity.

1.2. The Buddhist View on the Object

An entity again supposed to be of the nature of an absolute mode is no more capable of exercising its causal activity in succession as much as it is liable to perish in the immediately succeeding moment and as such succession either in respect of time or of space is not possible of being predicated of it. In fact, occupation of different points of space and occurrence at different moments of time which are possible only for an enduring entity, are respectively designated as spatial and temporal succession and certainly such characteristics are not predicable of an absolutely perishable entity. As it has been aptly observed by some one: "Whatever is in a point of space is exclusively there alone and whatever is at a moment of time is also exclusively thereat. Thus it is not possible for entities to continue through different points of space and time."

Nor is succession, as Buddhists believe, possible of preceding and succeeding moments in the role of a continuum, since continuum is an unreal abstraction. And if it were supposed to be a reality and at the same time momentary in duration, it would not have any difference from the constituent moments and so the impossibility of historical continuity will not be transcended. If the continuum were not momentary, the doctrine of absolute mode would have a happy defence indeed! As has been said by Jayantabhatta: **"If on the other hand, you admit an absolutely real and eternal entity that which you call by the name of continuum, then arise, O monk! your hopes have indeed borne fruit. The doctrine of momentariness of things has received the finishing blow once for all."**⁸

The other alternative of the exercise of causal efficiency in non-succession is no more tenable of a momentary entity. If the selfsame moment called colour which is supposed to produce the taste-moment and others is to produce all these diverse results in and through a self-identical nature, the effects should in all logical propriety be identical being produced by a self-identical nature. If, on the contrary, the cause is thought to produce all the diverse effects through diverse natures according as it functions as a material cause and as an auxiliary condition in respect of the diverse effects then the question will arise whether these natures are integral to the cause or not integral? If they were not integral to the cause they would not constitute the nature

of the later. And if they are constitutive of the very nature of the cause, than either of these two consequences should become irresistible. This cause would be as diverse as the natures or the natures in question would become as simple an identity as the cause would be, if it never abandoned its simplicity. If again, it is thought that what plays the role of a material cause in one context play also the role of an auxiliary condition in another and thus diversity of nature be admitted, then there would be nothing repugnant in the supposition that an eternal and uniform entity also executes diverse effects in succession without undergoing change of nature and without giving rise to the consequence of the effects being identical in nature. If it is contended that the latter hypothesis is untenable on grounds of the impossibility of the production of successive effects simultaneously from a non-successive cause (owing to the palpable contradiction involved in the supposition that one simple self-identical cause should simultaneously produce diverse effects which are, as a matter of fact, capable of being produced by a number of diverse causes), the same difficulty would make the production of diverse effects by a momentary entity all at one time equally an impossibility. Thus the determinant concomitants of production, namely succession and non-succession, are found to be impossible in a *Reality* supposed to be absolutely of the nature of a momentary mode, and this impossibility makes the production of an effect, which is its determinate concomitant, impossible. The absence of the productive activity entails the absence of reality in an absolutely momentary mode in pursuance of the law that the lack of the evidence of the presence of the determinant takes away the warrant of the presence of the determinate. Thus the theory of reality consisting entirely in a mode is found to be unsound.

1.3. The *Vaiśeṣikās* View on Object

The *Vaiśeṣikās* admit the reality of both substance and modes. Of these earth and the rest are substances, being receptacles of qualities and the like. Qualities and actions are the modes being contents thereof. Of them some are transitory, some endure as long as the substance and some are eternal. These philosophers cannot be regarded as exponents of the true nature of *Reality*, since they assert that substrates and attributes are absolutely different from one another. By way of proof, the question may be put whether existence is absolutely different from substance. If it be so, substance would by itself be non-existent. If it were contended that substance becomes existent by virtue of the inherence of existence in it, the contention would be unsound. How can non-entity be made existent by participating in existence? And if entities, substance, etc., were intrinsically existent, the inherence of existence would be a superfluity. If again things are believed to be possessed of existence per se as an inalienable part of their individuality, then why should a superfluous intermediary be postulated in the shape of inherence of existence? It has been contended that a thing is neither existent nor non-existent before its participation in existence as such and it becomes existent only as a consequences of its relation to existence. But, this is a verbalism and has no meaning, since third alternative different from existent and non-existent both is an impossibility. Moreover, there is no evidence from experience that there are felt three elements in a *Reality*, viz., the entity, existence, and a relation between them. Again, if the relation between an entity and its existence were a case of identity, that would be contradicted by their refusal to endorse it. Due to this same very reason i.e. denial, the relation cannot be supposed to be 'conjunction' which is possible only between two substances. As for inherence, it is not believed to be dependent for its being upon the relation, and if such an independent fact can serve as a relation, everything can come into relation with every other thing, or no entity can be in relation with any other entity. All these considerations are liable to be pressed according to the nature of the terms against the relation posited between substance and substance-hood, quality and quality-hood, action and action-hood, between one substance and another, quality, action, universal, specificity; between earth and earth-hood, water and water-hood, fire and firehood, air and air-hood; between substances such as space (*ākāśa*) and their relevant qualities. It is crystal clear that there can possibly be no relation in any way whatever between things which are absolutely different. It has become obvious that the determination of the nature of *Realities* in the scheme of Kaṇāda is vitiated by a fundamental defect.

Here an objection is raised: Even if a *Reality* were supposed to consist of both substance and mode, the same difficulty would persist as before. Thus, for instance, the exponents of *syādvāda* (the doctrine of non-absolutism affirming multiple nature of things) reject the view that substance and mode are either absolutely different or absolutely identical and think that they are both somehow identical and different. But this position cannot be legitimate inasmuch as it is vitiated by contradiction and other defects as follows:

1. Affirmation and negation cannot co-exist in one substratum like blue and not blue owing to their mutual opposition.
2. If difference is affirmed in respect of one aspect and identity in respect of another, the result will be that difference will have one locus and identity another and thus there will be split in the integrity of the locus.
3. The aspect in reference to which difference is asserted and the aspect in reference to which identity is affirmed—both of these aspects are to be regarded as mutually identical and different in order to avoid consequence of absolutism and this would lead to regressus ad infinitum, the focus of opposite predicated being placed under the necessity of bifurcation and the bifurcated aspect being again identical-cum-different would again require bifurcation in their turn and so on.
4. The aspect in which difference is posited will have difference and identity both as its traits, and likewise the aspect in which identity is asserted will have identity and difference as its predicate, and this means confusion which consists in the incidence of opposite attributes in the same substratum.
5. The aspect which embodies difference will also embody identity, and the aspect which embodies identity will embody difference. This, thus, gives rise to the fallacy of transfusion (the exchange of function and attributes).
6. A *reality* being both identical and different will not lend itself to be determined in a definite reference, and this would create doubt.
7. The consequence will be the absence of determination and
8. This will result in the impossibility of determination of objective *Reality*.

In fact, there is no occasion for contradiction in a thing which is cognised as such. One thing is supposed to be the opposite of another when in the presence of one the other is not perceived. But in a perceived datum what is the ground for the faintest trace of contradiction? As regards blue and not blue, if they were perceived in one locus, there would be no contradiction in the situation. And thus the Buddhists do not acknowledge the contradiction between blue and not blue in the unitary cognition of a variegated canvas. And as regards the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* philosopher, he admits the reality of multiform colour. Further, when one single piece of linen is found to possess in harmony the apparently opposed attributes of being mobile and immobile, red and no red, covered and not covered, what then is the ground for allegation of doubt? This line of argument would again put a quiet to the charge of the bifurcation of locus, since, in conformity with the principle set forth above, they have all been proved to be perceived in the same locus. As regards the charge of infinite regress, it is advanced by one who is ignorant of the position of the non-absolutist who unmistakably maintains that in a *Reality* which is the synthesis of substance and mode, the difference is not anything else than substance and modes themselves. The term 'difference' whenever employed stands for these two elements alone. When it is asserted that identity is in the aspect of substance it is to be understood that substance itself and not anything else constitutes the identity in question, and the proposition that a *Reality* is one and many lends support to this truth. As regards the charges of confusion and transfusion, they are easily parried by the instance of the synthesis of universal and particular in all *Realities*. If, on the contrary, it is maintained that the

solution of the difficulties in the above quoted instances is furnished by direct experience of the data, the same experience will also come to the aid of the opponent (Jaina philosopher), since experience cannot be guilty of partiality. And there is no logical justification for the emergence of doubt in a matter which has been definitely established. Doubt is a sort of cognition in which the mind wavers between two conflicting alternatives. It is absolutely out of question when the cognition is found to be unfaltering and unwavering. To say that knowledge is not possible regarding an object that is known is a bold assertion. The establishment of knowledge proves that there is no justification for the charge of lack of knowledge, and consequently for the impossibility of such a multiform real. The conclusion follows that the conception of reality as synthesis of substance and mode is not incompatible with the verdict of experience and interest of truth.

But the question arises: how can even a *Reality*, consisting of substance and mode, exercise causal efficiency? The exercise of causal efficiency has been found to be a concomitant of succession and non-succession, and must be held to be incompatible also with a *Reality* of dual nature exactly in the same way as it has been found to be incompatible with pure substance or pure mode advocated by the absolutists. It is perfectly allowable to assert that a *Reality* possessed of a dual nature is not capable of exercising causal efficiency in sequence on the grounds that an efficient entity has no reason for deferring its action. The hypothesis that it stand in need of the auxiliaries is absolutely illegitimate for the substance, which is unamenable to change, is entirely independent of the service of the auxiliaries.

And as for the modes, they are momentary, and so they cannot be supposed to wait for two consecutive moments required for the reception of the service accruing from the auxiliaries and for producing the effect at the next moment. Nor is the exercise of casual activity possible in simultaneity because a *Reality* which simultaneously executes all its effects and ceases to do so again will forfeit its claim to *Reality* being bereft of causal activity. And if it does produce an effect at the next moment the charges incidental to the theory of successive activity will come in force. Thus the defects which appertain to the theory of pure substance or pure mode are found to be equally shared by the theory of dual reality in conformity with the dictum: "Why should not the defect which is inevitable in each of the alternatives be not inevitable when both the alternatives are affirmed"? In reply to this objection, Hemcandra says:

"The realisation of causal activity by the same is warranted by its susceptibility to change having for its characteristics continuity, surrender and appropriation of the antecedent and consequent determinations respectively."

Continuity together with the surrender and appropriation respectively of the preceding and succeeding determinations, that is to say, of the states in due order, constitutes the defining characteristics of change, and this make the exercise of the causal activity by the same, that is to say, by a *Reality* possessing substance and mode as its moments, a logical and real possibility.

This is the purport. A *Reality* is neither of the nature of substance, nor of the nature of mode, nor a combination of both so that the defects pertaining to all these positions would become insuperable. It is, on the contrary, a *sui generis* multiform entity comprising as its moments continuity, origination and cessation. Thus, it exercises its several causal operations simultaneously or successively according to how the relevant auxiliary conditions present themselves; appropriates the chain of services rendered by the auxiliary conditions and runs its jolly course of self-development according to how it puts aside and accepts the services becoming both different and identical.

It does not run away like a fugitive frightened by the scandal; of the charges laying against both the alternatives. The charge of the impossibility of causal activity on the warrant of realised default of concomitant determinants and the consequential charge of the impossibility of existence, which is a concomitant determinate of the aforesaid causal efficiency, are out of place in such an entity. It is therefore established that a *Reality* composed of substance and mode as its elements is the object of an organ of knowledge.

2.0. The Resultant (*Pramiti*)

Now Hemcaṇdra defines the resultant as follows:

“The resultant is the illumination of the object.”¹⁰

The expression ‘of an organ of knowledge’ follows from aph. 30 and is to read into the present aphorism. The meaning thus comes out: the resultant of a organ of knowledge is ‘illumination of the object’ i.e., cognition of the object. All subjects are actuated by a desire for a *Reality* capable of satisfying an end, and so the cognition of the object should legitimately be the resultant of it. But a difficulty arises - if this is the case, then knowledge which is given out to be organ itself would be said to be the resultant. And if the organ and resultant are identical it would be liable to the objection which applies to the position of non-existent and existent effect. Non-existent cannot be organ, nor a previous existent be the resultant. The answer is: this defect is really present in respect of origination and not in respect of determination. As has been said “A non-entity cannot be a cause, nor can the existent cause be itself the resultant. This charge applies, if it is a case of efficient causation origination, but a case of determination which it is held to be is not liable to such accusation.”

The force of the contention can be brought out as follows: The organ of knowledge being a species of efficient cause can only be so if it produces expected effect, viz., knowledge. But when the organ is said to be nothing but knowledge and knowledge again is said to be the resultant, it commits the fallacy of making the cause and effect identical. It is obvious on the face of it that cause and effect must be different and they must occur at different moments of time. If there is no difference, chronological and numerical, the assertion of causality is nothing short of non-sense. Hemcaṇdra admits the justice of this objection in abstracto but he avers that the present instance does not fall within it, because the relation of the organ of knowledge is not of efficient causality and hence is not temporal. It is a logical relation and it is the local relation of determination which occurs at the same time. And there is no logical incompatibility in the same thing being its own determinant and determinate. The relation of determination as maintained here does not presuppose numerical difference, but only a difference of function. And this is going to be substantiated in the following aphorism.

Hemcaṇdra is showing the nature of determination:

“Its activity (reference) concerns the object.”¹¹

The activity of knowledge having reference to the object is the resultant.

What is the organ? In reply he states:

“The same activity as relates to the subject is the knowledge.”¹²

The cognition in so far as it takes note of the activity of the subject, is the organ.

But how can it be an organ of knowledge? An organ is an instrument, and the efficientmost of the causal conditions is stated to be the instrument, and it is immediately attended with the effect. In answer he says:

“The illumination of the object is realised immediately upon the occurrence of that.”¹³

Upon the occurrence of that means ‘after the activity in the shape of knowledge, which has been stated to be the organ, has taken place in the subject. Realisation of the illumination of the objects means, the determination of it as the resultant’. The organ and the resultant stand in relation of identity in so far as the two belong to the self-same cognition. Their difference is in respect of the relation of determinant and determinism). Thus the relation of organ of knowledge and the resultant partakes of the dual character of identity and difference, and as such follows the track of the theory of non-absolutism (*syādvāda*) which stands uncontradicted. The immediate effect which is common to all cognitive organs is thus set forth in the given discourse.

Hemcaṇdra further states an alternative resultant as immediate as the previous:

“Or the cessation of ignorance.”¹⁴

Others hold that the resultant is the cessation of the ignorance of the subject regarding the object in question before the application of the organ of knowledge. As has been said: “the immediate effect of an organ of knowledge is bliss and unconcern for everything else that of the rest is the notion of acceptance and avoidance.”

He now states the remote resultant.

“Or, of determinate perception and the rest, which have the characteristic of occurring successively, each antecedent member of the order is the cognitive organ and each succeeding member is the resultant.”¹⁵

It is to be understood that of determinate perception, speculation, perceptual judgement, retention (disposition), memory, recognition, reasoning, and inference, which occur in the order of immediate succession, each immediate antecedent is the cognitive organ and each immediate successor is the resultant. The self, possessed of the determinate perception as its evolved state, is transformed into the state of speculation and so determinate perception function as an organ in relation to its resultant in the shape of speculation. And subsequently to it, speculation again is the organ and perceptual judgement is the resultant. Again, perceptual judgements, the organ and retention are the resultant. As speculation and retention, they can be inferred as partaking of the character of cognition being derivatives of cognition. Next in order, retention is to be regarded as the organ and memory as the resultant. Next again to that, recognition is the organ and inference is the resultant. Lastly, reasoning is the organ and inference is the resultant. This completes the division of organ and resultant.

Now he states a different kind of resultant:

“Or the judgement of avoidance and the rest.”¹⁶

The judgement of avoidance, acceptance and indifference are the resultants of cognitive organ. The enunciation of a plurality of resultants is made with the purpose of bringing home the truth that there is no antagonism among the different resultants since they partake of one common character of ‘being resultant’ and the question of what is resultant is a matter of volitional interest and point of view.

2.1 Identity and Difference of the Resultant

In order to examine the views of rival philosophers, who hold that the resultant is absolutely identical with or absolutely different from the cognitive instruments, Hemcaṇḍra states:

“It is both identical with and different from its cognitive organs.”¹⁷

A cognitive organ being of the nature of an instrument and the resultant being of the nature of an effect are mutually different. If the relation is one of absolute identity, the conventional treatment of a cognitive organ and its resultant as numerically different would be logically absurd and in the case, it would be either exclusively a cognitive organ or exclusively a resultant. It might be urged that the treatment of the self-same fact as a cognitive organ is justified on account of its difference from what is not cognitive organ, and also as a resultant. But the contention has no substance. If this were the basis of such differentiation, the fact of one cognitive organ being numerically different from another cognitive organ should make the former liable to be treated as a non-organ. Likewise, the numerically different of one resultant from another resultant should justify its treatment as a non resultant. The truth is that a *Reality* is different from both what is homogeneous and what is heterogeneous and thus difference alone cannot be made the basis of classification, as it does away with the element of identity which is the presupposition of such procedure.

It has been shown that the difference between a cognitive organ and its resultant cannot be obliterated. The same logical necessity would compels us to recognise that a cognitive organ and its resultant are identical in

so far as they relate to one individual subject. In view of this fact, the same self, which changes into a cognitive organ, transforms itself into the resultant. If the two modes were absolutely different, the relation between the organ and the resultant would be as absurd, even in the same subject, as it is between two such modes occurring in two different subjects. It has been contended by the *Nyāya Vaiśeṣika* school that the self, in which a cognitive organ inheres is the very self in which the resultant is found to inhere. And the determination of the two occurrences as organ and resultant is effected by the relation of inherence. But the contention is untenable. Inherence is propounded to be eternal and ubiquitous and is thus bound to be as existent in one self as in all other selves, and thus it fails to account for the determinate relation of the events to a particular subject. The conclusion, therefore, follows that the result is somehow different from and identical with the cognitive organ.

3.0. The Subject (*Pramātā*)

Now Hemacandra is propounding the definition of the subject:

“The subject is the self which reveals its own self as well as another and is liable to change.”¹⁸

The self has the nature of revealing its own self as well as an object, which is other than the self. That this is the case is apparent from the circumstance that the self has subjective and an objective reference as is unfolded in the judgement ‘I know the jar’ in which the three factors the subject, object and the act are clearly open to notice. There is absolutely no ground for repudiating the cognition of any one of them. Nor is there any incompatibility between auto-revelation and hetero-revelation, which is found to be the case with light. Certainly a light does not depend upon anything other than its own self when it reveals its own self. This finding constitutes the reduction ad absurdum of the theories sponsored by a school of thinkers that cognition only reveals its own self and the other theory which maintains that the cognition reveals only an object.

In the phrase ‘liable to change’, ‘change’ should be understood in terms of the definition given before. Were the self an unchanging constant, such phenomena as joy, depression, pleasure, pain, enjoyment and the like, which are liable to origination and cessation, would not be possible attributes. Were it, on the other hand, absolutely perishable the ethical fallacies of loss of earned merit and acquisition of unearned deserts would become unavoidable. Furthermore, such activities, which are known to be the characteristic article deposited in the past would entirely collapse. But all these facts find an easy and natural explanation in the conception of a dynamic self, which is necessarily possessed of up the characteristics-origination, cessation and persistence. As it has been said:

“Just as the coiled state passes away and the state of erect posture succeeds, but the characters of the serpent as serpent continues, so with regard to the self as an eternal continuous principle possessed of the nature of pure consciousness, there is neither efflux of its total nature, nor is there the continuity of its entire character. But the states such as pleasure and pain, which happened to it in the past, pass away, other states supervene, and consciousness continues throughout. If the self were liable to absolute destruction, there would arise the fallacy of lost deserts and unearned enjoyment, and were it again absolutely uniform the transitional experiences of pleasure and pain would be absolutely unexplainable. Both the agent and the enjoyer are not the changing modes of the self, but it is the self which as the agent reaps these consequences being the self-same entity owning up these states.”

This live argument would serve to condemn the theories, which posit the self to be absolutely unchanging or absolutely perishable. The ‘self’ in the aphorism dismisses the theory of not-self of the Buddhists. The fact that the self comes to possess the same dimension as the body it inhabits has no bearing on the present topic. The definition of ‘subject’ is thus found to be sound and secure.

Notes:

1. (Aph.) “*pramāṇasya viśaya dravyaparyāyātmakam vastu*” in *Pramāṇa-Mīmāṃsā*; 1/30
2. “*Utpādayayadhrauvyayutam*” in *Tattvārtha Sūtra*; 5/29

3. Divākara Siddhasena, in *Saṁmatitarka*; verse 3/49
4. (Aph.) “*arthakriyāsāmarthyāt*”; in *P. M.*; 1/31
5. (Aph.) “*tallakṣanatvād vastunaḥ*” in *P. M.*; 1/32
6. *Pramāṇavārttika*; I.215
7. Patañjali, in *Mahabhāṣya*; III, 1.8
8. *Commentary on Nyāyamañjarī*; p.464
9. (Aph.) “*pūrvottarākāraparihārasvikārasthīlakṣaṇa-parināmenāsyārthakriyopapattiḥ*”; *P. M.*; 1/33
10. (Aph.) “*phalamarthaprakāśaḥ*”; Ibid; 1/34
11. (Aph.) “*karmasthā kriya*”; Ibid; 1/35
12. (Aph.) “*kartrsthā pramāṇam*”; Ibid; 1/36.
13. (Aph.) “*tasyām satyāmarthaprakāśasiddheḥ*”; Ibid; 1/37.
14. (Aph.) “*ajñānanivṛttirvā*”; Ibid; 1/38.
15. (Aph.) “*avagrahādīnām vā kramopajanadharmānām pūrvam pūrvam pramāṇamuttaramuttaram phalam*”; Ibid; 1/39.
16. (Aph.) “*hānādibuddhayo vā*”; Ibid; 1/40.
17. (Aph.) “*pramāṇād bhinnābhinnam*”; Ibid; 1/41.
18. (Aph.) “*svaparāvabhāsī pariṇāmyātmā pramātā*.” Ibid; 1/42.

QUESTION

Essay type question:

1. Write comparatively on the object of knowledge?

Short questions:

1. Why can neither pure substance nor pure mode be the object of the organs of knowledge?
2. Explain the substance of the resultant of knowledge?

Answer in one word:

1. Does the pure substance generate something?
2. Is it true that the momentary thing is unable to beget anything?
3. What is the view of Jainās on the objects of knowledge?
4. In which way the Jainā view differs from that of *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* on the object of knowledge.
5. What is the direct result of knowledge?
6. What are the indirect result of knowledge?
7. Do you agree with the concept of identity-cum-difference between the result and the organ of knowledge?
8. Define the subject of knowledge in your own words.
9. How would you differentiate between the organ and the resultant of knowledge?
10. Is it possible that one thing can bear two opposite qualities at a time.

Reference Book:

Pramāṇa-Mīmāṃsā (A critique of the organs of knowledge); by Hemacandra; translated by Prof. Satkaṁī Mukharjī and Dr. Nathmal Tāṭiā.

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LESSON 16

INFERENCE, THE UNIVERSAL CONCOMITANCE AND THE PROBANS (REASONS)

In this chapter we shall discuss in detail about the last kind of indirect knowledge i.e. inference, along with the probans and the universal concomitance.

1.0 Inference

“Inference is the knowledge of the *probandum* (major term) on the strength of the *probans* (middle term).”¹

The probans and the probandum are to be understood in terms of the definitions propounded here. The knowledge of the probandum, which is of the nature of authentic cognition of a real fact and which arises from a probans either observed or expressly stated, is called inference, literally, a cognition which takes place subsequent to the apprehension of the probans and recollection of the necessary relation between the *probans* and the *probandum*. It is called *anumāna*, being an organ of subsequent (*anu*) cognition (*māna*).

1.1 Kinds of Inference

“It is of two kinds-for one's own self (subjective) and for others (sylogistic).”²

It, that is, inference, is of two varieties depending on it being subjective and sylogistic. Subjective inference is what is calculated to remove personal misconception and sylogistic inference is competent to remove the misconception of others.

1.1.1 Subjective Inference : Of the two aforesaid kinds Ācārya Hemcaṇḍra defines subjective inference as follows:

“Subjective inference consists in the knowledge of the *probandum* from the *probans* ascertained by one's own self, as having the sole and solitary characteristic of necessary concomitance with the *probandum*.”³

Necessary concomitance with the *probandum* means the impossibility of the probans apart from the *probandum*. And the knowledge of the *probandum* from such a *probans* is definitely cognised by the arguer himself as having for sole and solitary characteristic, this inseparable relation with the *probandum* is called subjective inference. The probans is also designated as the sign (*liṅga*) and the *probandum* as the signet (content, ling). It is to be understood in this context that the probans or the sign is the condition of the cognition of an unperceived datum not by virtue of its casual efficiency as a seed is of sprout. The knowledge of fire does not arise from the mere presence of smoke unobserved. Nor again does such knowledge materialise from the cognition for the *probans* as such as is found to be the case with light revealing a jar. It is never found that a probans, though observed but not known as having a necessary concomitance, leads to the knowledge of anything beyond itself. The operation of the sign or *probans*, therefore, consists in the definite knowledge of its impossibility independent of the unperceived *datum*, and it is for this reason that the word ‘ascertained’ has been inserted in the definition.

In this context the Buddhist position is that the Buddhist monks assert, in order to rebut the fallacies of non-existence, contradictory and inconclusive probantia “the triple characteristic of the valid probans, viz, its subsistence in the subject (the minor term), its presence in the homologue (similar object), and its absence in a heterologue (an opposite). Thus the first characteristic is satisfied when it is definitely known that there is

'subsistence necessarily' (*sattvam eva*) of the probans in the subject of inference. The assertion of subsistence serves to exclude the nonexistent middle term such as visibility e.g. in the inference: 'Sound is perishable since it is visible', the probans 'visible' is invalid since it does not belong to sound. The insertion of the word 'necessarily' serves to exclude the fallacy non-existence of the probans in a part of the subject minor term, which is illustrated in the following case: 'Earth and the other elements are impermanent since they are possessed of smell'. In this instance the attribute of smell subsists only in earth out of the four elements which make up the subject. The insertion of the particle 'necessarily or alone' (*eva*) subsequent to the word 'subsistence' is intended to exclude an uncommon attribute. If the position were stated in the order 'the subsistence in the subject alone', the quality 'audibility' alone would serve as the *probans* as the quality of 'being audible' belongs to the word 'alone' and nothing else. The expression 'definitely known' serves to exclude all cases of middle terms whose subsistence is a matter of doubt.

The second characteristic is satisfied when it is definitely known that there is subsistence of the probans in the homologue alone. The insertion of the word 'subsistence' in this definition is calculated to dismiss the contradictory probans, which certainly does not occur in a homologue. The insertion of the word 'necessarily' rebuts the fallacy of the common inconclusive *probans*, since the latter does not subsist in the homologue alone but in the heterologue also. The employment of the restrictive particle 'alone' after the homologue in the English rendering is intended to assert that such attributes 'as being the outcome of exertion' are instances of valid *probans*, notwithstanding the fact that they do not embrace the whole extent of the homologue. If, on the other hand, restrictive particle were put after 'subsistence' the meaning would be this: 'the valid *probans* is one whose subsistence in the homologue is necessary and universal' and in that case 'the outcome of exertion' would not be reckoned as a valid probans. The insertion of the clause 'it is definitely known' is made for the purpose of excluding the inconclusive reason whose concomitance in agreement is a matter of doubt. Thus, for instance, in the inference 'X is omniscient, because he is a speaker', the attribute of 'being speaker' is of doubtful occurrence in the homologue 'omniscient.' It is not necessary that an omniscient person must always speak and, on the contrary, it is quite possible that there may have been an omniscient person who has not made a single utterance in his lifetime. So the attribute of 'being speaker' is not necessarily concomitant with omniscience third characteristic is that the valid *probans* must be definitely known as having 'non-existence necessarily' (*asattvam eva*) in the heterologue. The term 'non-existence' serves to exclude the contradictory *probans*. This occurs necessarily in the heterologue. The term 'necessarily' serves to exclude an attribute which occurs in a part of the heterologue, and is thus common both to the homologue and to the heterologue. Thus the attribute 'impermanence' is incompetent *probans* with regard to the *probandum* 'being the outcome of exertion' since the former occurs in a part of the heterologue, viz., a flash of lighting, and does not occur in space and the like which are instances of the heterologue. So this type of attribute is of necessity excluded by the employment of the term 'non-existence'. If the restrictive adverb 'necessarily' were placed after the term 'heterologue' in the definition the meaning would be as follows: 'The valid *probans* is that which does not exist in the heterologue alone with the implication that its non-existence is necessarily confined to the heterologue and its existence in the homologue is a matter of universal necessity'. The result would be that the attribute, being the outcome of exertion which does not occur even in certain homologous instances, could not be regarded as a valid *probans*. In order to preclude this confusion, the adverb 'alone' was not placed after the heterologue. The insertion of the expression 'must be definitely known' is intended for the rejection of the inconclusive reason whose non-existence in the heterologue is a matter of doubt. Thus the inference 'X must be non-omniscient, since he is a speaker' is invalid, because the absence of the *probans* in an omniscient person (heterologue) is a matter of doubt. There is no inherent impossibility for an omniscient person to be capable of giving instruction by speech. The conclusion irresistibly follows that the triple characteristic alone is capable of excluding the fallacies of impossibility and the rest from the purview of valid probans and it is

It is legitimate that this should alone be regarded as the dominant characteristic of a valid *probans*.

Furthermore, the presence of this condition alone, irrespective of the other two characteristics, is found to invest a *probans* with full cogency. Thus the following inference may be cited as an example: The admission of organs of valid knowledge is necessary for the monist also, as the proof of the desired conclusion and disproof of the undesired positions become otherwise absurd. In this instance of inference, there is neither subsistence of the *probans* in the subject (minor term), nor in the homologue. But still the probans is found to be conclusive, only on grounds of the presence of universal concomitance proved by the necessity of the incompatibility of the *probans* with the contradictory possibility. It has been contended that if subsistence in the subject be not a necessary condition, the probans in inferences such as "The palace is white, because the crow is black" would pass for a valid one. No, this is not possible. Even the *probantia* which do not subsist in the subject minor term are admitted to be perfectly cogent only because they possess universal concomitance. In the present case the universal concomitance is absent and so the inference is not valid. Thus universal concomitance alone should be regarded as the principal characteristic of a probans, the presence of which even in the absence of the triple characteristic makes the probans valid and cogent. The triple characteristic, furthermore, is not a necessary feature of a valid probans, since it is not universal. Thus in the following case of inference— All is momentary, since existent—which is the most predominant argument of the Buddhist beam the cornerstone of his whole metaphysical edifice, the probans 'existent' is held by them to be valid, though it does not occur in a homologue since every existent is included in the subject and there is nothing outside which can serve as an example. Thus it has rightly been said: "What does the triple characteristic serve, if incompatibility with the contradictory be present? And what would again this triple characteristic avail, if incompatibility with the contradictory is absent?"

The aforesaid consideration will also serve to dispose of the five-fold characteristic maintained by the *Naiyāyikās*, since this is nothing but an elaboration of universal concomitance. Thus, the aforesaid triple characteristic plus the absence of contradiction of the *probandum* and the absence of a countervailing *probans* constitute the five characteristics. Of them, the inference with the contradicted *probandum* consists in the employment of a *probans* subsequent to the assertion of probandum contradicted by perceptual cognition or verbal testimony. "A body of fire is not-hot being a product, like a jar" is an example of the same (contradicted by perceptual cognition). "Wine may be drunk, as it is a liquid substance, like milk" is an example of contradiction by verbal testimony. The negation of this possibility gives rise to the fourth characteristic of a *probans* having an uncontradicted *probandum*. A *probans* which is assailed by a counter-probans is an instance of countervailing *probans*. "Sound is impermanent, as no characteristic of a permanent entity is found to be present therein" is an inference the *probans* of which is offset by a countervailing probans in the inference "Sound is eternal, as no characteristic of an impermanent entity is found to be present therein." The negation of this possibility gives out the fifth characteristic, viz., the absence of a countervailing *probans*. Now, the two cases of contradicted *probandum* and countervailing *probans* lack universal concomitance and so the necessity of universal concomitance includes (within its ambit) the two latter characteristics also and hence their addition is a superfluity. As has been observed: "The opposition between contradiction and universal concomitance is irreconcilable."⁴

Moreover, these two fallacies are accounted for by the default of the characteristics which are asserted by the *Naiyāyika* himself to be the defining attributes of the subject-matter of inference and hence they ought to be regarded as defects of the latter. Thus it is established that a probans having the sole and solitary characteristic of standing in necessary relation with the *probandum* is alone sufficient to make inference possible.

1.1.2 The Syllogistic Inference : Subjective inference has been defined and now the author proposes to give the definition of syllogistic inference which comes next in order.

"Syllogistic inference is (definite cognition) resulting from statement of probans having the characteristics set forth before."⁵

“Having the characteristics set forth before” means having the sole and solitary characteristic of necessary concomitance with the probandum, ascertained by one’s own self. The *probans* in question must have this qualification, and the statement of such a *probans* implies that it is an assertion which is the instrument of communication to another person (of this fact) and the definite authentic cognition of fact that arises from such assertion is designated as ‘syllogistic inference’ which means the knowledge of the probandum derived from the communication made by another person.

Here a question is raised. Syllogistic inference is customarily stated to consist in verbal assertion. But how does it accord with the definition of inference? In reply to this the author says: **“Statement’ is called inference by way of metaphor.”**⁶

A statement being a non-mental fact cannot be the direct condition of valid knowledge as its result, and as such cannot possess the character of a cognitive organ in its own right and without resort to a metaphor. But it comes to be designated by the appellation ‘inference’ by transference of epithet, being the condition of inference proper. The transference in the present case consists in the ascription of the nature of effect to its condition. There arises a recollection of it (*probans*) from the statement of the *probans* as set forth before, and this recollection gives rise to inference. Thus the statement of *probans* as defined is the indirect condition of inference. Now, (by a recognised rhetorical device) the character of the effect, here inference, is transferred to, that is to say, super-imposed upon the condition, i.e., statement. It is by virtue of this transference that the statement, that is the condition of inference, is designed by the term ‘inference’. Or viewed from the other side, it may be considered to be a case of superimposition of the condition viz., inference, on the effect, viz., statement, which is the result of the inference made by the arguer. The statement is thus designated as inference by the rhetorical device of transference of epithet, and is not ‘inference’ proper in the conventional sense of the term.

1.1.2.1 Members of syllogistic Inference : **“In deference to (the calibre of) the person to be edited (the syllogism may have) five propositions also, viz., thesis, reason, illustration, application and conclusion.”**⁷

‘The person to be edified’ means a pupil and ‘deference to him’ means obligation to the pledge of edification of the same (pupil). It is in pursuance of such obligation that the five propositions also, beginning with thesis, ought to be affirmed. These propositions are designated by the name of members. These propositions are designated by the name of members, as has been observed by Akṣapāda: **Thesis, reason, illustration, application and conclusion are the members.**⁸

The particle ‘also’ in the aphorism is significant and implies that each of the five members, thesis and the rest, should be supplemented by a corroborative statement, totalling five in all out of deference to (the requirement of) the pupil. As has been remarked by His Holiness Bhadrabāhusvāmin of adorable feet: **“The syllogism is said to consist of five members, or of ten members in the alternative. We denounce neither but accept both as legitimate.”**⁹

1.1.2.1.1 Proposition : Now the author sets forth the definition of the proposition:

“The thesis is the statement of the theme to be proved.”¹⁰

The theme-to-be-proved is the subject with the predicative attribute contemplated to be established. Statement here means a sentence which states a fact. The statement of the theme-to-be is called the thesis (*pratijñā*) which sets forth a pledge or undertaking to be logically established. “This man is possessed of energy” is a typical illustration.

1.1.2.1.2 Reason : The author now defines the reason as follow:

“Statement of a probans ending in an inflexion unfolding the character of probans is called the reason.”¹¹

The 'inflexion unfolding the character of probans' is either the fifth or the third case-ending in *Sanskrit*. The statement of a probans as defined before with proper case-ending is what is called reason. The phrase 'ending in an inflexion, etc.' serves to rebut the role of probans of a word with the first case-ending, e.g. the unqualified statement of it as action without the relevant case-ending in *Sanskrit* and such words as 'because' or 'since' prefixed to it in English. The statement is two fold according as its concomitance is shown affirmatively or negatively. The proposition 'the existence of action is logically justifiable only on the condition of its positive concomitance with energy' or 'the existence of action is logically impossible unless the said concomitance be a fact' are typical examples.

1.1.2.1.3 Illustration : Now the author defines the illustration:

"Illustration is the statement of an example."¹²

Illustration is the statement which sets forth the example in conformity with the definition given before. It is also of two kinds on account of the difference of examples. The statement of an example based upon similarity of attribute is called illustration agreement-the example found to have the attribute to be proved (the probandum) entailed as a consequence of the attribute adduced as the logical ground (probans). "Whatever is possessed of action is possessed of energy as for example, the living body" is a typical instance of illustration in agreement. Illustration in difference is the statement of an example in dissimilarity in which the absence of the attribute qua probans is logically entailed by the absence of the attribute qua probandum. "Whatever is possessed of the absence of energy is possessed of the absence of action, e.g., the dead body" may be cited as a typical case.

1.1.2.1.4. Application : Ācārya Hemacandra now propounds the definition of application:

"Application is the act of bringing the probans into connection with the subject."¹³

The probans is the attribute which was found in the example (subject of the illustration-as concomitant with the probandum) and the predication of the same (probans) in respect of the subject is called application (*upanaya*), an act by which the probans into connection (*kosamhāriyate*) with the subject. The proposition "it is possessed of action" is a typical example of the same.

1.1.2.1.5 Conclusion : He now defines the conclusion.

"Conclusion is (the predication) of the probandum."¹⁴

The predication of probandum as an attribute of the subject is called conclusion which consists in a proposition that unfolds the logical intention of the foregoing members (premises). The proposition "Therefore it is possessed of energy" is an illustration of it.

These five members are rather parts of one (self-contained) proposition, each member contributing a quota of meaning which stands in necessary relation with what is conveyed by others.

2.0 The Fallacies of Reason of Probans

The topics which have been defined in this lesson should be understood and used in terms of their respective definitions. In the default of any constituent of these definitions, they are customarily regarded as sham simulations. Thus, for example, on account of the lack of the characteristics of valid cognition in general doubt, error, and indecision are called sham simulations of valid cognition, in the absence of the characteristic of doubt and the like, the cognition in question are called sham simulations of doubt, etc.: in the absence of the characteristic of perceptual cognition, it is called a sham simulation of perceptual cognition; likewise, in the defection of the relevant characteristics, memory and the like included under the head of the indirect, cognitions are designated as sham simulations. Similarly, when a probans lacks in its essential characteristic, it can be easily detected as sham dissembler of the same, i.e., as a fallacy. In view of the consideration that the determinate number and the characteristics of individual fallacies in particular do not lend themselves to easy apprehension, the author gives a list of the fallacies with a view to the formulation of their definitions.

“The fallacies of reasons are three, viz, non-existent, contradictory and inconclusive.”¹⁵

The reasons which are not probantia proper, but which do have the deceptive appearance of real probantia are called fallacious reasons, such as non-existent and the rest. Though the defects actually belong to probantia and not to reasons because they do not occur if the probantia are valid, yet these defects are transferred by extension of meaning to the reasons which are but statements of probantia and they have been designated by previous writers as defects of reasons. We have not thought fit to make a break with the tradition and have also designated them as defects of reason (as attribute to the custom).

The number ‘three’ is expressly stated for rebutting any other possible number. It is for this reason that the so-called fallacies, viz., contradictory and countervailed reasons are excluded from the category of fallacy of reason. Of these two, the contradicted reason is easily subsumed under defects of thesis (a fact which is apparent from the definition and illustration given as follows): The reason employed after the assertion of a predicate which is contradicted by perception or verbal evidence is called contradicted (literally mistimed on account of the absence of the predicate at the time of the assertion of the reason). This is the definition, and it is illustrated by the following argument: The mass of fire is unwarm, since it is a product, just like a jar (which is unwarm). As regards countervailed reasons, it is not possible at all. There is not the remotest possibility of another inference, so long as the inference is defined before stands as employed or unrefuted. An illustration is given of it as follows: Suppose one asserts “Sound is impermanent, being either a subject or a homologue” and immediately the second man retorts “Sound is eternal being either a subject or a homologue.” But this is the height of impropriety. Who can make such incoherent assertions in a council consisting of four parties (the president, the umpire, the proponent and the opponent-unless he has taken leave of his senses?

2.1 Non-existent

Now the definition of the fallacy called ‘non-existent probans’ is stated below:

“The non-existent probans arises from lack of proof, or doubt of its existence, according as the reason assigned is found to be non-existent and lacking in necessary concomitance, or lacking in definite proof of its existence as well as necessary concomitance..”¹⁶

The fallacy called ‘non-existent probans’ arise when there is no proof of its existence, that is to say, when the reason is found to be non-existent and to lack in necessary concomitance; in other words, when the reason is found to be non-existent eo ipso. “Word is perishable, since it is visible” is a typical instance. It must not be supposed that it is called non-existent, since it is not a necessary attribute of the subject and so the author adds the phrase ‘found to lack in necessary concomitance’ (to rebut the prevailing misconception). The reason is ‘non-existent’ not because it is not the attribute of the subject, but because it lacks in necessary concomitance which is the sole and sufficient characteristic of valid probans. It is not the necessary characteristic of a probans that it must belong to the subject as its attribute. That an attribute can function as a valid probans, even in spite of the lack of its existence in the subject provided it is armed with necessary concomitance has been sufficiently indicated. As has been observed by Bhaṭṭa Kumārila also: “It is a matter of common knowledge that the son is inferred to be a *Brāhmaṇa* on the ground of the *Brāhmaṇahood* of his parents and for this the subsistence of the probans in the subject is not required.”

Likewise, a reason

‘which is lacking in definite proof of its existence’, that is to say, whose existence is subject to doubt and also is ‘lacking in necessary concomitance’ is also a case of the fallacy called ‘non-existent probans’ even when its existence is subject to doubt. It is also called ‘doubt-cum-non-existent’. Thus ‘for instance, this fallacy occurs when a rising column of smoke doubted to be stream of vapour it adduced to establish fire, or when the ubiquity of the soul which, though by itself is a proved fact, is sought to be proved on the ground of ‘its having a quality perceived everywhere’, the fallacy being due to the fact that there is no proof in support of the truth of the reasons advanced.

2.2 Contradictory

The author next enunciates the fallacy called contradictory.

“The contradictory is a reason which is necessarily of the opposite concomitance and is thus possible in the absence (of the probandum) as a matter of necessity.”¹⁷

‘Opposite’ means contrary to what has been stated to be the nature of necessary concomitance. ‘Concomitance’ means necessary relation. The reason which has this opposite concomitance is called contradictory. The phrase ‘possible in the absence’ is only an explication of this characteristic instance, “Sound is eternal because it is a product” is an illustration of the contradictory since the reason ‘being a product’ is concomitant with the opposite of the probandum, viz., eternal. A product is necessarily perishable and so can never be eternal. Another instance of the fallacy is found in the argument of *Sāṅkhya*, viz., “The organ of vision, and the like exist for the purpose of an other since they are composite bodies, like bed, articles of food and such other subservient things.” Now in this argument ‘subservience to a non-composite entity’ is what is sought to be proved. But (the reason advanced, viz.) the composite constitution of the visual organ, etc., transpires to be contradictory (of the intended probandum since it proves the opposite of it, viz., that it is subservient to another composite thing, viz., the embodied person). “Earth and the like have an intelligent agent as their cause since they are products” is an argument of the *Naiyāyika* which is another instance of the contradictory reason because ‘being a product’ proves the very opposite of the intended probandum, viz., the fact of being created by a disembodied omniscient agent in view of the fact all intelligent agents are found to be embodied persons and we have not experience of a single instance of a pure disembodied spirit functioning as the creator of any thing.

The other varieties of the contradictory which have been set forth and illustrated by other logicians are also comprehended by this definition within its scope. Thus there are four varieties when a homologue is available (1) When the reason is includent of the subject and the heterologue, i.e., “Word is eternal, since it is a product.” The reason ‘being a product’ occurs in the subject ‘word’ and perishable entities such as a jar-constituting the entire sphere of the heterologue. (2) One which covers the whole of the subject and a part of the heterologue, e.g., “Sound is eternal being possessed of a universal and being cognisable by an external sense-organ possessed by us” as the reason occurs in the subject ‘sound’ and also in such perishable entities as the jar, though not in subtle composite substances like diads which are not cognisable by an external sense organ. (3) One which exists in a part of the subject but in the whole of the heterologue, e.g., “Earth is eternal since it is a product.” Here the reason ‘being a product’ exists in all composite bodies of earth but not in the atoms of earth and thus is found to exist only in a part of the denotation of the subject. It embraces, on the other hand, the whole extension of the heterologue and is thus contradictory. (4) One which exists only in a part of the subject and of the heterologue, e.g., “Sound is eternal being a consequence of effort.” The reason here applies to such sounds as produced by animal agency but not to natural phenomena like the noise of a river current or thunder and so the reason is partially true of the subject. It is, again, partially true of the heterologue, since not all produced phenomena are consequences of volitional effort, viz., a lightning-flash which though perishable is a purely natural occurrence. There are four varieties of the contradictory in the absence of the homologue. (1) A reason which occurs in the whole of the subject and the heterologue, e.g., “Sound is a specific quality of space, since it is knowable. An attribute which, according to *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* view, belongs to the subject in its entire denotation and to the whole extent of the heterologue which in the present case is everything other than the specific quality of space. (2) Which belongs to the whole of the subject, but to the part of the heterologue, e.g., “Sound is a specific quality of space being cognisable by an external sense-organ.” Since ‘sound’ as a class is certainly audible and hence the reason belongs to the whole of the subject without exception, but as regards the heterologues represented by everything other than sound which is exclusively specific quality of space they are not all cognisable by an external organ such, for instance, as the magnitude of space. (3) A reason which exists only in a part of the subject and the whole of the heterologue,

e.g., "Sound is a specific quality of space, since it is not an inflected word", that is, a sound which has a meaning. The reason holds good only of a part of the subject, viz., unmeaning sounds only but belongs to the whole of the heterologue which is not sound (4) A reason which exists only in a part of the subject and of the heterologue, e.g., "Sound is a specific quality of space, being a consequence of effort." Since all sounds are not consequence of effort, the reason is partially true of the subject, and since also whatever is not specific quality of space, that is to say, the whole class of the heterologue, is not the consequence of effort, the reason exists only in a part of the latter. In four cases (out of these eight) the contradictory is the exclusive fallacy. But in the other four cases where the reason belongs to a part of the subject there is a combination of both the fallacies, viz., the non-existent and the contradictory.

2.3 Inconclusive

The author now states the definition of the 'inconclusive.'

"The inconclusive reason is one which is possible even in the absence of the probandum and occurs when the necessary concomitance is either non-existent or subject to doubt."¹⁸

"Necessary concomitance" means absence of existence of the *probans* without the probandum and when it is non-existent, the reason is 'inconclusive.' For instance, in the proposition "Sound is perishable, since it is knowable", the reason 'to be knowable' is inconclusive since it exists even in such eternal entities as space. The same fallacy, again, occurs when necessary concomitance is subject to doubt. The proposition "X is non-omniscient, or possessed of attachment and the like, since he is a speaker" may be cited as an example of the above. The concomitance in agreement (between speakerhood and non-omniscience, etc.) is subject to doubt inasmuch as the incompatibility of 'being a speaker' with 'omniscience' or 'absence of attachment' which are by their nature placed beyond the range of perceptual cognition cannot be established by intuition or by inference since speech is not the effect of attachment and the like. The other varieties of the 'inconclusive reason' which have been cited by some logicians are necessarily included under the 'inconclusive' as defined before. Thus, for instance, (1) the reason which covers the three terms viz., the subject, the homologue and the heterologue, e.g., "Sound is perishable since it is knowable." Here the quality of 'being knowable' which is the reason adduced belongs to the subject 'sound', the homologue 'jar', and the heterologue 'space', 'time', etc.). (2) Which covers the subject and the homologue and belongs to a part of the heterologue, e.g., "It is a cow, since it is possessed of horns." The reason 'possession of horns' is a quality of the subject, of the homologue other cows, and of a part of the heterologue 'a buffalo', though not of the 'horse' which is another part of the same. (3) Which covers the subject and the heterologue and belongs to part of the homologue, e.g., "The goat is not a cow, since it is possessed of horns." Here 'possession of horns' is a quality of the subject the goat as a class, and of the heterologue, not-not-cow, i.e. the cow as a class, and it belongs only to a part of the homologue, viz., not-cow, i.e. horse, buffalo and the like are possessed of horns and the like are not. (4) That which exists in the whole of the subject and in a part only of the homologue and the heterologue, e.g., "Sound is perishable since it is perceivable" here the quality of 'being perceivable' exists in the whole of the subject-sound as a class, but belongs only to a part of the homologue, viz., the jar, though not to diads which are also included in the homologue 'being perishable'. It is also found in a part of the heterologue- eternal entities such as universal which is perceived in a perceivable substratum, and not to space, etc., which are also included in the heterologue 'being eternal'. (5) That which belongs to only a part of the subject and to the whole of the homologue and the heterologue, e.g., "space, time, direction, self and mind are not substances, since they are destitute of specific qualities which are momentary." Here the reason belongs only to a part of the subject, that is, to all the terms barring the self and space which are possessed of momentary specific qualities, viz., pleasure, pain, etc., and sound respectively. It covers the whole of the homologue, viz., non-substances, that is, all the categories other than substance, which do not possess any quality-specific or generic. The reason also belongs to all cases of the heterologue, viz., the four substances-earth, water, air and fire which are possessed of specific qualities but not momentary specific qualities/ (5) That which exists in a part of the subject and the heterologue, but in the

whole of the homologue, e.g., "Direction, time and mind are not substances since they are destitute of limited dimensions." Here the quality, viz., 'being destitute of limited dimension' belongs only to a part of the subject, viz., direction and time and not mind which is possessed to atomic dimension according to the *Naiyāyika*. It again belongs only to a part of the heterologue, viz., earth, water, etc., though not to self. The reason covers the whole of the homologue, that is, non-substances, such as quality, action, etc. (7) That which exists in the whole of the heterologue, but only in a part of the subject and the homologue, e.g., "Direction, time and mind are substances, since they are destitute of limited dimension." Here the reason belongs to direction and time but not mind-the subject. It again belongs only to a part of homologue viz., self and space, though not to earth and the rest. The reason covers the whole of the heterologue, viz., non-substances such as quality and the like. (8) That which exists only in a part of all the terms, e.g., "Earth is perishable, being an object of perception." Here the reason belongs to earth which is not atomic, only to a part of the homologue-water and the like other than atomic, and to a part of the heterologue, such as universal, though not to space, direction and the like.

3.0 Universal Concomitance

Now Hemcaṇḍra is propounding the definition of universal concomitance or relationship: **"Universal concomitance consists in the universal necessity of synchronous and successive occurrence of simultaneous and successive events."**¹⁹

Synchronous events are those which are the co-products of the same set of casual conditions such as colour and taste of a fruit, or which stand in the relation of a determinate concomitant included such as genus and species, e.g., tree (genus) and *śimsapa* (species). Successive events are those which occur in succession, as for instance, the appearance of *kṛttika* (pleiades) and *sakata* or, which are related as effect and cause, e.g., smoke and fire. The universal necessity of synchronous and successive occurrence respectively of those two sets of facts, that is to say, the necessity of synchronism of synchronous events and the necessity of succession of successive events, is what is meant by universal concomitance. It is gathered from the context that the terms of the relation function as probans and probandum.

Now it has been observed that universal concomitance of the aforesaid type is the condition of the knowledge of the probandum, when understood as such. But what is this organ by which such understanding is achieved? Certainly it is not by perceptual cognition, since being sensuous its operation is confined to an object standing in close proximity to the senses. Nor can the mind be the organ which, though it is capable of cognising all possible objects, is subject to the limitation that it can operate only in the sphere of the objects which have been apprehended by the senses. Otherwise if there was no such limitation, there would be no case of a person subject to blindness or deafness. As regards the capacity of mind for the apprehension of all possible objects, it should be understood as having reference to the objects which are cognisable by all the sense taken together, and not in its independent capacity. If mystic intuition were to be posited as the organ for the comprehension of universal concomitance, what would be the necessity of inference, perfectly unavailing, as the knowledge of the *probandum* to be inferred would be easily secured by the former? Were knowledge of universal concomitance supposed to be secured by inference, it has been shown that it would give rise to the consequences of regressus *ad infinitum* or a logical see-was. Nor is again an additional organ available, which can be credited with the capacity for the apprehension of such a relation as its object. With this consideration in view, Hemcaṇḍra observes: **The knowledge of the same is (achieved) by means of inductive Reasoning."**²⁰

Inductive Reasoning is reductio ad absurdum, d) which has already been defined."²¹ The knowledge of the same i.e., universal concomitance is secured by its aid.

The probans has been defined and examined. Now the author propounds its classification:

4.0 The Probans

"The probans is of the five types, viz, essential identity, cause, effect, co-inherent in the same substratum, and opposite."²²

4.1 Essential Identity

The first four probans beginning with essential identity are the probans for a positive probandum. The last, viz., the opposite, is the probans for a negative one. Thus we have five types of probans. Of these, essential identity is illustrated by the attribute of 'being a product' or 'audible' with regard to the inference of impermanence in a word e.g.,⁶ - word is impermanent, because it is a product or because it is audible.

Here a difficulty arises: audibility is an uncommon attribute. How can universal concomitance between it and impermanence be established? The answer is that it is established by the evidence of the organ of *reductio ad absurdum* of the contradictory possibility. The case is exactly on a par with that of the attribute 'existence' which is the ground for the proof of impermanence by the Buddhist. It would not be tenable to urge that existence alone is the legitimate *probans* in the case under consideration and audibility is only a case of existence and as such cannot be looked upon as an independent *probans* in its own right. Were it so, such *probans* as 'having an origin', 'being a product', 'being a consequent to exertion', 'being variable with the variation of casual factors', which are the derivative species of existence, would cease to be legitimate grounds of inference. Moreover, what is this concept of uncommon attribute thought to consist in? If it is supposed to consist in the fact that an attribute is present exclusively in the subject (minor term), the situation is exactly the same in the case of existence put forward as the probans in order to prove that all the entities are momentary. If it is maintained that the subject may also serve as the homologue, if known to be possessed of the attribute which is the *probandum*, then what is the ground for aversion against the present case (audibility)? If, on the other hand, any term entirely other than the subject is regarded as a legitimate homologue, then the inference 'diamond is inscribable by iron, being a derivative product of the element of earth, just like a piece of wood': would as be valid as the *probans* 'being an earthy substance' would be competent to bring home the *probandum* 'being inscribable by iron' in the diamond. If the Buddhists seek to escape the fallacy under the contention that there is not the inherent incompatibility of the probans 'being an earthy substance' with the contradictory of the *probandum* 'inscribable by iron' - in other words, the possibility that an earthy substance may be un-inscribable by iron is not shown to be absurd, then it is quite proper that the latter condition alone should be regarded as the only characteristic of a *probans*. But this would make even what is not an attribute of the subject a ground of inference, (so may the opponent contend).

The Jaina's answer is: it can be it, provided necessary concomitance is at its back. It is common experience that the emergence of the star *Kṛtikā* (Pleiades) serves as the ground of inference of the speaker being omniscient. The blackness of the crow, on the contrary, is not a valid ground, as it is inconclusive for the proof of the whiteness of the place, since the blackness of the crow is not logically impossible without the whiteness of the place. Likewise, the attribute of the jar 'being visible' is intelligible even without reference to the impermanence of the word; hence the former is not the probans of the latter. It follows, therefore, that such attributes as 'audibility', though uncommon, are not contingent to impermanence but, on the contrary, necessarily concomitant with it.

Moreover, if the impermanence of a word is to be established on the grounds of its being a product, will it not establish impermanence of substance as it does in the case of modes?

Certainly it is not so because it is impermanence of the modes alone that is sought to be proved. The noticeable thing here is that the *probandum* is what is intended to be established though not expressly stated? A problem is again raised: If the quality of 'being a product' and 'impermanence' are essentially identical, the probandum is as much a proved fact as the probans, or the probans will be accounted unproved like the *probandum*. The answer is - This has truth in it. But the syllogistic argument is employed in order to remove a delusion; as it has been observed: **"For a person who does not realise through elusion that a thing which has a definite beginning must have a definite end, the self-same entity used as probans and probandum is not liable to objection."**²³

4.2 Cause:

The cause as *probans* is illustrated in the following situations. For example, fire serves as the *probans* of smoke when the latter becomes the subject-matter of doubt as to whether it is a volume of vapour or an assemblage of mosquitoes; or the upsurge of a special variety of cloud as the *probans* of impending rain-fall. It is a truism that all persons who are interested in the effect set to work after the observation of a special kind of cause. The special kind that is to be known is what is an invariable concomitant of the effect in question.

Here it can be asked: is not the activity due to the knowledge of causality alone?

The answer would be: Yes, it may be granted that the knowledge of the cause as the special kind of *probans* is derived from perceptual cognition, but with regard to the effect which is yet to come into being, we cannot imagine anything as the source of its knowledge save and except inference. If all causes are condemned to be destituted of the character of valid *probans* on the grounds of the fallibility of some individual cases, the same contingency will be inevitable in the case of such recognised *probans* as the effect also. It may be urged that the contingency does not arise inasmuch as such pseudo-effects as vapour and the like are not effects proper. But then in the present case also, there is no room for objection, since the formula of causality is: If A is not the outcome of B, B is not the cause of A. The causal relation is to be understood in a specific reference. Thus, as a particular effect is affiliated to a particular cause, so exactly a particular cause, is to be affiliated to a particular effect. Just as the relation of 'being an effect' is not understood with reference to what is not its cause, so also the relation of 'being a cause' is not to be understood with reference to what is not its effect. Thus there is no material difference between the two situations. Furthermore, the Buddhist logician also endorses the position that the cause may function as a *probans* while he advocates the inference of colour from the presence of taste mediated by the inference of the self-same set of causal conditions of which the two are the common effects. As has been observed by Dharmakīrti, the Buddhist logician: **"The knowledge of colour, which is the co-product with taste of the self-same set of causal conditions from the presence of taste, is made possible through the inference of causal efficiency of the cause of taste with regard to colour. The case is on a par with smoke serving as the *probans* of transformation of fuel."**²⁴

The Jainās too, affirm the character of logical ground *probans* not of any and every cause, but only of that which has not suffered from obstruction of its *causal* energy by means of spells and the like, or from inadequacy owing to the diminution of any causal condition. But how can this be ascertained? In fact, there is a clear difference between what is deficient and what is other than adequate. And the knowledge of this is found to arise even among common folk with no education. As has been said, **"Such types of clouds do not fail to be attended with shower of rain which make the caves and ravines of mountains reverberate with their thundering roars, with their upraised bodies rendered yellow by the flashes of lighting entwining like creepers, as black as black-bees, horn of buffalos, black snakes and tamala trees."**²⁵

4.3 Effect

The effect as *probans* is illustrated by such instances as the appearance of a particular type of flood serving as the *probans* of rainfall, smoke serving as the *probans* of fire, vital function of consciousness. But how can this special nature of the flood be known? The *Naiyāyikās* have given the answer to this in the following words:

"It is not a fact that the special nature of the flood is not capable of being known with its enormous volume of muddy water exhibiting eddies and whirlpools, marked with conspicuous lines of foam, swirling with mighty waves, littered with the floating masses of moss, fruits, and patches of green grass."²⁶ As regards smoke and vital functions also, it is not difficult to ascertain that they are effects. As has been observed: **"Smoke is the effect of fire, as the characteristics of effect are observed to be present in it. If it were to come into existence even when it (the cause) were absent, it would forfeit the character of being conditioned by a cause."**²⁷

If the effect were to come into existence even in the absence of a cause the former would either be destitute of a cause or have or have a cause other than the recognised one. If the effect were destitute of a cause it must have either existence or non-existence for all time neither of which is warranted by experience. If it were supposed to be conditioned by some other cause, then being the consequence of a condition other than the observed *datum*, it could not be regarded as the product of the same. On the other hand, being perceived to follow upon the observed *datum* even in absence of any other antecedent condition, the effect in question cannot be regarded as the effect of another cause. And thus the effect would be destitute of every possible cause both the observed and the unobserved data being ruled out of court. As has been said in this connection: "What has been apprehended to emerge into existence from some other cause cannot have the properties of smoke just because of the difference of causes. It has been asserted that fire is the cause of smoke." Moreover, **"If the head of *śakra* (king of gods) were of the nature of fire, it would be nothing but natural fire capable of producing smoke. If, on the other hand, it were of a nature different from that of fire, how can smoke be possibly there?"**²⁸

Likewise, vital function qua effect serves as the ground of the inference of consciousness without which it is impossible, even as audibility is the ground of inference of impermanence. As regards its universal concomitance with the *probandum*, it has already been asserted that the former is established by the *reductio ad absurdum* of the contradictory possibility as in the case with existence as the probans of momentariness. Thus vital function, though it is the uncommon peculiar attribute serves as a legitimate ground of inference, since it does not lack necessary concomitance with consciousness.

Furthermore, concomitance in agreement is not a characteristic of a *probans*, since its default does not entail a fallacy. A probans which exists exclusively in the heterologue, is dubbed as the fallacy of the type called 'contradictory'. Also what exists, in the heterologue (as well as in the homologue) is known as inconclusive. As regards the attribute 'speakerhood' advanced to prove omniscience, it is regarded as fallacious and the reason of its being a fallacy is due to its absence of concomitance in difference and no doubt of its concomitance in agreement. By this observation the Buddhist logician also has affirmed the two types of fallacy to be exclusively due to the absence of concomitance in difference. As regards the uncommon attribute, again, it cannot be deemed inconclusive, if it can be ascertained to cease to exist in the absence of the *probandum*, and thus in default of an alternative possibility, it perforce establishes the probandum. Moreover, if concomitance in agreement were a characteristic of a valid *probans* which exists only in a part of the homologue should also be regarded as devoid of probative force on the grounds of its partial lack of concomitance in agreement, exactly on the analogy of an attribute which exists only in a part of the heterologue and is thus deemed incompetent on account of its partial lack of concomitance in difference. As it has been aptly observed: If concomitance in agreement were deemed a characteristic of a probans, just as the concomitance in difference is, then it could not have both existence and non-existence in the homologue, just as it cannot have both existence and non-existence in the heterologue. The Buddhists may urge that concomitance in agreement means the existence of the probans exclusively in the homologue and not universal and necessary existence in the same. Granted, but this is indeed tantamount to concomitance in difference. And thus you would endorse the position which is maintained by us. It is we who have been at pains to establish that a valid *probans* has incompatibility with the contradictory as its sole and solitary characteristic.

4.4. Co-inherent in the same Substratum

As for the co-inherent in the same substratum probans is concerned, it is illustrated by the situation in which an attribute inheres, that is to say, subsists along with the *probandum* in one and the same substratum whether perceived or unperceived. Such co-inherence in the same substratum is found between colour and taste belonging to one and the same fruit and the like, between the emergence of *sakata* and that of *kṛttika*, between moon-rise and the sea-tide, between impending rainfall and commotion of ants carrying their larvae, and between combustion of the betel creeper and the withering of its leaves. Of these, taste is the co-inherent of

colour or colour is of taste. The relation in question cannot be that of cause of effect subsisting as it does between two synchronous phenomena.

It may be urged that all these cases are instances of causality and therefore the object of inference is invariably a cause productive of two synchronous effects. But this is not true because in that case the effect will not be inferred. It may be contended that even when the cause is inferred, the effect is also invariably inferred by implication since the absence of the effect entails the absence of the cause. But this contention would be tantamount to the endorsement of the proposition that the cause is the ground of inference of the effect, a consequence repudiated by the Buddhist logician. As for the appearance of *sakata* and that of *kṛtika* and such like phenomena, the relative position of the terms as *probans* and *probandum* is to be comprehended in conformity with the nature of invariable concomitance. As it has been observed: "As regards co-inference in the same substratum, the ground of inference is to be understood in accordance with the relative position of the terms. Thus the rise case of other *probans* also. But here someone can ask: why should the *Jainās* not regard the incidence of the attributes of 'being a product' and 'being impermanent' as case of co-inference in the same substratum? The answer is: this is not possible as the two attributes are one and the same. As it has been said: "The same period of existence relative to a beginning and to an end respectively is viewed as the attribute of 'being a product' and as 'impermanent'. It is the self-same period of existence that serves as the *probans* and the *probandum*, and so it is not a case of two attributes subsisting in a common substratum."

4.5 The opposite Probans

The four probans beginning with essential identity are instruments for proving positive conclusions; the opposite, however, is the instrument for establishing a negative conclusion; the opposite, however, is the instrument for establishing a negative conclusion. The latter establishes the negation of the other by its presence; were it otherwise, the relation of opposition between them would not be established.

The implication of the word 'and' in the aphorism, is: since essential identity, cause, effect and determinant concomitant as the grounds of inference lead to the establishment of their respective *probandum* by virtue of their incompatibility with their opposites, it follows that they cannot possibly come into being in the absence of the *probandum* concerned, and so the non-cognition of these grounds of inference is also valid ground for the establishment of relevant non-existence. Of them, the non-cognition of essential identity is illustrated by the case. "The jar is not here, since it is not perceived though competent to perception." The non-cognition of the cause, is illustrated by the case "There is no smoke here, there is no fire." The case of the non-cognition of the effect is: "The causes of smoke with their powers unfrustrated are not present here, since there is absence of smoke." The case of the non-cognition of the determinant concomitant is: "The existence of the *śisapa* tree (a particular tree) is out of the question, since the existence of tree is impossible in the place."

As regards the opposite, it is what is opposed to the *negatum* or to the effect, cause or determinant concomitant thereof, or to the defect of its opposite. The respective examples of the above are as follows: There is no touch of cold herein, as fire is present; the causal conditions of cold with their powers unfrustrated cannot be present here, as fire is present in this place; there can be no case of 'goose-flesh' due to cold, as there is fire in the place; there is no possibility of the feel of snow here, as there is fire in the place. If smoke is substituted for fire in the instances cited above it will give rise to cases of inference on the basis of the effect of the opposite. Thus the syllogistic forms of inference on the basis of the opposite as probans are of various types.

Notes:

1. (Aph.) *Sādhanaṭ sādhyā vijñānaṃ anumānaṃ. Pramāṇa-Mīmāṃsā: 1/2/7*
2. (Aph.) *Tatdvidhā svārthaṃ parārthaṃ Ca. Ibid; 1/2/8*
3. (Aph.) *Svārthaṃ svaniścitasādhyāvinābhāvaikalakṣaṇāt sādhanāt sādhyavijñānaṃ. Ibid: 1/2/9*

4. (Aph.) *Hetubindu*; ch.iv
5. (Aph.) *Yathoktasādhanaḥbhindhānaḥ Parārtham* P.M.; 2/1/1
6. (Aph.) *Vacanamupacārāt*. Ibid, 2/1/1
7. (Aph.) *bodhyānurodhāt pratijñā hetūdāharaṇopanayanigamanāni pañcāpi*. Ibid; 2/1/10
8. NS, I.I.32
9. DV, Nir.50
10. (Aph.) *Sādhyanirdeśaḥ Pratijñā*. P.M. 2/1/11
11. (Aph.) *Sādhanatvābhivyañjakavibhaktyaṃtam Sādhanavacanam hetuḥ*.
12. (Aph.) *dr̥ṣṭāntavacanamudāharaṇam*. ibid; 2/1/13
13. (Aph.) *dharmiṇi Sādhanasyopasaṃhāra upanayaḥ*-ibid 2/1/14
14. (Aph.) *sādhyaḥ nigamanam* Ibid 2/1/15
15. (Aph.) *Asiddhaviruddhānaikāntikāṣṭrayo hetvābhāsāḥ*. Ibid 2/1/16
16. (Aph.) *Nāsaṃnaniścitasattvo vā'nyathānupapanna iti sattvasyāsiddhau sandeḥ vā'siddhaḥ*. Ibid;2/1/17
17. (Aph.) *Viparītanīyamo'nyathaivopapadyamāno viruddhaḥ*. Ibid 2/1/20
18. (Aph.) *Niyamasyāsiddhau sandeḥ vā'nyathāpyupapadyamāno'naikāntikaḥ*. Ibid; 2/1/21
19. (Aph.) *Sahakramabhāvinoḥ saḥakramabhāvanīyamo'vinābhāvaḥ*. P.M. 1/1/10
20. (Aph.) *Uḥāt tanniścayaḥ*. Ibid 1/2/11
21. Ibid 1/2.5
22. (Aph.) *Svabhāvaḥ Kāraṇam Kāryamekārtasamavāyi virodhi ceti pañcadhā sādhanam*-Ibid 1.2.12
23. P.M.P. 107
24. *Pramāṇavārttika* (PV) I, 11
25. *Nyāyamañjarī*, P. 129
26. Ibid; P. 130
27. PV.; 1.35
28. Ibid; 1.37

Glossary:

- a) Probantia: which is not really a probans but looks like that.
- b) *sakata*- the lunar asterism figured by a cart.
- c) *regressus ad infinitum*- endless regress,
- d) *reductio ad absurdum*- reduction to the absurd.
- e) *negatum*-the probandum which is being denied through the opposite *probans*.

QUESTION

LONG QUESTION:

1. Describe in detail the concept of inference in the Jaina view?

SHORT QUESTIONS:

1. Write in short on the doctrine of universal concomitance.

or

Give a short explanation of the members of the syllogistic inference.

2. Explain the different types of probans with example.

or

Throw light on the fallacies of Reason.

ANSWER IN ONE SENTENCE:

1. How many kinds of inference are there?
2. What are the necessary conditions of the subjective inference?
3. What is meant by syllogistic inference?
4. Why do the Buddhist monks assert the triple characteristic of a *probans*?
5. How does a Jaina define a probans?
6. Define universal concomitance in your own words.
7. By which means the knowledge of the universal concomitance can be achieved?
8. What is meant by the probans 'cause'?
9. Give one example of the probans 'effect'.
10. Of the five *probans* which one implies negation?

Reference Book:

Pramāṇa-Mīmāṃsā (a critique of organ of knowledge)-by Ācārya Hemcaṇdra

Translated by Prof. Satkaṃī Mukhaṇī and Dr. Nathmal Tāṭiā.

Editor:

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CONTENTS

LESSON-1	
ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE SCHOLARLY COMMENTARY ON JAINA LEARNING	01
LESSON-2	
<i>JÑĀNA</i> (KNOWLEDGE) AND <i>JÑEYA</i> (OBJECT OF KNOWLEDGE)	09
LESSON-3	
NATURE OF <i>DARŚANA</i> (PERFECT) & ITS TYPES	15
LESSON-4	
JAINA THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE	24
LESSON 5	
<i>ŚRUTA-JÑĀNA</i> (ARTICULATE KNOWLEDGE)	40
LESSON 6	
SENSE ORGANS & MIND	54
LESSON 7	
THE JAINA THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE AND EPISTEMOLOGY <i>AVADHIJÑĀNA</i> (CLAIRVOYANCE)	64
LESSON 8	
THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE AND EPISTEMOLOGY <i>MANAḥ-PARYAYAJÑĀNA</i> (MIND READING)	73
LESSON - 9	
<i>KAVALA-JÑĀNA</i> (OMNISCIENCE)	83
LESSON 10	
THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF JAINA LOGIC	91
LESSON 11	
CONTRIBUTION OF JAINISM TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDIAN LOGIC	106
LESSON 12	
CHARACTERISTIC OF <i>PRAMĀNA</i>	113
LESSON 13 - A	
<i>PRATYAKṢA PRAMĀṆA</i>	120
LESSON 13 - B	
THE THEORY OF PERCEPTION - II	130
LESSON 14	
<i>INDIRECT PRAMĀṆA</i>	142
LESSON 15	
THE OBJECT, THE RESULTANT AND THE SUBJECT	150
LESSON 16	
INFERENCE, THE UNIVERSAL CONCOMITANCE AND THE PROBANS (REASONS)	160

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